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Abstract
An Investigation o f  how the Catholic Tradition o f  Educational Thought might be given 
N ew  Articulation in the light o f Selected Aspects o f  the W ork o f  Three Contemporary 
Philosophers.
Michael J. Foley
This thesis exam ines the work o f  three philosophers -  Jacques M aritain, Bernard 
Lonergan and Terence H. M cLaughlin -  with a view to recovering from their 
educational w ritings important insights and approaches pertinent to the task o f  giving 
new  articulation to Catholic philosophy o f  education today.
Having noted the virtual disappearance o f  the Thom ist-Aristotelian tradition in Catholic 
educational discourse over the past half-century, the thesis seeks to identify in these 
authors elements that suggest new perspectives on the Catholic educational tradition in 
a postm odern age.
The thesis selects aspects o f the work o f  these thinkers that m erit critical appraisal in 
any attempt to give a systematic and detailed expression to the Catholic tradition o f 
educational thought today, namely: (1) M aritain’s integral Christian humanism, (2) 
Lonergan’s transcendental method, and (3) M cLauglin’s notion and practice o f  
pedagogic phronesis.
This study concludes with a reflection on how selected aspects o f  the work o f  these 
scholars m ight complement and strengthen the Congregation for Catholic Education’s 
discourse in term s o f  the provision of a philosophic basis and fram ework o f  analysis.
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H ow might contemporary Catholic philosophers o f  education, by providing a 
philosophical basis and a sense o f coherence for the literature o f  the Holy See’s 
Congregation for Catholic Education, contribute to the re-articulation o f  a Catholic 
philosophy o f  education for the Twenty-first Century?
I begin this dissertation by addressing its research question and elucidating the specific 
aims o f the thesis. A brief comment upon the term s o f the research question seems 
appropriate as well as a few tentative statements that would indicate the kind o f 
fram ework in w hich its several elements could be brought together. Such a reflection 
will serve to situate the main objectives for this dissertation and for the introductory 
chapter as set out below.
W hen the demise o f  the ancient tradition o f  Catholic educational thought was 
considered imminent, if  not, indeed, an already accomplished fact, the Holy See’s 
Congregation for Catholic Education (hereafter, CCE) began the publication o f  a series 
o f  docum ents centred on the nature, aims, and process o f  Catholic schooling. Two 
distinct, but in some ways complementary approaches, therefore, are now  endeavouring 
to give new articulation to traditional Catholic educational thought. On the one hand, 
there are the reflections o f a number o f contemporary philosophers o f  education who 
have either com mented directly upon particular aspects o f  Catholic education, or whose 
work in other areas o f  their professional life can be seen clearly to have the potential to 
be fruitfully applied to key questions within the context o f  Catholic educational theory 
and practice. Then, on the other hand, there has becom e available today the well- 
articulated body o f  educational thought originating from the CCE that, although strictly 
speaking is theological in nature and pastoral in its presum ptions and positions, is 
nevertheless, potentially at least, capable o f  being melded with m ore patently 
philosophical insights and enabling one to build there-from  a viable theory o f  Catholic 
education in a way reminiscent o f that characteristic approach o f  the Catholic 
intellectual tradition o f relating reason and faith.
John L. Elias writes o f recent development in Catholic educational thought that, ‘with 
the eclipse o f  a distinctive Catholic philosophy o f  education’, when m any Catholic 
educators no longer appear to be writing on the subject ‘from a specific philosophical
Research Question
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position’, and recent Church documents on education have ‘made few  explicit appeals 
to the Thomistic position’, what appears to have em erged within the Catholic 
educational community may best be described as ‘a theology o f  education based on 
principles drawn from Vatican documents and Catholic theologians’.1 A question then 
arises as to whether the Catholic educational com m unity should abandon its 
philosophical reflection, if  that were possible, or at least change its priority in this 
regard, and fully engage with a theological approach to the study o f  education. But an 
equally pressing second question can readily be im agined, namely, w hether the CCE 
corpus, alone and unsupported by any explicit philosophical considerations, is capable 
o f  providing a substantial philosophic basis and fram ework o f  analysis for the study o f 
Catholic education in today’s postmodern world. The CCE literature undoubtedly 
reflects an implicit philosophical orientation, nam ely, Thom istic personalism , but the 
adequacy o f  this position for a re-articulation o f  Catholic philosophy o f education today 
may be queried with some justification.
I f  Elias is correct about the direction being taken in the study o f  Catholic educational 
theory and practice today, both o f these questions becom e centre-stage and need to be 
addressed as a matter o f some urgency. The question o f  the pertinence o f  the CCE 
corpus for the articulation o f  a Catholic philosophy o f  education for our tim es, and 
similarly the query about the availability o f  contem porary philosophic insight on the 
theory and practice o f Catholic education, are at the heart o f  this thesis. A significant 
challenge for Catholic educators is to find in this officially endorsed theological- 
pastoral statement o f Catholic educational thought, in some w ay strengthened and 
supported by contemporary philosophical insight, a relevance either directly in their 
ow n work, or in their dialogue with others beyond the Catholic sector.
The process followed throughout this dissertation is, firstly, to indicate in very sum m ary 
form  some o f the major themes that may be considered educationally central in  the CCE 
discourse, depending upon the particular herm eneutical focus chosen in reading the text, 
and to highlight certain aspects o f this discourse that m ight be considered som ew hat 
problem atic in terms o f incorporating these them es into a philosophical study o f  
education. Thus, in relation to three specific them es in the CCE discourse, namely, ‘the 
integral form ation o f  the human person’, ‘the integration, or synthesis, o f  faith, culture
1 See, John L. Elias, “Whatever Happened to Catholic Philosophy of Education?” Religious Education,
and life’, and ‘the holistic influence o f the Catholic school as educative community’, 
each o f  which is ultimately derived from a theologically based understanding o f  
education, I shall argue that a largely visionary and theological presentation o f  these 
themes results in an apparent under-theorisation o f  the discourse, and thereby 
constitutes a problem for its integration into any formulation o f a renewed philosophy o f  
education for today. It is not its theological vision per se that risks our under-valuing o f  
the CCE discourse. It is the vision-guided theory and practice o f  Catholic education 
openly espoused in these documents, rather than their theological reference, that is 
problematic in a sense to be explained presently.
Secondly, I shall endeavour to demonstrate that the scholars studied here can remedy 
this potentially defective rendering o f Catholic educational discourse, serve to re-orient 
it, and give it improved coherence and balance. The problem is not one that is 
insuperable, nor is it such that it rules out altogether vision-guided thinking and practice 
in the context o f  a re-articulated Catholic philosophy o f  education. On the contrary, the 
Catholic tradition o f educational thought, in common with Catholic thinking generally, 
has room for both theological vision and rational philosophical under-pinning. Reason  
and philosophical insight together with theological reflection play their part in Catholic 
scholarship in education. The critical point is the manner and the measure in which both 
disciplines work together to give a coherent, balanced and rich rendering o f  the nature 
and purpose o f  Catholic education.
Thirdly, the burden o f the argument o f this dissertation is that what is needed for a 
harmonious melding o f theological vision and philosophical insight in the elucidation o f  
a reformulated Catholic philosophy o f education is the construction and deployment o f  
an interrogative framework, that would allow these different discourses to engage in 
mutual questioning, interpolation, and cross-examination, in pursuit o f  description, 
explanation, clarification, and understanding, o f respective positions and priorities 
regarding centrally substantive issues o f  interest to both disciplines. A necessary and 
sufficient condition for such reciprocal interpretation must be the availability o f  
philosophical insight that is able sympathetically to critique theological vision.
The problem and the challenge o f  giving new expression to Catholic philosophy o f  
education is not simply a preference for a theology o f  education, in itself a perfectly 
valid position to adopt for the elucidation o f  Catholic perspectives in education. That
there exists a theological viewpoint on education, materially and formally distinct from 
a philosophical approach, is a fact well-attested to. Thus, John M. Hull discusses the 
nature o f  the relationship between theology and educational theory and rejects the claim  
that there can be ‘no useful and coherent relations between theology and educational 
theory’.2 Similarly, Leslie J. Francis argues that a theology o f  education is ‘something 
to be taken seriously’, though theologians need to be ‘convinced that the subject matter 
o f education is worthy of theological scrutiny’, and educationalists need to be convinced 
that ‘the methods o f  theology are worthy o f  serious consideration within the educational 
arena’.3 Hull and Francis, among many other scholars, maintain that the theology o f  
education has ‘a crucial contribution’ to make in the evaluation and development o f  the 
work o f  schools and colleges, ‘o f  equal standing to the perspectives offered by the 
philosophy o f  education, psychology o f  education and sociology o f  education’.4 
Recently, too, Brian J. Kelty has examined the change o f  theological focus in recent 
Catholic educational theory and has proposed for adoption by Catholic educators ‘an 
emerging theology o f education’, that would focus on the themes o f  ‘the nature o f  the 
person, the function o f knowledge, human destiny within history, and the individual’s 
stance towards society’.5
The very real problem that arises here lies in the virtual impossibility in this particular 
context o f  Catholic education o f  distinguishing between ‘philosophical’ and 
‘theological’ perspectives relating to substantive themes like those just mentioned by 
Kelty, and similar to the key themes characteristic o f  the CCE discourse. This is not 
simply a matter o f  semantics. Tempting as it might be to designate the kind o f discourse 
used by the CCE as o f  a ‘philosophical-theological’ genre and not, therefore, in need o f  
analysis into separate disciplinary types, this is not a solution to the problem. It might be 
argued that there is no need to distinguish between these dominant perspectives, but that 
a synthesis o f  these complementary viewpoints should be attempted. But i f  synthesis is
2 John M. Hull, “Christian Theology and Educational Theory: Can there be Connections?” British 
Journal o f  Educational Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Jun., 1976), pp. 127-43.
3 Leslie J. Francis, “Theology o f  Education”, Educational S tudies, Vol. 38, N o. 4 (Nov., 1990), pp. 349- 
64.
4 Leslie J. Francis & Adrian Thatcher (ed.s), Christian Perspectives fo r  Education: A Reader in the 
Theology o f  Education, Leominster, HR: G racewing  / Fowler Wright Books, 1990; Bob Freathy & Leslie 
J. Francis (ed.s), Religious Education and Freedom o f  Religion and B e lie f  Oxford: Peter Lang, 2012; Jeff  
Astley, Leslie J. Francis, Mandy Robbins, & Mulla Selcuk (ed.s), Teaching Religion, Teaching Truth: 
Theoretical and Em pirical Perspectives , Oxford: Peter Lang, 2012.
5 Brian J. Kelty, “Towards a Theology o f  Catholic Education”, R eligious Education , Vol. 94, N o. 1 
(Winter, 1999), pp.6-23.
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to be more than mere aggregation or addition, it is difficult to envisage how it can be 
undertaken without a clear analysis and identification o f  the elements that will 
constitute it. It is the distinction between two elements that invites the question o f  how  
they come together or coalesce.
A  central focus o f  this thesis will be an examination o f  how the CCE visionary 
discourse can be made relevant to a study o f  Catholic education from the perspective o f  
a contemporary Catholic philosophy o f  education that is probably correctly described as 
being in a process o f  evolution. This is considered to be worth-while since, from the 
moment o f  publication, there were not only Catholic educators, some o f  whom, like 
Padraic O’Hare, were glad to see, with the demise o f  traditional Catholic philosophy o f  
education, the disappearance, as they interpreted it, o f ‘deeply rooted integralism’, 
‘classicism’, ‘didacticism’, and ‘moral and philosophical absolutism’, but also 
influential Catholic philosophers o f education, who saw value in this literature despite 
its heavily-laden theological and visionary nature.6 Thus, Terence H. McLaughlin could 
divine in the CCE corpus ‘a rich source o f  Catholic educational principles’, and regard 
the discourse as representing ‘some o f the central educational documents o f  the 
Church’, though he acknowledges certain ‘drawbacks’ when it comes to the 
‘interpretation and elaboration’ o f all such documents.7
Church documents o f  this kind, McLaughlin wisely notes, ‘are not fully self-sufficient’, 
but need to be ‘understood by reference to the wider belief, tradition and practice o f the
ft
Church’, and ‘in the light o f  inter alia sustained philosophical analysis’. McLaughlin 
speaks o f  the dangers o f lifting isolated phrases from these documents and basing 
discussion o f  Catholic educational principles upon them. An ‘adequate account o f  these 
principles’, he says, cannot be derived from such documents alone, though ‘the 
documents can provide a guide to central themes and elements o f  Catholic educational 
principles’.9 What is needed, though, claims McLaughlin, is for
[a] distinctively Catholic philosophy o f  education to be developed which can draw not only upon 
the philosophical resources o f  notable Catholic thinkers such as Aquinas, Newman, Maritain,
6 Padraic O ’Hare, “Catholic Ambiguity or Sectarian Certainty?”, Religious Education , Vol. 94, N o. 1 
(Winter, 1999), pp. 111-16.
7 Terence H. McLaughlin, “The Distinctiveness o f  Catholic Education”, pp. 136-154 (139). In: Terence 
McLaughlin, Joseph O ’Keefe SJ & Bernadette O ’Keeffe (ed.s), The Contem porary Catholic School: 
Context, Identity and D iversity , London: RoutledgeFalmer, 1996.
8 Ibid., p. 139.
9 Ibid., p. 140.
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Chesterton and Lonergan but which wilt also address directly matters o f  current educational 
10concern.
McLaughlin’s programme for a Catholic philosophy o f  education indicates concisely 
what might be a worthwhile undertaking in the context o f  this dissertation. I intend to 
bring into dialogue certain features or themes o f  the CCE discourse, that are integral to, 
and highly characterise the nature and aims o f  Catholic education described therein, 
with the kind o f  ‘sustained analysis’ McLaughlin envisages that can be made available 
from a study o f selected aspects o f  a number o f well-known philosophers o f  Catholic 
education.
The introductory section o f this thesis will, therefore, indicate briefly the origins, nature 
and content o f  the CCE discourse and identify the themes selected for analysis. Next, 
the reasons will be provided for the choice o f three Catholic philosophers o f  education 
in the task o f  analysing these CCE themes. A summary o f  important understandings that 
might emerge from this correlation of educational theme and philosopher’s insight is 
attempted. Finally, I will suggest how, in the course o f  the dissertation, it will be 
possible to see a progressive building-up o f  what it is hoped will amount to an 
appropriate philosophic base for the CCE discourse, one that will permit the 
development o f  a sense o f  coherence in relation to those aspects o f  the discourse 
selected for study. The structure o f  the thesis w ill become clear in the course o f  
elucidating these objectives.
I
The Documents of the Congregation for Catholic Education (CCE) on the Catholic 
School and Catholic Education (1977-2014): A Resource for the Articulation o f  a 
Catholic Philosophy o f Education.
This section begins by presenting the major documents o f  the CCE published during the 
past forty years, relating directly to the Catholic school and having obvious implications 
for the on-going debate about the nature and purposes o f  Catholic education.11 Their 
origin in the post-Vatican II era o f renewal within the Catholic Church is well recorded.
10 Ibid., p. 139.
11 Documents o f  the CCE corpus (1977-1997) referred to in this thesis are available in a collection o f  
official Catholic teaching on education edited by Leonard Franchi. See, Leonard Franchi (ed.), An 
Anthology o f  Catholic Teaching on Education , London-New York: Scepter, 2007. A ll these documents 
m ay be downloaded from the Vatican’s website(s).
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In accordance with the wishes o f the world’s Catholic bishops, after lengthy and often 
acrimonious debate about what the Council should say, and do, in relation to Catholic 
schools and their ‘role in the progress and development o f education’, the Council 
decided to limit itself to ‘the declaration o f certain fundamental principles o f  Christian 
education especially in schools’, adding that these principles w ill have to be ‘developed 
at greater length by a special post-Conciliar commission and applied by episcopal 
conferences to varying local situations’.12
No such ‘special commission’ appears to have been established and, accordingly, the 
Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, metamorphosed from the Sacred 
Congregation for Seminaries and Universities, eventually undertook the responsibility. 
The Congregation, now comprised o f a third section, the Schools Office, was intended 
to ‘develop further the fundamental principles o f  education, especially in schools’, 
called for by the bishops in Declaration on Christian Education (1965).13 Some ten 
years, however, were to elapse before the Congregation in question published its first 
reflections on Christian education, and in doing so it considerably narrowed its remit by 
‘limiting itself to a deeper reflection on the Catholic school’, albeit situating its 
discussion in the context o f  what it regarded as ‘the serious problems which are an 
integral part o f  Christian education in a pluralistic society’.14
In the years following the publication o f  The Catholic School (1977), the Congregation 
published further documents relating to various aspects o f  the Catholic school and 
offering an account o f  Catholic education very largely from the perspective o f  schooling 
as understood throughout this discourse.
A. The Catholic School / Catholic Education Corpus o f the CCE (1977-2014)
The major documents comprising this corpus are as follows:
L The Catholic School (1977).15
II. Lay Catholics in Schools: Witnesses to Faith (1982).16
III. Educational Guidance in Human Love (1983).17
12 Gravissimum Educationis, Declaration on Christian Education, Second Vatican Council, Paul VI,
1965, Introduction. Hereafter: GE  (1965).
13 See: Apostolic Constitution, Regimini ecclesiae universae, 1967.
14 Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, The Catholic School, 1977, N o.s 1 ,2 .
15 Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, The Catholic School, 1977. Hereafter: CS (1977).
16 Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, Lay C atholics in Schools: W itnesses to F aith , 1982. 
Hereafter: ¿C S (1982).
IV. The Religious Dimension o f Education in a Catholic School: Guidelines for 
Reflection and Renewal (1988).18
V. The Catholic School on the Threshold o f The Third Millennium (1997).19
V]. Consecrated Persons and their Mission in Schools: Reflections and
Guidelines (2002).20
VII. Educating Together in the Catholic School: A Shared Mission between 
Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful (2007).21
VIII. Circular Letter to the Presidents o f BishopsJ Conferences on Religious 
Education in Schools (2009).22
IX. Educating to Intercultural Dialogue in Catholic Schools: Living in Harmony 
for a Civilization of Love (2013).23
X. Educating Today and Tomorrow: A Renewing Passion (2014).24
B. M ajor Themes o f the CCE Discourse on Catholic Education.
No attempt is made at this point to analyse in detail, or to summarise the overall 
importance o f  this discourse, in terms o f  a complete understanding o f the nature and 
practice o f  Catholic education. It is clearly possible to adopt a number o f  distinctive 
hermeneutical foci in the study o f this substantial body o f discourse, such as a 
theological-pastoral viewpoint, or a Catholic social teaching perspective, in addition to 
the philosophy o f  education approach preferred in this thesis. The particular focus o f  
study will determine the selection o f themes in any summary o f  the material offered. It 
is therefore important to bear in mind that, in addition to the preferred perspective, there 
are distinct theological underpinnings, largely reflecting a Vatican II vision, that are not 
highlighted in this review. It would be generally agreed that the composite picture o f
17 Congregation for Catholic Education, Educational Guidance in Human L ove , 1983. Hereafter: EGHL  
(1983).
18 Congregation for Catholic Education, The Religious Dimension o f  Education in a Catholic School: 
Guidelines fo r  Reflection and Renewal, 1988. Hereafter: RDECS  (1988).
19 Congregation for Catholic Education, The Catholic School on the Threshold o f  The Third M illennium , 
1997. Hereafter: CSTTM  (1997).
20 Congregation for Catholic Education, Consecrated Persons and their M ission in Schools , 2002. 
Hereafter: CP MS (2002).
21 Congregation for Catholic Education, Educating Together in Catholic Schools: A S hared M ission  
between C onsecrated Persons and Lay Faithful, 2007. Hereafter: ECTS  (2007).
22 Congregation for Catholic Education, Circular Letter to the Presidents o f  B ish ops’ Conferences on 
Religious Education in Schools, 2009. Hereafter: CLRES (2009).
23 Congregation for Catholic Education, Educating to Intercultural D ialogue in C atholic Schools: L iving  
in H arm ony f o r  a Civilization o f  Love, 2013. Hereafter: EID (2013).
24 Congregation for Catholic Education, Educating Today an d  Tomorrow: A Renewing P assion , 2014. 
Hereafter: ETT (2014).
Catholic education and schooling drawn by these documents taken as a whole, 
examined from the perspective o f their common underlying foundation in the Catholic 
tradition o f  education, would be as follows.
I. A Catholic understanding o f education is based on a distinctive Christian 
anthropological vision derived from its understanding o f  the nature and 
destiny o f  the human person. This fact dictates that Catholic education’s 
central focus is on the integral formation o f the human person.
II. The specific purpose o f Catholic education, its ultimate end, is inspired by 
its Christian supernatural vision o f  human life and o f  all reality. This end or 
goal o f  education necessarily entails a spiritual, religious and moral/ethical 
dimension in education.
III. A  synthesis o f faith and life is a primary goal o f  Catholic education. This 
synthesis demands the formation o f the whole person, including intellectual, 
emotional, aesthetic, religious and moral development, the education o f  
conscience, formation in virtue and the building o f  character.
IV. This synthesis between faith and life provides a link to Catholic education’s 
aspiration to exert holistic influence throughout the Catholic school, imbuing 
the whole school community with a Catholic world-view and permeating the 
entire way o f  life and curriculum o f  the school.
V. The curriculum o f the Catholic school is founded on a synthesis o f  faith and 
culture. One o f  the most significant elements o f  the Catholic school’s 
educational project, namely, the integral formation o f the human person is to 
be achieved through a living encounter with a cultural inheritance 
illuminated by the light o f  Christian faith. The whole practice o f  the school, 
its teaching and learning, is based on and reflects the integration o f faith, life 
and culture.
VI. The Catholic school is conceived primarily, not as an institution, but as an 
educative community, in recognition that at its centre is Christian belief 
about the social nature o f human beings and the reality o f  the Church as ‘the 
home and the school o f  communion’.25 The school community is more than 
a network o f persons with common interests, goals and intentions. The 
community dimension o f the Catholic school is to be recognised as primarily
25 CSTTM (1997), No. 9; ETCS (2007), No.s 12-17.
a theological concept rather than a sociological category. The Catholic 
school community is symbolically constructed and at the heart o f  its 
communal life the sacramental nature o f  reality is celebrated.
VII. Catholic education and Catholic schools are tasked to recognise, respect, and 
enhance the diversity o f learners in the various contexts and circumstances in 
which the Church carries out its educational mission. A singular contribution 
that Catholic education must aim to make to intercultural dialogue is in its
9 6reference to the centrality o f the human person.
II
Three Contemporary Philosophers of Education as Dialogue Partners with 
the CCE Discourse
The nature and scope o f  a Catholic philosophy o f education in this dissertation will be 
sought largely in the interaction and the dialogue between the official tradition o f  
Catholic educational thought, o f  which recent CCE discourse is representative, and a 
selected range o f  scholars who, though perhaps not formally constituting a discourse 
community as such, are nevertheless interested in philosophical enquiry about education 
and find a well-spring for their thought in the Thomist intellectual tradition. O f course, 
the Catholic educational community, recognising that ‘the Spirit breathes where he 
w ills’ (Jn. 3:8), has never restricted itself to finding resources for the articulation o f  its 
thought within the bounds o f  its own fold and a more extensive investigation o f  
Catholic philosophy o f  education than is envisaged here would look to the wisdom and 
philosophical acumen o f other scholars in addition to those whose work is directly 
addressed here.
The three scholars to be studied here, namely, Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), Bernard 
J.F.Lonergan (1904-1984), and Terence H. McLaughlin (1946-2005), clearly illustrate 
each in his own unique discourse, how Christian philosophical reflection might give the
26 The outline drawn here reflects substantially the description o f  the Catholic school in terms o f  ‘Five 
Marks’ described by Archbishop J. Michael Miller, CSB, Secretary to the Congregation for Catholic 
Education (2003-2007). See, J. Michael Miller, CSB, The H oly S e e ’s Teachings on Catholic Schools, 
Atlanta: Sophia Institute Press, 2006. Several writers select more or less the same elem ents in their 
characterisation o f  the nature and essence o f  Catholic education. See, for instance, Kevin W illiams, “The 
Common School and the Catholic School: A response to the work o f  T.H. McLaughlin”, International 
Studies in Catholic Education , Vol. 2, No. 1 (March, 2010), pp. 19-36 (24).
CCE discourse a rational grounding that it sometimes seems to lack and thereby better 
equip it to communicate its insights and understandings o f  the aims and processes o f  
Catholic education in a postmodern age. The main part o f this dissertation is an 
investigation o f  how selected aspects o f the work o f these philosophers, especially their 
philosophical perspectives on the theory and practice o f education, might be identified 
as apt for this task. A priority will be to identify features o f  these three quite different 
philosophical discourses that would enable their correlation with selected constitutive 
themes o f  the CCE discourse, namely, the integral formation o f  the human person, the 
integration o f  faith and culture, and the construction o f  the Catholic school as an 
educational / educative / educating community, to take place.
A Basis for Correlation
Among the features that will need to be identified in the work o f  each philosopher in 
order to achieve the kind o f correlation, or mutual interrogation, envisaged as integral to 
the melding o f  CCE vision and philosophical insight in a re-articulation o f  Catholic 
philosophy o f  education, one might isolate, somewhat artificially perhaps, the 
following. Firstly, it will be necessary to identify and characterize the substantive 
philosophical base o f  each philosopher and the ‘impulse’ that drives his philosophical 
endeavour. Secondly, it is important to become aware o f  the dominant and distinctive 
methodological approach o f the philosopher in question and o f  his underlying rationale 
for that approach.27 Thirdly, it is necessary that consideration o f the discourse o f  each 
philosopher must be limited to matters directly connected with his recommendations, 
and/or prescriptions, for the understanding and practice o f  education.
M aritain’s ‘Perennialist’ Philosophical Discourse
Thus, in the case o f  Maritain, the subject o f  chapter two o f this dissertation, I shall 
firstly indicate how his perennialist discourse faithfully reflects the Thomist-Aristotelian 
tradition o f  educational thought and provides a sense o f  the continuity in important 
respects o f  Catholic philosophy o f education with that tradition. Secondly, attention will 
be drawn to the characteristic methodology employed by Maritain, the impulse for 
which he acquired from the self-imposed injunction that he claimed guided all his
27 I borrow the term ‘impulse’ from Nicholas C. Burbules as a kind o f  shorthand way o f  indicating what 
has drawn a philosopher into this kind o f  activity in the first place, and as a means o f  summarising what 
he sees as the ultimate purpose o f  philosophy o f  education. See,
httD://education.stateuniversitv.com/pa«es2321/Philosophy-Education.html. A ccessed 16/09/2012
philosophy: ‘Woe to me if  I do not Thomisticize!’28 For Maritain, distinct Thomist 
principles o f  a metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological nature could be identified 
and their perennial validity meant that they could not only be applied to any human 
situation, political, social, cultural, or educational, but their permanently true character 
across time, society and culture made it prescriptive or normative that they be so 
applied. Thirdly, Maritain’s understanding o f what for him was a ‘liberal education’ 
will be addressed. Maritain regarded ‘liberal education’ as an education for freedom, 
directed toward wisdom, and centred on the humanities, aiming to develop in people the 
capacity to think correctly and to enjoy truth and beauty.29
In this context, it will be noted how Maritain’s personalism and his Christian humanism 
became key drivers o f  his philosophy o f  education. It is suggested that the CCE 
discourse, indubitably influenced by Maritain’s philosophy, may in consequence have 
taken up the themes o f  the integral formation o f the human person and the integration o f  
faith and culture as archetypal aims o f Catholic education. Chapter two o f  the thesis 
comments in some detail on Maritain’s once well-known little work, Education at the 
Crossroads (1943), in which he warned educators that they stood at a ‘crossroads’, 
where they would have to choose between ‘a humanistic education based on Christian 
tradition’ or ‘an instrumentalist, pragmatic perspective’.30 Maritain’s central argument 
in this work, that the architectonic aim o f  education is to nurture the intellect and 
strengthen the will, is rehearsed. Basing him self upon his Judaeo-Christian image o f  
humanity, Maritain was convinced that failure to follow the Christian humanist model 
o f the human person would result in an education he deemed unsuitable to the dignity 
and freedom o f human beings.31 The sufficiency o f  Maritain’s metaphysical discourse 
for a re-articulation o f Catholic philosophy o f education is assessed in a context where 
philosophers o f  education have by and large already moved away from explicit attempts 
to use metaphysics to answer questions about the aims and processes o f  education.
Lonergan’s Subject-Centred ‘Cognitional D iscourse’
Chapter three o f  this dissertation shifts the focus from the prescriptive perennialist 
discourse and conceptualist rationality o f  Maritain to the discourse o f  interiority and
28 Jacques Maritain, St Thomas Aquinas, London: Sheed & Ward, 1930, p. viii.
29 Jacques Maritain, “Thomist Views on Education”, pp. 57-90. In M odern Philosophies and Education , 
N elson B. Henry (ed.), Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1955.
30 Jacques Maritain, Education at the C rossroads , N ew  Haven: Yale University Press, 1943, pp. 117-18.
31 Ibid., pp. 4-14.
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intentionality analysis that is essentially characteristic o f  the thought o f  Bernard 
Lonergan, and which shall be referred to throughout as his ‘cognitional discourse’. 
Lonergan, for whom cognitional theory and epistemology take priority over 
metaphysics, sees reflective understanding o f the data o f  sense and consciousness as 
leading to judgment. He understands ‘the full act o f  meaning’, that which ‘settles the 
status o f  the object o f thought’, as being an ‘act o f  judging’.32 As such, his discourse 
might be termed ‘critical’, in the sense o f  the root meaning o f  ‘judgment’ (Gk. krisis). 
Since there is likely to be some confusion with modem usage o f  the term ‘critical’, 
however, as for instance in reference to ‘critical pedagogy’, to denote a philosophical 
impulse to critique ideology, power and authority in the cause o f  promoting the interests 
o f  disadvantaged groups, ‘critical’ is perhaps best not used in the present context 
without due qualification. The term is used quite appropriately in regard to Lonergan’s 
description o f his philosophical stance as a ‘critical realist’ perspective.33
Lonergan’s philosophic base and driving impulse, arising out o f  the ‘detached, 
disinterested, pure, and unrestricted desire to know’, is exemplified in his cognitional 
theory, his understanding o f the process o f  knowing.34 His methodology, variously 
termed, ‘general empirical method’, ‘transcendental method’, ‘intentionality analysis’, 
is based on his understanding o f the ‘procedures o f  the human mind’, wherein can be 
discerned ‘a basic pattern o f related operations employed in every cognitional 
enterprise’.35 Lonergan’s method represents the process o f ‘objectifying the contents o f  
consciousness’ that occurs as we move from the data o f  sense and consciousness 
through inquiry, understanding, reflection, and judgment to an awareness and 
appropriation o f  our conscious and intentional operations whereby we are able to 
answer three basic questions.36 What am I doing when I am knowing? (cognitional 
theory) Why is doing that knowing? (epistemology) What do I know when I do it? 
(metaphysics).37
Lonergan is a scholar who has been hugely influential in advocating the transition from 
a ‘classical’, neo-scholastic form o f philosophical and theological thinking to a more
32 Bernard Lonergan, M ethod in Theology, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972, p. 74.
33 See, M ethod in Theology, pp. 76, 206, 238-241, 263-264.
34 Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study o f  Human Understanding , London: Longmans, Green & Co Ltd, 
1968, pp. xiv, 4, 9, 74, 220-22, 348-50, 380-81, and passim  in this book.
35 Ibid., p. 4.
36 Ibid., pp. 13-25.
37 Ibid., p. 25.
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‘historically-minded’ and critical form o f enquiry and this work is directly relevant to 
the re-articulation o f  Catholic philosophy o f  education.38 Patrick D. Brown notes 
Lonergan’s use o f  the term ‘transposition’ in relation to the tasks associated with this
39transition to mean a re-statement o f an earlier position in a new and broader context. 
Lonergan might well have predicted the demise o f Catholic philosophy o f  education, as 
reported by Elias, when he described ‘classicist education’ as a matter o f  ‘models to be 
imitated, o f  ideal characters to be emulated, o f  eternal verities and universally valid 
laws’.40 One could perhaps say that he bequeathed to Catholic philosophy o f  education 
the task o f ‘transposing’ Catholic educational thought into what Brown describes as, ‘a 
more contemporary and adequately theoretic context’, while preserving its basic 
elements in a ‘new effort o f analysis and synthesis’.41
M cLaughlin’s ‘A nalytic’ and ‘Phronetic’ Discourses
Chapter four o f  this dissertation explores the analytical and phronetic approaches o f  
Terence H. McLaughlin, whose largely positive opinion o f  the CCE corpus has already 
been referred to above. The impulse that drives much o f  McLaughlin’s philosophy is 
‘analytical’, and part o f that approach as McLaughlin understands this tradition, is the 
attempt to spell out the set o f rational conditions that educational aims and practices 
must satisfy in a liberal democratic society. There is much in McLaughlin’s analytical 
approach, understood in both this sense and in the narrower sense o f  conceptual and 
ordinary language analysis, from which students o f  the CCE discourse might profit in 
attempting to bring about a re-articulation o f Catholic philosophy o f  education. This 
chapter limits itself to a brief examination o f his work in relation to the question o f  the 
‘distinctiveness o f  the Catholic school’.42 Already in this sample o f  McLaughlin’s 
regrettably meagre (at least by size, if not by significance) Catholic corpus we are 
offered important insights for the re-articulation o f  Catholic philosophy o f education, 
and provided with a range o f analytic skills and dispositions entirely appropriate for the 
study o f  all aspects o f the CCE discourse.
38 Bernard Lonergan, “The Transition from a Classicist W orld-View to Historical-M indedness”, pp. 1-10. 
In A Secon d Collection, William F.J. Ryan SJ & Bernard J. Tyrrell SJ (ed.s), London: Darton, Longman 
& Todd, 1974.
39 Patrick D. Brown, “Aiming Excessively High and Far. The Early Lonergan and the Challenge o f  
Theory in Catholic Social Thought”, Theological S tudies, Vol. 72, 2011, pp. 620-644.
40 Bernard Lonergan, M ethod in Theology, p. 301.
41 Patrick D. Brown, “Aiming Excessively High an d F a r”, pp. 629-32.
42 “The Distinctiveness o f  Catholic Education”, pp. 136-54.
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In chapter four, also, another feature of McLaughlin’s work, what can be termed his 
‘phronetic discourse’, that arises out of his practice o f ‘pedagogic phronesis\ is equally 
if  not more pertinent to the contribution he might make to providing a philosophic basis 
for selected major themes o f  the CCE discourse, such as the developing o f  the Catholic 
school as an educational / educative / educating community.43 What is very significant 
about McLaughlin’s understanding o f the Catholic school as an educative community is 
that the vision arises out o f the practice, and cannot be imposed from without by 
whomsoever, and howsoever authoritatively, proposed or imposed.
Philosophic Interrogation of the CCE Discourse
Chapter five o f this dissertation seeks, by means o f  a comparison o f discourses, to 
identify how the work o f each o f  these three philosophers - Maritain, Lonergan, and 
McLaughlin -  may offer critical but sympathetic perspectives on major themes o f  the 
CCE discourse. Thus, in the first place, aspects o f  Maritain’s work, notably his 
personalism and Christian humanist philosophy, are put in dialogue with the aim o f  
formative education announced in the CCE theme o f the integral formation o f the 
human person’.44 Indeed, the CCE text already emphatically echoes the aims and 
processes o f  Maritain’s ‘liberal education’ when it asserts that the Catholic school ‘must 
begin from the principle that its educational programme is intentionally directed to the 
growth o f  the whole person’.45 As the CCE document in question asserts, ‘the purpose 
o f instruction at school is education’, that is, ‘the development o f  man (sic) from within, 
freeing him from that conditioning that would prevent him becoming a fully integrated 
human being’.46
Secondly, Lonergan’s cognitional theory and his accompanying notion o f culture offer 
an appropriate elucidation o f the CCE theme o f the integration o f faith and culture.47 
The process o f  human knowing, involving the multiple, cumulative and dynamically 
related operation o f experience, understanding, judgment and decision, enable the
43 Kevin W illiams has advised that it may be somewhat problematic to designate M cLaughlin’s phronetic 
approach as ‘discourse’, in view  o f  the limited opportunity he had to develop this aspect o f  his work more 
fully. Nevertheless, purely for the sake o f  convenience in referring to the work o f  all three philosophers as 
‘discourse’, I have retained the descriptor ‘phronetic discourse’ for this aspect o f  M cLaughlin’s work, 
always o f  course recognising the limitation o f  the term specifically in reference to McLaughlin.
44 GE (¡965), No. 8; CS (1977), No. 29.
45 CS (¡977), No. 29.
46 Ibid.
47 GE (1965), No. 8; Cs (1977), No. 37.
16
human subject to progress from the realm o f  common sense meaning, through theory, to
48 ■interiority and self-transcendence, and thereby become authentically human. The CCE 
discourse, in the effort to achieve through the medium o f its education, an integration o f  
faith and culture, enjoins upon the Catholic school ‘a deep awareness o f  the value o f  
knowledge as such’, and forbids it from ‘wishing to divert the imparting o f  knowledge 
from its rightful objective’.49 Lonergan’s cognitional theory suggests that true 
integration o f  faith and culture is not to be found in subjects, singly or in any kind o f  
curricular combination, but, rather, in the person o f  the knower as he self-consciously 
appropriates his knowledge and learning through his relationship with significant others 
in his/her life.50 All human knowledge is to be regarded as ‘truth to be discovered’ and 
the achievement o f  an integration o f faith and culture ‘depends not so much on subject 
matter or methodology o f  the school as on ‘the people who work there’.51 The 
integration o f  culture and faith, the CCE text concludes, ‘is mediated by the other 
integration o f  faith and life in the person o f  the teacher’.
Finally, McLaughlin’s phronetic approach is proposed as an essential requirement for 
both comprehending what is involved in the project o f  re-articulating Catholic 
philosophy o f  education, and authentically contributing to the realistic construction o f  
the Catholic school as an ‘educational / educative / educating community’, as envisaged  
in the CCE discourse.53 How the Catholic school might become capable o f  delivering, 
through its goal o f  desiring to ‘exert holistic influence’, the kind o f  intellectual, moral 
and religious formation that ‘embodies the meaning o f  the human person and o f  human 
life’ that it professes, is indeed, a matter demanding much practical wisdom and 
knowledge.54 Foremost in that conception o f  the human person is his/her God-given 
freedom, the source o f  dignity and right, o f  uniqueness and responsibility, that 
autonomy o f  the person, as Maritain puts it, which is ‘in conformity with the nature o f
48 See, Fellows o f  the Woodstock Theological Centre, The Realms o f  Desire: An Introduction to the 
Thought o f  B ernard Lonergan , Washington, DC: The W oodstock Theological Centre, Georgetown  
University, 2011.
49 C S (1977), tio.& 37-43.
50 Richard M. Liddy, “Bernard Lonergan on a Catholic Liberal Arts Education”, Catholic Education, Vol. 
3, N o . 4 (Jun., 2000), pp. 521-528 (525).
51 C S (1977), N o.43.
52 Ibid., No. 43.
53 Multiple references to the Catholic school as ‘educational/educative/educating com m unity’ are to be 
found in the CCE literature. See, for example, CS (1977) N o.s 53-56; RDECS (1988) No. 3; CSTTM  
(1997) No. 4, 11, 13, 16, 18 ,20.
54 “The Distinctiveness o f  Catholic Education”, pp. 140-45.
things’ and therefore ultimately more ‘theocentric’ than ‘anthropocentric’.55
It will be argued here that it must be to McLaughlin’s phronetic discourse, as well as to 
Maritain’s metaphysical one, that Catholic educators in a pluralistic world should look 
for the practical wisdom o f pedagogic phronesis in the construction o f  a community 
characterised by Gospel values. The Catholic educative community is expected to 
provide a genuine experience o f community, but that is a goal that must be sought after 
in crucially important ways that are able to safeguard human freedom in the integral 
formation o f  the human person. The whole way o f life o f  the Catholic school needs to 
reflective o f  and guided by the kind o f phronetic approach exemplified by McLaughlin.
CCE Discourse and the Need for Philosophy
It is nowhere throughout this dissertation suggested that the CCE discourse is devoid o f  
philosophical insight or foundation. Even a passing acquaintance with the discourse 
would reveal the presence o f  a pronounced personalist strain o f  thought throughout the 
corpus. Several o f  the characteristic features o f  personalist thought, as described by 
Thomas D. Williams and John Olaf Bengtsson, for instance, can be readily identified in 
the various documents o f the CCE discourse.56 Thus, one can recognise in the CCE 
discourse an insistence on the radical difference between persons and the non-personal, 
an affirmation o f  the dignity and inherent value o f  the person, a concern for the person’s 
subjectivity and self-determination, and a particular emphasis on relationality and 
communion arising out o f  an understanding o f  the person’s social being.57
It is a central hypothesis o f  this dissertation that a measure o f  engagement with, and 
dialogue between, the CCE literature and a body o f more traditionally philosophic 
discourse on education could achieve a greater degree o f  appreciation for, and a clearer 
perception o f  the relevance o f  the theological-pastoral discourse o f  the Holy See in the 
field o f  Catholic philosophy o f education in contemporary society. The over-arching 
aims o f  Catholic education suggested here as in need o f  support from a more explicit 
philosophical insight might require, in any case, measures to ensure their coherence, 
since the different discourses emphasise different goals, priorities and values.
55 Jacques Maritain, “The Conquest o f  Freedom”, pp. 159-179. In: Donald & Idella Gallagher (ed.s), The 
Education o f  Man, Notre Dame, IND: University o f  Notre Dame Press, 1962.
56 Thomas D. W illiams & John O lof Bengtsson, “Personalism”, Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personalism/. . . Accessed: 04/08/2014.
57 Ibid., pp. 12-20.
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McLaughlin’s work on values and coherence in the school context, for example, could 
provide the kind o f  explicit philosophical perspective needed to bring coherence to the
• 58different discourses o f a re-articulated Catholic philosophy o f  education. While it 
might reasonably be argued, as in fact John Sullivan does, that, from amongst the 
CCE’s architectonic themes, the integral formation o f  the whole person can be singled 
out as having an over-riding priority, there still remains the question o f  the ‘inter­
connectedness’ o f  these aims.59 This would suggest a further task for philosophy in the 
elucidation o f  the interrelationship o f  the various aims o f  the Catholic school
McLaughlin’s philosophical reflections on the task o f making the educational values o f  
the school coherent, and the matters he identifies as being necessary for achieving 
coherence in practice, can contribute to this discussion o f inter-connectedness in general 
and specifically in relation to the CCE aims under discussion here. In any case, it 
remains true that a better understanding o f the three major themes o f  the CCE discourse, 
which one might expect from their being put into dialogue with our three philosophers, 
offers a fruitful way to appreciate the Catholic concept o f  education in the school 
context.
Admittedly there is a certain degree of artificiality about the alignment o f  specific CCE 
themes with the named philosophers in this study since, in a real sense, each o f these 
scholars has a positive contribution to make to understanding the tasks allocated to the 
others, as indeed each might competently achieve the whole range o f  tasks solely. 
Nevertheless, on the basis that it is possible to identify features in each philosopher’s 
characteristic discourse, whether it be Maritain’s prescriptive discourse, or Lonergan’s 
cognitional discourse, or McLaughlin’s phronetic discourse, it is legitimate to appeal in 
this way to an individual philosopher to bring light to bear on a particular CCE theme 
where there is some correspondence between issues central to that theme and the insight 
that dominates the work o f  the philosopher. A more comprehensive treatment, where all 
three philosophers are engaged in an analysis o f  the several themes (including those 
identified here) that comprise the CCE discourse is beyond the remit o f  this thesis.
58 See, Terence H. McLaughlin, “Values, Coherence and the School”, C am bridge Journal o f  Education , 
Vol. 24, No. 1 (N ov., 1994), pp. 453-71.
59 John Sullivan, Catholic Education: D istinctive and Inclusive, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2001, pp. 85-89.
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The subject o f  this dissertation was chosen following a comprehensive literature search 
o f studies relating to the recent educational discourse o f  the Holy See’s Congregation 
for Catholic Education (1977-2014) revealed that none had addressed the matter at issue 
here, namely, the project o f bringing the CCE discourse into dialogue with the earlier 
and mainly philosophico-theological discourse that comprised the tradition o f  Catholic 
educational thought prior to Vatican II (1962-1965).
No study was found in the published, or unpublished matter reviewed, which considered 
the need to provide a more explicit and patently philosophical basis for the mainly 
theological-pastoral discourse o f  the CCE corpus. A study o f  this nature was considered 
worthwhile, firstly, to identify in the CCE discourse valuable insights from the earlier 
tradition and, secondly, thereby better to enable the CCE discourse to engage more 
vigorously, and at a higher level o f  generality, in contemporary scholarly conversation 
relating to the nature, aims and practice o f  education. Within the overall theme o f  how  
the Catholic tradition o f  educational thought might be given new articulation for today, 
it was argued that a project o f this kind would make a significant contribution.
Several authors, recognising the salience o f the CCE literature for an understanding o f  
the theory and practice o f Catholic education today, incorporate themes and concepts 
from that discourse, some at greater length than others, but few  with an overtly 
philosophical goal to the fore. The exception would probably be Terence H. 
McLaughlin, who, in The Contemporary Catholic School, when writing on The 
distinctiveness o f  Catholic education’, considers that the Church documents with a 
directly educational focus are ‘a rich source o f  Catholic educational principles’ that 
reveal a number o f  distinctive features o f  Catholic education. Among these principles 
McLaughlin lists Catholic education’s ‘embodiment o f  a view about the meaning o f  
human persons and o f human life’, ‘an aspiration to holistic influence’, and ‘a 
commitment to religious and moral formation’.60 McLaughlin is convinced o f the need 
for a Catholic philosophy o f education, furnishing Catholic concepts and arguments,
60 Terence McLaughlin, Joseph O ’Keefe & Bernadette O ’Keeffe (ed.s), The Contem porary C atholic  
School: Context, Identity and Diversity, London: RoutledgeFalmer, 1996, pp. 140-145.
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which would ‘illuminate the nature not merely o f Catholic education, but o f  education 
as such5.61 Due to his untimely death he was tragically unable to indicate in any detail 
how the documents o f the CCE might be used to develop such a Catholic philosophy o f  
education. Chapter four o f  this dissertation will record the vitally important first steps 
he was able to take in this direction.
John Sullivan, albeit from a less pronounced philosophical perspective, in Catholic 
Schools in Contention, makes several references to the documents o f  the CCE as he 
seeks to map out the contours o f  Catholic education and examines ‘the implications, 
dilemmas and value clashes’ that arise from the use o f  ‘competing models and 
metaphors’ for Catholic schools.62 Later, in Catholic Education: Distinctive and 
Inclusive, Sullivan, seeking to understand ‘the interconnectedness and coherence’ o f  the 
various themes and principles which together constitute a distinctively Catholic 
educational philosophy, identifies a number o f  these principles from the CCE document, 
The Catholic School (1977), including the ‘integral formation o f  the whole person’, the 
‘synthesis o f  culture and faith and o f  faith and life’, the ‘autonomy o f the subjects
63taught’, and the ‘development o f the critical faculties o f  the pupils’.
James C. Conroy and his fellow contributors, in Catholic Education: Inside Out,
Outside In, are concerned to open up a dialogue with others working from both within 
and from without the Catholic tradition. One o f  their concerns is ‘to offer an account o f  
not only the nature and aspirations o f  Catholic education’ but also what it may or may 
not ‘provide to the wider democratic polity’.64 Although reference to the CCE literature 
is sparse, the effort o f the essayists ‘to ground Catholic education either implicitly or 
explicitly in a self-reflective and critical discourse’, regarding what Catholic identity 
and an education system premised upon such an identity might mean, is certainly within 
the spirit o f  the CCE discourse.65
Kevin Williams has highlighted the importance o f  the CCE literature by acknowledging 
that the tradition o f  reflection on Catholic education from a Catholic perspective has 
found ‘authoritative expression’ in recent Vatican documents and, because o f  its
61 Ibid., p. 139.
62 John Sullivan, Catholic Schools in Contention: Com peting M etaphors and Leadership Im plications, 
Dublin: Veritas, 2000, p. ix.
63 C atholic Education: Distinctive and Inclusive, pp. 74-81.
64 James C. Conroy (ed.). Catholic Education: Inside Out, Outside In , Dublin: Veritas, 1999, pp. 7-11.
65 Ibid., back cover.
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intrinsic value, this source has attracted the attention o f a number o f  contemporary 
educational philosophers.66 In his article, “The common school and the Catholic school: 
a response to the work o f T. H. McLaughlin”, Williams attributes to the CCE doctrine, 
in part at least, the ‘explicit remit’ o f Catholic schools to ‘uphold and promote thick or 
maximal values’.67 It is very likely that Williams would consider a role for 
philosophical reflection in ‘providing traction’ for these CCE values in the Catholic 
school, a matter he considers ‘problematic for a number o f reasons’, not least in what
• * ¿ o
concerns the ‘dilemma o f substantiality’.
Among other published sources, such as, for example, articles in various journals, or 
those made available on the internet, scholars such as Stephen J. Denig and Anthony J. 
Dosen, and Denis McLaughlin, to select but a few, show appreciation for various 
aspects o f  the CCE literature, though none appears to express disquiet about its subdued 
philosophical tone and content. Thus, Denig and Dosen, writing on the ‘mission o f the 
Catholic school in the post-Vatican II era’, examine how the mission o f  Catholic 
schools was ‘transformed’.69 The goals o f  the Catholic school were ‘modified’ during 
the post-Vatican II era, say these authors, and they highlight four themes that now  
become prominent and are attested to by the CCE literature. These themes are: 
‘evangelization, community, holistic influence, and public worship’.70 At the same 
time, they note, in many parts o f  the world it became an imperative for Catholic schools 
to be ‘centres o f  social justice and liberation’ - and o f  outreach to individuals and 
groups o f  people beyond the school.71
These new priorities, Denig and Dosen claim, originated in the Vatican II Declaration 
on Education {GE, 1965) and are reflected in the subsequent CCE publications which 
sought to bring about a change o f perspective in Catholic schools worldwide in 
accordance with the Declaration’s vision. The authors identify the emphasis on the 
Catholic school in the CCE literature as ‘a community animated by the Gospel spirit o f
66 Kevin W illiams, “Education and the Catholic Tradition”, pp. 167-180 (167). In: The Sage H andbook o f  
the Philosophy o f  Education , ed. Richard Bailey, Robin Barrow, David Carr & Christine McCarthy, 
London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2010.
67 Kevin W illiams, “The common school and the Catholic school: a response to the work o f  T. H. 
McLaughlin”, International Studies in Catholic Education , Vol. 2, No. 1 (March, 2010), pp. 19-36 (26).
68 Ibid., p. 24.
69 Stephen J. Denig & Anthony J. Dosen, “The M ission o f  the Catholic School in the Pre-Vatican II Era 
(1810-1962) and the Post-Vatican II Era (1965-1995): Insights and Observations for the N ew  
M illennium”, Catholic Education, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Dec., 2009), pp. 135-156.
70 Ibid., pp. 142-146
liberty and charity’ as being indicative o f  a foundational principle for Catholic 
education.72 Interpreting the wishes o f the Council through a pastoral-theological rather 
than a philosophical reading, the American Catholic bishops asserted that ‘the Christian 
vocation is a call to transform oneself and society with God’s help’, whence the 
educational efforts o f  the Church ‘must encompass the twin purposes o f  personal
73sanctification and social reform’ in the light o f  the Christian vision.
Denis McLaughlin, writing on the theme of, “The Catholic School: Avenue to 
Authenticity”, analyses a document from the CCE, The Catholic School on the 
Threshold o f the Third Millennium (1998), and concludes that its essential message is 
that the fundamental purpose o f the Catholic school is to create an educational 
environment that promotes authentic humanity.74 McLaughlin believes that this position 
has its basis in ‘the Catholic concept of personhood’ which he claims underpins the 
CCE document.75 This is the kind o f philosophical reference point which the present 
dissertation hopes to identify in its study o f  the CCE literature. Contrary to 
McLaughlin’s goal o f incorporation of this philosophical concept into a wider pastoral- 
theological framework, however, it is the aim o f this thesis to investigate how the 
concept o f  person might be enhanced in this context with reference, for instance, to the 
work o f Jacques Maritain, in the hope o f  providing a re-articulated Catholic philosophy 
with a concept and a principle that could be shared with educators in other contexts.76
Among un-published sources, a number o f  recent dissertations appear to have taken an 
interest in the CCE discourse and its importance in relation to elucidating the Church’s 
educational mission. The authors have variously concentrated on identifying key themes 
in the CCE literature and have not usually been concerned about their philosophical or 
theological nature or emphasis. None o f  these studies has expressed an interest in the 
overtly philosophical dimension o f education.
Thus, Anthony Raymond Densley, conducted historical research into the ‘evolution o f  
the philosophy o f  Catholic schools’ at Fordham University, in 1990, by means o f
72 G £ (J 9 6 5 ), No. 8.
73 USCCB, To Teach as Jesus D id , 1972, No. 7.
74 Article available at: http://dlibrarv.acu.edu.au/research/cel/cathschool Ihtm. Accessed: 19/05/2012.
75 CCE, The C atholic School on the Threshold o f  the Third M illennium , 1998, N o.s 8-10.
76 Jacques Maritain’s philosophy o f  education is treated in chapter two below; the dialogue between 
Maritain’s philosophy o f  the person (as given expression in, for example, J. Maritain, 1973, The Person  
and the Common G ood , South Bend, IND: University o f  Notre Dame Press) is commented upon in 
chapter five below.
‘documentary analysis o f  recent church documents’.77 D ensley’s focus is on the 
explication o f ‘change, shift and refinement’ to be found in the ‘philosophy o f  Catholic 
education’ as revealed in the documents studied.78 His reference to ‘philosophy’, 
however, evokes a very weak sense o f the notion and is virtually identical with a 
theological perspective on education. D ensley’s interest does not lie in an assessment o f  
the depth or shallowness o f the strictly philosophical foundations in the CCE’s 
contemporary expression o f Catholic philosophy o f  education, nor does it entail a 
judgment as to its sufficiency for the purpose o f  its engagement in a shared dialogue 
with other philosophical perspectives on education, both concerns o f  and indicators o f  
the goal o f  the present dissertation.
William Francis Sultmann submitted a doctoral thesis at the Australian Catholic 
University, Victoria, in 2011, entitled, “Stones Cry Out: A Gospel Imagination for 
Catholic School Identity”, which purported to examine the nature o f  Catholic school 
identity within a changing social and educational context.79 Sultmann conducted an 
empirical study in relation to four CCE publications in order to identify a number o f  
‘identity concepts’, from which he then extracted a number o f themes characteristic o f  
each identity concept, and then finally formulated a set o f principles o f  an integrative 
nature that would serve to characterise the identity o f  the Catholic school. Although this 
study makes copious reference to CCE documents, as an inter-disciplinary study 
featuring theological discourse and statistical research, it contains little in the way o f  
philosophical explication or elucidation and does not therefore overlap with the aims or 
content o f  the present study.
As has already been indicated, the present study seeks to investigate how an 
interrogative framework might be established that would allow the CCE discourse to 
engage in dialogue and discussion with aspects o f  the earlier (that is, the pre-Vatican II) 
tradition o f  Catholic philosophy o f  education. When I began to focus on what aspects o f  
the earlier tradition might be brought into relationship with selected themes and 
concepts o f  the CCE literature, it seemed a sensible and viable way forward to select, as 
it were, significant ‘dialogue partners’ from that pre-Vatican II tradition o f  educational
77 Anthony Raymond Densley, The evolution o f  the ph ilosophy o f  Catholic schools: An analysis o f  recent 
church documents, 1929-1990 , Fordham University Graduate School, 1990.
78 Ibid., p. 2.
79 William Francis Sultmann, Stones Cry Out: A G ospel Imagination fo r  Catholic School Identity, School 
o f  Theology, Australian Catholic University, Victoria, 2011.
thought, who would have this precise capacity to interrogate the CCE discourse and 
converse with it in a gainful manner.
Thus, three scholars were chosen for this purpose, namely, Jacques Maritain, Bernard 
Lonergan and Terence McLaughlin, each o f whom has made significant contributions 
regarding the nature and practice o f  Catholic philosophy o f  education. Maritain and 
Lonergan were considered representative o f  two different, contrasting styles o f 
Thomism, the discourse o f the former being correctly described as ‘perennialist5 and 
‘conceptualise, while that o f the latter could be described as ‘cognitionaT and ‘subject5- 
focused. McLaughlin was not chosen on the basis o f  any Thomist credentials, since 
there is some uncertainty about this matter as to whether it applies to McLaughlin or 
not. McLaughlin was chosen, rather, because o f  his analytical and phronetic skills in the 
study o f  the philosophy o f education, which he was unfortunately unable to develop 
fully in the context o f Catholic education. McLaughlin is seen as a kind o f  bridge- 
builder between earlier and later phases in the tradition o f  Catholic educational thought.
It is actually the case, though this might come as a surprise to some, as far at least as 
Maritain is concerned, that any literature search today relating to these three 
philosophers can reveal several titles relating to their work that continue to make claims 
for the relevance o f  these philosophers and invite our reconsideration o f  them. Thus, in 
Maritain5 s case, the published papers o f  a recent symposium, Teaching, A Secular 
Contract, A Sacred Calling, compare and contrast several aspects o f  the work o f John 
Dewey and Jacques Maritain in the field o f  philosophy o f  education, and make clear 
why it might be an error to simply dismiss Maritain as no longer relevant to our 
reflections.80 Books and journal articles continue to be published on Maritain, mainly in 
connection with his integral humanism and political philosophy, though now fewer and 
fewer titles appear that argue for his relevance in the field o f  education.
As far as Lonergan is concerned, more than one dedicated Lonergan website appears to 
be active in quarrying Lonergan5s major works for insights and understandings into 
several areas o f  thought, some o f  which could potentially contribute to the project o f  
reformulating a Catholic philosophy o f education for today. Numerous publications, 
both books and journal articles, appear with regularity from these sources, although
80 See, Teaching, A Secular Contract, A Sacred C alling , ed. W. A. Carpenter, Educational H orizons, V ol. 
83, No. 4 (Summer, 2005), pp. 241-301.
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very few  treat questions relating to the philosophy o f education, and I have found none 
that use Lonergan’s work in connection with an analysis o f  CCE documents. We are 
largely left to our own devices to use our ingenuity in interpreting and applying 
Lonergan’s complex thought to our chosen field o f  interest. An unpublished doctoral 
thesis by Ivan K. Gaetz explores Lonergan’s intentionality analysis as a way o f  
understanding selected topics in the field o f  ‘secular education and educational 
philosophy’.81 In chapters three and five o f  this dissertation I select aspects o f  
Lonergan’s thought that appear promising for my declared purposes in this dissertation.
It is obviously the case that other scholars might have been chosen for this study, since 
the three scholars actually chosen do not exhaust the whole spectrum o f philosophical 
perspective on education represented in the Catholic tradition. Scholars such as, for 
example, at one end o f  the spectrum, John Henry Newman, and, at the other, Paulo 
Freire, each with distinctive and contrasting philosophical inclinations and motivations, 
the former an important intellectual influence on both Maritain and Lonergan, the latter 
with the ability to introduce a critical pedagogical approach to Catholic philosophy o f  
education. Contemporary literature continues to record opinion relating to both these 
scholars but this is by and large beyond consideration for inclusion in this study. A good 
case might be made for the inclusion o f John Paul II (Karol Wojtyla) as an important 
Catholic philosopher relevant to the task o f  the re-articulation o f  Catholic philosophy o f  
education. His influence is noteworthy in the CCE literature since the 1980s in the form 
o f his Thomist personalism. His non-inclusion is regrettable but has to be understood as 
an inevitable consequence o f  the limited scope o f  this thesis.
At the conclusion o f this literature search, I felt justified in selecting the theme 
announced above as an appropriate area o f  investigation within the overall context o f  a 
project considering how new expression might be given to the tradition o f  Catholic 
educational thought for today. There is no prior investigation that had chosen an 
identical goal, or had achieved substantially the same result perhaps starting from a 
different perspective and intention. It is recognised, o f  course, that this dissertation must 
in many respects be regarded as a preliminary study that others may in the future 
develop and modify.
81 Ivan K. Gaetz, An Exploration and Expansion o f  B ernard L onergan ’s Intentionality Analysis fo r  
Educational Philosophy , Ph.D. Thesis, The Faculty o f  Graduate Studies, The University o f  British 
Columbia, 2003.
Chapter Two: Toward a Re-Articulation of the Thomist Tradition of 
Catholic Philosophy of Education. A Perspective from the Work of 
Jacques Maritain (1882-1973)
Jacques Maritain, the noted French Catholic philosopher, during his long life-time 
deeply influenced the philosophical, religious, social, and political aspects o f  life, not 
only o f  French Catholics, but o f  those o f  Europe at large, and o f the North American 
continent as well. At the time o f his death, William Street wrote that, ‘Maritain was 
arguably the best known Catholic philosopher in the world’.1 The ‘breadth o f  his 
philosophical work’, Sweet adds, his ‘influence in the social philosophy’ o f the Catholic 
Church, and his ‘ardent defence o f human rights’ made him ‘one o f  the central figures 
o f his tim es’.2 Over the course o f his life, John Macquarrie claims, Maritain became 
‘one o f the Catholic Church’s most outstanding intellectual leaders o f  recent tim es’.3 
Expressing little interest in the claims o f  other systems o f  philosophy, Macquarrie notes, 
Maritain was convinced that ‘it is to the realism o f neo-Thomist thought that we must 
turn for the solution to the intellectual and cultural problems o f  our time’.4 John 
Haldane has described Jacques Maritain as ‘the best-known neo-Thomist o f the 
twentieth century’, who devoted more than sixty years o f his life to ‘the elaboration o f  a 
comprehensive philosophical system based on the writings o f  Thomas Aquinas and his 
scholastic followers’.5
In this chapter I seek to assess the extent to which, and the manner whereby, Maritain 
attempted to articulate and promote the tradition o f  Catholic philosophy o f education 
through his application o f  key elements o f  Thomism to the task o f  understanding and 
renewing that tradition. Maritain regularly declared that it was his vocation and duty to 
philosophize in the Thomist-Aristotelian tradition. He was utterly convinced that 
Thomism was not ‘a museum piece’, but ‘a living tradition relevant to every epoch’, 
able ‘to answer modem problems, both theoretical and practical’.6 Maritain’s life-long  
effort was devoted to ‘renovating’ the Thomist philosophical tradition, and to ensuring 
that it remained ‘a synthesis with a power to fashion and emancipate the mind in the 
face o f  contemporary aspirations and perplexities’.7 It is appropriate, therefore, to begin 
to address the research question o f this thesis with reference to a philosopher and
1 William Sweet, “Jacques Maritain”, Stanford E ncyclopedia o f  Philosophy, 2008. 
http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/maritain/ . Accessed: 04/08/2011.
2 Ibid., p. 1.
3 John Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought, London: SCM Press, 1989, p. 284.
4 Ibid., p. 285.
5 John Haldane, “Jacques Maritain”, p. 522. In Ted Honderich (ed), The O xford Companion to 
Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
6 Jacques Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics: Seven Lectures on Being , London: Sheed & Ward, 1945, p. 
1.
7 Ibid., p. 1.
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educator who, ‘in the depths o f the mind heard the summons to fashion a universal 
Christian wisdom’, who then whole-heartedly accepted the challenge o f  the ‘renewal’ o f  
Thomism for his times, and offered to all the fruits o f  his labour, together with the 
invitation if  not, indeed, the injunction, that they too might perform a similar task in
Q
their time and place.
To investigate the relevance o f  Maritain’s work for the re-articulation o f Catholic 
philosophy o f education in general, and to attempt specifically to identify what elements 
o f  his work might be appropriate to the task o f  engaging Catholic philosophy o f  
education in explicit and constructive dialogue with major themes o f  the educational 
discourse o f  the Congregation for Catholic Education (CCE), this chapter sets down 
three objectives as follows.9
Firstly, the general philosophical basis, the driving impulse in the Thomism that 
Maritain appropriated from the renewal movement initiated by Leo XIII, and from his 
reading o f certain medieval commentators on Aquinas’s work, is identified.10 It 
becomes evident that Maritain is pre-eminently a Thomist metaphysician, and an 
exemplar o f  the kind o f metaphysics scholars such as John Haldane and Rachel M. 
Goodrich have identified as characteristic o f  the tradition o f  Catholic educational 
thought.11 Maritain accepted from Aquinas both his metaphysics o f  the act o f existence 
and his basic theory o f  knowledge. These provided him with the only foundation he 
considered necessary for the tasks o f  renewing philosophy and addressing the numerous 
social, political and educational issues o f  the day.
Secondly, an account o f  Maritain’s central work in the philosophy o f  education is 
examined and its more notable features subjected to comment. The focus o f  attention is, 
in the main, on an analysis and an assessment o f  one o f  Maritain’s most important 
contributions to the field o f educational philosophy, namely, Education at the 
Crossroads, first published in 1943.12 This is a short, but not insignificant discourse,
8 Ibid., p. 12.
9 The Holy See's Congregation for Catholic Education will be cited throughout the chapter as: CCE.
10 Leo XIII, in his encyclical, Aeterni Patris (1879), promoted a renewal o f  the study o f  philosophy, and 
especially that o f  the work o f  St Thomas Aquinas, Maritain was much influenced in his understanding o f  
Aquinas by John o f  St Thomas, or John Poinsot (1589-1644).
11 See, for example: Rachel M. Goodrich, “Neo-Thom ism  and Education”, British Journal o f  E ducational 
Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Nov., 1958), pp. 27-35; John Haldane, “Metaphysics in the Philosophy o f  
Education”, Journal o f  Philosophy o f  Education, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1989, pp. 171-183.
12 Jacques Maritain, Education at the C rossroads, N ew  Haven, CN & London: Yale University Press, 
1943.
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and one o f  the relatively few immediate sources o f  Maritain’s philosophy o f  education. 
The general contours o f  his philosophy o f  education are noted, and his distinctive 
perspective on the aims o f education is delineated. The manner in which the argument 
central to his educational theory is developed throughout the work in question is 
examined, as is the context in which the discourse is being conducted. Here, too, 
Maritain5s characteristic methodology o f  ‘applying Thomist principles’ to illuminate 
and bring resolution to the problematics o f  education becomes clearly evident.
Thirdly, an assessment o f  what Maritain’s educational philosophy might have 
contributed, in the way o f  providing a new and coherent expression o f the Catholic 
tradition o f  educational thought, is offered. In this connection, the judgment o f  an 
important group o f  Catholic scholars concerning the potential o f  Maritain’s Education 
at the Crossroads (1943) to provide a basis for a specifically Catholic philosophy o f  
education is critically assessed. The availability o f  Maritain’s educational philosophy 
for engaging with the recent CCE discourse is investigated, both in terms o f  
commonality o f  theme and over-riding intention, in relation to the aims o f  Catholic 
education. Common elements and themes in Maritain’s perennial philosophy, and in the 
less philosophically nuanced discourse o f  the CCE, are identified with a view  to 
bringing them into dialogue and facilitating a mutually interrogative relationship 
between them.
I
Maritain’s Philosophical Basis, Guiding Impulse and Characteristic 
Methodology
This section commences with a brief resumé o f Maritain’s Thomist-Aristotelian 
metaphysics, the starting point for all his philosophizing, in education as elsewhere. 
Frederick C. Copleston’s view o f (neo-) Thomism as, ‘a living and developing 
movement o f  thought, deriving its inspiration from Aquinas, but conducting its 
meditation on his writings, in the light o f  subsequent philosophy, and o f  subsequent 
cultural developments in general’, is an accurate summation o f Maritain’s attitude to 
this tradition upon which his entire work is based.13 Maritain identified three 
fundamental principles in Aristotle’s metaphysics that he believed were taken over by
13 Frederick C. Copleston (1958). Aquinas. Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin Books, p. 250.
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the Thomist philosophical tradition. These principles, to be found in Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, he identified as act (actuality) and potency (potentiality), causality, and 
knowledge. Authentic Thomism accepted by and large that Aquinas had radically 
transformed Aristotle and produced a profoundly original philosophy. Maritain, 
however, in common with other Thomist interpreters such as Etienne Gilson, regarded 
Aquinas as far more than a mere synthesiser o f  the findings o f  human reason and the 
truths o f  Christian revelation. That Thomist-Aristotelian theory had, for Maritain at 
least, the capacity to illuminate every aspect o f  human life and to resolve a whole range 
o f  philosophical, moral, political, social, and cultural problems encountered in human 
society.
Rachel Goodrich suggests that, for Maritain, Aquinas’s originality consists partly in the 
fact that as a metaphysician he adopts an ‘existentialist’ as distinct from an ‘essentialist’ 
approach.14 For Plato, and even for Aristotle, the core o f  reality was to be found in the 
notion o f ‘essence’. Beings, or substances, consisted o f ‘form’ and ‘matter’ -  ‘form’ 
being the intelligible element which enables things to be classified and known in terms 
o f concepts, and ‘matter’ that which distinguishes individuals within the class or 
species. It was through ‘concepts’ that one came to understand the ‘essential’ nature o f  
substances. It was St Thomas’s great achievement, Thomist philosophers believe, that 
while accepting these categories o f ‘substance’ and ‘essence’, and o f  ‘form’ and o f  
‘matter’, he passed beyond them to a deeper level o f  reality by affirming an ‘act-of- 
being’ which is prior to essence, and constitutes the living actuality o f  each existent 
thing.15
A major emphasis in the Thomist-Aristotelian system o f  metaphysics adopted by 
Maritain is its focus on the study o f  ‘first principles’, or ultimate truths, as a means o f  
comprehending reality as a whole. Such an orientation, or emphasis, ultimately brings 
the subject to focus upon the transcendent reality that is God. Maritain affords 
metaphysics so understood a privileged position in all his philosophizing, and not least 
in his elaboration o f a Catholic philosophy o f  education. The kind o f standard elements 
or ingredients that this metaphysics has offered traditional Catholic thought in the field 
o f  education as elsewhere would include the following. Firstly, belief in an ultimate 
origin, foundation, or first principle (arche) o f  all reality, including human beings;
14 Rachel M. Goodrich, Neo-Thomism and Education, p. 27.
15 Ibid, p. 28.
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secondly, the existence o f  a fixed form or essence (eidos) o f everything that exists; 
thirdly, an end, completion, or purpose for all being (telos); fourthly, the state o f  
completion, perfection, or complete actualization o f  being (entelechia); fifthly, 
actuality, activity or function (energeia) and potential for change (dynamis), and, 
sixthly, the notion o f substance or subject (ousia).
When one lists these standard ingredients or elements o f  the Thomist-Aristotelian
system upon which Maritain depended, it may all seem, as Jim Garrison rightly
remarks, somewhat ‘recondite and remote’, and likely to be openly rejected by
contemporary educators.16 Yet philosophy o f  education must necessarily address
essential and fundamental questions, often reflecting these elements, such as questions
about the absolute foundation o f human development; the ultimate, unchanging essence
o f  human beings; whether human life has an end, purpose or telos; the limits o f human
potential and the actualization o f human potential for both the individual and the human
collective, and the whole question o f whether perfect teleological actualization o f  the
human essence is a valid educational goal, or can ever be achieved in practice.17
Maritain never shirked the search for answers to these deeply philosophical questions at
the core o f  educational thought and practice and invariably turned to Aquinas for the
* 18principles that would provide the leverage for their solution.
Haldane acknowledges the educational viability and importance o f  these metaphysical 
questions in Maritain’s philosophy. The view o f  metaphysics in education favoured and 
defended by Haldane himself provides an apt summary o f  Maritain’s broadly similar 
expression o f metaphysical intent in education.19 Haldane states that the account o f  the 
nature and purpose o f  education that he would wish to uphold is ‘an implication o f a 
more general philosophical position’, which is a form o f ‘naturalism’ that is combined 
with ‘a realist epistemology and metaphysics’, and ‘an objectivist theory o f  value’.20 
Unsurprisingly, in terms o f his fundamental, metaphysical, epistemological and
16 Jim Garrison, “Some Remarks on D ew ey’s M etaphysics and Theory o f  Education”, Journal o f  
Thought, Fall-Winter, 2009, pp. 89-99 (89).
17 Ibid., pp. 90-92.
18 Maritain’s major reflections on metaphysics are to be found in: A Preface to M etaphysics  (1939); 
Existence and the Existent (1947); The Range o f  Reason  (1948); Science and Wisdom  (1940). The 
D egrees o f  K nowledge  (1932) is important for an understanding o f  both Maritain’s epistem ology and his 
metaphysics.
19 John Haldane, “Metaphysics in the Philosophy o f  Education”, Journal o f  the Philosophy o f  Education , 
Vol. 23, No. 2, 1989, pp. 171-183 (173-lxx).
20 Ibid., p. 173.
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axiological principles, this is an accurate summary o f Maritain’s position.
For Haldane, education is ‘a process of formation involving the realisation o f  certain 
potentialities5.21 Education is always part o f  ‘a general movement towards the full 
actualisation o f the subject’s nature5.22 To formulate the goals o f  education, therefore, 
and to determine how best these might be achieved, one needs to have 4 an account o f  
what a human being is5.23 There is required ‘an organised set o f descriptions o f  the 
various capacities characteristic o f  human beings’, o f  ‘the pattern o f  their development 
and inter-relations’, and o f ‘the states and activities in which a developed human being 
most fully realizes his or her nature’.24 An analysis o f  Maritain’s understanding o f  the 
aims o f education in the following section may be expected to fit remarkably closely to 
Haldane’s account here.
Haldane further characterises his philosophical position by claiming that it is ‘a version 
o f Aristotelian naturalism’.25 That is to say, education is aimed at ‘developing our 
essential nature by systematically cultivating various capacities in accordance with their 
inbuilt structure and teleology’.26 On this account, Haldane claims, ‘education may be 
both instrumentally and intrinsically valuable’. Instrumentally it is o f  worth inasmuch as 
‘it satisfies a prerequisite o f human flourishing5; education is needed because it is ‘the 
means o f  developing those capacities the exercise o f  which is itself a precondition o f  
achieving a good life’.27 It is intrinsically valuable because ‘some o f the activities it 
involves are themselves realisations of capacities, the exercise o f  which is partly 
constitutive o f  human flourishing’.28 The central philosophical concepts in a theory o f  
education o f  this sort, according to Haldane, are those o f  the ‘human person’ and o f  
‘human virtues’, since a ideological theory requires an account o f  the agents involved  
and, when ‘virtue’ is conceived not in ‘a restrictedly moral sense5 but rather as ‘an 
enduring excellence o f  character with respect to any given human activity’, the role o f  
the appropriate virtues also becomes clear. According to this view o f  education, 
therefore, the purpose o f  education is to promote good human lives by cultivating
21 “Metaphysics in the Philosophy o f  Education”, p. 174.
22 Ibid., p. 174.
23 Ibid., p. 174.
24 Ibid., p. 174.
25 Ibid., p. 174.
26 Ibid., p. 174.
27 Ibid., p. 174.
28 Ibid., p. 174.
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virtue.29 Once again, Haldane’s account o f  his own philosophy o f  education is a perfect 
rendering o f  Maritain’s position.
Maritain, as it were, insets this Aristotelian naturalist account o f  the theory and aims o f  
education within the framework o f his Thomist metaphysics and specifically locates it 
in relation to Aquinas’s understanding o f  the nature and destiny o f  the human person. 
Maritain put his faith in Thomism and that, partly at least, because for him Thomism is 
a philosophy o f ‘common sense’, that is, ‘a spontaneous and naturally right use o f  
intelligence’.30 Thomist doctrine, for Maritain, ‘establishes demonstratively the 
conclusions instinctively laid down by common sense’.31 Thomism is a ‘philosophypar 
excellence’, both in regard to ‘faith and revealed truth’, and in regard to ‘natural reason 
and common sense’.32 Maritain often lamented the loss o f  our ‘natural faith in reason to 
discover truth’, because ‘erroneous philosophies have been teaching that truth is an out­
worn notion’.33 But for him, in the depth o f  his Christian commitment, there was never 
any doubt about the usefulness, indeed, the necessity, o f  Thomism, as both a philosophy 
and a theology, to discover truth in every area o f  human life, and across every cultural 
boundary.
Maritain and the ‘Application’ of Thomist Principles
William Sweet’s judgment that Maritain’s distinctive contribution is not to the ‘details 
o f  Thomist metaphysics’, or to a mere ‘summary or restatement o f  Aquinas’s v iew s’, 
but to ‘a renovation o f Aquinas’s thought’, and ‘bringing it into relation with modem  
science and philosophy’, is undoubtedly true.34 Maritain’s initiative in applying Thomist 
philosophy to concrete issues in society marks the beginning o f a development in 
Thomist thought and practice that would single him out as a very special kind o f  
Catholic philosopher. He would become one who worked above all for a ‘synthesis’ o f  
human experience and traditional philosophical wisdom, and a man who strove 
throughout his life to form his followers in the pursuit o f  this kind o f  ‘integration’ o f  
Thomism and contemporary life and culture. For Maritain, there was available to all an 
ancient source o f  wisdom ‘to be mined for its precious ore’, a wisdom that needed to be
29 Ib id , p. 174.
30 Jacques Maritain, Saint Thomas Aquinas, London: Sheed & Ward, 1931, p. 145.
31 Ibid., p. 147.
32 Ibid.. p. 150.
33 Education at the C rossroads, pp. 114-115.
34 William Sweet, “Jacques Maritain”. 2008. Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy. 
http://pl ato.stanford.edu/entries/maritain/. Accessed 04/08/2011.
‘extracted from a historically conditioned matrix’ and ‘shorn o f the interminable 
controversies’ that were no longer relevant to contemporary needs.35 This philosophical 
wisdom o f the past is to be used to grapple with modem questions, to challenge 
‘pseudo-philosophies’, and to forge a new synthesis.
Several writers have noted this over-riding aim in the entirety o f  Maritain’s work, 
namely, his desire to engage in the reconstruction o f philosophy and society, to forge a 
synthesis between the Thomist philosophy he considered had an ‘inexhaustible capacity 
for synthesis’ and the rapidly developing and ever expanding knowledge and
36understanding o f  the contemporary world o f  science, technology and philosophy.
Thus, Mortimer J. Adler, speaking o f Maritain’s book, The Degrees o f Knowledge 
(1932), wrote that he discerned in it ‘the outlines, at least, o f  a synthesis o f  science, 
philosophy and theology’ that would, he claimed, ‘do for us what St. Thomas did for 
philosophy and theology in the Middle A ges’.37 Adler added that it seemed to him that 
Maritain was ‘the only contemporary philosopher who has deeply sensed the movement
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o f history, and the point at which we stand’.
Maritain him self expressed his commitment to the application o f  Thomist principles to, 
and their synthesis with, contemporary reality in the graphic imperative: Vae mihi, si 
non Thomistizavero! ( ‘Woe to me, if I do not Thomisticize!’).39 The slogan, if  one may 
call it that, serves to underline both Maritain’s discovery o f  a personal vocation ‘to 
Thomisticize’, and the utter seriousness with which he took the world as being 
important in itself and which led to his intimate involvement with philosophic reflection 
on a comprehensive range o f reality, with works on metaphysics and epistemology, the 
philosophy o f  culture, science, history, politics, aesthetics, and education. He singly- 
handedly directed the thought o f  Aquinas beyond the largely clerical audiences targeted 
by many in the early phases o f  the Thomistic revival initiated by Leo XIII. What is 
more, he often used Thomistic categories to argue in contexts, and for conclusions, that 
might well have surprised if  not horrified St Thomas.
35 Jacques Maritain, N otebooks, Albany, New York: Magi Books, 1984, D. 135.
36 Brooke W illiams Smith, Jacques Maritain, Antim odern or U ltram odern? , N ew  York/ 
Oxford/Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1976, p. 6.
37 Donald & Idella Gallagher, The Achievements o f  Jacques and Raissa M aritain: A Bibliography, 1906- 
1961, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962, p. 16.
38 Ibid., p. 16.
39 Jacques Maritain, St Thomas Aquinas, p. viii. We should not think that, in adopting the words o f  St 
Paul (1 COR 9:16), Maritain is trivialising the original meaning o f  the text and sim ply putting Scripture to 
his own personal use.
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The fundamental idea o f  his ‘synthesis’, Maritain tells us, is ‘to bring into play at one 
and the same time’, in the concrete problems and needs o f  our mind, ‘things we know to 
be diverse in essence, but which we want to unify within us’, such as reason and faith, 
philosophy and theology, metaphysics, poetry and politics, and the ‘great rush o f  new  
knowledge and new questions brought by modem culture’.40 Resorting on occasion to 
quite remarkable imagery, Maritain compares this synthesis, or integration, to ‘throwing 
into the bath, Thomism all bristling with its quills’, and discovering that ‘it swims there 
with ease’.41 It should be noted, however, that the whole idea o f  the Maritain 
‘synthesis’, or ‘application’ o f Thomist principles, to secure an understanding of, and 
guidance concerning appropriate action in concrete situations, is a notion that has been, 
and continues to be critiqued.
Maritain’s ‘synthesis’, or application o f  Thomist principles to concrete situations, seems 
to express a preference for an understanding o f the philosophy o f  education that justifies 
the importation o f  principles from without, as against the interpretation o f  situations 
from within, in the search for meaning and significance. Unless his ‘synthetic’ or 
‘integrative’ activity is interpreted with great care, Maritain would appear to have 
ignored, or perhaps rejected, D ew ey’s admonition that philosophy o f education should 
not be seen as an application o f philosophy to practice.42 The whole question o f  the 
validity o f  Maritain’s approach becomes critical at a time when most contemporary 
philosophers o f  education do not appear to philosophise by ‘applying’ a philosophical 
position to a current educational situation or problem. This is a matter to which attention 
will be given below and it is an issue where appropriate comparison o f  Maritain’s 
philosophy o f education with the work o f  some other contemporary philosophers o f  
education, such as, for example, Bernard J.F. Lonergan and Terence H. McLaughlin, 
might bear fruitful results.
The start o f  Maritain’s life and work as a Thomist philosopher was fittingly signalled by 
the publication o f  his book, St Thomas Aquinas, in 1930. A  clear message emerges from 
this book: Thomism is not to be ‘relegated to the limbo o f  dead systems’.43 Thomism, as 
Maritain outlines it here, and as Gerald B. Phelan correctly interprets him, is not ‘an
40 Jacques Maritain, Distinguish to Unite, or, The D egrees o f  K now ledge, N ew  York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, [1932], 1959, p. 135
41 Ib id , p. 136.
42 See, John D ew ey, D em ocracy and Education, N ew  York: Macmillan, 1916.
43 Christopher Dawson & J.F. Bums (eds.), Essays in Order, N ew  York: Macmillan, 1931, p. xv.
archaeological Thomism’, a mere historical thing, a system o f thought, vital perhaps in 
the past, but interesting in our age merely as a historical phase o f  human reflection.44 
For Maritain, according to Waldemar Gurian, Thomism is, in its substance, ‘an 
expression o f  universal truth, able to incorporate the truth o f  all times and capable o f  
being liberated from its purely historical elements and conditions’.45 Again and again, 
Maritain is at pains to stress that his Thomist doctrine is ‘not a medieval Thomism’, but 
a living and present system o f thought: ‘Thomism is truly the perennial philosophy’.46
Maritain resisted attempts to ‘modernize Thomism’, demanding that all abide by the 
letter and the spirit o f  Aquinas. He became irked with the whole notion o f  a ‘neo- 
Thomist philosophy’. ‘There is no weo-Thomist philosophy’, he declared, ‘there is only 
a Thomist philosophy’. Yet, paradoxically, he him self did modernize it, and in doing so 
added new insights to the thirteenth century philosophy o f  St Thomas which rendered it 
more capable o f  being applicable in modem times. Maritain found solutions to a whole 
range o f  modem problems in Thomism, making it for him at least, relevant to a whole 
spectrum o f  human and contemporary areas o f  life including education. He admitted, 
however, that Thomism does not profess to be the panacea for the ills o f  modem life 
and in any case its usage cannot dispense with the need for intellectual effort, especially 
that reason which is enlightened by faith, in the search for meaning that characterizes 
human life. Maritain frequently insists that he ‘does not wish to destroy but to purify 
modem thought’, and to ‘integrate everything true’ that has been discovered since the 
time o f  Saint Thomas.47 Maritain’s Thomist philosophy emphasizes more and more the 
dignity and proper ends o f  human nature and o f  temporal history in Christian thought. 
With the rise o f  totalitarianism, Maritain began to insist more emphatically on the 
fundamental value o f  a democratic philosophy o f life and society.48
The never ending theme o f the ‘always newness and ever relevance’ o f  Thomism  
continues to be stressed throughout Maritain’s St Thomas Aquinas. Thomism is ‘not a 
medieval mummy to be studied archaeologically, but an armoury o f  the living 
intelligence and the necessary equipment for the boldest explorations’.49 Aquinas did
44 Gerald B. Phelan, Jacques M aritain , London: Sheed & Ward, 1937, p. 31.
45 Waldemar Gurian, “On Maritain’s Political Philosophy”, The Thomist, January, 1943, pp. 9-12. This 
edition o f  The Thomist was a Special edition devoted to the life and work o f  Maritain.
46 Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 15.
47 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
48 “On Maritain’s Political Philosophy”, pp. 9-12.
49 Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 20.
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not write for the thirteenth century but for our time; he is to be regarded as a 
contemporary writer, ‘the most present o f  all thinkers’.50 Maritain is certain that he is 
‘not trying to include the past in the present, but to maintain in the now the presence o f  
the eternal’.51 The philosophy o f Aquinas is ‘o f  its very nature a progressive and 
assimilative philosophy’, a ‘missionary philosophy’ and, above all, it is ‘not a relic o f  
the Middle A ges’.52
One particular priority for this perennial philosophy was, in Maritain’s view, the 
restoration o f  unity to Western culture. Donald A. Gallagher notes that a philosophical 
perspective on culture runs like a leitmotiv through Maritain’s social and political 
writings and is a clear testimony to his belief that the philosopher ‘should not dwell in 
an ivory tower’ but should be concerned with the role o f  philosophy for all dimensions 
o f human society.53 Aquinas is our ‘predestined guide in the reconstruction o f Christian 
culture’, Maritain declared.54 The unity o f  a culture, he wrote, is determined by ‘a 
common philosophical structure, a certain metaphysical and moral attitude, a common 
scale o f  values’, and the Thomist synthesis offers ‘a means par excellence o f  achieving 
the unity o f  Christian culture’. Maritain’s views on education, as we shall see in the 
following section, have to be understood in this context since Thomist education is 
fundamentally about ‘the salvation of the intellect’ and ‘the expansion o f  liberty’, two 
essential conditions for human growth and unity.55
50 Ibid., p. 70.
51 Ibid., pp 18-19
52 Ibid., pp. 80, 103.
53 Donald A. Gallagher, “The Philosophy o f Culture in Jacques Maritain”, pp. 277-285 (277). In: Peter A. 
Redpath (ed.), From Twilight to Dawn: The Cultural Vision o f  Jacques M aritain , Notre Dame: Notre 
Dame University Press, 1990.
54 Ibid., pp. 69, 8 4 ,8 7 .
II
The Philosophy of Education of Jacques Maritain: Education at the 
Crossroads (1943) 56
Jacques Maritain’s philosophy o f education, articulated on occasion quite briefly and in 
part only, on other occasions at greater length and in more depth, sometimes expressed 
by incidental remarks, at other times by deliberate reference, through many lectures and 
philosophical works, has been brought together in a relatively small number o f  
published studies. The most notable of these is, without doubt, Maritain’s Education at 
the Crossroads, first published in 1943.57 Other important sources o f  Maritain’s 
reflections on education have been collected, in whole or in part, by Donald and Idella
58Gallagher in The Education o f Man: The Educational Philosophy o f Jacques Maritain.
A third text o f  relevance for an understanding o f Catholic education from a Thomist 
standpoint is Jacques Maritain, “Thomist V iews on Education”, a lecture published in 
1955, in the Fifty-Fourth Yearbook of The National Society fo r the Study o f Education?9 
These works will be sufficient to demonstrate the outline o f  a Catholic philosophy o f  
education such as Maritain has drawn it during the latter half o f  the twentieth century.
A proper assessment o f  Maritain’s philosophy o f  education should begin from as 
comprehensive and accurate a picture o f  his position as it is possible to give within the 
limits o f this dissertation. A first priority in this section, therefore, must be to outline 
succinctly what might be considered to be the more enduring (and therefore more 
relevant) beliefs and philosophical principles which comprise Maritain’s theory o f  
education. As a matter o f  practical necessity in the main, the focus here will be on 
Maritain’s flag-ship treatment o f  the ‘aims, principles, and dynamics o f  education’, as 
these are presented in E C  (1943).
For a more complete appreciation o f his educational thinking, this text needs to be 
complemented and reinforced by reference to various articles and books containing
56 Jacques Maritain, Education at the C rossroads , N ew  Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1943.
57 This text w ill be cited throughout this section as: E C  (1943), follow ed by the relevant page number.
58 Donald & Idella Gallagher (ed.s), The Education o f  Man: The Educational Philosophy o f  Jacques 
M aritain , Notre Dame, IND: University o f  Notre Dame Press, 1962. Herefafter: EM  (1962).
59 Jacques Maritain, “Thomist Views on Education”, pp. 57-90. In, N elson B. Henry (ed.), Philosophy 
and Education: Fifty-Fourth Yearbook o f  the N ational Society fo r  the Study o f  Education. Chicago: 
University o f  Chicago Press, 1955.
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further philosophical reflection relevant to Maritain’s study o f  education. Because 
Maritain was truly integral in his thinking, there are a number o f  key ideas throughout 
his work generally that might also be used, both to situate his educational thought in 
broader relief and to provide (in the final section o f this chapter) a kind o f  internal 
standard for the assessment o f his potential in regard to the task o f  re-articulating 
Catholic philosophy o f education.
Maritain, as is apparent from the first section o f  this chapter, is an incredibly complex 
thinker, highly resistant to simplification, and his educational ideas are inextricably 
linked with more general features o f  his thinking. Maritain’s educational thought as it is 
outlined in EC(1943) demands, therefore, to be read against the backdrop o f  the more 
distinctive features o f his philosophy in general, if  a truly comprehensive picture o f  his 
philosophy o f  Catholic education is to be presented. This is especially true in respect o f  
E C  (1943) both because o f the particular setting in which this series o f  lectures was first 
delivered, and because this occasion was probably never intended by Maritain to be his 
definitive statement on the philosophy o f  Catholic education.
E C  (1943) is a short, relatively condensed work which needs to have its high principles 
elaborated in greater detail, and the depth o f  their implications drawn out to a greater 
extent than it was possible for Maritain to achieve in the four short Terry Lectures 
delivered by invitation at Yale University before a largely non-Catholic audience in 
1943. In the course o f these lectures, Maritain did not make explicit reference to his 
Catholic identity or to the specificity o f  his Christian philosophy.60 On the other hand, 
he made no attempt to disguise the fact that he was proud to philosophize in the 
tradition o f  Aquinas, nor would the temptation to do otherwise ever have been 
entertained by him.
That Maritain5 s Catholicism played a very unobtrusive part in these lectures on the 
philosophy o f  education is a fact worth noting. This may have been in deference and 
respect to the (then) Presbyterian ethos o f  Yale, or out o f  a desire to be generally 
pluralist in his remarks before an American audience. Maritain would certainly have 
welcomed this opportunity to be a participant in Yale’s Terry lecture series on ‘Religion
60 One might note two small exceptions to this remark. (1) Maritain, ‘speaking from a Catholic point o f  
v iew ’, comments on the need to create ‘centres o f  spiritual enlightenment, or schools o f  w isdom ’ along  
the lines o f  Catholic religious and monastic orders and the confraternities o f  laymen associated with them. 
(2) Maritain expresses his opinion, ‘as a Catholic’, concerning ‘the abiding sense o f  the reality o f  original 
sin ’. See EC (1943), pp. 85 and 94, respectively.
in the Light o f  Science and Philosophy’. For Maritain, there was never any question that 
religion should concern itself with the nature and problems o f contemporary education.
It is remarkable too that Maritain’s Thomistic perspective on education was considered 
appropriate by this group o f  academics for the time and place in question.
Whatever Maritain’s reasons for his discretion about his religious affiliation and 
philosophical stand-point. it is probably the case that the specificity o f  the situation 
precludes us from reading o ff directly from these lectures a comprehensive Catholic 
philosophy o f  education, despite the undoubted presence o f  the Christian (even the 
Thomistic) tradition o f  educational thought richly reflected in them. Much depends, o f  
course, on the degree to which it is proper to identify Catholic philosophy o f  education 
with Thomist theories relating to key aspects o f  Catholic educational thinking and 
practice. Since this is a matter to be discussed in greater detail in a later section, it is 
appropriate and convenient to defer it for the moment and to turn to an analysis o f  some 
o f the more important aspects o f  Maritain’s philosophy o f  education in E C  (1943).
Review of Selected Aspects of Education at the Crossroads (1943)
Two features might be selected as important for a study o f  Maritain’s philosophy o f  
education as it is developed in E C  (1943). Firstly, the context o f  the study needs to be 
commented upon; secondly, its extensive discussion o f  the aims o f education and how  
these have been (in Maritain’s judgment) ‘m isconceived’ deserves to be noted.
Education at the Crossroads: General Introductory Comments on Context
In the opening paragraphs o f E C  (1943), Maritain asserts that ‘the chief task o f  
education is above all to shape man’, or ‘to guide the evolving dynamism through which 
man forms him self as a man’.61 He remarks that he might for that reason have given this 
series o f  lectures the alternative title o f  ‘The Education o f Man ’ (sic).62 Here, Maritain 
situates him self in a long tradition o f ‘formative education’, with historic roots in 
ancient Greece and Rome, a tradition appropriated by the Thomist-Aristotelian tradition 
of philosophical reflection, and becoming in time the most characteristic feature o f  the 
Catholic tradition o f  educational thought. Maritain further notes that the word
61 EC (1943), p. 1.
62 There seem s to be no alternative but to retain Maritain’s non-inclusive usage throughout, in the 
interests o f  accuracy and faithfulness to his text. Maritain uses the word ‘man’ to mean any person, male 
or female, o f  a rational human nature. There is no intention on his part, or mine, to engage in gender 
discrimination.
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‘education5 has for him ‘a triple yet inter-mingled connotation5, that allows it to refer to 
either ‘any process whatsoever by means o f  which man is shaped and led toward 
fulfilment5, or to the ‘task o f  formation which adults intentionally undertake with regard
63to youth5, or, in its strictest sense, to ‘the special tasks o f  schools and universities5.
To conceive education as a process which ‘shapes man and leads him toward fulfilment5 
posits two fundamental dilemmas for the educator, namely, the problem o f  having a 
clear understanding o f  the ‘nature o f  man5 as such, and the problem o f comprehending 
what constitutes man's ‘personal and spiritual awakening, his growth and fulfilment5.64 
These are issues which Maritain deliberately raises at the outset o f E C  (1943). They are 
critical problems for a Christian philosopher who regards true education, which would 
secure the ‘practical and concrete position o f  the human creature before God and his 
destiny5, as a step on the way to an ‘integral humanism5.65 To the question concerning 
the nature o f  man, Maritain will advance as his view  the ‘Greek, Jewish and Christian 
idea o f  man5, that is,
[M]an as an animal endowed with reason, whose supreme dignity is in the intellect; man as a 
free individual in personal relation with God, whose supreme righteousness consists in 
voluntarily obeying the law o f  God; and man as a sinful and wounded creature called to divine 
life and to the freedom o f  grace, whose supreme perfection consists o f  love .66
For some educators, Maritain5 s Christian faith and the integral references in his 
arguments to the data o f  Christian revelation, as amply exemplified in this definition o f  
the human being, make his anthropology somewhat problematical. On the other hand, 
the Catholic educator will easily recognise in Maritain5 s description o f  human beings 
echoes o f  a similar definition to be found in that classic statement o f  Catholic 
philosophy o f education, namely, the encyclical letter o f  Pius XI, Divini Illius Magistri, 
On the Christian Education o f Youth (1929). Pius XI wrote that
[T]he subject o f  Christian education is man whole and entire, soul united to body in unity o f  
nature, with all his faculties natural and supernatural, such as right reason and revelation show  
him to be; man, therefore, fallen from his original state, but redeemed by Christ and restored to 
the supernatural condition o f  adopted son o f  G od.67
The encyclical added that
63 EC (1943), p. 2.
64 Frank O ’ M alley, “The Education o f  Man”, in: The Review  o f  Politics, Vol. 6, N o. 1 (Jan., 1944), pp. 3- 
17 (3)
65 Jacques Maritain, True Humanism , N ew  York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1938, chapter 1.
66 EC (1943), p. 7.
67 Pius XI, D IM  (1929), No. 58.
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[T]here can be no true education which is not wholly directed to man’s last end, since the whole 
work o f  education is intimately and necessarily connected with, and consists in, preparing man 
for what he must be and for what he must do here below, in order to attain the sublime end for 
which he was created.68
Maritain endorsed completely the essential teleology that is central to the Catholic 
vision o f education.
Ascribing ‘appropriate aims’ to education, is a crucial consideration for Maritain’s 
educational philosophy. His first concern in this series o f lectures is to draw our 
attention to the fact that contemporary education is blighted by a serious o f  
‘misconceptions’ concerning not only the nature o f  man, but in equally disastrous 
measure, ‘misconceptions’ relating also to how the personal and spiritual awakening, 
the growth and fulfilment o f the human person, might be enshrined as an over-riding 
aim in education. Maritain sets out, in characteristic fashion, on the basis o f  a 
considered philosophical analysis o f  human nature, to correct these various 
misconceptions and to propose instead a set o f  aims that will ‘help and guide man 
toward his own human achievement’.69 This path will lead him in the end to recommend 
a single basic type o f  humanistic education for all children that may be called liberal, 
both in the sense o f  liberating the energies o f  the human personality, and in preparing 
free men and women to live together in a democratic community.70
Before entering into detailed discussion about the substantive issues involved here, it is 
important first o f  all to comment upon Maritain’s general approach to and analysis o f  
the several ‘misconceptions’ concerning the aims o f  education he highlights. To fail to 
do so might run the risk o f incorrectly interpreting the emphasis and sense o f  contrast 
with which he is accustomed throughout the first two lectures in E C  (1943) to develop 
his argument. Maritain, as an accomplished philosopher, engages in a two-fold process 
o f  clarifying what he identifies as the critical problems o f education before presenting 
what he regards as possible alternatives or solutions. His approach is broadly 
comparable to the analytical approach o f  Terence H. McLaughlin, the subject o f  
discussion in chapter four below.
This two-fold process o f ‘analysis’ followed by ‘synthesis’ is a methodology Maritain
68 Ibid,, No. 7.
69 E C  (1943), p. 4.
70 John Herman Randall Jr, “Review o f  Education at the Crossroads  by Jacques Maritain”, pp. 609-614  
(609). In: The Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol. 40, N o. 22 (Oct., 1943).
considered to have been deployed in an excellent way by Aquinas, in whose footsteps 
he sought to follow, both in respect o f the content and manner or style o f  argument. His 
preference for this approach to philosophising is clear in what is regarded by many as 
the most notable achievement o f Maritain’s long and fruitful literary career, namely, his 
book entitled Distinguer pour unir: Ou, Les degrés du savoir, (1932).71 The usual title, 
Degrees o f Knowledge, and its effective sub-title, ‘Distinguish in Order to Unite’, 
describes precisely what Maritain is doing constantly throughout his philosophizing and 
is exemplified here in his discussion o f the ‘seven misconceptions o f  aims’ o f  modem  
education he identifies. No doubt, too, Maritain was perfectly aware o f  an earlier and 
most eminent proponent o f  the art o f ‘analysis - synthesis’, namely, Augustine, a 
process he directed ultimately toward an integral understanding o f  all reality. ‘Whether I 
divide things up or join them together, I have the same end in view, the same object o f  
love’, wrote Augustine. ‘But, when I divide (analyse) them, I aim at their purification;
72when I rejoin (synthesise) them, it is with a view to their integration’.
The cmaking o f  distinctions’ was another characteristic procedure o f  scholastic 
philosophy and remains an important element even in much contemporary analytic 
philosophy. Maritain’s distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ conceptions o f  the aims o f  
education is not simply for effect; it is no mere charade, nor an exercise in knocking 
down ‘straw m en’. It is a characteristic strategy o f  Maritain, a feature o f  his ‘dialectic’ 
one might say, to teach us something in two contrasting ways: we learn from what he 
specifically asserts about a given reality, and we also learn from the erroneous 
understandings that he identifies in the assertions o f  his opponents. Maritain analyses 
situations in the light o f  his Thomistic creed, high-lights the errors therein, and removes 
the falsity. Then, following the example o f  Augustine and Aquinas (not to mention 
Aristotle, Socrates, and Plato), he seeks to generate true insight in a synthesis with the 
unquestioning truth which derives from Christian revelation and Thomist doctrine. This 
is essentially what Maritain intends when he tells us that he is ‘applying Thomist 
principles’ in all areas, including education, o f  contemporary life.
y
Being thus aware o f Maritain’s intention and methodology throughout this series o f  
lectures on the meaning and goals o f education, we are better placed to appreciate the
71 Jacques Maritain, Distinguish to Unite: Or, The D egrees o f  K now ledge, N ew  York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1959. Hereafter cited as: Degrees o f  Knowledge.
72 St. Augustine, D e Ordine (On Order), 2.18.48. Cited in: Jean Guitton, The M odernity o f  St Augustine, 
London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1959, p. 34.
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rich and positive vision o f  education presented here, and especially its role in the 
promotion o f  an integral humanism, the foundation upon which Maritain believed both 
earthly and heavenly fulfilment and salvation, under the action o f  God’s grace, 
ultimately depended. Maritain’s prime goal, Donald A. Gallagher claims, is the 
provision o f ‘an integral education for integral humanism’, a watchword uttered by 
Maritain him self and not a mere slogan.73 ‘Liberal’ education, as Maritain understands 
it, is critically important for the promotion o f  a ‘new humanism’ that is the only answer 
to the contemporary crisis in civilisation.74
Education at the Crossroads: ‘Misconceptions’ About the Aims of Education
In discussing the aims o f  education Maritain highlights what he regards as ‘significant 
misconceptions’ about aims, ranging from either a ‘disregard o f  the ends’ o f  education, 
or ‘false ideas about ends’, both defects stemming from a common source, namely, the 
‘absence o f  the Christian idea o f  man’, to misunderstandings about approaches to 
education (such as ‘pragmatism’) and methods o f  education (such as ‘social 
conditioning’), finally to over-emphasis on, and exaggerated optimism about, the 
direction and development o f  intellect (‘intellectualism’), and will ( ‘voluntarism’).75 
There is no need to discuss all o f  these ‘misconceptions’ to an equal extent since all are 
not equally relevant or urgent for the contemporary educator. ‘M isconceptions’, like the 
‘conceptions’ o f  which they are a mis-construal, always arise within a particular social 
and historical context and are thus historically sensitive.
Neither is it necessary here to present every detail o f these ‘misconceptions’, nor does it 
seem realistic to try to make a summary o f  what is already a brief and compact 
discussion o f  the issues by the author. Instead, I shall attempt to identify in each case 
the process o f  Maritain’s argument in terms o f  the analysis/synthesis methodology 
implicit in his ‘making o f  distinctions’ to which I have drawn attention above. I shall 
also note Maritain’s substantive conclusions about the true aims o f  education as he 
conceives them. Throughout his presentation, it is important to note that, for Maritain, 
education is primarily an intellectual activity aimed at the formation o f  the intellect and 
the life o f  reason.
73 Donald A. Gallagher, “Integral Education for Integral Humanism”, pp. 274-288. In; Deal W. Hudson 
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Education and the Christian idea of Man
According to Maritain, the most glaring weakness o f  much education is the failure to 
keep in mind that its aim is ‘the perfection o f  the humanity o f  human beings’.76 If, 
however, the aim o f education is conceived as the ‘helping and guiding o f  man toward 
his own human achievement’, then education ‘cannot escape the problems and 
entanglements o f  philosophy’, for it must o f  necessity have an answer to the question, 
‘What is man?’77 Maritain clearly distinguishes between the ‘scientific’ and 
‘philosophical-religious’ answers that have been given to this question and concludes 
that ‘the complete and integral idea o f man which is the prerequisite o f  education can 
only be a philosophical and religious idea o f  man’, though he readily admits that there 
are ‘many forms o f the philosophical and religious ideas o f  man’.78
Maritain emphasises that the identity o f  man is fundamentally a philosophical issue 
because the idea ‘pertains to the nature or essence o f  man’ and has, therefore, an 
‘ontological content’ that deals with ‘the essential and intrinsic, though not visible or 
tangible character o f  that being which we call man’.79 He insists equally that the idea o f  
man is a religious one because o f  ‘the existential status o f  this human nature in relation 
to God’.80 Maritain does not envisage, in this particular context at least, the contribution 
that the social sciences such as psychology and sociology make to our understanding o f  
the nature and functioning o f human beings. This might be considered a distinct 
weakness in his theory o f  education, but it cannot be assumed that he did not consider 
this dimension important. One must rather accept the priority he gives here to 
metaphysical reflection and assess his work on that basis.
Maritain concludes that the education o f  man, in order to be ‘completely well-grounded’ 
must be based upon ‘the Christian idea o f  man’, because ‘this idea o f  man is the true 
one’.81 Maritain does not here set out to justify this claim, so remarkably similar to that 
o f  Pius XI, that the Christian idea o f man is ‘the true one’, and that it is essential for the 
theory and practice o f  education. Maritain, however, is well aware o f  the fact that ‘the 
universal assent o f all minds’ is impossible to obtain but, in any case, he does not regard
76 EC (1943), pp. 3-4.
77 EC (1943), p. 4.
78 EC (1943), pp. 4-6.
79 EC (1943), p. 5.
80 EC (1943), p. 6.
81 EC (1943), p. 6.
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this as necessary.82 He recognises the existence o f  ‘diverse great metaphysical 
outlooks’, and ‘forms o f Christian creeds, or even o f  religious creeds in general’, but if  
the former recognise ‘the dignity o f  the [human] spirit’, and the latter, ‘the divine 
destiny o f  man’, this makes it possible, he is convinced, ‘even for those who do not 
share in the creed o f  its supporters’, for all ‘to play an inspiring part in the concert’ that
83is a ‘well-founded and rationally developed’ Christian philosophy o f  education.
‘Person’ and ‘Individual’
From a philosophical point o f  view, Maritain contends that the main concept to be 
stressed concerning the nature o f education and its aims is that o f  the ‘human person’.84 
Man is a person, says Maritain, who ‘holds him self in the hand by his intelligence and 
w ill’.85 Human beings are not to be understood as mere physical beings, or their 
existence to be fathomed and explained in terms o f  sense experience alone. Man has ‘a
ft
spiritual super-existence’, manifest through his capacity to know and to love. At the 
root o f  this unique power to know and to love, Maritain asserts, is ‘the full 
philosophical reality that is the concept o f  the soul’.87 The human person exists by 
virtue o f  the existence o f  his or her soul. It is the spirit which is the root o f  
personality.88 It is this ‘mystery o f  our nature’, Maritain writes, which religious thought
89designates when it says that ‘the person is in the image o f God’. A person possesses 
‘absolute dignity’ because he is ‘in direct relationship with the realm of being, truth, 
goodness, and beauty, and with God, and it is only through this relationship that he can 
arrive at his complete fulfilment’.90
Of all the distinctions made by Maritain in order to create his integral vision of 
humanity, synthesised by faith and reason, the distinction between ‘personality’ (or 
personhood’) and ‘individuality’ is perhaps the most crucial in the context of his 
educational thought. Personality is only one aspect, or one pole of the human being, 
according to Maritain.91 The other pole is ‘individuality’.92 The same man, the same
82 E C  (1943), p. 7.
83 E C  (1943), pp. 6-7.
84 EC (1943), pp. 7-10.
85 EC (1943), p. 8.
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‘entire person’ who is, in one sense, ‘a person or a whole made independent by his 
spiritual soul’, is also, in another sense, ‘a material individual, a fragment o f  a species, a 
part o f  the physical universe’.93 In graphic terms, Maritain declares that a man’s 
humanity is still ‘the humanity o f  an animal’, living by sense and instinct as well as by 
reason.94 Man is a horizon in which two worlds, the spiritual and the material, meet, 
Maritain concludes.95
In the context o f  this distinction between ‘personality’ (or, perhaps, being more true to 
Maritain’s thinking, ‘personhood’) and ‘individuality’, Mario D ’Souza has drawn 
attention to the fact that postmodernism has much to say about the nature o f  the human 
subject and what it terms the development o f  human subjectivity that is at odds with 
Maritain’s view .96 One o f the implications o f  postmodernism, according to Tom 
Kitwood, is ‘the collapse o f  the unitary subject’, that is, ‘the one who knows his or her 
aims and desires, and works towards their attainment through an instrumental 
rationality’.97
In a later chapter o f  this thesis, Bernard Lonergan will be seen to offer an approach to 
the human subject, based on his cognitional theory, which in many respects diverges 
from Maritain’s understanding but, perhaps, enables us to avoid some o f the difficulties 
encountered in Maritain’s person / individual distinction. Lonergan, as we shall see, 
does not accept the Aristotelian account o f  the soul that is at the basis o f  Maritain’s 
distinction and he, therefore, avoids the temptation to resort to faculty psychology in 
describing the capacities o f  the human soul. While Maritain is concerned with the 
faculties o f  the soul that make knowledge and freedom possible, Lonergan places his 
emphasis on what constitutes knowledge, on the nature o f  human knowing, and its 
invariant structure and method.
92 Elsewhere, Maritain has much to say on the distinction he makes between ‘person’ and individual’ and 
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Humanism: Tem poral and Spiritual Problem s o f  a N ew Christendom , N ew  York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, [1936], 1968.
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Education and Freedom
Maritain regarded the ‘aspirations o f the human person to freedom’ as a critically 
important matter in education and understood the purpose and function o f  education to 
be about ‘the conquest of internal freedom’.98 In this context, also, Maritain makes a 
number o f  important distinctions as he develops his argument. One such distinction is 
that between what he terms the freedom deriving from free will, ‘human nature’s gift to 
us’, by means o f  which we make free (but situated and necessarily restricted) choices, 
and the freedom which is ‘spontaneity, expansion, or autonomy’, which is not given, 
but which we have to ‘gain through constant effort and struggle’.99 One o f  the most 
‘profound and essential forms’ o f  such an aspiration to freedom, Maritain maintains, is 
the ‘desire for inner and spiritual freedom’, identified by Aristotle as the ‘independence 
which is granted to men by intellect and wisdom as the perfection o f the human 
being’.100 This inner and spiritual freedom is also to be identified with the ‘perfection o f  
love and the freedom o f those who are moved by the divine Spirit’, o f  which the 
Christian Gospel speaks.101
The ‘prime goal o f  education’ for Maritain is the ‘conquest o f  internal and spiritual 
freedom’ to be achieved by the individual person, or, in other words, ‘his liberation 
through knowledge and wisdom, good will, and love’.102 This freedom is not, for 
Maritain, to be identified with ‘a mere unfolding o f  potentialities without any object to 
be grasped’, or ‘a movement o f  the will undirected toward any specific aim or 
objective’.103 Maritain recognises that the conquest o f  ‘internal and spiritual freedom’ 
may well be an aim which, ‘here on earth, will only ever be grasped in a partial and 
imperfect manner’.104 Yet, Maritain is certain, the aim will somehow be grasped, even if  
only partially.
Echoing the Gospel message that ‘the truth shall make you free’ (Jn. 8:32), Maritain 
expounds upon his understanding o f truth, stressing that ‘truth does not depend on us 
but on what i s ’.'05 Truth cannot be regarded as ‘a set o f  ready-made formulae to be
n  EC (1943), pp. 10-12.
99 EC (1943), p p .  10-11.
100 EC (1943), p. 11.
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passively recorded’, for this inevitably results in the mind being ‘closed’, according to 
Maritain. Truth is ‘an infinite realm, as infinite as being’, whose ‘wholeness transcends 
infinitely our powers o f  perception’.106 This conquest o f  truth, the ‘progressive 
attainment o f new truths’, or the ‘progressive realization o f the ever-growing and ever- 
renewed significance o f  truth already attained’, opens and enlarges our mind and life, 
and situates them in freedom and autonomy’.107
Much o f what Maritain asserts here on the conquest o f  internal freedom through the 
acquisition o f truth is reminiscent o f  Newman’s well-known description o f  
‘enlargement o f  the mind’.108 ‘Enlargement’, or ‘enlightenment o f  the mind’, Newman 
writes, consists, ‘not merely in the passive reception into the mind o f  a number o f  ideas 
hitherto unknown to it’, but in the mind’s ‘energetic and simultaneous action upon, and 
towards, and among those new ideas.109 An education that has as its priority the 
‘enlargement’ or ‘enlightenment o f  the mind’ is a challenging goal for Catholic 
philosophy and practice o f  education, when society generally conceives a largely 
instrumental purpose for schooling. In chapter five, this dissertation will consider 
whether, and how, the engagement of a philosopher like Maritain with the recent 
educational discourse o f  the CCE might promote this kind o f ‘fine-grained’ education 
and provide all children and young people with a ‘liberal’ education so defined.
Maritain’s education posits a distinctive emphasis on the ‘transcendentals’ -  on unity, 
truth, goodness, and beauty -  that is a striking feature o f  his educational reflection. The 
‘transcendentals’ are, according to Maritain, following Aquinas, the essential properties 
o f every real being. They are what educators wish to inspire in and elicit from students 
and it is precisely through these properties o f  being claims Gregory Kerr, interpreting 
Maritain, that man can arrive at his complete fulfilment.110 For Maritain, ‘the moment 
one touches a transcendental, one touches being itse lf  and he adds that, ‘it is 
remarkable that men really communicate with one another only by passing through
106 EC (1943), p. 12.
107 EC (1943), p. 12.
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being, or one o f  its properties’.111 Human nature’s ultimate aspirations, Maritain 
suggests, are ‘along the pathway o f the transcendentals’, and may be promoted 
educationally by three different means. Firstly, towards true understanding of, and 
judgment about the real, including the knower’s authentic understanding o f  him self as 
knower; secondly, towards an appreciation o f  what is truly good and the fulfilment o f  
the person’s own nature, including the realization o f  his freedom and responsibility; and 
thirdly towards an appreciation o f  the beautiful, including the development o f  the 
capacity to discover the ordered beauty and intelligibility o f  things.112
Maritain’s efforts to get as complete a picture as possible o f the aims o f education, 
makes it necessary for him to focus on the intentional spiritual activities o f  the human 
being that are related to intelligence and free will. Yet, he is by no means unaware o f  
the fact that human existence is an embodied and social existence and that the 
‘formative tradition’ o f Christian education to which he is heir must also address these 
dimensions o f  human life.113 Maritain, from very early on in this work, makes us aware 
o f the ‘practical aim o f education’, which however, is ‘best provided by the general 
human capacities developed’.114 He offers us a comprehensive description o f  the aim of 
education in the following terms:
It is to guide man in the evolving dynamism through which he shapes h im self as a human person 
- armed with knowledge, strength o f  judgment, and moral virtues - while at the same time 
conveying to him the spiritual heritage o f  the nation and the civilization in which he is involved, 
and preserving in this way the century-old achievem ents o f  generations.115
For Maritain, ‘the utilitarian aspect of education must surely not be disregarded’, but, 
equally, this ‘practical aim’, and the ‘ulterior specialized training’ that may be required, 
must never ‘imperil the essential aim o f education’.116
The ‘Social Dimension9 of Education
Besides the aspiration o f  the human person to ‘inner and spiritual freedom’, Maritain 
reflects on what he sees as another form o f  this desire, that is, the ‘desire for freedom
111 Jacques Maritain, A rt and Scholasticism, Notre Dame, IND: University o f  Notre Dame Press, 1974, p. 
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externally manifested5, which he understands lies at the very root o f  social life.117 
Social life, life in society with others, is absolutely necessary for the full development 
and growth o f  the human being. Social life allows human beings to benefit from the 
‘common good5, while at the same time rightfully ‘subordinating the individual to the 
common good for the sake o f  that good as a w hole.118
It is obvious for Maritain that man’s education must be ‘concerned with the social 
group’ and have, as one o f its aims, his preparation to play a part in society.119 Shaping 
man ‘to lead a normal, useful and cooperative life in community’, claims Maritain, or 
‘guiding the development o f  the human person in the social sphere’, awakening and 
strengthening both his ‘sense o f freedom and his sense o f  obligation and responsibility’, 
is an essential aim o f education.120 But the social purpose o f  education, for Maritain, 
Michael Tierney argues, is best attained not by any special ‘conditioning for social 
ends’, but by so ‘developing the citizen’s personality’, in harmony with, but not 
enslaved to the traditions o f  his community’, that he can ultimately take his place in 
society as an ‘autonomous person’.121
For Maritain, this social aim is ‘not the primary, but a secondary essential aim’ o f  
education.122 The distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ aim, or ‘ultimate’ and 
‘proximate’ ends in education, allows Maritain to allocate to society two quite distinct 
roles for the education it provides. The ultimate end o f  education concerns ‘the human 
person in his personal life and spiritual progress’, not in his ‘relation to the social 
environment’.123 Maritain regards ‘social conditioning’, even as a secondary aim o f  ~ 
education, as a misconception o f what is an important aim o f education. The ‘essence’ 
o f education, he insists, ‘does not consist in adapting a potential citizen to the conditions 
and interactions o f  social life’, but first in ‘making a man \ and by this very fact 
preparing a citizen.124 To be a good citizen and ‘a man o f civilization’ what matters 
above all is ‘the inner centre, the living source o f  personal conscience’, in which
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originate idealism and generosity, the sense o f  law and the sense o f  friendship, respect 
for others, but at the same time deep-rooted independence with regard to common 
opinion.125 The final end o f education, the fulfilment o f  man as a human person, is 
regarded by Maritain as an extremely high and broad aim, since it deals with ‘our very 
freedom and spirit, whose boundless potentialities can be led to full human stature only 
by means o f  constant, creative renewal5.126
Twin Heresies: ‘Intellectualism9 and ‘Voluntarism9
Two further ‘misconceptions’ about the aims o f  education, two ‘contrasting heresies5 as 
it were, arise, according to Tierney, like all heresies, from an unhealthy ‘over-emphasis 
o f what is right in its own place5.127 These Maritain refers to as ‘intellectualism5 and 
‘voluntarism5 respectively, and they come, he claims, from ‘a failure to preserve due 
proportion in regard to the powers of the human soul5.128 Commentary upon the details 
o f  these misconceptions is less pressing than to be clear about the role o f  Maritain’s 
‘faculty psychology5 in understanding their origins.
This is a feature o f  their thinking where Maritain and Lonergan, the subject o f  the 
following chapter in this dissertation, differ sharply. Lonergan, as we shall see, rarely 
speaks o f  ‘intellect5 and ‘w ill’, or their functions, on the grounds that they are ‘not 
given directly to consciousness’ but rather are reached through metaphysics.129 While 
Maritain appears to have little problem in subscribing to the Aristotelian doctrine o f  the 
soul and its powers, Lonergan, though admitting that Aristotelian psychology is not 
without ‘profound insight into human sensibility and intelligence5, nevertheless, 
maintains that ‘its basic concepts are derived, not from intentional consciousness, but 
from metaphysics’.130 Since metaphysics follows intentionality analysis for Lonergan, 
he prefers to foreground the conscious, intending subject rather than the soul.
For Lonergan, the Aristotelian concept o f  ‘soul’ does not mean the ‘subject’, but an 
‘act’, the ‘first act o f an organic body5.131 In Aristotle, Lonergan admits, there exists ‘a 
systematic account o f  the soul, its potencies, habits, operations, and their objects’, and
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though in some respects it is ‘startlingly accurate’, it is ‘incomplete and throughout 
presupposes a metaphysics’.132 Since Maritain accords a priority to metaphysics, this is 
not a problem for him and, in addition, he would probably point out that the Arisotelian 
notion o f soul has been ‘complemented by the fuller theory o f  Aquinas’.133
It is probably important not to exaggerate these differences between the scholars as far 
as the practical implications for education are concerned. Lonergan’s notion o f  the 
‘existential subject’, as we shall see in the following chapter, while it might have been 
overlooked, or under-emphasised to some extent, by the traditional categories that 
distinguished faculties o f  the soul, such as intellect and will, makes common cause with 
Maritain’s notion o f the final end o f education that is focused on ‘the fulfilment o f man 
as a human person’.134 Lonergan, too, believes that the human subject, both as ‘a 
knower’ (one that experiences, understands, and judges), and as ‘a doer’ (one that 
deliberates, evaluates, chooses, acts), by his or her own knowledge and acts, makes 
him self or herself what he or she is to be, and does so freely and responsibly. Indeed, he 
or she does so precisely because his or acts are the free and responsible expressions o f  
him self or herself. ‘We are’, as Lonergan emphatically puts it, ‘subjects by degrees’, 
and education has an essential role in assisting our authentic becom ing.135
It is a matter worth noting, perhaps, that the Christian anthropology that silently 
underpins the CCE discourse does not appear to mention the human soul. A more 
existential and personalist philosophy seems to be the basis for characterising the 
activities o f  the human subject. A more biblical based understanding regards the human 
person not in any sort o f  dualistic fashion but considers the bodily and the spiritual 
dimensions as united in the most intimate o f  relationships. ‘Though made o f  body and 
soul, man is one’.136 Human beings have certain interior qualities (interioritas) that
* * • 137make them distinctive.
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humanities, contribute to the humanising process o f  education and the promotion o f  the 
student’s growth towards personhood, and how the relation between universal values 
and growth in humanity may be compromised through premature specialization. ‘The 
intellectual nature o f  the human person is perfected by wisdom. Wisdom gently attracts 
the mind o f  man to a quest and a love for what is true and good’.
‘Voluntarism’ in general is a kind o f  excessive reaction that subordinates human 
intelligence to the w ill.139 Again, voluntarism is a question o f mis-placed emphasis. 
Education is expected to concentrate either on the will which is to be disciplined, or on 
the free expression o f nature and natural potentialities which are to be encouraged. 
Voluntarism, Maritain argued, cannot succeed in forming and strengthening the will, 
but is more likely to deform and weaken the intellect, by the very fact that it exaggerates 
the role o f  will in thought, and tries to make everything a matter o f  one’s will to 
believe.140 The primacy o f the will in human thought ‘reduces everything to arbitrary 
opinions or academic conventions’, says Maritain.141 Education o f  the will, education o f  
feeling, even formation o f  character, may in fact amount to no more than a form o f  
‘educational voluntarism’ designed to compensate for the ill effects o f  intellectualism.
It is important to make it clear that, for Maritain, the task o f  institutional education is 
primarily ‘intellectual’ in nature. Where a school imparts moral education, it must do so 
through the enlightenment o f  the intellect; it does not rightly engage in a direct 
formation o f  the will. The ‘direct and primary responsibility o f  the school’, Maritain 
writes, ‘is not moral, but intellectual in nature’ -  namely, ‘responsibility for the normal 
growth o f the intellect o f  the students’, the ‘acquisition by them o f articulate and 
sufficiently universal knowledge’, and ‘the development o f  their own inner intellectual 
capacities’. 142 At the same time, Maritain believes that ‘formation in moral life and 
virtues is an essential part’, indeed, he would say, ‘the most important part’, o f the 
primary aim o f  ‘education in the broad sense o f  the word’.143
School and college education, he argues, is not equipped to secure moral formation in ‘a
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full and complete manner’; yet it is bound to contribute positively and efficaciously to 
the moral formation o f youth.144 The responsibility for moral education rests, ‘directly 
and primarily on the family’ on the one hand, and on the other hand ‘on the religious 
community to which the family o f  the young person belongs’.145 Maritain also believes 
that since the ‘assistance o f religious education is basically needed to convey to young 
people the treasure o f  moral ideas and the moral experience o f  mankind’, it is, therefore 
‘an obligation o f the school and the college, not only to enlighten students on moral 
matters, but also to allow them to receive full religious education’.146
Maritain is at pains to stress the relationship between the will and the intellect. He 
believes that intelligence is, in and by itself, ‘nobler than the will o f  man, for its activity 
is more immaterial and universal’.147 Yet, he also believes that in regard to the things or 
the objects upon which intelligence bears, ‘it is better to will and love the good rather 
than simply to know it’.148 Moreover, Maritain concludes, it is through his will, when it 
is good, not through his intelligence, however perfect, that man is made good and 
right.149
In the context o f  institutional education, where intellect is dealt with directly, according 
to Maritain, and will is addressed indirectly through the enlightenment o f  the intellect, 
the roles o f  both intelligence and will are to be respected. Maritain underlines the 
importance o f  the relationship between intelligence and will, which, as Mario D ’Souza 
puts it, he regards as the foundation for the metaphysical and ontological formation o f  
the person.150 The upbringing o f the human being must ‘lead both intelligence and will 
toward achievement’, and the shaping o f  the will is more important to man than the 
shaping o f  the intellect.151 It is a matter o f  some regret to Maritain that, in his 
experience, while the educational system o f many schools and colleges ‘succeeds as a 
rule in equipping man’s intellect for knowledge’, it seems to be ‘missing its main
I
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Maritain and Contemporary Pedagogy
Maritain’s opening Yale lecture also affords us some light into his understanding of, 
and attitude to the ‘means/end’ problem, which has so often dogged modem educational 
discourse. In distinguishing between ‘ends’ and ‘means’ in education, Maritain, further 
to his belief that by definition there must be ends in education, is in no way oblivious to 
the question o f means. It is certainly his position that ‘the supremacy o f  means over 
end’ contributes to the ‘collapse o f  all sure purpose and real efficiency’ (understood in 
terms o f  means not actually leading to the intended aim, or the loss o f  sight o f that aim) 
and thus becomes ‘the main reproach to contemporary education’.153 Nonetheless, 
Maritain has much praise to bestow on contemporary pedagogy and the sane means 
education regularly adopts in pursuit o f legitimate goals. Thus, he admits that ‘modern 
pedagogy has made invaluable progress in stressing the necessity o f  carefully analyzing 
and fixing its gaze on the human subject’.154 For Maritain, the wrong begins when the 
‘primacy’ o f  the object to be taught is forgotten, and when ‘the cult o f  the means, not to 
an end, but without an end’, results in a form o f ‘psychological worship’ o f  the 
subject.155
Maritain is quite prepared to admit that, in contemporary pedagogy, ‘the means are not 
bad’; on the contrary, ‘they are generally much better than those o f  the old 
pedagogy’.156 In fact, Maritain complimented his American audience on the discovery 
o f  ‘educational ways and means better fitted for the nature and dignity o f  all the 
children o f man’, and went so far as to say that the ‘democratization o f education’ 
which facilitated this, ‘constituted one o f  the glories o f  the country’.157 Maritain 
welcomed too what was perhaps the main discovery o f  so-called ‘progressive 
education’, namely, that ‘the principal agent and dynamic factor (in education) is not the 
art o f  the teacher but the inner principle o f  activity, the inner dynamism o f  nature and 
the mind o f the child’.158 The goals and techniques o f  progressive education he found in 
large measure promising, always provided, o f  course, that the due and irreplaceable role 
o f the teacher is not overly restricted. Such a positive attitude contrasts sharply with
153 EC (1943), p. 3.
154 EC (1943), p. 14.
155 EC (1943), p. 14.
156 EC (1943), p. 3.
157 EC (1943), p. 118.
158 EC (1943), p. 82.
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what was then the official attitude o f  Catholic educators generally to D ew ey’s work.159
To have ‘made education more experiential’, Maritain also acknowledged, ‘closer to 
concrete life’, and ‘permeated with social concerns from the very start’, is an 
achievement o f  which modem education is ‘justly proud’. 160 He is, nevertheless, 
careful to add that ‘without abstract insight and intellectual enlightenment the more 
striking experiences (o f human life) are o f  no use to man’.161 In connection with the 
question o f  ‘experience’ and the focus on the child in pedagogy it is worth recalling that 
Maritain was in no way hostile to the teaching methods as such promoted by John 
Dewey and his followers. In the following passage, although he is not explicitly named, 
Maritain appears to offer a fair appreciation o f D ew ey’s approach and methodology in 
education. Maritain writes that
[T]he conception which makes education itself a constantly renewed experiment, starting from
the pupil’s present purposes and developing in one way or another according to the success o f
his problem-solving activity with regard to these purposes and to new purposes arising from
broadened experience in unforeseen directions, such a pragmatist conception has its own merits
when it com es to the necessity o f  adapting educational methods to the natural interests o f  the 
162
pupil.
What Maritain would be most concerned with in regard to this is, o f  course, ‘the 
standards forjudging the purposes and values’ thus successively emerging in the pupil’s 
mind, and the question o f whether the teacher has, or has not, ‘a general aim and a set o f  
final values to which the whole process is related’.
In his comments about ‘pragmatic, instrumentalist, and progressive education’,
Maritain expresses concern about ‘a pragmatic over-emphasis in education’.164 The 
‘crossroads’ o f  the title o f Maritain’s premier work on philosophy o f  education focuses 
precisely on the important distinction Maritain made between ‘pragmatic and 
instrumentalist philosophy’ and the ‘personalist and humanist venture’ in education.165 
It would be a mistake, however, to interpret Maritain as rejecting out o f  hand the 
notions o f ‘action’ and ‘praxis’, which he considers essential to the notion o f
159 Here, if  one were interested in comparing Maritain with, or assessing him in relation to Pius X I’s 
teaching, there is an interesting contrast between Maritain’s position and what the pope dubbed, perhaps 
somewhat unfairly, ‘pedagogic naturalism’. See D IM  (1929), N o.s 60, 61-63.
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'pragmatism5, or to think o f him as being diametrically opposed to all aspects o f  the 
work o f  John Dewey, with whom he probably identifies the philosophy o f pragmatism 
here.166
While Maritain is hesitant about the philosophical basis o f D ew ey’s problem solving 
approach in education, he actually applauds many essential features o f  his pedagogy, in 
practice at any rate.167 Maritain admired much about the genius and work o f the great 
American educator, while disagreeing fundamentally with his ‘functionalist theory’ o f  
truth. Thus, despite his general antipathy towards pragmatism, and his personal 
conviction that ‘this philosophy will naturally lead to the denial o f  the objective value o f  
any spiritual need’, Maritain’s generous spirit allowed him to express genuine
admiration for ‘a great thinker like Professor John D ewey who is able to maintain an
168ideal image o f  all those things which are dear to the heart o f  free men’.
The central difficulty for Maritain concerning ‘pragmatism’ and ‘instrumentalism’ 
hinges on the under-lying theory o f  human knowledge common to both. It is ‘an 
unfortunate mistake’, he says, ‘to define human thought as a response to various stimuli 
and situations in the environment’.169 This is tantamount to equating human knowledge 
with animal knowledge and thus failing to appreciate the uniqueness o f  human 
knowledge, and specifically, o f over-looking reason in the human being. For Maritain, 
human thought is able ‘to illumine experience, to realize desires which are human 
because they are rooted in the prime desire for unlimited good, and to dominate, control, 
and refashion the world’.170
The reason for this, Maritain argues, is because: (i) every human idea, to have a 
meaning, ‘must attain in some measure to what things are, or consist o f  unto 
them selves’171 ; (ii) human thought is ‘an instrument, or rather a vital energy, o f  
knowledge into (rather than about) things, a spiritual intuition’172; (iii) human thinking 
begins, ‘not only with difficulties or problems, but with insights’, and ends up in 
insights, which are made true by rational proving or experimental verifying, not by
166 See, John D ew ey, D em ocracy and Education, 1916, N ew  York: The Free Press.
167 EC (1943), p. 115.
168 E C  (1943), p. 115.
169 E C  (1943), p. 12.
170 E C  (1943), p. 13.
171 E C  (1973), p. 13.
172 EC (1943), p. 13.
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pragmatic sanction’.173 ‘At the beginning o f human action, insofar as it is human’, 
Maritain concludes, ‘there is truth, grasped or believed to be grasped for the sake o f  
truth’.174 Such is the chief criticism to be made o f the pragmatic and instrumentalist 
theory o f  knowledge, he confidently assures us.175
Maritain has a real fear about the effects o f  a pragmatic theory o f  knowledge in the field  
o f education. He accepts that ‘many things are excellent in the emphasis on action and 
praxis, for life consists o f  action’.176 But ‘action’ and ‘praxis’, indeed ‘life’ itself, ‘aim 
at an object, a determining end, an end which makes life worthy o f  being lived’.177 
Contemplation o f  life’s end or purpose, and the conduct o f  life in pursuit o f  self- 
perfection are likely to ‘escape the purview o f the pragmatic mind’, according to 
Maritain.178 Maritain believes that where there is an over-emphasis on pragmatism, 
‘education can hardly produce in youth anything but a scholarly scepticism’, which will 
be ‘unnaturally used against the very grain o f  intelligence’, so as to ‘cause minds to 
distrust the very idea o f  truth and wisdom’ and to ‘give up any hope o f  any inner 
dynamic unity’ in human knowledge and learning.179
Richard Pring has recently pointed out that Dewey saw in pragmatism ‘a middle way 
between dualist and idealist ideas o f  truth’, both o f  which were unsatisfactory to his 
mind.180 Dewey, on the one hand, could not ‘ignore the experiences that constantly 
impact upon our minds, experiences not o f  our own making’.181 On the other hand, he 
was clearly aware that ‘such experiences do not come, as it were, raw, un-interpreted by 
the thought system o f the person doing the experiencing: they do not give us direct 
access to a world independent o f  our thinking’.182 As experiencing and thinking human 
beings, we are ‘not waiting passively for further experiences’; we are ‘actively seeking 
perceived goals or ends-in-view, and having to adapt to, and to interpret, experiences as 
they occur’.183 It is likely that Maritain’s metaphysical realism and epistemological
173 E C (1943), p. 13.
™ E C (1 9 4 3 ), p. 13.
175 E C (1943), p. 13.
116 E C  (1943), p. 12.
177 E C  (1943), p. 12.
Ï7* E C (1 9 4 3 ), pp. 12-13
179E C (1943), p. 13.
180 Richard Pring, John Dewey: A Philosopher o f  Education fo r  our Time?, 2007, London: Continu um, 
p. 149.
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stance aggravated his real difficulties with pragmatism. One might, therefore, just add in 
passing that Bernard Lonergan, the subject o f  the following chapter in this dissertation, 
might have been better placed, on the basis o f the critical realism that accompanied his 
cognitional theory, to engage in conversation with Dewey about the nature o f  
knowledge, truth and meaning.
‘Paradox’ and ‘Prudence’
Maritain’s first Terry lecture ends with a note on what he refers to as the ‘paradoxes o f  
education’, and an attack on a final ‘misconception’ that concerns the ‘proper object o f  
education and its boundaries’.184 For Maritain, ‘paradox’ is an inevitable reality in the 
field o f  education. ‘Paradox’ is much more than a figure o f speech here. It entails the 
notion o f ‘contrariety’ and raises the spectre o f  ‘un-intelligibility’ in respect o f  certain 
decisions arrived at in the practice o f education. Maritain reflects briefly on how  
Aristotle developed the doctrine o fphronesis, or ‘prudence’ (prudentia), to guide 
practical decision-making. The notion o f  phronesis, or ‘prudence’, is important in the 
context o f  this analysis by Maritain o f ‘misconceptions’ in relation to the aims o f  
education. It is in reality the ambiguity o f  modem educational theory that Maritain 
addresses in this final part o f  his opening lecture.
It w ill be interesting in a later chapter o f  this thesis to compare the phronetic reasoning 
o f  Maritain with that o f  Terence H. McLaughlin in the context o f  the re-articulation o f 
Catholic philosophy o f  education. For now, one should focus on Maritain’s ‘right 
appreciation o f practical cases’, that is, phronesis or ‘prudence’, as he concludes his 
reflections on the aims o f  education, specifically within the context o f  institutional 
education, or schooling.185 Prudence (phronesis) is described by Maritain as ‘an inner 
vital power o f  judgment developed in the mind and backed up by a well-directed will, 
which cannot be replaced by any learning whatsoever’. It is a ‘cardinal virtue’ in the 
life o f  man.186
A problem that much concerned Maritain arose out o f  contemporary education’s goal o f
184 EC (1943), pp. 22-27.
185 EC (1943), p. 23.
186 EC (1943), p. 23. See, Josef Pieper, Prudence: The F irst Cardinal Virtue, London: Faber & Faber, 
1939.
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equipping young people with what are regarded as essential skills for living. Here, as 
in so many (if  not all) facets o f education, the role o f  judgment and practical wisdom is 
critical. Maritain, D ’Souza notes, has been criticised frequently for what is described as 
‘an overly intellectual agenda in education’, but he also stresses ‘the spiritual dimension 
of knowledge and learning, the contemplative dimension o f  education, and the roles o f  
intuition and love’.188 As far as Maritain is concerned, this is the fundamental paradox 
in education, that through none o f its courses or initiatives can education impart the gift 
of practical wisdom we need throughout life.
There are courses in philosophy, but ‘no courses in wisdom ’, says Maritain. ‘Wisdom is 
gained through spiritual experience’.189 For man and for human living nothing is more 
important than ‘intuition and love’; yet, ‘neither intuition nor love is a matter o f  training 
and learning’, for these are, he says, ‘gift and freedom’.190 In spite o f  this, Maritain is 
certain that intuition and love are matters about which education should be ‘primarily 
concerned’, irrespective o f  the fact that ‘not every love is right, nor every intuition w ell 
directed or conceived’.191 Education ought to teach us ‘how to be in love always, and 
what to be in love with’, Maritain concludes, making his own the words o f  John U. N ef, 
a contemporary writer, to the effect that ‘the great things o f  history have been done by 
the great lovers, by the saints and men o f science and artists; and the problem o f  
civilization is to give every man a chance o f  being a saint, a man o f science, or an 
artist’.192
Maritain’s understanding o f ‘intuition’ is complex and its elaboration largely beyond the 
scope o f this chapter.193 As well as stressing its importance here in this discussion o f  
the aims o f  education, Maritain returns to the matter o f  ‘intuition’ when, during the 
course o f  his second Yale lecture, he returns to the subject o f  ‘the freeing o f  the intuitive 
power o f  man’.194 Intuition and intuitive judgment cannot, as far as Maritain is 
concerned, be promoted through training or methods, but only through attention to the
187 The kind o f ‘sk ills’ listed by Maritain include matters that might make contemporary educators bristle, 
such as, courses on ‘getting married, or the scientific means o f  acquiring creative genius, or o f  consoling  
those who weep, or o f  being a man o f  generosity’. See EC (1943), pp. 22-23.
188 Mario O. D ’Souza, “Maritain’s Seven M isconceptions”, p. 448.
189 E C  (1943), p. 23.
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192 E C  (1943), pp. 23-24. See, John U. N ef, The US and C ivilization , Chicago, 1943, p. 265.
193 For a fuller treatment o f  intuition than is possible here, see Jacques Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art 
and Poetry, N ew  York: Pantheon Books, 1953.
194 E C  (1943), pp. 42-45.
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life o f  the imagination and human creativity. Maritain understands that an essential 
aspect o f the teacher’s role consists in engaging the life o f  the imagination and gradually 
linking it to the life o f reason and rational knowledge. One might mention that intuition 
is yet another matter where Maritain’s understanding o f how we know being, and 
Lonergan’s study o f insight and human understanding, might bear fruitful comparison 
in connection with the re-articulation o f Catholic philosophy o f education.
Given the paradoxes that he sees at the heart o f the educational process, Maritain is led 
to question the whole matter o f the relationship between the learner and his/her 
environment. Once again, he considers it highly paradoxical that what he terms the 
‘extra-educational sphere’ - that is, the ‘entire field o f  human activity’ (daily work and 
pain, experiences in friendship and love, social customs, etc.), the ‘common wisdom  
embodied in the behaviour o f  the people’, the ‘inspiring radiance o f  art and poetry’, the 
‘penetrating influence o f  religious feasts and liturgy’ -  all this, in Maritain’s judgment, 
‘exerts on man an action which is more important in the achievement o f  his education 
than education it s e lf .195 It might occur to one reading Maritain’s remarks today that 
living in our contemporary society and culture is likely to exert a far less unified impact 
upon the learner than Maritain appears to envisage here. Nonetheless, the impact 
remains widespread and critical. Within this same context o f  the influence o f  various 
‘educational’ and ‘extra-educational’ environments on learning, Maritain comments 
wisely upon the mutual and reciprocal educational roles o f  family, school, state, and 
Church, including the call that each becomes more aware ( ‘and more worthy’) o f  its call 
and that each recognizes not only its limitations and the necessity o f  mutual help but 
also the inevitability o f  a reciprocal tension between the one and the other.196
Maritain, as has already been remarked, belongs integrally within the Christian tradition 
o f  formative education, and his comment upon how education, formal or informal, 
affects the shaping o f the will and the formation o f  the intellect is an important 
reflection o f  that tradition. Maritain is happy to set boundaries to what society must 
expect or demand o f its schools and their characteristic activity. He is adamant, as noted 
above, that school-based education has only a partial (but necessary) task, and ‘this task
195 EC (1943), p. 25.
196 EC (1943), p. 24. Here again clear parallels and echoes between Maritain and Pius XI in D IM  (1929) 
are easily detected. See DIM  (1929), N o.s 28-33, 35-52.
is primarily concerned with knowledge and intelligence’.197 Teaching’s domain is the 
domain o f truth, speculative as well as practical truth, he asserts.198 In terms reminiscent 
o f  Newman’s Idea o f a University, Maritain emphasizes that ‘the one influence that 
should dominate’ in school and college must be ‘that o f  truth, and o f the intelligible 
realities whose illuminating power obtains by its own virtue, not by virtue o f  human 
authority’.199 The task o f  the teacher, in Maritain’s view, is to promote the assent o f  an 
‘open mind’ in the child, who, at first, is reliant on the trust he can place in his teacher, 
before he becomes capable o f  judging ‘according to the worth o f  evidence’. 200 The 
teacher must ‘respect in the child the dignity o f  the mind’, must ‘appeal to the child’s 
power o f  understanding’, and conceive o f  his own effort as ‘preparing a human mind to 
think for its e lf .201
Maritain concludes that the paradoxes that are at the heart o f  modem education can be 
resolved only through the realization that what is most important in the upbringing o f  
man, that is, ‘the uprightness o f the will and the attainment o f  spiritual freedom, as well 
as the achievement o f  a sound relationship with society, is truly the main objective o f  
education in its broadest sense’.202 In what concerns ‘direct action’ on the will and the 
shaping o f character, ‘this objective chiefly depends on educational spheres other than 
the school’, says Maritain, adding wryly, ‘not to speak o f the role which the extra- 
educational spheres play in this matter’.203. On the other hand, concerning ‘indirect 
action’, school and college education ‘provides a basis and necessary preparation for the 
main objective in question by concentrating on knowledge and the intellect, not on the 
will and direct training’, and by keeping sight, above all, o f  the ‘development and 
uprightness o f  speculative and practical reasoning’.204 School and college education 
‘has indeed its own world’, and for Maritain that essentially consists o f  the recognition 
o f ‘the dignity and achievements o f  knowledge and the intellect’, that is, o f  ‘the human 
being’s root faculty’. And ‘that knowledge which is wisdom is the ultimate goal’ o f this 
world.205
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It is chiefly through the instrumentality o f  intelligence and truth that the school and the 
college may affect the powers o f desire, will, and love in the young. Moral education is 
considered by many to play an essential part in school and college education. But it is 
essentially and above all by way o f  knowledge and teaching that school education must 
perform this moral task, ‘illuminating and giving rectitude to practical reason’.206 The 
main duty in the educational spheres o f the school as well as o f  the state is not to shape 
the will and directly to develop moral virtues in youth, but to enlighten and strengthen 
reason. Maritain conceives that the appropriate relationship here is that o f  exerting an 
indirect influence on the will, ‘by a sound equipment o f  knowledge and a sound 
development o f  the powers o f thinking’.
Maritain is acutely aware o f  the centrality o f  aims to education but he is equally 
conscious o f  the need for educators to reflect on the actual process o f  education, that is, 
on the complex and subtle interaction that takes place between learner and teacher. 
Having guided his audience in his opening lecture by the beacon o f  his Thomist light in 
a lengthy reflection on the aims o f  ‘liberal’ education, and alerted them to some o f  the 
more prevalent misconceptions concerning these aims, Maritain next turns his attention 
to what he designates the ‘instrumentalities and dynamics o f  education’, that is, to the 
fundamental processes and interactions that characterize true education. Among the 
factors he identifies are: (i) the ‘dynamic agents at work in education’, notably, the 
‘inner vitality o f  the student’s mind’ and the ‘activity o f  the teacher’; (ii) the ‘basic
dispositions to be fostered in the pupil’; and (iii) a set o f  four rules, or ‘fundamental
208norms’ to assist the teacher in enabling the student ‘to grow in the life o f  the mind’.
206 EC (1943), pp. 26-27.
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I l l
Education at the Crossroads (1943): ‘A Distinctive Catholic Philosophy of  
Education?
In this section an attempt is made to assess the claim that, in Education at the 
Crossroads, Maritain offers a distinctive Catholic philosophy o f  education congenial to, 
and foundational for, the need for a systematic and detailed expression of Catholic 
educational thought for the twenty-first century. That claim is to be adjudicated by 
means of a critique of the study of Carr and his colleagues, “Return to the Crossroads: 
Maritain Fifty Years On”, regarding the potential and value of Maritain’s Education at 
the Crossroads for the task of the re-articulation of a distinctive Catholic philosophy of 
education.209 I share their aim of providing a proper and fair assessment of Maritain’s 
contribution to the articulation of Catholic philosophy of education, and agree broadly 
on the value they attribute to his perennial discourse in this context. I differ, however, 
both in my assessment of the priority to be given to the text they have chosen for this 
specific purpose, and the conclusion they draw from it concerning its capacity to 
establish a specific Catholic philosophy of education for today.
With regard to the re-articulation of a Catholic philosophy of education for our times, 
David Carr and his fellow contributors turned to Maritain to discern ‘what might be the 
form of an adequate Catholic philosophy of education’ for our time, a philosophy in 
continuity with its traditional roots, while remaining open to contemporary 
scholarship.210 The writers make clear from the start that they see a Catholic philosophy 
of education as ‘an understanding, from what claims to be a universal standpoint, of 
education as such’, and not, ‘save by inclusion’, ‘a theory of Catholic education’.211 
This group of eminent scholars conclude, on the basis that it is ‘hardly possible even to 
entertain the idea of Catholic philosophy without thinking of Thomism’, that, in 
Maritain, ‘who looked primarily to the philosophy of Aquinas for inspiration’, 
‘important resources for the rational articulation and defence of a distinctively Catholic
209 David Carr, John Haldane, Terence McLaughlin, and Richard Pring, ‘‘Return to the Crossroads: 
Maritain Fifty Years On”, British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Jun., 1995), pp. 162- 
178. Hereafter cited as: “Return to the Crossroads”.
210 Ibid., p. 163.
211 Ibid., p. 163.
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These authors concur that ‘a detailed philosophical exploration and justification’ of 
Maritain’s Thomist inspired study on education is ‘a task worthy of much serious 
attention’.213 While it is possible to agree with their general conclusion, one might wish 
to address a number of questions arising out of the assessment by these scholars of the 
potential of Education at the Crossroads for a re-articulation of a distinctively Catholic 
philosophy of education. Their opinion that Maritain is an ‘important resource’ for this 
task is not disputed; I question their conclusion as to whether the case for a distinctively 
Catholic philosophy of education can be established on the basis of a study of this 
single Maritain text.
To put the matter in clear context, it appears that EC(1943) was primarily intended by 
Maritain to be an elucidation and defence of ‘liberal education’ as he understands the 
term. Thus, education is conceived of as, the ‘conquest of internal and spiritual freedom 
by the human person’ through the liberation of the inner resources of the human spirit: 
knowledge, wisdom, good will and love 214 This integral education for an integral 
humanism necessarily involves the confrontation of the intelligence of man with the 
wisdom of the humanist tradition.215 One of Maritain’s key intentions for 
recommending this kind of liberal, humanist education is to enable full participation by 
all citizens in the democratic way of life. In view of these explicitly stated intentions, a 
number of questions need to be asked if this text is to be read as an articulation of a 
distinctively Catholic philosophy of education.
Firstly, therefore, I ask whether Maritain’s Education at the Crossroads (1943) is 
intended in fact to portray a ‘distinctive Catholic philosophy of education’, after the 
manner envisaged by Carr and his fellow contributors.216 This initiative, undertaken in 
1995 by a group of eminent British Catholic philosophers in response to a remark by 
Robert Dearden, sought to outline, on the basis of a re-consideration of Maritain’s 1943 
Yale Lectures, ‘a distinctively Catholic systematic account of the nature and role of
conception of education are indeed to be found’.212
212 Ibid., p. 176.
2,3 Ibid., p. 176.
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215 EC(1943), p. 10.
216 Ibid., pp. 162-178.
education’, in other words, ‘a Catholic philosophy of education’ for our times. Their 
under-taking needs to be critiqued, to begin with in relation to the degree of Catholic 
‘distinctiveness’ intended by Maritain in his series of lectures, but also in respect of 
their reliance on only one source of Maritain’s educational thought to the apparent 
neglect or exclusion of other available material.
Secondly, the manifest assumption of the authors that a ‘Catholic’ philosophy of 
education must of necessity be a ‘Thomist’ philosophy of education, must at least be 
queried. In view of several levels of criticism directed at Maritain’s entire approach to 
the application of Thomist principles generally, and specifically in the field of 
educational reflection, one might speculate as to whether the ‘undiluted Thomism’ of 
Maritain might not rightly be regarded as problematic for Catholic philosophy of 
education in a post-modem age. The question might be raised as to whether Maritain’s 
Christian philosophy ultimately represents what Bernard Lonergan would call ‘a 
classicist worldview’, where reality is envisaged as ‘static, fixed, and governed 
harmoniously by immutable laws’, and where ‘truth is discovered deductively through
9  1 J2the application of abstract, universal and objective principles’.
Thirdly, I focus on some of the more frequent criticisms levelled at Maritain generally 
and attempt to assess the extent of their validity or otherwise. In summary, I ask 
whether, in the context of the time, and in view of the availability of alternative 
philosophical perspectives on education, even within Catholic circles, the attempt of 
Carr and his fellow contributors at recovering a Thomist philosophy of education from 
Maritain’s Education at the Crossroads should be considered a failure, and a missed 
opportunity, rather than a promising way forward, for Catholic philosophy of education.
Context and Aims of “Return to the Crossroads” (1995)
It may be recalled that Carr and his fellow contributors, responding to Robert F. 
Dearden’s ‘interesting observation’, as they term it, that ‘the nearest thing to a 
distinctive Catholic philosophy of education’ then existing in 1982 was probably
217 Ibid., p. 163. See, Robert F. Dearden, “Philosophy of Education, 1952-82”, British Journal of 
Educational Studies,Vol. 30, No. 1 (Feb., 1982), pp. 57-71. Dearden, apropos the dearth of alternative 
approaches to conceptual analysis, suggested Maritain’s Education at the Crossroads might be assessed 
in this connection.
218 Bernard Lonergan, “Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical Mindedness”, pp. 1-7, A 
Second Collection, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974. See chapter three below of this thesis for an 
extensive discussion of Bernard Lonergan’s work in relation to the renewal of Catholic philosophy of 
education.
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Jacques Maritain’s Education at the Crossroads, undertook ‘to offer an account and an 
assessment of Maritain’s text’.219 These authors clarify their intention when they say 
that they wish to pursue the question of ‘the form of an adequate Catholic philosophy of 
education’ in discussing Maritain’s text, and they do not seek ‘to articulate a full-blown 
account of Catholic educational philosophy’, but merely ‘to determine some likely 
features of such an account drawn from an admittedly limited source’.220 It is important 
to note the authors’ insistence that ‘the text in question is not a comprehensive and
detailed treatment’ of the major elements of Catholic philosophy of education and that,
221in any case, it is a work ‘that is now virtually unheard o f.
Having noted the limitations of Maritain’s text, it is not surprising that these authors 
seek to supply for its limitations by considering Maritain’s views within the broader 
context of ‘important resources for the rational articulation and defence of a 
distinctively Catholic conception of education’ to be found in the philosophy of St. 
Thomas.222 What is perhaps curious, at least in hindsight, is why the authors in question, 
each of whom might justly have boasted of his back-ground in, and record of skilful 
exercise in the techniques and procedures of analytical philosophy, made no attempt to 
complement the chosen Maritain text by introducing an alternative approach into their 
selected assignment. In seeking to outline the form and features of a distinctively 
Catholic philosophy of education they have not sought to integrate another perspective 
along-side Maritain’s Thomism, or even to investigate the possibility of so doing. This, 
to my way of thinking, must be regarded as a missed opportunity to build upon 
Maritain’s insights and conclusions and thus to further the task of re-articulating a 
Catholic philosophy of education for today.
The decision of Carr and his fellow contributors to situate their comments about 
Maritain within the Thomist tradition is obviously justified, even demanded, one might 
say, since this is the conviction and perspective that dominated his thinking in every 
sphere of his work. The conclusion of the authors that, ‘notwithstanding the range of 
philosophical perspectives adopted by Catholic thinkers, it is hardly possible even to 
entertain the idea of Catholic philosophy without thinking of Thomism’, might 
nevertheless, be considered to be insufficiently supported in the present context and
2I9“Retum to the Crossroads'1, p. 163.
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regarded as at least contestable in any context.223 The witness of history, and the fact 
that ‘the Thomistic influence has been ever present, particularly in official documents’, 
makes it ‘reasonable’ for these authors, particularly in the present context, to interpret 
Catholic as Thomist, and so to ask, ‘what might a Thomist philosophy of education 
be’.224 The fact also that Maritain appreciated that, in the Summa Theologiae, a 
Thomistic approach to educational questions has available to it a much richer and 
wider-ranging treatment of fundamental issues than is necessarily available from a 
single work of Aquinas’s, such as De Magistro, a work of a largely scholastic style of 
argument and unlikely as such to attract much attention, seemed convincing to Carr and 
his fellow contributors.225
My intention here is not to provide a detailed critique of Carr and his colleague’s 
analysis of the ideas of Maritain and Aquinas relating to education, since there is little 
to dispute concerning many of the major points of interpretation. Thus, in relation to 
their discussion of how Maritain conceives the aims of education, one can readily accept 
their identification of his starting point in the realist metaphysics and epistemology of 
Aquinas, which conceives human beings as possessed of a transcendent destiny, able 
through their intellectual powers to grasp the intelligibility of reality, and, as social 
animals, able to realise themselves as persons through their participation in the common 
life of humanity.226 Carr and his fellow contributors judge correctly that the ideas 
presented by Maritain in his opening lecture on the aims of education are 
‘philosophically rich’ and their examination ‘likely to be both rewarding and 
profitable’.227 Similarly, in relation to Maritain’s formulation of appropriate procedures 
for education, Carr and the others are right in characterising Maritain’s approach as ‘a
critical examination of both sides of a familiar dualism in educational theory’, namely,
228that between traditional and progressive perspectives.
Catholic Philosophy of Education is Thomist Philosophy of Education?
The identification by Carr and his colleagues of aspects of Maritain’s educational 
thought that can be considered ‘evidently derivative of and consistent with a broadly
225 Ibid., p. 163.
224 Ibid., p. 164.
225 Ibid., p. 164.
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227 Ibid., p. 167.
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Thomist philosophical anthropology’ is a matter upon which widespread agreement can 
be expected.229 William F. Losito notes that a problem may arise, however, in regard to 
some of the assumptions these authors have made, assumptions which he describes as 
having ‘serious implications for the field, or boundaries, of a distinctly Catholic 
educational philosophy’.230 Thus, it is by no means clear to all what it is about ‘the 
present context’ that makes it particularly ‘reasonable’ to interpret ‘Catholic’ as
231‘Thomist’, and thereby to reduce Catholic philosophy to Thomist philosophy. Of 
course it is legitimate to hope that various Thomistic texts would remain as an 
invaluable part of the canon for philosophical enquiry in the Catholic tradition. But ‘it is 
premature’, as Losito sees it, ‘to identify a priori a Catholic educational philosophy 
with the Thomistic framework. It may be the case that in the future we discover 
Catholic philosophies (plural) of education’.232 It may be the case at this moment that 
the Thomist framework is only one of several that would be appropriate in the search 
for a distinctively Catholic philosophy of education. This possibility was not 
investigated by Carr and his colleagues.
Equally pertinent to the perception of Catholic philosophy of education being conflated 
with Aquinas’s educational theory might be Alisdair MacIntyre’s critique of ‘Thomist 
philosophy of education’ as little more than a ‘fabricated collage’ of a variety of 
passages on topics relevant to education extracted from Aquinas’s writings’ (such as his 
theses on learning and teaching, for example), and ‘amounting to a gross mis­
representation of its value as philosophy of education’, since, in effect, Aquinas ‘had no 
philosophy of education as such’.233 MacIntyre’s argument is that the works from which 
the materials for such a collage would have been extracted originally belonged to a 
number of philosophical disciplines, such as ethics, politics, metaphysics and theology, 
and ‘it is from arguments whose concepts and premises belong to these disciplines that 
Aquinas derived his educational conclusions’.234 But to abstract those conclusions for 
the purpose of producing a collage of Aquinas’s ‘philosophy of education’, MacIntyre
229 Ibid., p. 172.
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alleges, not only ‘deprives them of justification, but removes them from the
* * T l  r
argumentative context which makes them intelligible’.
In any case, MacIntyre argues, Aquinas’s Thomism, in education as elsewhere, has to 
exclude itself from a contemporary culture that presents itself as ‘tolerantly hospitable
236to many standpoints’, but finds no room for a ‘background of shared moral beliefs’. 
Where for Aquinas the goal of education is ‘an achievement of a comprehensive and 
completed understanding’, in much contemporary society education offers no more than 
a medley of skills and knowledge designed to enable the individual to pursue his or her 
preferences, whatever they may be.237 Where for Aquinas ‘the individual is to be 
measured by his or her success or failure in directing himself or herself toward the 
human good’, the dominant culture of many western societies today assumes that there 
is no such thing as the human good, but that each individual must choose among a 
variety of different and rival conceptions of the good, and education is all about 
preparing individuals for making such choices.238 MacIntyre questions the suitability of 
Aquinas’s supposed philosophy of education to successfully become ‘an integrative and 
unifying experience’ in the context of what he sees as the fragmentation and bankruptcy 
of modem education.
In the absence of a quite precise and widely accepted definition of ‘Catholic philosophy 
of education’, other than one based principally on Thomist principles, there is little to 
justify the presumption that Thomism and Thomism alone captures the essential 
features of the ‘distinctly Catholic philosophy of education’ that is to be sought as an 
alternative to analytical philosophy.240 If such an alternative is to be sought (rather than, 
for instance, exercising the option to incorporate a different perspective), might it not be 
just as ‘reasonable’ (to invoke Carr’s phrase) to look to existential, phenomenological, 
or process philosophical orientations, or perhaps philosophical perspectives such as the 
critical one embedded in, or emanating from liberation theology, for the kind of clear 
distinguishing characteristics that should feature in a Catholic philosophy of education? 
None of this is meant to dismiss or disparage Maritain’s Thomism in which Carr and his
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fellow contributors have found much that is reasonable and valuable. It can hardly be 
disputed that Thomist philosophy in the past provided Catholic educational thought with 
a powerful lodestone for the establishment and practice of Catholic schooling world­
wide. Today, however, it is highly debatable as to whether Maritain’s Thomism is as 
characteristic of Catholic thought, and it is by no means proven that it should 
necessarily be the face of a distinctive Catholic perspective on education.
The following chapters of this thesis will seek, firstly, in the work of Bernard Lonergan, 
for a different, less conceptualist kind of Thomism than Maritain’s, and then in Terence 
H. McLaughlin’s work for an analytical and phronetic perspective, both fine exemplars 
of approaches to philosophy of education which, at least in conjunction with other 
perspectives, would seem to have the capacity to offer something perhaps equally as 
valuable as Maritain’s ‘undiluted’ Thomism in the search for a distinctive Catholic 
philosophy of education for today. The curious thing about the Carr study is that these 
authors did not use the occasion of their work on Maritain’s text to suggest how his 
philosophy of education might be developed in conjunction with the work of scholars 
such as Lonergan, already in the public domain, or their own studies, or even that of 
Paulo Freire, and thereby contribute to a distinctive Catholic philosophy of education 
for our times. Carr and his fellow contributors seem to have been content to identify 
fruitful ideas to be found in the writings of Aquinas and to have been satisfied with a 
contemporary explication of them in an educational context on the basis of a study of 
virtually a single Maritain text
Salient features of a Catholic philosophy of education
As Carr and his fellow contributors put it, the first task before Maritain in his Yale 
lectures was ‘to identify specific goals for education and methods for their achievement’ 
that might enable one ‘to avoid the spiritual and evaluative vacuum which is opened by 
pragmatism’.241 Given that one of the aims of this chapter is to assess the contribution 
that Maritain’s thinking makes to a contemporary re-articulation of the Catholic 
tradition of educational philosophy, Carr and his colleagues are correct to argue that 
something more remains to be accomplished beyond the mere re-iteration of the 
orthodox perspective in the tradition of Catholic educational thought on aims. What is 
needed, these scholars adjudge, is that we recover from Maritain’s educational lectures
241 “Return to the Crossroads”, p. 168.
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whatever might be judged ‘distinctively Catholic5 about his educational philosophy, and 
anything that might ‘assist us to pinpoint the salient features of a Catholic educational 
philosophy as such5.242 This is the thought that pre-occupied them as they turned to an 
analysis of Maritain’s final lecture, where they claim he has addressed a set of pressing 
contemporary issues in a way which ‘more directly brings out the distinctively Catholic 
character of his educational views5.243
One could arguably contend that much of Education at the Crossroads does not, in fact, 
directly address the question of the distinctive nature of Catholic education but is, 
rather, a treatise on Maritain’s theory of ‘liberal education5. Maritain, and the Catholic 
tradition of educational thought he represents would, of course, regard as an integral 
dimension of Catholic education, the goal of ‘education directed at wisdom, aiming to 
develop in people the capacity to think correctly and to enjoy truth and beauty, and so 
attain to freedom5, described by Donald and Idella Gallagher as quintessentially ‘liberal 
education5 according to the mind of Maritain.244 It might well be conceded, too, that 
Education at the Crossroads has, at least, ‘drawn the outlines of a Christian philosophy 
of education for our time5.245 Whether we can find in this text the kind of Catholic 
philosophy of education envisaged by Terence H. McLaughlin as, ‘a coherent modem 
statement with which to confront questions of the distinctiveness5 of Catholic education, 
is a matter to which this dissertation returns in chapter four below.246
A question that arises, then, is whether what might be deemed its ‘distinctively Catholic 
character’, and what might be regarded as constitutive of the ‘salient features of a 
Catholic educational philosophy as such’, is necessarily available from this set of 
lectures.247 In the absence of a precise statement of what constitutes the distinctive 
character of Catholic educational philosophy as such, it is difficult to answer this 
question. It will be recalled that throughout his Yale lecture series Maritain displayed a 
marked reluctance to identity with, or speak exclusively from a Catholic standpoint, for 
whatever reason, and I have already speculated on what some of these reasons might 
have been. It is, in any case, very debatable as to whether a distinctively Catholic
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educational philosophy can be discovered here, in its entirety, without reference, on the 
one hand, to certain of Maritain’s major positions on moral, social and political 
philosophy (necessarily absent in large measure from the specific context) or, indeed, on 
the other hand, without reference to some of his other discussions relating to Catholic 
educational philosophy from elsewhere in his writings on education.
Carr and his fellow contributors do indeed seem to be aware of the need to identify with 
and, contrary to MacIntyre’s view above, make use of some of the larger and more 
encompassing Maritain themes originating from his general philosophical corpus, if  the 
distinctively Catholic character of his educational views is to be appreciated. Thus, they 
identify two main issues that are unquestionably relevant here. Firstly, there is the 
concern as to ‘how one ought rightly to conceive the relationship of the individual to 
society’; and, secondly, there is the problem of the ‘nature and purpose of moral 
education and development’ that inevitably arises in connection with the individual in 
society.248 Carr and his colleagues focus on these two goals that Maritain addresses in 
his final lecture, namely, the problems of, on the one hand, ‘political authority and 
healthy social functioning’, and on the other, the ‘moral formation of the individual with 
regard to human flourishing in general’.249 Carr and his colleagues are of the opinion 
that Maritain’s views on the question of political and social functioning can be 
understood only in terms of his resort to the Thomist idea of the ‘common good’, an 
idea, they note, which is ‘very much at odds with the essentially reductive perspectives 
of both liberalism and communitarianism’.250 Thus, Maritain’s view of education, based 
on the notion of the common good, contrasts with both liberal individualist and non­
liberal collectivist accounts. Maritain’s conception of moral development and his views 
on moral education, like his view of the common good, is that ‘it needs to be grounded 
in conditions and considerations of human flourishing which run considerably deeper 
than ideas of rational self-interest or social contract’.251 His views on the origins of our 
moral responses in ‘larger transcendent goals of the kind characteristic of religious 
morality’, are similarly ‘considerably at odds with those which have been canvassed in 
much recent philosophy of education’.252
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It should be noted, by way of conclusion to this section, that Maritain in his final lecture 
actually begins with a prior consideration of a more fundamental task that ‘confronts 
education today’, notably, the ‘importance of liberal education with regard to a new 
humanism’, or as he puts it in slogan-like form, ‘an integral education for an integral 
humanism’.253 Maritain sees the special tasks of ‘moral teaching’ and educating for the 
‘needs of the political community’ as the second objective of his lecture, and one would 
expect that his thoughts on these matters would draw heavily on, and point to the 
underpinning importance of the integral humanism theme that serves as his introduction 
here.254 It seems, therefore, that some discussion of Maritain’s integral humanism, for 
instance, should have preceded any consideration of precisely how the two-fold task of 
moral education and the educative demands of the political community become 
definitive of what is distinctive about Catholic philosophy of education.
I stated at the beginning of this discussion that I wished to evaluate the case that might 
be made for regarding Education at the Crossroads as sufficient for providing a 
distinctive Catholic philosophy of education. It is clear from what has been said above 
that it is possible to have reservations about the validity of the claims made by Carr and 
his fellow contributors on the basis of this particular piece of Maritain’s work. Maritain 
himself nowhere in the course of this Yale lecture series claims to be articulating a 
specific Catholic, or indeed, Thomist philosophy of education, even though much of 
what he says might correctly be judged to be de facto  of this nature. In his final lecture, 
Maritain appears to suggest that his over-riding purpose is to discuss ‘the importance of 
liberal education with regard to a new humanism we all hope for’.255 Maritain calls for 
‘an integral education for an integral humanism’ that would make possible and 
characterise ‘a personalist and communal civilization, grounded on human rights, and 
satisfying the social aspirations and needs of man’.256 Likewise, he sees in a ‘humanistic 
education’, adapted to the requirements of the common good, a bulwark against one of 
the deficiencies of education in even democratic countries, namely, ‘the danger of an 
education which would aim, not at making man truly human, but making him merely 
into an organ of a technocratic society’.257
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A consideration which serves to justify my hesitation in this matter is the fact that there 
was already in existence at the time of their writing another piece of work by Maritain 
which might have better made the case for his work to be regarded as the paradigmatic 
Catholic philosophy of Catholic education, but to which Carr and his fellow 
contributors made no reference, preferring to rest their case on the earlier publication. I 
refer, specifically, to Maritain’s address to the National Society for the Study of 
Education (NSSE), entitled, “Thomist Views on Education”, where Maritain responded 
diligently to the NSSE Committee’s request for an analysis of education as interpreted 
in the Thomist tradition.258
In his NSSE address, “Thomist Views on Education”, Maritain (in common with the 
other speakers involved) was given six themes upon which he was asked to speak.
These were: Basic orientation, or philosophical principles; aims, values and curriculum; 
the educative process, or methods; school and society; school and the individual, and 
religious and moral education. The Committee invited the guest philosophers to discuss 
these themes primarily qua philosopher. It was the hope of the NSSE Committee that, 
in the field of general philosophy there might be not only ‘more varieties of opinion 
than in the more limited field of education’, but that there might also be a number of 
prominent philosophers ‘whose views on education, if once worked out from their 
author’s philosophical premises, may very well provide fresh insights into educational 
problems’.259 Given that these philosophers might not have been familiar with the 
problems of education at secondary and elementary levels, ‘in order to make their 
philosophical analysis and conclusions as available as possible’ on these lower rungs of 
the educational ladder, an educational collaborator was appointed for each contributor to 
the Yearbook.260 Maritain, the Thomist philosopher, was, like the other participants, 
offered the choice of an educational consultant to assist him in his task. The person he 
chose was Professor William F. Cunningham, Notre Dame University, who had himself, 
qua philosopher o f  education, written a well-known text that provided what he called
Maritain’s NSSE Essay, “Thomist Views on Education" (1955)
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There is much in this NSSE address of Maritain’s, “Thomist Views on Education”, 
which merits consideration in any exercise aiming to provide an outline that would 
identify characteristic features of a ‘distinctively Catholic philosophy of education’, 
such as that attempted by Carr and his fellow contributors. It will be noted that two 
issues, considered by Carr and his fellow contributors to be ‘salient features of a 
Catholic educational philosophy as such’, namely, the relationship of the individual to 
society, and the nature and purpose of moral education and development, are addressed 
here.262 It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that these scholars interpreted their brief so 
narrowly as to rule out any reference whatsoever to Maritain’s NSSE address. Maritain, 
whom Gallagher and Gallagher have credited with ‘drawing the outlines of a Christian 
philosophy of education for our time’, did so, not on the basis of a single publication, 
Education at the Crossroads, excellently helpful and central as that little book happens 
to be, but throughout a whole series of articles and addresses from 1930 through to 
1958 263
It can hardly be the case that Carr and his fellow contributors judged that Maritain 
added no new perspective to his thinking on education post Education at the 
Crossroads. Even accepting that this book might in their judgment have contained in 
reality the whole essence of his entire educational philosophy, and that his subsequent 
writing simply reflected its findings, Maritain’s later reflection might justifiably have 
been assessed to see whether any new insight might be present.264 Only a comparative 
textual study of Maritain’s other works with Education at the Crossroads such as is 
impossible to provide here, would seem to prove whether Maritain’s thought did in fact 
develop. Here, it is possible to suggest only a few aspects of Maritain’s thinking in his 
NSSE (1955) lecture that might be conceived to be novel in some respect and might 
thus have contributed something to the re-articulation of Catholic philosophy of 
education that was overlooked by Carr’s study.
There are at least certain emphases in Maritain’s NSSE (1955) address that are worth
261 See, William F. Cunningham, The Pivotal Problems o f Education: An Introduction to the Christian 
Philosophy o f Education, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940.
262 See, “Thomist Views on Education”, pp. 70-77, 83-85.
263 EM (1962), p. 10.
264 Maritain does cite EC (1943) on a number of occasions in his NSSE (1955) lecture; eg., EC (1943), 
pp. 7-8, 12-13, 42, 44-45, 60-62, 64-65, 73-74, 75.
‘an introduction to Christian philosophy of education’.261
noting, not because they are necessarily radically different from his earlier discourse, 
but because they concretise and give new impetus to his thinking, especially in the 
context of the practice of education as distinct from its more remote theoretical 
philosophizing and under-pinning. One might draw attention, for instance, to the 
following matters.
Firstly, it might be argued, that, in his “Thomist Views on Education” address, Maritain 
outlines a Christian philosophy of education for our times more succinctly than he has 
done so previously. Maritain’s statement that in educational matters, ‘what is of chief 
importance is the direction of the process, and the implied hierarchy of values’, helps 
immediately to focus one’s attention on the ‘basic orientation’ required of every 
philosophy of education.265 Maritain points out that underlying all questions concerning 
the basic orientation of education is ‘the philosophy of knowledge’ to which the 
educator, consciously or unconsciously subscribes.266 This is, he indicates, the reason 
why Thomism regards empiricist and instrumentalist theories of knowledge as, ‘of a 
nature inevitably to warp, in the long run, the educational endeavour’, since in their 
sense-based knowledge they largely ‘ignore the nature of the rational and spiritual 
powers of the mind and disregard their proper needs and aspirations’.267 For the 
Thomist philosopher of education, Maritain asserts,
education is fully human education only when it is liberal education, preparing the youth to .
exercise his power to think in a genuinely free and liberating manner, that is to say, when it
equips him for truth and makes him capable of judging according to the worth of evidence, of
268enjoying truth and beauty for their own sake, and of advancing toward wisdom.
Secondly, throughout his NSSE (1955) address, Maritain maintains stoutly a clear 
distinction between ‘the basic philosophical issues on which theories of education 
depend’ and the ‘questions of a more practical nature which bear on concrete 
application and the technique of education’.269 In later chapters of this thesis, when 
scholars such as Lonergan and McLaughlin are the subject of the study, it will be 
possible to return to a consideration of the validity of this characteristic approach of 
Maritain in distinguishing between ‘philosophical principles’ on the one hand, and, on 
the other, ‘practical application’. In this address, the approach serves him well in
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enabling him to criticise the philosophical bases of opposing theories of education while 
at the same time acknowledging their more positive role and influence insofar as the 
practical techniques and arrangements of education are concerned. Thus, for example, 
Maritain is convinced that Thomist philosophy, which insists that ‘man is body as well 
as spirit’, and that ‘nothing comes into the intellect if not through the senses’, ‘heartily 
approves’ of the general emphasis put by progressive education on the essential part to 
be played in the process by the senses and by the natural interests of the child.270
Thirdly, Maritain in his NSSE paper attaches much importance to the notion of ‘a 
hierarchy of values’ in the philosophy and practice of education. He is adamant that 
‘there is no unity or integration without a stable hierarchy of values’, and that every 
ordering of value is ‘appendent to faith in truth’.271 Education, dealing as it does with 
man’s formation, must ‘be aware of the genuine hierarchy of intellectual values and be 
guided by such awareness’, as it seeks to prepare and preserve in the young person ‘the 
natural germs of what is best in the life of the mind’, and attempts ‘to equip them with
272the beginnings of those disciplines of knowledge which matter most to man’.
Fourthly, concerning the ‘educational process’, Maritain diagnoses ‘a twofold crucial 
problem’ arising when the ‘educational task’ has to be performed ‘in a changing world 
of knowledge and a changing world of culture and social conditions’. He insists that, 
in the contemporary world where social change abounds, ‘teachers have neither to make 
the school into a stronghold of the established order nor to make it into a weapon to 
change society’.274 In fact, there would be no dilemma here at all if it was clear that ‘the 
primary aim and function of education are not defined in relation to society and social 
work but are in reality defined in relation to intelligence’.275 Teachers , he adds, must be 
‘concerned, above all, with helping minds to become articulate, free, and autonomous’, 
for the general purpose of education is teaching how to think. As concerns the changing 
world of knowledge, Maritain locates the solution to this dilemma in the integrative task 
of education. All new gains and discoveries should be used, not to reject or destroy what 
has been acquired in the past, but to augment it.276 This is challenging task, Maritain
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admits, and it presupposes that ‘teachers are in possession of what they have to 
communicate’, namely, ‘wisdom and integrated knowledge’.277
Lastly, one might instance how Maritain, believing strongly that education has ‘to foster 
in the pupils the principles of the democratic charter’, including the ‘pluralist principle’, 
put forward in more explicit terms than had been the case in Education at the 
Crossroads a basic principle for living together in a pluralist democratic society.278 In 
his later text, that is, his NSSE address of 1955, Maritain spells out his belief that ‘a 
society of free men implies agreement between minds and wills on the bases of life in 
common’.279 Hence, there are a certain number of ‘tenets’ (for example, about the 
dignity of the human person, human rights, human equality, freedom, justice and law) 
‘on which democracy presupposes common consent’ and which, Maritain says, 
constitute what may be called ‘the democratic charter’.280 These basic tenets and this
charter of freedom are ‘strictly practical in character’, and ‘without a general, firm, and
281reasoned-out conviction concerning them, democracy cannot survive’. Maritain 
immediately adds that matters are different when one attends, not to the practical 
necessity, but to ‘the theoretical justifications -  the conceptions of the world and of life, 
the philosophical or religious creeds -  which found, or claim to found, the practical 
tenets of the democratic charter’.282 Maritain is adamant that ‘a genuine democracy 
cannot impose on its citizens or demand from them, as a condition for their belonging to
283the city, any philosophic or any religious creed’.
Concerning a related matter, moral education, religion and the school, in pluralist 
societies, Maritain invokes ‘a sound application of the pluralist principle’ as the 
appropriate way o f surmounting the many difficulties that arise in relation to this sphere 
o f education.284 Maritain believes that ‘formation in moral life and virtues is an essential 
part, indeed, the most important part of the primary aim of education in the broad sense 
of the word’.285 Although school and college education is ‘not equipped to secure it in a 
full and complete manner’, it is nevertheless ‘bound to contribute positively and
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efficaciously to the moral formation of youth5.286 Maritain, establishes on the level of 
philosophical principle, that there exists for the school and college ‘an obligation, not 
only to enlighten students on moral matters, but also to allow them to receive full 
religious education5.287 In the practical situation of the modem state, however, Maritain 
recognises that ‘no privileged treatment, contrary to the principle of the equality of all 
before the law, can be given by the state to the citizens of any given creed, their 
activities, or their institutions5.288
IV  
Assessing M aritain’s Contribution to the Provision o f an Interrogatory 
Fram ework for the Study of CCE Discourse
There is little doubt that Maritain represents key features of the Thomist-Aristotelian 
tradition of educational thought in Education at the Crossroads and gives a fresh and 
distinctive expression to its metaphysical, epistemological and axiological bases. 
Although seemingly appropriate and suitable as this achievement may have been to his 
times -  and, in truth, one has to recognise that this little work of Maritain5 s was highly 
influential throughout the Catholic educational world for a good thirty years -  one 
would have to be concerned about the relevance of some of its contents and 
methodology in the context of what Catholic philosophy of education must attempt to 
provide for Catholic educators and others today. What I have reflected upon as I address 
the question of whether Education at the Crossroads has adequately expressed the 
distinctiveness of the Catholic tradition of educational thought, is the further question of 
whether that text contains within it the seeds of a contemporary philosophy of education 
that has the capacity to adapt to new conditions and radical change in both Church and 
society. My reservations arise, in part at least, from the fact that Maritain never actually 
intended this particular work to be a treatise on Catholic educational philosophy as 
such. And, secondly, I am convinced that a group of British Catholic philosophers of 
education who, in 1995, had the opportunity to develop Maritain5s original work along 
suitable lines for today's world, failed to avail of this unique occasion. The essay of 
Carr and his fellow contributors represents an opportunity lost for the re-articulation of
286 Ibid., p. 83.
287 Ibid., p. 83.
288 Ibid., p. 84.
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In the concluding this chapter, and as part of the overall aim of this thesis, I briefly 
query whether, and in what ways, Maritain5s perennialist philosophy of education might 
still be called upon to provide a more explicit philosophic basis and framework of 
analysis for the recently published discourse of the CCE. This is a topic to which I shall 
return in chapter four of this thesis below. But a number of pertinent questions already 
suggest themselves at this point and may perhaps be listed here in conclusion to this 
chapter on the work of Maritain in relation to the re-articulation of a Catholic 
philosophy of education.
In the first place, one might ask whether Maritain5 s ‘undiluted Thomism5 is too 
problematical for any role in the re-articulation of Catholic philosophy of education 
today, and specifically, whether it has much to offer to a dialogue with the CCE 
discourse from which, at first sight at any rate, extensive use of explicit Thomist 
perspective appears to be lacking. At this point, and by way of conclusion, I merely ask 
whether one has to face up to the fact that there are ‘troublesome5 elements (for many 
modems) of Thomism in Maritain5s work that are likely to remain problematical 
because, as so eloquently and forcefully argued by, for instance, Bernard Lonergan, they 
derive from a ‘classicist worldview5, and do not represent sufficiently the ‘historical­
mindedness5 of even later Thomism. In reflecting on this question here one needs to 
identify what might be intended by the term ‘an un-diluted Thomism5, and seek to 
justify the reasons why a Thomism such as Maritain5 s is likely to be more of a 
hindrance than a help to the re-articulation of Catholic philosophy of education today.
In our post-modern world, one aspect of Maritain5 s work especially, namely his critical 
realist epistemology, needs to be considered in terms of its relevance and value in the 
re-articulation of Catholic philosophy of education. Where scepticism and relativism is 
rife, Catholic philosophy of education has to contend with ‘constructivism5, a theory of 
education which grew out of psychological theories of learning and instruction, but 
which also has distinct philosophical content and implications for a Thomist theory of 
knowledge. Maritain did not tend to see concepts, interpretation and theory after the 
manner of Dewey, for example, as socially constructed means for understanding human 
experience. Neither did he see personality as largely socially constructed. One will 
search in vain for any reference to Piaget's psychological and pedagogical
a distinctive Catholic philosophy of education.
constructivism in Education at the Crossroads. Maritain’s theory of knowledge and its 
learning often appears as a simply absorptive, assimilative, purely intellectual process. 
The role of psychological mechanisms and social factors is scarcely studied by 
Maritain, or at least, these factors are not given much priority. Intellectual activity 
dominates in Maritain’s understanding of the construction and reception of knowledge.
It is possible that MaritahTs critical realist theory of knowledge is more open to a 
constructivist interpretation when one reflects more deeply on what happens in the 
Thomist theory of knowledge after the simple ideas that come from sense experience 
become the conceptual understanding in the mind. This topic is obviously extensive and 
deserving of more in-depth analysis than is possible within the present confines.
A second question, focusing on the more positive achievements of Maritain’s thought, 
might inquire whether, for instance, Maritain’s Thomist philosophy of the person and 
his integral Christian humanist perspective have something to offer Catholic philosophy 
of education today. If some, at least, of Maritain’s more formally metaphysical, 
epistemological and axiological stances, as distinctive elements of the Thomist meta­
theory that he so thoroughly committed himself to, are likely to prove problematical 
today, in one respect or another, it becomes necessary to reflect on whether certain 
broader themes, equally saturated with Thomistic thought, often developed in the course 
of his wide-ranging dialogue with the modem world, might not prove more attractive to 
the task of giving new expression to Catholic educational thought. Several of these 
aspects of Maritain’s Thomist philosophy might be considered apt for analysis with 
respect to the possible contribution they might make to contemporary Catholic 
philosophy of education. His metaphysics and philosophy of the person, and his notion 
of integral Christian humanism, as suggested, might be identified as valuable sources 
for enhancing the philosophical basis of the recent CCE discourse. It would seem that 
the educational discourse of the CCE already reflects in no small measure both these 
emphases of Maritain’s work, though in a distinctively informal philosophical register.
In chapters three and four below the educational thought and philosophic practice of 
Bernard Lonergan and Terence H. McLaughlin, respectively, will be investigated in an 
exercise of comparison and contrast with elements of Maritain’s philosophy of 
education identified above. The characteristic way in which they too might contribute to 
the re-articulation of a distinctive Catholic philosophy of education will be identified. 
Then, in chapter five, a suitable means, designated there as an ‘interrogatory
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framework5, will be sought that might enable Maritain5s perennialist discourse, together 
with the discourses of Lonergan and McLaughlin, to engage in conversation with the 
CCE pastoral-theological discourse, concerning the re-articulation of Catholic 
philosophy of education. Distinct traces of Maritain’s integral Christian humanism and 
of his Thomist-based personalist ontology can in fact already be detected in the CCE 
discourse. The question is whether it is possible or desirable to accentuate these 
features, and by what kind of dialogue of discourses might this result be achieved.
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Chapter Three: A View of the Nature and Role of Catholic Philosophy 
of Education from the Perspective of Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)
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The Canadian Jesuit philosopher-theologian, Bernard J.F. Lonergan, like Jacques 
Mari tain, sought inspiration in the philosophy and theology of Aquinas, but unlike 
Maritain his interest was less in the conceptual scheme and contents of Aquinas, and 
much more in the intellectual process and cognitional theory which he identified as 
basic to, and characteristic of Aquinas’s scholarly approach. Although it is not my 
purpose here either to engage in a critical investigation of Lonergan’s massive study of 
human understanding, or to compare his reading of Aquinas directly with that of 
Maritain, nevertheless, this chapter will reflect the fairly stark contrast between two 
versions of Thomism to be found in the work of these scholars, which have 
characterised Catholic theology in the latter half o f the twentieth century. On the one 
hand there is the conceptualism of Maritain of which ample evidence has been provided 
in the previous chapter, while on the other hand there is the dynamic intellectualism of 
Lonergan that will become evident throughout the present chapter. There is not, of 
course, by any means universal agreement about the Thomist credentials of Lonergan, 
but for the purposes of this chapter that debate is not directly relevant. What will be of 
concern here is the much more restricted issue of how Lonergan’s reading of Aquinas 
enabled him to develop a cognitional theory by means of which he outlined a sketch of 
Catholic philosophy of education quite different from that of Maritain.
Lonergan’s ‘real discovery’ in Aquinas, Frederick E. Crowe observes, was o f ‘the way 
Aquinas worked and questioned and thought and understood and thought again and 
judged and wrote’.1 It was not so much points of objective theology or philosophy, 
Crowe reckons, but ‘factors that are more subjective and methodological’, and for that 
reason ‘more fundamental’, that influenced Lonergan in his reading of Aquinas.2 
Thomist cognitional theory was the subject that caught Lonergan’s attention most 
vividly, and a critical aspect of Aquinas’s thinking and methodology that he sought to 
employ in the elaboration of his own thought and practice. Having discovered Aquinas 
late in his studies, and ‘browsed rather indifferently in him’, before coming to ‘suspect 
he was not as bad as he was painted’, and then while spending many years teaching 
scholastic theology, Lonergan became more seriously engaged in a process, or exercise, 
of ‘reaching up to the mind of Aquinas’.
1 Frederick E. Crowe, Lonergan, London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1992, p. 47.
2 Ibid., p. 47.
3 Ibid., pp. 47-48.
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Throughout his life-time Lonergan strove to retain his basic Thomist belief and yet Tive 
at the level of his time’, always committed to ‘making Catholic thought respectable in a 
world that by and large scorned it’.4 He appreciated the fact that, ‘besides being a 
theologian and a philosopher’, St. Thomas was ‘a man of his time meeting the 
challenges of his time’.5 He judged that Aquinas had contributed massively to the 
medieval cultural synthesis at a time of ‘feverish intellectual ferment’, and saw many 
parallels in our own times when we are ‘somewhat belatedly coming to grips with the 
implications of modern sciences and philosophies’ and bringing our theology and 
Christian living ‘up to date’.6 For Lonergan, Aquinas was engaged in an aggiornamento 
of Christian philosophical and theological thinking, taking account of ‘what was going 
forward in his day’, namely, ‘discovering, working out, thinking through a new mould 
for the Catholic mind’, a mould in which it could remain fully Catholic and yet ‘be at 
home with all the good things that might be drawn from [a new] cultural heritage’.7 
Lonergan set himself a precisely similar goal for modem times.
Lonergan’s all-encompassing aim in a lifetime of dedicated scholarship has been 
described by Patrick D. Brown as an attempt ‘to transpose’ the richness and the depth of 
the tradition of Catholic thought into ‘a more contemporary and adequately theoretic 
context’ while preserving its basic elements in ‘a new effort of analysis and synthesis’.8 
Lonergan’s widely used notion of ‘transposition’ implied a three-fold movement of 
analysis and synthesis of a tradition.9 Firstly, ‘transposition’ signifies a ‘transition from 
classicism to historical-mindedness’.10 It involves a critique of the presence and 
influence of ‘classicism’ within a tradition and an estimation of what needs to be done 
to move from a ‘classic’ mind-set to ‘historical-mindedness’. Secondly, ‘transposition’ 
seeks to identify and underline the dearth or scarcity o f ‘technical information’, or 
‘scientific knowledge’, in a tradition with a view to enlarging its ‘technical and
4 Ibid., p. 53.
5 Bernard Lonergan, “The Future of Thomism”, pp. 43-54 (44). In: A Second Collection, ed. William F.J. 
Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrrell, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974.
6 Lonergan, p. 53.
7 “The Future of Thomism”, p. 44.
8 Patrick D. Brown, “Aiming Excessively High and Far: The Early Lonergan and the Challenge o f Theory 
in Catholic Social Thought”, Theological Studies, Vol. 72, 2011, pp. 620-644 (620, 622-623). Hereafter 
cited as: Aiming Excessively High and Far.
9 Ibid., pp. 640-643.
10 Bernard Lonergan, “The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness”, pp. 1-9. 
In: William F. J. Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrrell (ed.s), A Second Collection, London: Darton, Longman & 
Todd, 1974.
scientific horizon’.11 The development and integration of an adequate theory base, in 
philosophy of education as elsewhere, calls for ‘reformulation and new interpretation 
within a vastly enlarged theoretical horizon’.12 Thirdly, ‘transposition’ demands for its 
success a commitment to ‘operate at the level of history’ in pursuit of ‘a restatement of 
an earlier position in a new and broader historical context’.13 ‘Transposition’, for 
Lonergan, represents an effort ‘to shift and lift’ the tradition of Catholic thought 
forward into ‘a more adequate theoretic context by developing the virtualities of the 
tradition’ while remaining true to the tradition.14
This imperative to transpose tradition provided the intellectual dynamism that drove 
Lonergan in his life-long quest for a critical, empirical and historically based theoretical 
framework for the ‘reconstruction’ of Catholic thought. His massive effort of 
scholarship is readily visible in his proposed solution to the problem of integrating 
critical philosophy, the empirical human sciences, and historical scholarship in his 
major works, Insight and Method in Theology as it is, indeed, in his critique of the 
continuing effects of ‘classicism’ in so many areas of Catholic thought, including the 
field of Catholic philosophy of education, the subject of this dissertation.15
The overall aim of this chapter of the dissertation is to examine how Lonergan’s effort 
to transpose the tradition of Catholic educational thought may have contributed to the 
creation of ‘a new mould for the Catholic mind’ in Catholic philosophy of education, 
and provided ‘an empirical and critical theoretical framework’ for its ‘reconstruction’.16 
Soon after the publication of Insight, Lonergan briefly investigated the field of Catholic 
education and philosophy of education in what was for him an unusual departure from 
his primary fields of philosophical and theological reflection. Limiting himself to 
educational issues that he regarded as priorities in Catholic education, Lonergan sought 
to address what he considered to be ‘the fundamental problem’ in Catholic philosophy 
of education, namely, ‘the horizon of the educationalist and the horizon of the
11 Aiming Excessively High and Far, p. 631.
12 Ibid., p. 631.
13 Bernard Lonergan, “Horizons and Transpositions”, pp. 409-432 (410). In: Collected Works o f Bernard 
Lonergan, Vol. 17, pp. 409-432 (410).
14 Patrick D. Brown, Aiming Excessively High and Far, p. 633.
15 See, Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Insight: A Study o f Human Understanding, London: Longman, Green & 
Co Ltd, 1958; Method in Theology, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972. Hereafter cited as Insight 
and Method respectively.
16Bemard Lonergan, “The Future of Thomism”, A Second Collection, pp. 43-47.
teacher’.17 The manner in which he would approach the study of Catholic philosophy of 
education would be by ‘cognitional analysis’, that is, in terms of the elements and 
operations of the knowing subject’s consciousness, first outlined in Insight, his major
1 ftwork on the nature of human understanding.
Whatever way one wants to put it - ‘creating a new mould for the Catholic mind’, or, 
bringing about change in ‘the horizon of the educationalist’ - Lonergan’s goal for the re­
articulation of Catholic philosophy of education seems clear-cut, at least in general 
terms. T wish to tackle the problem of the philosophy of education’, Lonergan 
announces, to ‘bring our philosophic thinking into contact with the [contemporary] 
problems of education’.19 It is a goal that must be examined in the context of both his 
commitment to the transposition of Catholic thought in general, and of his conviction 
that only a methodology based on cognitional analysis will prove equal to the task.
This chapter works towards a more precise understanding of Lonergan’s broad goal in 
an educational context mainly by an examination of an early work of his, first recorded 
as the ‘Cincinnati Lectures on Education’ in 1959, and now available as Topics in 
Education. Lonergan sets out here a kind of elementary framework for an understanding 
of the elements he considers essential to the elaboration of a philosophy of education, 
and also underlines the challenge involved in transposing traditional Catholic thought 
on education to the context of contemporary education and the ‘new kind of learning’ 
that for him characterizes it.20 The question to be answered in this chapter centres on the 
nature and basis of Catholic philosophy of education and how Lonergan’s thought 
might help to give it new expression for our times. It is hoped that some degree of 
enlightenment can be found by retracing Lonergan’s own steps in Topics, where, in an 
unusually low key, with even subdued emphasis on cognitional theory, we can 
nonetheless observe Lonergan’s transcendental method and its under-pinning 
intentionality analysis in action.
This chapter is divided into four sections as follows. In the first section, the focus is on 
the introductory lecture in Topics in which Lonergan raises what he terms ‘the problem
17 Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Topics in Education, Robert Doran and Frederick E. Crowe (ed.s), Collected 
Works of Bernard Lonergan, Vol. 10, Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1993, p. 106. Hereafter cited as: 
Topics. Or abbreviated as: TIE (1993).
18 Insight, pp. xviii, xxii, xxvi, xxix, 272-74, 282-84, 304, 399-401, and passim in this book.
19 Topics, p. 23.
20 Ibid., pp. 22-24.
90
of a philosophy o f  education’.21 Some key issues are identified here that relate to the 
reasons why Lonergan regarded the traditional Catholic philosophy of education as 
‘problematical5. His analysis of the controversy between ‘traditionalist5 and ‘modernist5 
philosophies of education is summarised and, in particular, his relation to Dewey’s 
philosophy of education is noted.
In the second section, Lonergan’s conception of ‘the human good5, elaborated by him in 
Topics in the context of identifying the aims of Catholic education, is analysed. 
Lonergan understands educational reality and its good in the light of his account of the 
human good in general. Of special interest here is the way Lonergan uses the notion of 
‘the human good5 as a means of reflecting on the ‘development5 of the human subject. 
As will be noted in chapter five below, ‘development5, in terms of the integral 
‘formation5 of the human person, is an architectonic aim of the CCE discourse on 
Catholic education. The notion of ‘development5 is thus an important point of contact 
between Lonergan’s philosophical work and that discourse.
In the third section, Lonergan’s notion of ‘development5 is specifically related to his 
understanding of the person as ‘a psychological subject5, and development, as ‘change 
of horizon5, notably in relation to the ‘intellectual pattern of experience5, is examined. 
The relevance of this perspective for an articulation of a Catholic philosophy of 
education is assessed. Lonergan’s notion of education as the subject constructing his or 
her own world, proposed by him as an important corollary for education, is commented 
upon.
In the fourth section, some of the major insights Lonergan has shed upon Catholic 
philosophy of education in this series of lectures are summarised, and, by way of 
conclusion, the ‘new bases’ he has provided for the re-articulation of Catholic 
philosophy of education are recapitulated.
21 Topics, pp. 3-24. The emphasis on o f  is deliberate. Lonergan apparently wants to develop a philosophy 
o f education arising out of an awareness of what the knowing subject is doing as educator rather than 
dwell on a philosophy about education, that is, the traditional application from without o f Scholastic 
philosophical principles to educational practice after the manner of Maritain.
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IAn important source, though not the only one, for Lonergan5 s thinking, with relevance 
for the articulation of a Catholic philosophy of education, is his early work, the
99‘Cincinnati lectures5 of 1959, or, as it will be referred to here, Topics in Education. 
Lonergan appears to have been somewhat reluctant to write specifically, or at length, 
about education and its philosophy and was happy to allow others to develop his 
thought on these issues on the basis of both his monumental early work, Insight: A 
Study o f  Human Understanding, 2 3  and his later impressive work, Method in Theology ?4 
His Cincinnati lecture series is important because of its clear focus on Catholic 
education and on matters related to Catholic philosophy of education. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that Topics does not amount to a fully developed philosophy of 
education as we might understand the term today, nor was it so intended. Neither is it in 
any sense restricted to a narrow Catholic perspective.
Although Lonergan discusses various matters that arise in philosophy of education, and 
provides some analysis of these matters in terms of his rigorous philosophical study of 
human knowing introduced in Insight, his declared intention in this series of lectures is 
to be ‘a philosopher speaking to educators, much as a biologist would speak to a 
medical doctor, or a mathematician to a physicist5.25 Presumably the theoretician in each 
case would share knowledge, principles and methodology with the corresponding 
practitioner in supporting and guiding the latter5 s activity and goals. Lonergan5 s 
intention, therefore, seems to have been not the presentation of a fully articulated 
philosophy of education so much as the provision of an account of certain ‘bases for a 
philosophy of education5, that is, a kind of introduction to a philosophy o f education the 
outlines of which he would hope to provide in the course of his lectures.26 That said, 
however, the ‘topics5 discussed here reflect important insights and positions that relate
Bernard Lonergan and Catholic Philosophy of Education
22 As already indicated, this series of lectures has been transcribed and edited and is available in the series 
Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Topics in Education (1993). Hereafter cited as: Topics.
23 The edition referred to throughout this chapter is the revised students’ edition, first published, 1958. 
Hereafter cited as: Insight.
24 Hereafter cited as: Method.
25 Topics, Editors’ Preface, p. xii.
26 Ibid., p. xii.
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to Lonergan’s general philosophy though now used in the analysis of the nature and 
practice of education and as such are fully intelligible only in terms of his distinctive 
intentionality analysis.
The ‘Problem of a Philosophy of Education9
Lonergan’s introductory lecture in Topics is entitled, ‘The Problem of a Philosophy of 
Education’.27 Lonergan does not immediately specify what the nature of the ‘problem’ 
is, or detail its contours, but from the contents of the lecture one can surmise that his 
concern centres on three related questions. Thus, he wonders how one is to understand 
the nature of such a discipline today, what the role of philosophy of education might be 
in the context of contemporary education, and, lastly, what conditions need to be 
fulfilled to give proper articulation to the characteristic features of a Catholic 
philosophy of education at the present time. The focus throughout the first section of 
this chapter is on Lonergan’s call for ‘a positive’ philosophy of education, the viability 
of which transcends equally its traditional origins and the then current debate 
concerning the nature and purpose of education.
This first lecture in Topics commences with a general assessment of the nature and 
purpose of the philosophy of education.28 Lonergan argues that the discovery and 
articulation of ‘a positive function’ for philosophy of education is a critical matter that 
‘calls for originality and creativity’.29 In his judgment, traditionalist responses to 
modem philosophies of education are ‘inadequate’, and the formulation of a truly 
satisfactory alternative will demand that ‘we face complicated technical issues that take 
seriously the context of contemporary learning’.30 A ‘merely negative conception’ of 
philosophy of education, amounting perhaps to no more than ‘a pulling up of the weeds 
and correcting wrong ideas’, is an inadequate response.31 Lonergan was no doubt 
familiar with standard treatises on educational philosophy widely in use among Catholic 
educators, which concentrated largely on critiquing and rejecting all contemporary 
philosophy that might be used in support of educational theory and practice, leaving the 
way clear for the traditional Thomist-Aristotelian metaphysical, epistemological and 
axiological principles that alone were deemed acceptable and normative as the
27 Topics, pp. 3-25.
28 See ibid., pp. 3-15.
29 Ibid, p. 3.
30 Ibid, p. 3.
31 Ibid, pp. 3-4.
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‘perennial philosophy’. Such a response, Lonergan suggests, is ‘inadequate’. His 
reasons for this position become abundantly clear throughout the course of these 
lectures.
Lonergan and the ‘Traditionalist-Modernist’ Controversy
Lonergan first turns his attention to the then current debate between ‘traditionalists’ and 
‘modernists’ concerning the nature and practice of education, a debate that seemed to 
have intensified with the widespread adoption of John Dewey’s philosophy of 
education. To what extent Lonergan agreed with the casting of Dewey as the principal 
cause of this controversy is briefly commented on below. Lonergan’s aim is to analyse 
the root causes of the controversy and to assess its relevance to his task of formulating a 
‘positive’ philosophy of Catholic education. Given the close correlation between 
education and philosophy, a matter upon which both Dewey and Lonergan most 
certainly agreed, ‘traditionalists’ and ‘modernists’ were bound to disagree about the 
nature of education, and the value and effectiveness of any philosophy of education. 
Lonergan seeks to get behind the dichotomies that divide the dissenting schools of 
thought, to understand their purposes and to discern their governing philosophical 
positions.
Lonergan sets down the main lines of opposition between ‘traditionalists’ and 
‘modernists’, or ‘progressives’, under three headings.32 First, while both affirm the 
value of ‘liberal education’ and strive to achieve it, they mean by it totally different 
things. Lonergan believes that modernists hold that all questions of value, and therefore 
all questions about the aims and ends of education, are ‘to be settled by the methods of 
empirical science’.33 To make this claim, however, is, he believes, to exclude entirely 
what traditionalists understand by liberal education.34 Secondly, both traditionalists and 
modernists advocate a reform and simplification of an overloaded and congested 
curriculum, but their ways of going about this task are opposed. They see different 
groups of subjects as the true ‘medium of education’ and they go about the reform of 
the curriculum on the basis of ‘entirely different criteria’.35 Modernists tend to solve
32 Lonergan acknowledges his debt to Mortimer Adler & Milton Mayer for this account. See, Mortimer 
Adler & Milton Mayer, The Revolution in Education, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, pp. 
152-156.
33 Topics, p. 6.
34 Ibid., p. 6.
35 Ibid., p. 7.
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issues by having recourse to ‘techniques of gathering and sifting information’, whereas 
the traditionalists appeal to ‘principles’.36 Thirdly, while both traditionalists and 
modernists acknowledge the relevance of the past to the present, there is no agreement 
about the manner in which the wisdom of the past is to be recovered and positioned in 
the present. According to Lonergan’s interpretation, the modernist or progressive 
movement in education values only ‘that wisdom which has been formulated as a 
scientific hypothesis and verified’, while the traditionalists cannot accept the view that 
‘all ideas are to be put into the form of scientific hypotheses’ and judged by the ‘degree
7of empirical verification obtainable by strictly empirical methods’.
Lonergan, therefore, diagnoses as the root cause of this dissension between the 
traditionalist and the modem camps in education, the existence of diametrically opposed 
philosophies. Behind this ‘thorough-going opposition’ in educational stance, there is ‘an 
opposition in philosophy’, he suggests.38 In his opinion, the ‘critical difference’ 
between the traditionalists and the modernists is that ‘the modernists have a philosophy 
made specifically for educational purposes’, while the traditionalists, taken as a total 
group, have not.39 This is a situation where it is imperative that ‘a positive alternative’ 
to the traditionalist response must be attempted, Lonergan concludes.40
The so-called traditionalist position in education and in philosophy o f education is 
further represented by Lonergan in the following summary terms.41 For the 
traditionalist, things exist prior to changing, and change does not eliminate all previous 
properties, some at least of which are permanent. There exists a variety of 
methodologies, these differ widely and are proper to science, to philosophy, or to 
metaphysics as the case may be. Finally, there are truths that are certain, accessible to a 
pre-scientific, pre-industrial, and pre-democratic age, but equally accessible to any 
age.42 Although Lonergan does not name, or refer to Maritain, in this brief description 
of the traditionalist position in philosophy of education, the account given appears quite 
close to what one might expect from the metaphysical and epistemological principles 
endorsed by Maritain.
36 Topics, p. 7.
37 Ibid., p. 7.
38 Ibid, p. 7.
39 Ibid, p. 7.
40 Ib id , p. 7.
41 Ibid., p. 9.
42 Ib id , p. 9.
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What is perhaps surprising about all this is that Lonergan, although he must apparently 
reject many of the philosophical principles underlying progressive education as 
represented by its proponents, is by no means convinced of the validity of the 
traditionalist position thus represented. On the contrary, he detects certain ‘weaknesses5 
in the traditionalist position which not only render it liable to attack but in fact amount 
to no more than a ‘negative expression5 of a philosophy of education.43 Lonergan 
writes:
An educational philosophy that appeals to the immutable elements in things, to their eternal
properties, to the truths that hold in any age, and simply urges that empirical methods are not the
only methods, really is defending a negative position. It is not offering a vision, an
understanding, a principle of integration and judgment. [It lacks] the great power offered on the
modernist side by their close correlation between fundamental philosophic notions and 
44educational theory.
In brief, Lonergan appears to be saying that Catholic, traditionalist philosophy of 
education is unable to engage with the realities of contemporary education, since it fails 
to offer ‘vision, understanding, and a principle of integration and judgment5, and is 
particularly vulnerable because it ‘lacks a close correlation between fundamental 
notions and educational theory5, thus seeming merely to be ‘grounding an abstract 
education for abstract human beings5.45
Appearing ready to reject a modernist, or progressive philosophy of education, and 
regarding the traditional approach as sadly lacking in key respects, Lonergan poses the 
challenge of finding a new way of philosophizing about education that suffers from the 
handicaps of neither the traditional nor progressive approaches. It will not do to ‘ascribe 
a merely negative value to the philosophy of education5, he declares. One should rather 
attempt to grasp the idea of a philosophy of education as ‘something positive5, and as 
‘providing the vision missing in the traditionalist response5.46 The fashioning of a 
positive philosophy of education capable of meeting the needs of the day, that will be 
neither traditionalist nor modernist in the sense he has explained these terms, is the task 
that Lonergan envisages. It will first and foremost have to be cognisant of contemporary 
challenges in the fields of both education and philosophy.
43 Topics, p. 9.
44 Ibid., p. 9.
45 Ibid., p. 9.
45 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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Lonergan, not unsurprisingly perhaps, began his presentation of the traditionalist- 
modemist debate by choosing to draw attention to the philosophy of education 
associated with the work of John Dewey, which he acknowledges has had an ‘enormous 
influence5 world-wide.47 In accordance with his own counsel about the inadequacy of a 
‘negative philosophy of education5, Lonergan, although he is critical of the underlying 
pragmatism of Dewey's position, nevertheless, does not exhort his audience to reject 
Dewey and return to traditional education and its supporting philosophy, not even to a 
rejuvenated version of traditionalism 48 Lonergan might have been expected to be more 
critical of Dewey, and such a negative reaction would certainly have been widespread 
among his audience in 1959, at the dawn of an era of revolutionary change in education. 
A closer reading of Lonergan5s text, however, reveals a certain sympathy on his part 
toward Dewey's educational ideas, at least in terms of his own underlying philosophical 
insight into the nature of human enquiry. Though their accounts differ in many respects 
they are not in principle irreconcilable, and there is every reason to believe that 
Lonergan was more aware of Dewey's genius and more appreciative of his work than is 
apparent in this lecture.
Lonergan acknowledges that Dewey's philosophy of education is essentially ‘a 
philosophy of education that connects ideas on education with fundamental ideas on 
philosophy' and it is here, he believes, rather than on perceived practical results claimed 
for Dewey's methods, that one's criticism of Dewey should rightly fall.49 William M. 
Shea observes that subsequent studies have shown that a feature common to both 
Dewey and Lonergan was their highlighting of education, not as ‘a passive acceptance 
of tradition but as a critical appropriation of it', and both provided interpretations of the 
movement ‘from classicism to method' and its significance for education.50
Lonergan interprets Dewey's conception of human knowledge as ‘a transition from a 
problematic situation to an improved situation', a transition that involves two 
components, namely, ‘reflection and action', each of which is vitally necessary51.
47 Topics, p. 4.
48 Ibid., pp. 7-9.
49 Ibid., p. 4.
50 See William M. Shea, “From Classicism to Method: John Dewey and Bernard Lonergan”, American 
Journal o f Education, Vol. 99, No. 3 (May, 1991), pp. 298-319 (298).
51 Topics, p. 4.
Lonergan, Dewey, and the Philosophy of Education
‘Action without reflection is blind’, ‘reflection without action is meaningless’, and 
‘knowing by itself is nothing’, are sentiments of Dewey with which Lonergan fully 
concurred.52 Philosophy for Dewey, Lonergan says, ‘is reflection on the human 
situation at an ultimate level’53. It is fundamental thinking about the human situation. 
Education for Dewey, as Lonergan understands him, is ‘the great means for 
transforming the human situation’.54 Consequently, philosophy and education are 
interdependent. Philosophy is the ‘reflective component’, and education is the ‘active 
component’ at the ultimate level of reflection and action in human life. Philosophy is 
the ‘guide and inspiration’ of education, and education is ‘the verification, the pragmatic 
justification, of a philosophy’.55 The two notions of philosophy and education are linked 
in the closest possible manner in Dewey’s thought, Lonergan observes.56
Although Lonergan does not cite the oft-quoted phrase from Dewey’s Democracy and 
Education to the effect that ‘the most penetrating definition of philosophy’ which can be 
given is that it is ‘the theory of education in its most general phases’, one has the 
impression that it may not have been far from his mind as he reflected on Dewey’s 
linking of philosophy and education in the context of his own efforts to reconstruct a 
positive philosophy of education for contemporary Catholic and other religious 
believers that would achieve the same result.57 Both Lonergan and Dewey are well 
aware that philosophy has deep historical and theoretical connections with education.
Lonergan, one feels, would also endorse Dewey’s view that philosophy of education ‘is 
not an external application of ready-made ideas to a system of practice having a 
radically different origin and purpose’.58 As adverted to in the preceding chapter, here 
we have an issue that very clearly distances Lonergan’s philosophy of education from 
that of Maritain. Lonergan would appear to be in general agreement with Dewey’s view 
of philosophy that, in as much as it is ‘an explicit formulation of the problems of the 
formation of right mental and moral habitudes’, it becomes but ‘the theory of education
52 Topics, p. 4.
53 Ibid., p. 4.
54 ibid., p. 5.
55 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
56 Ibid., p. 5..
57 See John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy o f Education, New 
York: Collier Macmillan, 1966, pp. 328-331.
58 Ibid., pp. 328-331.
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in its most general phases’ and ‘the reconstruction of philosophy, of education, and of 
social ideals and methods thus go hand in hand’.59
Lonergan scholars claim, correctly in my view, that, as far as philosophy of education is 
concerned, Lonergan and Dewey ‘share several basic philosophical tendencies’. The 
claim, if  proven, would mean that Lonergan, in his Cinncinati lectures, is by no means 
desirous of discarding Dewey’s work in the field of philosophy of education, even 
though it is highly probable that the more traditional minded and conservative audience 
he was addressing might have wished him to be so.60 It might therefore be thought a 
little surprising, even if understandable, that Lonergan did not choose to make explicit 
in this opening lecture those aspects of Dewey’s philosophy of education which echoed 
elements of his own methodology. It is certainly a fact, well-documented by later 
scholars, that substantial common ground existed between their logics of enquiry and to 
be aware of this is something that is likely to prevent our misunderstanding of 
Lonergan’s true attitude to Dewey and his philosophy of education.
Thus, Antonia Galdos claims that Lonergan and Dewey ‘share the philosophical project 
of articulating the structure of cognition’, and, in so doing, ‘critically expose traditional 
misconceptions regarding the nature of human knowing’.61 For each of these thinkers, 
cognition is defined by ‘functionally interrelated operations’ that collectively constitute 
human knowing. In Lonergan’s cognitional theory, human knowing is not some single 
operation but a dynamic structure of the operations of experience, understanding, and 
judgment. None of these stages is solely constitutive of knowledge, nor can any stage be 
reduced to any other, and the objectivity of human knowing is not some single property 
but a combination of distinct properties that reside severally in distinct operations. 
Lonergan’s critical realism argues that the essence of the objectivity of human knowing 
does not stand revealed in the act of taking a look, or seeing, or in any other single 
cognitional operation.
Galdos summarizes Dewey’s understanding of human inquiry as also a process
59 Ibid., pp. 328-331.
60 Antonia Galdos, “When Pragmatism and Instrumentalism Collide: Lonergan’s Resolution of the 
Peirce/Dewey Debate on Theory and Practice in Science”, in METHOD: Journal o f Lonergan Studies, 
Vol. 18, 2000, pp. 123-144 (124-5). Hereafter cited as: “Pragmatism and Instrumentalism”.
61 Ibid., p. 124.
62 Bernard Lonergan, “Cognitional Structure”, pp. 15-33 (29). In: Philip McShane, Introducing the 
Thought o f Bernard Lonergan, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973. Hereafter cited as: “Cognitional 
Structure”.
consisting of four stages: the pre-problematic stage, the empirical stage, the speculative 
stage, and the point of judgment. She concludes that in many respects, this structural 
account of cognition corresponds to Lonergan’s stages of presentation of evidence, of 
understanding, and of judgment.63 Like Dewey, Lonergan notes that enquiry begins at 
the level of experience, with a puzzle or problem that, guided by a notion or a ‘hunch’, 
leads first to an explicit formulation of the problem and definition of its related concepts 
and ultimately to the enquirer grasping an ‘insight’ or understanding of the situation. 
Galdos believes that Dewey, too, like Lonergan, rejected simplistic misconceptions 
about cognition and objectivity.
In comparing their two accounts, Galdos makes it clear how both Lonergan and Dewey 
emphasize the dynamic character of human enquiry. There are, of course, important 
differences between Dewey’s instrumentalism and Lonergan’s cognitional theory, as 
Galdos also observes.64 She correctly judges that while they offer ‘seemingly parallel 
accounts of the stages of inquiry’, their entire philosophical trajectory is ‘ultimately 
defined by differences in their conception of the origin of enquiry’.65 Lonergan argues 
that human enquiry is driven by ‘a detached, disinterested, unrestricted, pure desire to 
know’.66 The desire to know orders human cognition over and beyond the demands of 
environmental stimuli, as Lonergan makes clear:
[The desire to know] pulls man out of the solid routine of perception and conation, instinct and 
habit, doing and enjoying. It holds him with the fascination of problems. It engages him in the 
quest of solution. It makes him aloof to what is not established. It compels assent to the 
unconditioned.67
As Galdos interprets him, Lonergan’s desire to know is distinctive from other human 
desires, by reason of its ‘capacity to order human cognition beyond instinctive
biological adaptation’, and its ‘movement of human beings beyond experiential
68immediacy towards the critical affirmation of the actual’.
From this brief comparison of Dewey and Lonergan we can better appreciate what was 
probably Lonergan’s true attitude to Dewey’s philosophy of education, even if, on this
63 Antonia Galdos, “Pragmatism and Instrumentalism”, p. 125.
64 See, ibid., p. 136.
65 Ibid., p. 136.
66See Bernard Lonergan, Insight, pp. xi, xiv, 4, 9, 74, 220-22, 348-50, 380-1, 528, 550, 596, 599-600, 
623-24, 636-39, 642, 682, 701-2, 738.
67 Tbid., p. 348.
68 “Pragmatism and Instrumentalism”, p. 138.
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occasion, it was not explicitly so admitted. There is, as Galdos puts it, a common 
ground between the logic of inquiry which Dewey is determined will have practical or 
instrumental effect and Lonergan’s logic of enquiry that asserts that truth can be 
pursued for its own sake and discovered by authentic investigation of reality.69 This 
kind of ‘compromise’ features in Lonergan’s philosophy, whose critical realism 
includes an account of concrete judgment strikingly similar to that of John Dewey, but 
whose account of the normative structure of cognition, emanating from the individual’s 
radical desire to know, also incorporates emphasis on the ontological aspect of truth, 
whereby all knowing is true by its relation to being and truth is a relation of knowing to 
being.70 Notwithstanding their real differences, these more recently acknowledged 
similarities in the fundamental thinking of Dewey and Lonergan have important 
consequences for our appreciation of the importance of Lonergan’s cognitional theory 
discourse in the re-articulation of Catholic philosophy of education.
Toward a Catholic Philosophy of Education
Lonergan’s wish for ‘a positive philosophy of education’, which would offer educators 
‘a vision, an understanding, and a principle of integration and judgment’, has been 
noted. Such a philosophy of education would be distinguished, in Lonergan’s view, by a 
close correlation between fundamental philosophic notions and educational theory of 
the kind he believed Dewey and the modernists were able to offer. Lonergan declares 
that none of three lines of philosophical enquiry that he has analysed ‘fits, even 
proximately, what is wanted for a Catholic philosophy of education at the present 
time’.71
Obviously, Lonergan asserts, there is little of value in a philosophy of education in the 
sense of ‘secularist philosophy’, where philosophy ignores, or seeks to replace religion 
entirely.72 Lonergan acknowledges that in fact, in much of today’s education, ‘ultimate 
criteria’ do not have a religious source or origin, but spring rather from ‘philosophy in
73the sense of human reason and human freedom as the ultimates’. In the Catholic 
tradition, however, philosophy of education has never admitted that human reason and 
human freedom are absolutes in this sense, or sufficient on their own; rather, reason
69 Antonia Galdos, “Pragmatism and Intellectualism”, Ibid., p. 123.
70 Insight, p. 552.
71 Topics, p. 19.
72 Ibid., p. 18.
73 Ibid., p. 18.
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enlightened by Christian faith and will strengthened by grace provide the criteria 
whereby truth may be known and wisdom sought after. In any case, a secular 
philosophy is unsatisfactory since, de facto , Catholic philosophy of education is a 
discipline that has come to exist by the very evident reality of Catholic education and a 
Catholic school sector, which has arisen out of basic Catholic beliefs about God, human 
existence, and the mediational role of the Church in relation to the promulgation of the 
Christian Gospel.
Also to be rejected by the Catholic tradition, Lonergan argues, is the philosophy he 
describes as ‘exclusively Cartesian’, in the sense of a discipline that may recognise a 
certain theoretical superiority and freedom of religion and theology, but ‘proceeds 
simply on its own independent criteria and in accord with its own independent 
methods’.74 The Catholic faith tradition seeks to integrate religious faith and learning in 
a total way of life and the idea of a compartmentalized philosophy that does not 
facilitate such integration is irrelevant. Likewise to be rejected, Lonergan concludes, is 
any kind of ‘medieval symbiosis of philosophy and theology’, for such a view ‘does not 
provide proximate criteria for an examination of the new learning’.75 Philosophy, as it 
was thought out in the medieval period, is ‘not connected intimately enough with the 
new learning’.76
Lonergan has already briefly indicated what the phrase ‘new learning’ connotes and 
later in this lecture series he will take considerable trouble in setting down what he 
intends by the term and spelling out its implications for contemporary philosophy of 
education.77 Briefly, the ‘new learning’ with which Lonergan is concerned is not merely 
‘an addition’ of new to old subjects, but their ‘transformation’.78 In the contemporary 
era, Lonergan believes, there has been not only ‘an emergence of new thinking’ in areas 
such as natural science, but equally in the human sciences such as psychology, history, 
language and literature. The challenges inherent in this development of knowledge and 
learning have been further compounded by the phenomenon of ‘specialization’, a 
phenomenon Lonergan fears, very easily results in a notion of education as ‘a conveyor
74 Topics, p. 18.
75 Ibid., p. 19.
76 Ibid., p. 19.
77 See Topics, chapters 5, 6, 9, and 10.
78 Topics, p. 16.
belt supplying students with a great many isolated pieces of information5.79 Here, for the 
moment, it suffices to note with Lonergan that ‘the new learning5 is what has come into 
being since the medieval scheme of learning was worked out and subsequently 
abandoned. As he puts it, the philosophy that used to be an integral part of the 
‘medieval symbiosis5 does not offer ‘a direct synthesis for the unassimilated mass of the 
new learning5.80
Issues of Central Concern for the Re-articulation of Catholic Philosophy of 
Education
In the final section of his introductory lecture in Topics Lonergan reflects directly on the 
nature of the correlation he perceives between philosophy and education and on the kind 
of Catholic philosophy that is required for contemporary purposes. What is needed, 
urgently, according to Lonergan is a distinctly Catholic philosophy o f education. Two 
passing remarks might be pertinent here before what is implied in Lonergan5 s 
understanding of the specificity of Catholic philosophy o f  education is analysed.
Firstly, there is no evidence here that Lonergan intended to develop a very narrowly 
focused approach to philosophy of education for the Catholic sector solely. His remarks, 
on the one hand, merely reflect the fact that his audience consists mainly of practitioners 
in the field of education within the Catholic tradition. On the other hand, it is clear that 
his thoughts on the subject, especially if  interpreted in the light of his magisterial 
document, Insight, lend themselves to the creation of a wider ranging philosophy of 
education than might at first be anticipated.
Secondly, one should not imagine that Lonergan is developing his educational thinking 
in a vacuum as it were. Attention has already been drawn to his awareness of modernist 
re-thinking in the field, and, in particular, his acquaintance with the work of Dewey. In 
the absence of evidence, it is impossible to say to what extent Lonergan was familiar 
with writers in the field of Catholic philosophy of education, such as Jacques Maritain 
and William J.McGucken, but it is highly probable that he was au courant with their 
views, without at all approving of what he must have regarded as their essentially
79 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
80 Ibid., p. 19.
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* 81 ‘classicist’ positions.
Lonergan has now arrived at what he judges the core of the problem of elucidating a 
Catholic philosophy of education for our times. The theoretical problem of a Catholic 
philosophy of education that must be ‘addressed with skill and rigour’, is, Lonergan 
asserts, that as traditionally conceived by Catholics, ‘philosophy is not a philosophy of. .
82 jy[It] is not a subject of other subjects, but philosophy simply’. He sees ‘a host of 
problems’ connected with the necessary shift in conception to a philosophy of. . . ,  and 
some of them are ‘very technical’, he believes. Yet, he is confident that ‘such a shift in 
conception can be effected on a basis strictly in harmony with the tradition’, and he sets
83himself the task of ‘attempting to offer some indication as to how this can be done’. 
Catholic philosophy of education, if its proponents can execute that ‘shift in conception’ 
needed to see philosophy as ‘philosophy o f \  can be transposed into a new context by a 
new effort of analysis and synthesis that still preserves its basic elements and character.
Lonergan, while not attempting a comprehensive solution for the range of problems 
associated with the needed ‘shift in conception’ concerning the nature of philosophical 
activity, selects a number of issues for discussion that he considers particularly pressing 
for, and in need of, a response from the Catholic tradition and from Catholic philosophy 
of education. Two such issues or concerns might be identified and discussed briefly 
here. In the first place, the contemporary Catholic philosopher of education must be 
prepared to abandon the traditionalist Scholastic approach to the discipline; and, 
secondly, Catholic philosophy of education must entertain a new and more authentic 
way of knowing reality, and adopt a new stance to the nature and process of human 
knowing, in whatever field, philosophical or elsewhere.
Philosophy of X
To begin with, then, Lonergan comments on the difficulty for those who have been 
formed on ‘medieval philosophy’ as traditionally interpreted, in distinguishing between
81 Just as Maritain was a contributor to the Fifty-Fourth Yearbook of the NSSE, so too William J. 
McGucken contributed an article, “The Philosophy of Catholic Education”, to the Forty-First Yearbook. 
See, William J. McGucken, “The Philosophy of Catholic Education”, in Nelson B. Henry (ed), 
Philosophies o f Education: The Forty-First Yearbook o f the NSSE, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1942.
82 Topics, p. 19.
83 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
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‘philosophy simpliciter and philosophy o f. . . \ 84 He reminds his audience of the current 
vogue in philosophical circles of talk about ‘a philosophy of mathematics’, ‘a 
philosophy of science’, ‘a philosophy of nature’, ‘a philosophy of history’, ‘a 
philosophy of education’ and so on. This mode of speech, Lonergan continues, is 
‘strange to anyone brought up on scholastic fare’, where philosophy is a subject by 
itself, not a subject of some other subject: ‘It is not a philosophy o f  everything else’.85 
He invites his audience to dwell on the question of how one acquires the notion of ‘a 
philosophy of X ’ and what kind of philosophy that is.86
Lonergan would probably have been aware of the widespread debate in North American 
education concerning the nature of ‘philosophy o f  education’, and the many different
07
relationships between philosophy and education seemingly intended by this term. It 
was precisely this debate that occasioned the publication of the Fifty-Fourth Yearbook 
of the National Society for the Study of Education, Modern Philosophy o f  Education, a 
few years before his Cincinnati series of lectures on the subject.88 It will be recalled 
from chapter two above that Jacques Maritain contributed an article, “Thomist Views on 
Education”, to this volume in which he attempted to identify the basic philosophical 
issues on which that theoiy of education depended. Lonergan does not mention Maritain 
at all in his discussion of these matters in Topics. What his silence about Maritain’s 
views on philosophy of education and its task, as Lonergan saw it, of developing a 
philosophical perspective for Catholic education, might imply, one can but speculate.
From today’s vantage point we might regard this whole question as rather out-dated and 
somewhat irrelevant. Obviously, at the end of the 1950s, this was not so, at least not for 
Lonergan’s present audience whose principal philosophical formation had been in the 
tradition of the scholastic Thomism of the manuals. We are accustomed to the usage , 
‘philosophy of X ’ , and generally understand it to mean ‘philosophizing about X ’ , that 
is, as an activity that applies philosophical understanding to the illumination of issues in 
X, whether that be religion, science, history, or education, or any of several other areas 
of learning and discourse. Since people, however, disagree about the nature of 
philosophy (and are equally likely to have divergent views about the nature of X), this
84 Ibid., p. 19.
85 Ibid., p. 19.
86 Topics, p. 19.
87 See, Harvard Educational Review, 1956, Vol. 26, No. 2, for “Symposium on Philosophy of Education”.
88 Nelson B. Henry (ed), Modern Philosophies o f Education: The Fifty-Fourth Yearbook o f the National 
Society for the Study of Education, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955.
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definition is of limited value only. Given that many contemporary philosophers have 
been influenced by the conception that the function of philosophy is essentially critical 
or analytical, in each instance of ‘philosophy of X ’, the philosopher is likely to be 
concerned with an examination of the arguments and a clarification of the concepts 
which are used within the discipline that is the object of his philosophizing. From this 
point of view, the philosophy of education stands in the same relationship to education, 
as the philosophy of religion to religion, or the philosophy of history to history.
Today, there is wide agreement that all human studies, including education, need a 
philosophical critique and grounding. Such a ‘philosophy o f  will regularly be 
comprised of analyses of certain concepts or tenets central to the host discipline. A 
thorough examination of the meaning and justification of central claims of the discipline 
will be present de rigeur. The ‘philosophy o f  any human activity or discipline will 
acknowledge the fundamental ontology of that activity or discipline and respect its 
characteristic methodology. From an ontological perspective, the philosophical 
operation will be concerned with the reality posited by the under-lying discipline, that 
is, with what it perceives as reality and whether this is consistent with logic and/or 
common sense belief. The methodical perspective will look at questions to do with how 
the discipline generates knowledge and how it provides distinctive explanations for the 
phenomena it observes. Thus, metaphysical and epistemological concerns are always an
89integral part of the philosophizing envisaged in the activity of the ‘philosophy of X5. 
Lonergan and the Priority of Cognitional Theory
Lonergan’s attempt to elucidate what he understands by the term ‘philosophy o f  was 
‘a matter of major concern to him’ and ‘a category recurrent in his thinking’ at this time, 
we are told by the editors of this volume of his lectures on education.90 Lonergan’s 
second concern, then, that the Catholic philosopher of education should come to 
understand human knowing in a new way, both introduces us to the dominant feature of 
his philosophy, namely, his cognitional theory, and testifies to his first efforts to wean 
Catholic educators from a conceptualist approach to educational philosophy to one
89 It is not possible in the present context to extend this discussion of what the term ‘philosophy o f . .’ 
means. Analysis o f entries in standard dictionaries o f philosophy may be found helpful. See, for example, 
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
90 Topics, p. 20, footnote 60.
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Lonergan’s preference for an account of philosophy of education that would employ his 
theory of cognitional process and his methodology of intentionality analysis, rather than 
simply revert to type by merely repeating a classicist account of Catholic philosophy of 
education that was highly ‘conceptualist in tone’, largely incapable of ‘rising to the level 
of the times’, and failing to adjust to the ‘vastly changed cultural and intellectual timbre 
of the day’, has been noted by Crowe, and is also abundantly clear from a reading of 
Topics.92 Furthermore, one should recall Lonergan’s view from elsewhere that, now that 
a classicist culture is being put aside, there exists a type of philosophy that is in many 
ways very relevant to the current crisis in Catholic thought.93 That crisis is about a ‘shift 
in horizon’, and, according to Lonergan, a philosophy that is to have relevance in any 
field suffering from a crisis resulting in ‘a shift of horizon’ must be one that ‘centres on 
three questions’ of a cognitional, epistemological and metaphysical nature: ‘What am I 
doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do
it?, 94
When answers to these questions have been ascertained, Lonergan suggests, there is 
available a method that enables us to become clear about the nature of any activity of 
knowing upon which we are engaged and one that serves to guide the process towards a 
result. Answering a specific question, ‘What are we doing when we do X?’, is integral 
to a methodology that is by no means limited to a single discipline. Thus, Daniel Vokey, 
reflecting upon the nature and role of the discipline of philosophy of education, 
legitimately poses the question, ‘What are we doing when we are doing philosophy of 
education?’95 Vokey’s question is an adaptation of Lonergan’s approach to cognitional 
process which begins from that radical question, ‘ What are we doing when we are 
knowing?’ This philosophical approach, Lonergan suggests, makes possible basic 
analysis and much needed critique in the field of Catholic education.
based on intentionality analysis and transcendental method.91
91 For these matters, see the extensive treatment in Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study in Human 
Understanding (1957); and, Method in Theology (1974)
92 Frederick Crowe, Lonergan, p. 58. Crowe records a phrase Lonergan borrowed from Ortega y Gasset in 
the 1930s: ‘One has to strive to mount to the level of one’s time’.
93 Bernard Lonergan, “Philosophy and Theology”, pp. 193-208. In: A Second Collection, William F.J. 
Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrrell (ed.s), London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974.
94 Ibid., p. 207
95 Daniel Vokey, “What Are We Doing when We Are Doing Philosophy of Education?”, Paideusis, Vol. 
15, No. 1 (2006), pp. 45-55 (45).
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Lonergan’s cognitional process, briefly recalled, is an understanding of human knowing 
that advances from experience through enquiry and reflection to judgment and decision. 
Lonergan is rarely concerned with the existence of knowledge as such but rather with its 
nature and with how the knowing subject appropriates the very activity of knowing. 
Lonergan* s emphasis is not with what is known but with the structure of the knowing, 
not with the ‘abstract properties of cognitional process’ but with a ‘personal 
appropriation of one’s own dynamic and recurrently operative structure of cognitional 
activity’.96 Lonergan’s structure of cognition is a multi-level process: a level of 
experience where sense data and data of consciousness are presented; a level of 
intelligence which consists in acts of inquiry, understanding, and formulation, and a 
level of reflection which complements the level of intelligence. In this process, the 
formulations of understanding yield concepts, definitions, objects of thought, 
suppositions, and considerations. Every answer to a question for intelligence raises a 
further question for reflection. It is within this third level that there is involved the 
personal commitment that makes one responsible for one’s judgments.97
Lonergan, in his efforts to sketch the outlines of a Catholic philosophy of education on 
the basis of his cognitional theory, firstly, encourages his audience ‘to attend not merely 
to concepts’, but to go beyond the position where one thinks only of ‘universals being 
applied to particulars’.98 Introducing his intentionality analysis almost as an aside, 
Lonergan invites his audience ‘to think of understanding, of insight, as the ground of 
conception’.99 If one thinks in this way, Lonergan assures his listeners, one will see ‘a 
quite different relation between intelligence and sensible data’.100 Lonergan goes on to 
explain that intelligence, understanding, insight, as the ground of conception, has ‘a 
quite different relationship with the particular and the concrete from the relationship 
found in the abstract concepts of the universal and the particular’.101 This first 
introduction of his audience to his cognitional process, with its pattern o f the intentional 
operations of enquiry, understanding, and judgment, has important ramifications for the 
development of the Catholic philosophy of education Lonergan will eventually propose.
96 Insight, p. xxiii.
97 Insight, pp. 272-273. It might be noted in passing that the later Lonergan, as author of Method, formally 
introduces a fourth level of cognitional process, namely, the level of deliberation and decision.
9$ Topics, p. 20.
99 Ibid., p. 20.
100 Ibid., p. 20.
101 Ibid., p. 20.
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By emphasizing the pivotal role of insight in human knowing, Lonergan displays a clear 
break with classicist metaphysics which emphasized deduction of certainties from 
abstract principles. Lonergan’s metaphysics is based on what he terms the ‘invariant 
structures of human knowing’, not on any code of verbal propositions called first 
principles.102 It is only by close attention to the ‘data of consciousness’, he asserts, that 
one can discover ‘insights’, acts of understanding with the ‘triple role of responding to 
inquiry, grasping intelligible form in sensible representations, and grounding the 
formation of concepts’.103 For Lonergan, what comes first is insight into the concrete, 
not deduction from abstract ‘first principles’. Insight, as Lonergan understands it, does 
not strictly come from a deductive process or, at least, does not come about only as a 
result of a deductivist process. Lonergan doubts, in a way that Maritain did not, that one 
can develop a Catholic philosophy of education today on the basis of pre-existent and 
immutable first principles. Lonergan’s vision of insight, claims Matthew C. Ogilvie, 
excludes the classicist notion that human knowledge is attained with certainty by 
deducing truths from self-evident axioms.104 Philosophy in the past has not been 
‘thought out’ in terms of concrete situations and concrete realities, Lonergan laments, 
but has relied on a perennial philosophy that was never envisaged as being ‘essentially 
an open philosophy’.105
Lonergan’s second stage in the cognitional process proposes ‘a period of elaboration’ in 
which one attempts to ‘express one’s insight’, and it is here that concept formation 
through a process of abstraction occurs, he believes.106 Lonergan therefore notes two 
important properties of concepts. First, they are constituted by the ‘act of supposing, 
defining, considering, thinking, formulating’, though they may or may not be more than 
that.107 Secondly, concepts do not occur randomly; they emerge in that multiple activity 
of thinking, supposing, considering, defining, and formulating, which occurs only in 
conjunction with an act of insight.108 Lonergan thus maintains, Ogilvie points out, that
Implications of Cognitional Theory for Catholic Philosophy of Education
102 Bernard Lonergan, “Theories of Inquiry”, A Second Collection, pp. 33-42 (39).
103 Bernard Lonergan, “The Subject”, A Second Collection, pp. 69-86 (74).
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insight is prior to concept and that the concept only arises in conjunction with the 
insight, and as the insight’s expression.109 Concept formation expresses in a kind of 
general way what is essential to experiencing insight. But Lonergan insists that, in the 
exercise of intelligence, a conceptual definition remains an expression of an insight, and 
not the other way round.
That insight is prior to concepts, and concepts are dependent on insight, is critically 
important for the re-articulation of Catholic philosophy of education, Lonergan argues. 
The conceptualist educator, he claims, thinks with the assumption that concepts are 
prior to insights. For Lonergan, there is a major problem in traditional Catholic 
philosophical thinking about education, as elsewhere, in this kind of position that he 
calls ‘conceptualism’.110 Lonergan attributes several basic defects to conceptualism, 
which impinge greatly on the human subject in his pursuit of knowing. Firstly, 
conceptualism ‘condemns the subject to an anti-historical immobilism’, which, since it 
disregards insights, cannot account for the development of concepts.111 Secondly, 
conceptualism involves ‘an excessive abstractness’.112 Conceptualism ignores human 
understanding and so it overlooks the concrete mode of understanding that grasps 
intelligibility in the sensible itself. It is confined to a world of abstract universals, and its 
only link with the concrete is the relation of universal to particular.113
The levels of experience and of understanding in Lonergan’s cognitional process are 
complemented by a third level of knowing. The final increment in the process o f 
knowing, the act of judgment, also has considerable import for how philosophy of 
education and its philosophising activity should be conceived. This notion of judgment, 
it should be noted, differs from the old notion that judging is a matter of comparing 
concepts and discovering that one entails another. The understanding we have gained by 
intelligence is regarded as a mere possibility until the evidence for its reality has been 
evaluated. At the rational level of human consciousness, we reflect upon an object, 
marshal evidence and pass judgment on its truth or falsity.114 In judgment, the knowing 
person takes an object of thought and transforms it from a mere idea to an object of 
affirmation. It is on this third level that there emerge notions of ‘truth and falsity’, of
109 Matthew C. Ogilvie, Faith Seeking Understanding, p. 82.
110 Bernard Lonergan, “Theories of Inquiry”, A Second Collection, pp. 33-42 (39).
111 Bernard Lonergan, “The Subject”, A Second Collection, pp. 69-86 (74).
112 Ibid, p. 74.
113 Ibid , pp. 74-75.
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‘certitude and probability’, and it is within this third level that there is involved ‘the 
personal commitment that makes one responsible for one’s judgments’.115
Lonergan observes that judgment, which is, like the act of understanding, an active, not 
a passive operation, relies on a special kind of insight.116 This account of judgment as an 
active operation recalls Newman’s notion of the ‘illative sense’.117 The ‘illative sense’ 
which leads to certitude ‘is not a passive impression made upon the mind from without’, 
but ‘an active recognition of propositions as true’, such that it is the duty of each 
individual himself to exercise ‘at the bidding of reason’. Lonergan calls this active 
operation of judgment ‘reflective understanding’.118 Lonergan acknowledges Newman 
as the source of his notion of ‘reflective understanding’, and admits that his account, 
although in different terms, is roughly equivalent to Newman’s illative sense.119 
Lonergan acknowledges that Newman’s notion was a key influence in his understanding 
of reflective judgment as a natural part of human cognitional operations.
When the work of Terence H. McLaughlin is presented for consideration below, in 
chapter four of this dissertation, it will become apparent that there is much in common 
between Lonergan’s notion of ‘reflective understanding’ in which judgment and 
deliberation is grounded, and McLaughlin’s espousal and use o f ‘pedagogic phronesis\ 
insofar as both scholars express in their own ways the centrality of insight in human life 
and action. There we shall see how the educational practitioner, whose judgment and 
decision making arises out o f ‘pedagogic phronesis\ could be said to be successfully 
deploying the cognitive operations of Lonergan’s common sense intelligence, though 
perhaps with a more focused perspective on the good of the whole community rather 
than on the good of an individual.
An ‘Existential’ and ‘Historical’ Catholic Philosophy of Education.
If Lonergan’s transposition and reconstruction of the tradition of Catholic philosophy 
of education demanded as a first priority the abandonment of conceptualism and 
commitment to cognitional theory, another imperative for him lay in the importance of
115 Insight, p. 273. Lonergan refers to Aquinas regarding judgment and concern for truth. See, Aquinas,
ST la, Q. 16, a. 1 c.
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117 John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar o f Assent, Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co. 
Inc, Image Books edn, 1955, ch. IX, pp. 270-299.
118 See, Bernard Lonergan, Insight, ch. X, pp. 279-316.
119 Bernard Lonergan, “Insight Revisited”, A Second Collection, pp. 263-278. ‘Newman’s illative sense 
became my reflective act of understanding’, p. 263.
meeting the challenge that he sees in the ‘non-historical nature of medieval thought’.120 
This lack of historical perspective has adversely influenced the development of Catholic 
thought and left it incapable of truly recognising the historicity of the human subject 
today, Lonergan maintains.121 Lonergan’s base position is clear. One cannot ground a 
concrete historical apprehension of man on abstract foundations. 122 Longeran ponders 
over the question of how it is possible to incorporate into Catholic philosophy of 
education a notion such as the ‘present time’, and is convinced that this could not be
1 9^achieved ‘if philosophy deals simply with timeless truths’.
In particular, Lonergan asks, against the background of ‘the traditional Catholic 
conception of philosophy’, how it is possible to have a genuine Catholic philosophy of 
education that ‘does not consider man as he is in the world’.124 The ‘core problem’ of 
education, as it appears to Lonergan, is ‘the problem of education today’, the problem of 
educating not the medievals, or the people of the Renaissance, but the people of 
today.125 Essentially, the challenge is the problem of the ‘development of the individual 
up to the level of the times’, that is, the level of human development reached by 
Western culture and civilization.126
Scholastic thought, Lonergan argues, was ‘concerned with eternal, timeless truths’ 
rather than with ‘genesis, development, and history’, but this constitutes a major 
difficulty if we try to bring today, or the present time, into the ambit of such unchanging 
philosophical categories.127 Lonergan asks how we are to account for ‘the notion of the 
developing individual’ within the confines of a philosophy of education that appears 
unable to accommodate the idea of historical development. Medieval thought was not 
historical thought.128 Lonergan arrives at a starkly frank answer to his own question: If 
you conceive philosophy simply as a matter of eternal, timeless truths, then such a 
philosophy can have no answer in relation to the notion o f the development of the 
individual, or the development of society. Such a philosophy cannot be ‘timely’; it is
120 Topics, p. 20.
121 Ibid., p. 20.
122 Bernard Lonergan, “The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness”, A 
Second Collection, pp. 1-9 (6).
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‘timeless’, or so it claims.129
The traditional Catholic conception of philosophy is ‘not existential’, Lonergan alleges. 
It has not been concerned, he says, with ‘the individual coming to grips with the 
meaningybr him of true propositions’.130 Its concern has been ‘to pick out and label 
which propositions are true per se\ 131 To show how propositions come to have a 
meaning for us in our living, to show what is true for us as we exist in this world at the 
present time, Lonergan maintains, is not a question ‘proper to Catholic philosophy as it 
has been traditionally conceived’.132 That belongs rather to theology, he believes.133 So 
the question remains unanswered as to how you can have a Catholic philosophy of 
education, if you do not consider man as he is in this world today.134
For Lonergan, medieval philosophy is unable to address the important existential 
question of achieving meaning in the here and now, in the context of one’s immediate 
lived existence, and so a Catholic philosophy of education would seem to have few 
prospects in adopting that mode of philosophizing as far as being relevant to Catholic 
educators is concerned. On the other hand, a Catholic philosophy of education would 
seem ill-advised to ignore or reject a whole tradition of Catholic thinking that sought to 
positively relate faith and reason in the search for truth consonant with Christian 
revelation. Historical existence brings greater understanding and is the necessary 
context for discovering the meaning of truth for the contemporary believer.
Ultimately, it would appear that Lonergan’s vision for Catholic philosophy of education 
is a synthesis of the older wisdom of traditional philosophy, in the measure that it truly 
reflects ‘the mind of St Thomas’ (vetera), and the insights of a more contemporary 
philosophy seeking ‘to rise to the level of the times’ (nova), that he makes available in 
his own philosophical thinking and particularly in his cognitional process and its 
accompanying intentionality analysis.135 The on-going interplay in human history of
129 Ibid., p. 21.
130 Ibid., p. 21.
131 Ibid., p. 21.
132 Ibid., p. 21.
]33 Ibid., p. 21.
134 Topics, p. 21.
135 See, Leo XIII, Aeterni Paths (1879), whose clarion call, ‘vetera novis augere et perficere5, ‘to enlarge 
and perfect the old by means of the new5, Lonergan interpreted, not as a ‘back to Thomism call5 
simpliciter, but as an invitation to unite the historical and the transcendental, an invitation that he took to 
heart and used to express the nature of his own task (.Insight, p. 743).
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In many respects, Lonergan’s demand for a far more sophisticated type of philosophy 
than the medieval world could furnish, upon which to ground a Catholic philosophy of 
education, is but a reflection of a constant theme throughout his writings, namely, the 
need for Catholic thinking to make that transition from ‘classicism to historical- 
mindedness’ to which allusion has already been made. Lonergan writes in Insight that it 
is commonly recognised that Aquinas took over the Aristotelian synthesis o f philosophy
1^7and science to construct the larger Christian view that includes theology. He adds that 
it is perhaps less commonly appreciated that the development of the empirical human 
sciences ‘has created a fundamentally new problem’.138 The new problem is that these 
sciences ‘consider man in his concrete performance’, and that performance is a 
manifestation not only of human nature but also of human sin, not only of nature and sin 
but also of a de facto need of divine grace, not only of a need of grace but also of its 
reception and of its acceptance or rejection.139 Lonergan concludes that it follows from 
this fact that ‘an empirical human science cannot analyse successfully the elements in 
its object without an appeal to theology’, and, inversely, theology, not only by right but 
also in fact, and theologians, have to take ‘a professional interest’ in the human sciences 
and allow them to ‘make a positive contribution to their methodology’.140
This, therefore, is the mind-set and intention with which Lonergan approached the 
present task in Topics of outlining the elements of a Catholic philosophy of education. 
He reminds his listeners of the problems that such an undertaking is bound to encounter 
in the modem world. What is needed for a Catholic philosophy of education, he 
concludes, is a philosophy that ‘remains true to itself and yet develops’, that ‘preserves 
its identity and yet takes over the mastery of different successive ages’, a ‘philosophia 
perennis\ of which medieval philosophy was but ‘a moment’.141 Such a perennial 
philosophy would essentially be ‘an open philosophy’, a philosophy that ‘can take 
cognizance of individual and historical developments’, and account for developments 
that are ‘concrete’ and ‘existential in the general sense of that term (not in the sense of
136 See, Bernard Lonergan, “Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation”, pp. 35-54. In: A Third Collection, 
Frederick E. Crowe (ed.), London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1985.
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particular existentialist schools).142 Only such a philosophy of education can be 
‘historical’, ‘Catholic’, and a ‘philosophy of. . as required by our circumstances. It 
must not be a philosophy of education ‘confined simply to timeless truths and 
conclusions drawn from universals to particulars’.143
Lonergan believes that such a philosophic tool, which acknowledges the need to deal 
with human reality in the context of historical existence, can be constructed. One might 
legitimately interpret him to further believe that such a tool should be available to 
Catholic educators to develop a philosophy of education that would engage in dialogue 
with other discourses concerning the aims and goals of education. What we can in 
practice take from Lonergan’s vision for the purpose of engaging in conversation with 
the CCE discourse pertaining to the development of the human person and the 
integration of faith and knowledge are matters to which we shall return in chapter five 
of this dissertation below.
Lonergan concludes his opening lecture by reminding his audience that one may 
encounter in his book Insight ‘thinking that heads in the same direction’ as that which 
he has illustrated in Topics.144 That distinct and helpful pointers concerning how to 
tackle the problem of the philosophy of education are to be found in this source is 
undoubtedly true. It is not, nonetheless, the case that all the possibilities for the 
development of a Catholic philosophy of education inspired by Insight have been 
articulated in the current series of lectures, Topics. Lonergan regards what he wishes to 
achieve here as ‘fundamentally an expression of traditional thinking’, and an attempt to 
retain all that is best in medieval philosophy, especially as understood and practised by 
Aquinas, while at the same time incorporating the historical, developmental and 
existential dimensions of human existence as revealed today by the human sciences.145
142 Ibid., p. 22.
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II
Lonergan’s extensive analysis of ‘the good5 in Topics might at first appear to be an 
abandonment, or a leaving to one side, of the outline of Catholic philosophy of 
education, and the discussion of the conditions required for its proper articulation, that 
he had begun to engage with in his opening lecture. The topic of the ‘human good’, 
however, is integral to his conception of the philosophy of Catholic education. What 
Lonergan is in fact doing, is simply presupposing for the moment that at least ‘an 
indication of the locus and type of solution to the problems’ of Catholic philosophy of 
education has now been identified.146 He is well aware, however, that only a general 
vision for Catholic philosophy of education has in fact been sketched so far, and we are 
justified in expecting him to fill out the details of that sketch.
Nevertheless, one would have been mistaken to have assumed Lonergan would follow 
explicitly in the direction more traditionally adopted by Catholic textbooks of the period 
on the subject. These conventionally began from discussions of underlying philosophies 
in education, and focused on critiquing their divergent statements on the nature and 
destiny of the human person, and hence on the aims and processes of education, as well 
as on theories of learning, the curriculum, and consequent pedagogical considerations. 
Instead of approaching the nature of education as, say, the process of liberating the 
human intelligence and the strengthening of the will, after the manner of Maritain, for 
example, and then inquiring into how education is directed to promoting that 
development, Lonergan opts instead to progress his reflection from a quite different 
vantage point, namely, the notion of ‘the good’.147
Lonergan devotes three lectures in this Cincinnati series (1959) on education to the 
topics of ‘the good’ and ‘the human good’.148 The fact that he dedicates so much of his 
time to what one might at first glance regard as perhaps a remote rather than a 
proximate theme, or at least a theme often left inexplicitly developed, in the context of 
the presentation of a philosophy of education, indicates the importance the notion of the
146 Topics, p. 24.
147 Ibid, p. 24.
148 See Topics, chapters 2, 3, and 4.
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good had for him in his philosophy. In Topics Lonergan focuses on the notion of the 
‘human good5 as a critical starting point for an elucidation of an important facet of 
philosophy of education, namely, a discussion of the overall aim or purpose of 
education. His goal, he states, is ‘to provide a basis for discussions of the end, the aim, 
the goal of education’, that is, to answer the question why people are educated.149
If we prescind for the moment from the curious fact that Lonergan nowhere throughout 
his whole discussion on ‘the good’ mentions the once ubiquitous term, the ‘common 
good’, his treatment of the ends for which education is undertaken would appear to be 
totally consonant with the Catholic tradition of educational thought in general. Christian 
education, according to the classic account of Pius XI, viewed sub specie aeternitatis, 
aims at ‘securing the Supreme Good (that is, God) for the souls of those who are being 
educated, and the maximum of well-being here below for human society’, and this it 
seeks to achieve, ‘by cooperating with God in the perfecting of individuals and of 
society’.150 Lonergan, in a sense, appears to have selected for his purpose a wholly 
traditional concept, the ‘good’, but in the course of his analysis it will become apparent 
that he attempts to render what he considers a more adequate theoretical and 
contemporary account of the good in Catholic education.
Lonegan’s alternative strategy and approach to Catholic philosophy of education is to 
begin from the notion of ‘the human good’, by attempting to ‘grasp in philosophic 
fashion’ what constitutes the human good in the concrete, and to understand what its 
relevance for education might be.151 His treatment of various aspects of the good, 
including the notion of the good and the ‘invariant structure’ of the human good, the 
‘diversity and integration’ of the human good, and the human good and ‘development’, 
is comprehensive.152 The scope of this thesis permits extended comment only upon 
Lonergan’s discussion of ‘the human good’ and how he relates it to the notion of 
‘development’.
Education and ‘the Good9
Before attempting to analyse Lonergan’s treatment of ‘the human good and 
development’, it might be appropriate to reflect a little on the reasonableness of his
149 Topics, p. 26.
150 Pius XI, DIM (1929), No. 8.
151 Topics, p. 24.
152 Ibid., pp. 26-48, 49-78, 79-106.
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choice of ‘the good5 as a key consideration in the articulation of a Catholic philosophy 
of education. Education as a human activity is almost invariably, even axiomatically, 
assumed to be a good for human beings, and the ultimate goal of education is frequently 
stated in terms of human flourishing, howsoever defined. Yet, despite the many ways in 
which the notion of education might be considered to be a contested concept, and the 
resultant good of education might likewise be considered debatable, Lonergan does not 
directly address the deceptively simple question concerning whether education is indeed 
a good thing and in what precisely it is to be thought that the good of education consists.
Lonergan indicates, as mentioned above, that he wishes to speak of ‘the good5 in the 
present context so as ‘to be able to provide a basis for discussion of the end, the aim, the 
goal of education’.153 Lonergan reasons that if one asks the question, Why are people 
educated?, the answer inevitably and necessarily must be in terms of some ‘good’ to be 
obtained as a direct result of that process.154 Hence, in essence, discussion of the aim or 
goal of education revolves around the issue of what is meant by ‘the good’ and why, in 
fact, education is to be regarded as a good.
John Wilson analyses carefully the assumption that ‘education is a good thing’, a 
desirable matter, and challenges the belief of philosophers of education that there is, 
either ‘some tight logical connection between education and desirability’, perhaps to be 
found in the meaning of the term ‘education’, or that there is some looser connection 
between various concepts or conceptions of education and desirability.155 Wilson finds 
fault with both these positions and, while stressing that he does not wish to discredit the 
importance of various utilitarian objectives and goods in education that make it both 
desirable and necessary in society, he concludes that we need to conceive education as a 
‘moral enterprise’, where ‘moral’ is understood in a sufficiently wide sense.156 Wilson 
argues that, if education is to be seen as a good thing in itself, and if educators are to be 
regarded as more than just ‘social functionaries’ who deliver the particular skills and 
items of knowledge considered necessary or useful at particular times, then education
157must be considered as itself ‘essentially a moral practice’. Wilson cites support for 
this view in the work of, amongst others, Richard Pring, and urges ‘a fuller and deeper
153 Ibid., p. 26.
154 Ibid., p. 26.
155 John Wilson, “Is Education a Good Thing?”, British Journal o f Educational Studies, Vol. 50, No. 3 
(Sept., 2002), pp. 327-338.
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One might regard Lonergan’s reflections on the good in the context of Topics as 
contributing something of importance to this discussion. Education was certainly 
understood by Lonergan as a ‘moral’ undertaking, in the sense that education is seen to 
be oriented fundamentally toward the human good that is the development of the 
subject. Although he does not develop his thoughts on the subject extensively in this 
context, Lonergan raises the specific question as to whether education ‘should be 
moral’, and suggests an answer in the affirmative on the basis of the ‘whole-functioning 
of the person’, which does not permit a sharp distinction between the intellectual and 
moral dimensions, but implies that the ‘moral element is always present in education, at 
least implicitly’.159 Furthermore, in what looks remarkably similar to Maritain’s way of 
thinking, Lonergan stresses that ‘effecting the process of moral development is an 
important indirect effect of the education of intelligence’.160
Lonergan conceives human growth and development as a process of self-transcendence, 
through a multiple-stage ‘conversion’ (intellectual, moral and religious), and the 
ultimate attaining to authentic humanity. It might be noted here, too, that the CCE 
discourse, discussion of which will largely be the focus of chapter five of this work, 
regards education as a good that promotes the integral formation or development of the 
human person. With Lonergan, the CCE discourse subscribes to the view that the good 
of education is intimately related to what it means to be human, and it is this in the end 
that makes education a moral practice, insofar as it may enable young people to explore 
seriously what it means to be human and deliberately engage them in activities intended 
to promote the growth of that humanity.
The Notion, Invariant Structure and Dynamism of the Human Good
Lonergan, for whom ‘the good’ was a centrally important theme in both his 
philosophical and theological writing, first engaged in a discussion o f ‘the good’ in 
Insight, in the context of outlining a theory of ethics.161 In many respects, Lonergan’s 
theory of ‘the human good’ in Topics might be regarded as an intermediate treatment of
158 Ibid., p. 338. See, Richard A. Pring, “Education as a Moral Practice”, Journal o f Moral Education, 
Vol. 10, No. 2, 2001.
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161 See insight, ch. XVII, pp. 595-607.
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the theme when considered in the light of his earlier comments in Insight and his much 
more fully developed discussion in Methods in Theology}62 What is common to all his 
accounts of ‘the good’, however, is the notion of ‘the invariant structure of the good’.
Levels of the Good
Lonergan distinguishes ‘three levels’ in the good, and in the human good, the specific 
matter of interest here, although strangely this latter term is never used by him in 
Insight. On an elementary level, ‘the good’ is the ‘object of desire’, such that, when it is 
attained, is ‘experienced as something pleasant, enjoyable, satisfying’.163 Many of the 
individual goods and services of education would probably be regarded by Lonergan as 
simply (or at least in the first place) ‘objects of desire’. For Lonergan, though, among 
people’s many desires, there is one desire that is ‘unique’, that is, ‘the detached, 
disinterested, pure, unrestricted desire to know’.164 The satisfaction of this desire orients 
and intends the human being for a life that is far beyond anything attainable by the 
cumulative fulfilment of the various and more mundane single objects of desire.
Through this radical desire, too, and the knowledge it generates, there comes to light a 
second meaning, or level, of the good, according to Lonergan. Besides the good that is 
simply an object of desire, there is ‘the good of order’, examples of which might be 
institutions, such as the family, the school, or the state.165 The ‘good of order’ is not the 
object of any single desire, for it stands to single desires ‘as system to systematized’, or 
as ‘universal condition to particulars that are conditioned’.166 The ‘good of order’, as 
Christopher Friel interprets Lonergan, ‘systematizes’ the various single desires; it is ‘the 
condition for the meeting of particular desires’; and it provides a scheme that enables 
the ‘recurrence of satisfactions’.167
Lonergan’s description of the ‘good of order’ is in many respects reminiscent of the 
traditional notion of the ‘common good’, a term significantly perhaps that he never uses 
throughout the course of these lectures. Thus, the ‘good of order’, first introduced by
162 For an interesting discussion of the evolution o f Lonergan’s views on the ‘human good’, see, 
Christopher Friel, “The Evolution of Lonergan’s Structure o f the Human Good”, in The Heythrop 
Journal, Vol. LIV, 2013, pp. 756-766.
163 Insight, p. 596.
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167 Christopher Friel, “Lonergan’s Development of the Structure of the Good”, p. 761.
Lonergan in the context of discussion on ‘civil community’, is considered to be ‘the 
intelligible pattern of relationships that conditions the fulfilment of each man’s desires 
by his contributions to the fulfilment of the desires of others’.168 For Lonergan the 
traditional concept of the ‘common good’ might well have represented a reality that, 
like so many others in Catholic philosophical and theological thinking, needed to be 
transposed into a more contemporary and meaningful context. His failure to endorse the 
use of the term the ‘common good’ is due presumably to his unhappiness with a 
terminology and a set of understandings that he regarded as belonging to a classical way 
o f thinking, as distinct from his own ‘new notion of the good necessitated for him by a 
shift in thinking to a more historically minded approach.169
A third aspect of the good is described by Lonergan as ‘value’.170 ‘Value’ is the good as 
the possible object of rational choice. It is in rational, moral self-consciousness that the 
good of value comes to light. Just as the objects of desire give rise to the good of order 
grasped by intelligence, so also, Lonergan reasons, the good of order with its concrete 
contents becomes a possible object of rational choice and so a value.171 Value is a type 
of good that emerges on ‘the level of reflection and judgment, of deliberation and 
choice’.172 Empirically, the good is the object of desire; the good of order at the 
intellectual level is a higher synthesis; practical deliberation and critique reveals the 
good as value. This is a distinguishing feature of Lonergan’s thought on the theme o f . 
the human good.
Specificity of the Human Good
In Topics Lonergan speaks of the ‘human good’ rather than the generic term ‘the good’ 
which he used exclusively throughout his account in Insight}13 His rationale for 
focusing on ‘the human good’ is obvious, since it is necessary in the context of 
education for Lonergan to establish the specific nature of the ‘human good’, in the light 
of which he understands educational reality and its good. The human good Gust like ‘the 
good’ generically) is to be understood in terms of its ‘invariant structure’, that is, in 
terms of certain features of the good that are to be found in any society or culture, at any
168 Insight, p. 213.
169 See, Paul Hoyt-O’Connor, “The Human Good and Lonergan’s Macroeconomic Dynamics”, Logos: A 
Journal o f Catholic Thought and Culture, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Spring, 2009), pp. 94-124.
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171 Insight, p. 601.
172 Ibid., pp. 322-24, 330-332, 549, 613-15.
173 Topics, pp. 32-33.
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In Topics, however, Lonergan’s focus is more on the ‘dynamic5 and ‘concrete5 aspects 
of the human good rather than its invariant structure. The ‘distinctive feature5 of the 
human good, Lonergan asserts, is that it is a reality that ‘emerges out of human 
apprehension and choice5.175 The good is ‘human5 only insofar as it is realized through 
human apprehension and choice.176 The human good is ‘a history, a concrete, 
cumulative process resulting from developing human apprehension and human choices 
that may be good or evil5.177 This reference to apprehension and choice, through which 
the human good is realised, is intended to correspond closely to the distinctive 
operations of consciousness that Lonergan envisages in cognitional structure. Lonergan, 
in fact, sees a kind of ‘isomorphism5 between the levels of consciousness that he 
identifies - the experiential, the intellectual, and the rational or reflective - and the 
structural levels of the good178. Human apprehension is a matter of understanding and 
judgment, and choice is a matter of deliberation and decision. These activities of 
knowing and choosing reveal, so Lonergan argues, the invariant process that human 
beings engage in as they seek to achieve the good. Lonergan5 s description of the human 
good as ‘a history5, a ‘cumulative process5, where there is both growth in apprehension 
and distortion and aberration in choice, discounts the notion of the human good as any 
kind of innate or fixed system, a legal system or a moral system, or an abstraction, or a 
mere ideal.179
Having asserted that this dynamic developing process is what constitutes the human 
good, Lonergan turns to a further discussion of the ‘question of value5, value being for 
him what is most specific about the human good. ‘Value5 arises, firstly, Lonergan
180maintains, because people ‘ask questions about the existing human good of order5. 
‘Value5 is an aspect of the good which ‘emerges on the level of reflection and judgment,
1 ft 1of deliberation and choice’, according to Lonergan. He endeavours to elaborate 
further the meaning of ‘value’ by distinguishing three kinds, or levels, of value: the
174 Ibid., p. 27.
175 Ibid, p. 32.
176 Ibid., p. 32.
177 Ibid, p. 33.
178 See Insight, pp. 431 -432, and Method, p. 21, for Lonergan’s notion o f the ‘ isomorphism’ o f operations
of the cognitional process with the structure of the universe.
179 Ibid., p. 33.
180 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
181 Insight, p. 597.
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‘Ethical value’, as described by Lonergan, resides in ‘the conscious emergence of the
subject as autonomous, responsible, free’.183 The development of the human person who
gradually becomes aware of freedom and of its meaning and responsibilities is an
ethical value of supreme importance in the field of education. Lonergan is here making
the point that in his understanding of the value component of the human good, ethical
value is what underscores the essential quality of human freedom in the realization of
the good.184 The ‘excellence of man, the proper good of man’, is precisely doing what is
right because he is free. His freedom is to ‘realize the good’.185 With ‘ethical value’,
Lonergan reiterates, there emerges ‘the autonomy of spirit’, where the subject ‘takes his
* 1stand upon the truth, upon what is right, upon what is good’.
Lonergan explains, however, that if one stopped short at ‘ethical value’, one is left with 
‘a secularist philosophy of education’, and one is ignoring the fact that there is also 
‘religious value’.187 ‘Religious value’ appears, Lonergan argues, when one goes a step 
further, when the autonomous subject stands before God, with his neighbour, in the 
world of history. A person is open to religion when he or she realizes within himself or 
herself ‘that internal order, the metaphorical justice of justification, that inner hierarchy 
in which reason is subordinate to God, and sense to reason’.188 Religious value is, 
therefore, a concern with one’s existence as a transcendent being and is to be 
understood in relation to the triple conversion of the human subject - intellectual, moral 
and religious - to self-transcendence. In Lonergan’s view, it would be inconceivable to 
imagine Catholic education without reference to religious value.
The later Lonergan, as the author of Method in Theology, similarly included a chapter in 
this book, entitled ‘the human good’.189 Here, too, Lonergan declares his aim is ‘to 
assemble the various components that enter into the human good’.190 Amongst the 
elements that he identifies as comprising the human good are ‘skills, feelings, values,
182 Topics, pp. 37-38.
183 Ibid., p. 37.
184 Ibid., p. 38.
185 Ibid., p. 38.
186 Ibid, p. 38.
187 Topics, p. 38.
188 Ibid., p. 38. Lonergan appears to have in mind here the Thomist account of justification. See ST la 
Ilae, Q. 113, a. 1.
189 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, chapter 2, pp. 27-56.
190 Ibid., p. 27.
‘aesthetic’, the ‘ethical’, and the religious’.182
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and beliefs’, all of which are required for the acquisition of the good and the promotion 
of progress in the face of the ever present threat of decline.191 This later outline of the 
structure of the human good is in many ways an advancement upon that which he offers
192in either Insight, or in Topics.
In terms of its usefulness in the specific context of examining the aims of Catholic 
education, Lonergan’s later treatment of the human good supplies for what many have 
perceived as a deficiency, or at least an under-emphasis, on the affective and emotional 
dimensions of human-ness in the highly intellectual presentation of the good in Insight.
It is a feature of the Catholic tradition of educational thought, still prominent in the CCE 
discourse today, that education must aim to exercise an ‘holistic influence’. The CCE 
discourse perpetuates the conviction of Pius XI that Christian education must include 
‘the whole aggregate of human life, physical and spiritual, intellectual and moral, 
individual, domestic, and social’, and the belief of Leo XIII that ‘every subject taught in 
school must be permeated with Christian piety’.193 Descriptions of Catholic education in 
the CCE literature, such as the ‘total formation’ and ‘complete education’, of the human 
person express the same commitment to, and engender the same imperative for, holistic 
education to ensure that no dimension of human reality is absent horn the underlying 
conception of the human good.194
One might summarise Lonergan’s account of the structure and dynamism of the human 
good in the following terms. In his framing of the broad outline of the structure of the 
human good, Lonergan is seeking to orient educational thinking in terms of human self­
transcendence as the ultimate goal of education as of life. His description of the human 
good includes a broad sweep of human existence and reflects in many ways the 
dynamism of human consciousness that enables the human subject to recognise and 
seek for the good of self transcendence. Lonergan proposes that the structure of the 
human good, understood as the particular good, the good of order, and the good of 
terminal value, reflects, or parallels, the structure of cognitional activity as three distinct 
but interrelated operations, or levels, of experience, understanding and judgment, within 
human consciousness. Reciprocally, the differentiated and interrelated structure and 
operations of human consciousness reflect the basic structure he discovers in the human
191 ibid., pp.27-54.
192 Ibid., pp. 47-51.
193 Pius XI, DIM (1929), No.s 80, 95.
194 CS(1977), No.s 15, 19.
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good.195 Lonergan’s intentionality analysis integral to his transcendental method thus 
becomes a useful means of critiquing one’s progress towards the good of self­
transcendence.
It might prove a worthwhile exercise to analyse the CCE vision of the Catholic school 
as an ‘educational / educative / educating community’ in terms of these components of 
the good of order and the terminal values which arise out of that order. It should be 
possible to select elements of this kind of generalized discussion o f aspects of the 
human good proferred by Lonergan that would allow one to analyse (Catholic) 
education as a human good. Clearly, education, in a formal sense at any rate, requires an 
appropriate sort of institutional framework, a good of order that regularly produces the 
particular goods desired by society, where both the institutional and the individual 
goods have been judged to be worth-while, suitable for purpose, and endorsed by 
society. The regular production of the desired educational goods implies and stipulates a 
process that might appropriately be designated ‘dynamic’. That dynamic is supplied by 
the on-going efforts of human persons to acquire and develop the necessary knowledge, 
skills, feelings, beliefs, and values which are acted upon in an agreed and cooperative 
way to produce the desired particular goods of education. It is easy to see, however, that 
the successful working out of this dynamic is critically dependent on the beliefs and 
values of society.
I l l
The Developm ent o f the Person and the Human Good
The end-point of Lonergan’s discussion of the ‘human good’ is the focus on what he 
terms ‘the human good as subjective development’, that is, on the ‘developing subject’ 
as a primary exemplification of the human good.196 Lonergan’s purpose in these lectures 
on ‘the good’, it will be recalled, has been to ‘form some notion of ends’ in 
education.197 He wishes in particular to provide an account of the quintessential aim of
1 OftCatholic education in terms of the human person as ‘a developing subject’. His 
philosophy of education as ‘development’ reflects a long tradition of educational
195 Topics, p. 41.
196 Topics, pp. 24, 79-106 (79).
197 Ibid., p. 54.
198 Topics, pp. 79-106.
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thought in which the holistic development of the human person is a critical aim and 
goal.199 Lonergan, on the basis of his reflections on the human good in general, and 
specifically the human good as it relates to the developing subject, asserts that he is 
attempting to arrive at both ‘a determination of what the aims of education might be, or 
should be’, and ‘a criticism of what in fact they are5.200
In this section, then, the way Lonergan conceives the human person as a ‘developing 
subject5 is first noted. Secondly, his understanding of the notion of human development 
is briefly summarised. Thirdly his perspective on the process of the development in 
terms of the intellectual pattern of experience is analysed, and its central importance for 
education as ‘formation5, or ‘development5, is discussed.
The Person as Psychological Subject
Lonergan notes that there is currently a great deal of emphasis in ‘contemporary 
philosophy5 on the ‘subject5.201 His view on the person as ‘psychological or developing 
subject5 must be understood in the light of this ‘turn to the subject5. For Catholic 
philosophy of education to be in a position to consider the person as ‘a developing 
subject5, and not as an ‘object5 of any kind, Lonergan argues that it must undergo a 
three-fold ‘transition5. Firstly, there must be a transition ‘from essence to ideal5; 
secondly, a transition ‘from substance to subject5, and thirdly, a transition ‘from faculty 
psychology to consciousness5.202 It is only in consequence of such a radical change in 
mentality, dictated by the demands of historical consciousness, that a framework can be 
constructed within which the notion of the developing subject can be properly 
understood.
In his portrayal of the person as ‘subject5, Lonergan places much emphasis on the 
notions o f ‘consciousness5 and ‘levels of consciousness5.203 By ‘consciousness5, he 
means the ‘awareness immanent in cognitional acts5 and, depending on the type of act, 
it may be classified by the metaphor ‘levels of consciousness5, as ‘empirical5,
199 The recent CCE discourse, as mentioned above, also belongs integrally to this tradition.
200 Topics, p. 54.
201 Bernard Lonergan, “The Subject”, A Second Collection, pp. 69-86 (69). It should perhaps be borne in 
mind that Lonergan makes this comment in the early 1970s and other emphases, for example, ‘critical 
theory’, may be deemed more characteristic of philosophy in our age.
202 Topics, pp. 79-81; 81-82, and 82-85.
203 Insight, pp. 322-324.
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‘intelligent’, or ‘rational5 consciousness .204 For Lonergan, a person is ‘a psychological 
or developing subject5 because of his or her performance of conscious operations on 
different levels of awareness, namely, the levels of empirical awareness, of intelligence, 
of rational consciousness, and on the level of decision making.205 These levels of 
consciousness are not to be conceived as discrete entities but as constituting a ‘whole 
structure5 of interrelated aspects or operations that is dynamic, self-constituting and 
capable of reaching out to an object. The conscious operations of the subject take place 
not only in the world of immediate experience, the ‘world of immediacy5, they also 
thrust the subject into another world, ‘a world mediated by meaning and motivated by 
values5.206
These conscious operations of the subject also relate him or her to other persons, and 
this gives rise to ‘intersubjectivity5. The human person emerges from within an ‘inter- 
subjective matrix5 which is constitutive of all ‘social5 and ‘cultural5 living.207 Such 
intersubjectivity, which Lonergan sees as the ‘formal constitutent5 of community, 
becomes the carrier of shared meaning and value. ‘Community5, it might be noted, is 
not just ‘an aggregate of individuals within a frontier5, since meaning, its formal 
constituent, demands a common field of experience, where subjects share a common or 
at least complementary way of understanding, and when they make common judgments 
and have common aims.208
The study of the human subject in historical existence is the study of oneself in as much 
as one is conscious. It attends to operations that are characteristic of and have their 
centre and source in the self. Cognitional and volitional activity not only deals with 
‘objects5, but also ‘reveals the subject and his activity5.209 The subject is a substance 
that is present to itself, that is conscious. Here one is not dealing with logical essence 
and substance, Lonergan says, but with the subject and what he or she has to be, or to 
become.210 It is the unfolding of human consciousness, and especially the break-through
204 Ibid., pp. 320-322.
205 Method, pp. 7-9.
206 ibid., pp. 28, 30-31, 35, 76-77, 89, 92-93, 95-96, 112,221, 238-9, 262-4, 303
207 Bernard Lonergan, “Belief: Today’s Issue”, A Second Collection, pp. 87-100 (91).
208 Method\ pp. 356-7; and, Bernard Lonergan, “Dialectic o f Authority”, A Third Collection, pp. 5-12.
209 Topics, p. 81.
210 Ibid., p. 83.
127
211
to intellectual consciousness, that makes humans ‘human’, Lonergan adds.
Lonergan’s account of the developing subject rests firmly on a description of the human 
subject with respect to the differentiated and interrelated operations of consciousness 
already mentioned. Human consciousness is seen as operating on different levels, the 
empirical, the intellectual, the rational, and the level of self-consciousness.212 It is
213
important to remember that, for Lonergan, ‘we are subjects, as it were, by degrees’.
The distinct and related levels of consciousness he regards as an instance of ‘sublation’, 
of a lower being retained, preserved, yet transcended and completed by a higher.214
Human intelligence goes beyond human sensitivity, yet it cannot get along without sensitivity. 
Human judgment goes beyond sensitivity and intelligence yet cannot function except in 
conjunction with them. Human action finally, must in similar fashion both presuppose and 
complete human sensitivity, intelligence, and judgment.215
The Recovery of the Subject
Lonergan argues that it has become necessary to recover a true sense of the subject, an 
absolute requirement if one is to use the person as the starting point for philosophical 
and/or theological reflection on education. He believes that ‘neglect of the subject’ 
characterised much Catholic thinking in the past.216 That playing-down of the 
importance of the subject, Lonergan attributes to a number of factors including an over­
emphasis on the ‘objectivity of truth’, and a ‘metaphysical account of the human soul’ 
that, focusing on its potencies, habits, and acts, through which the essence of the soul is
217known, invited understanding of its actions in the same objective manner. The study 
of the subject that Lonergan calls for is, he stresses, ‘quite different’ because it is the 
‘study of oneself inasmuch as one is conscious’, and it prescinds from the classical 
objective ways of looking at the soul, for example, the soul, in ‘its essence, its
* * * • 2 1 8 't *potencies, its habits, its faculties’, for ‘none of these is given in consciousness’. The 
subject whom Lonergan urges us to study attends to operations of knowing and doing, 
refers them to ‘their centre and source which is the se lf, and is able to discern different
211 Bernard Lonergan, “Natural Right and Historical M indedness”, A Third C ollection , pp. 169-183 
(170).
212 Topics, p. 81.
213 Bernard Lonergan, “The Subject”, A Second C ollection , p. 80.
214 Ibid., p. 80.
215 Ib id , p. 80.
216 Ib id , pp. 69-86.
217 Ib id , pp. 70-73.
218 Ib id , p. 73.
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levels of consciousness, to which appropriate attention must be given in the interests of 
development.219
220
The ‘self, for Lonergan, means ‘a concrete and intelligible unity-identity-whole\ The 
self is characterised by ‘acts of sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, 
understanding, formulating, reflecting, and judging’.221 It is worth noting that while 
Lonergan’s sense of the self contrasts, on the one hand, with Aristotle’s notion of the 
individual, constituted by matter and form, and seeking its fulfilment in the realisation 
of innate potentialities, it is not, on the other hand to be identified with the predominant 
modem notion of the self as a socially constructed agent. The self is the subject who is 
aware o f himself or herself operating consciously and intentionally at different levels, 
whose consciousness and awareness expands in new dimensions in the ascent from 
mere experiencing, to understanding, to judgment, and decision.
Lonergan’s notion of the subject, who is neither ‘truncated’, ‘immanentisf, nor 
‘alienated’ appears to be an attempt to mediate between metaphysical models of the self 
that no longer enjoy wide acceptance, and a plethora of contemporary models that tend 
to reduce self either to ‘a mind’ or ‘a body’.222 Notions of the self today are largely 
socially constructed (often based on ethnic, social and racial identity) and education has 
to be re-aligned and designed to promote these new identities. In the face of this, as 
Aidan Seery has observed, education is tempted to retreat from the traditional task of 
self formation and to confine itself to a largely instrumental role and declining to dwell 
upon or question the goals to which prevailing educational methodologies seem to be 
directed.223
As Lonergan worked out the implications of operating at different levels of 
consciousness his intentionality analysis led him to make a clean break with ‘faculty 
psychology’.224 A transition ‘from faculty psychology to the flow of consciousness’, 
Lonergan declared, must necessarily be executed before one turns to the central
219 Ibid., p. 73.
220 Insight, p. 319.
221 Ibid., p.319.
222Bemard Lonergan, ‘T h e Subject”, A Second C ollection , pp. 73-75, 75-79, 85-86. Lonergan applies 
these descriptors to the various ways in which the subject is misunderstood through insufficient attention 
being paid to consciousness.
223 Aidan Seery, “Education, the formation o f  se lf  and the world o f  Web 2 .0”, London Review o f  
Education , Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 63-73.
224 M ethod, pp. 340-343.
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question of human development and the growth of the human subject as understood 
from the point of view of historical consciousness.225 Lonergan gradually ceased to 
speak of intellect and will, and referred instead to the second, third, and fourth levels of 
conscious intending, that is, to the subject’s intelligent grasp, critical reflection, and 
evaluation and commitment. His reason, Lonergan says, is that ‘intellect and will are 
not given directly to consciousness’, and he thus prefers to speak o f ‘the conscious, 
intending subject’ rather than of the ‘soul’.226 There is nothing wrong with faculty 
psychology as such, Lonergan admits, but ‘it is not enough for our present purposes’, 
because ‘it does not take us near enough to the concrete’, the only context in which one 
can in reality speak of development.227
Education, including the Catholic tradition of educational thought, as recently 
highlighted in the CCE discourse, has long been considered as having some part to play 
in the formation, or promotion, or ‘construction’ of the self and in the development of 
self identity. Lonergan writes that the task of education is ‘constructing a world of 
meaning and value’ and ‘finding something to do in the world’, or, as one might say, 
discovering a ‘vocation’ in the world.228 Speaking of what he refers to as ‘active 
methods in education’, Lonergan declares that the ‘element of fundamental truth’ in 
these methods is the perception that ‘education helps the subject to construct his own 
world’ by means of ‘a broadening of horizons’.229
Since Lonergan believes that education helps subjects to construct their own world by a 
process he denotes as ‘a broadening of horizons’, it is imperative that one should 
appreciate what he understands by this notion, and how he envisages the process might 
be achieved to secure the ‘development’ of the human subject and thereby to promote 
the human good as a whole.230 Briefly, ‘horizon’ is a notion upon which rests 
Lonergan’s idea of development within ‘the intellectual pattern of experience’ 
generally.231 Horizon envisages ‘a whole mentality, a whole climate of thought and 
opinion, a whole mode of approach, and procedure, and judgment’.232 All human
225 Topics, pp. 82-84.
226 Bernard Lonergan, A Second Collection , p. x.
227 Topics, p. 83.
228 Topics, pp. 133-135.
229 Topics, p .104. The emphasis is Lonergan’s own.
230 Topics, p. 104.
231 M ethod , pp. 29, 286.
232 Bernard Lonergan, “Theology in its N ew  Context”, A Secon d Collection , pp. 55-68 (56)
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knowledge, Lonergan states, occurs within a horizon, a context, a total view, an all- 
encompassing framework, a Weltanschaaung, and apart from that context, it loses 
sense, significance, and meaning.233 Lonergan considers that ‘broadening of horizon’ is 
brought about by an appeal to ‘fundamental potentialities’ of the subject, such as the 
capacity for self-transcendence, and the authentic or genuine realization of human 
personality through self-transcendence, which occurs through and within the various 
modes of experiencing, understanding, judging , and deciding.234
Lonergan’s views on education’s role in the formation of the subject might seem to be 
vulnerable on the one hand to the charge that he simply continues, as has been the case 
in the past, to promote a formation that is a moulding of the self within a pre-existing 
ideological framework. The educational processes of empirical observation, rational 
thought and reasoned judgment that he advocates appear to operate within more or less 
traditional bodies of knowledge. On the other hand, Lonergan’s insistence that learners 
be encouraged to construct their own world and their own reality could conceivably be 
interpreted by others as a commitment to ‘constructivism’.
Two considerations are in order, perhaps, both to understand Lonergan’s intention 
correctly, and to defend him from being over-hastily dismissed either as having nothing 
particularly innovative to offer in respect of the over-arching aims of Catholic 
education, or rejected on the alterative grounds of having an overly constructivist view 
of learning that would threaten the foundational purpose of the Catholic school. Firstly, 
one needs to be aware that, in Lonergan’s view, the philosophical thinking required to 
articulate the process of the development of the human subject is simply not available in 
the absence of a radical ‘transition’ in Catholic thinking about education and it is 
primarily with respect to this that much of his thought has been concerned. Secondly, 
with regard to the charge of being overly ‘constructive’, sometimes levelled at him, it is 
possible to offer a defence of Lonergan, to the effect that it is his respect for the 
authentic subject’s development, and in recognition of the pattern of the recurrent and 
related operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, which 
comprise human knowing, and enable the subject progressively to construct his or her 
world, that he is convinced of the need to place the developing subject at the heart of his
233 Bernard Lonergan, “The Future o f  Christianity”, A Secon d C ollection , pp. 149-164 (162).
234 Bernard Lonergan, “The Response o f  the Jesuit as Priest and Apostle in the M odem  World”, A Second  
Collection, pp. 165-187(169-170).
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theory of learning.
For Lonergan, ‘development’ is a general principle fundamental to the meaning of 
human existence and as such is clearly relevant to philosophical reflection on the 
meaning and purpose of education understood as the process of the development or 
formation of human subjects. Lonergan’s interest in Topics is focused on the intellectual 
pattern of experience and ‘cognitive’ development, so his presentation of the notion of 
‘development’ here is less general than in the much wider framework of Insight. There, 
Lonergan wished to construct a comprehensive theory of development that would have 
universal application and account for every aspect of human existence.235 His objective 
was ‘to offer a single integrated view’ of development, and his account would ‘take its 
stand upon the structure of human knowing’.236 In Topics, however, Lonergan is 
primarily interested in the emergence and growth of the intellectual level of 
consciousness, where we ‘inquire, come to understand, express what we have
? 237understood, work out the presuppositions and implications of our expression’.
Education is inextricably caught up with processes that occur on all levels of human 
development. Lonergan clearly identifies the numerous features that comprise the 
process of development but is adamant that what makes humans ‘human’ is the advent 
of intellectual consciousness.238 While there are organic, physical and psychological 
aspects to human growth and development, in the field of education and philosophy of 
education, the emergence and growth of insight becomes centrally important. 
Lonergan’s fundamental concern centres on the issue of personal growth and 
development insofar as that pertains to the process of knowing and the differentiation 
and transformation of one’s consciousness that occurs as a result of the various 
operations of cognitional structure.
Obviously, all the patterns of experience (aesthetic, biological, dramatic, intellectual) 
are pertinent to the study of education and the articulation of a philosophy of 
education.239 Nevertheless, Lonergan appears to privilege intellectual inquiry and the
235 /night, p. 434; Method, p. 138.
236 Insight, p. 479.
237 M ethod , p. 9.
238 Insight, p. 470.
239 Ibid., pp. 181-189, 251, 268, 385.
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intellectual pattern of experience in education.240 This being the case, however, it is as 
well to note in passing that education has a more holistic brief than intellectual 
development, a fact of which Lonergan was aware, but which has not prevented 
criticism of his work as being overly intellectualist because of his apparent omission 
from consideration of the affective dimension of consciousness.241 Lonergan’s primary 
concern is to point out how cognitive development is intimately connected with the 
occurrence of insight.242
The ‘principal illustration’ of the notion of development is ‘human intelligence’, 
Lonergan constantly affirms.243 Intellectual development, he insists, ‘rests upon the 
dominance of a detached and disinterested desire to know’.244 When this desire to know 
is adverted to and allowed to arise, insights are produced that accumulate and coalesce 
in diverse ways, within the varied patterns o f human experience. Such insight and 
understanding may, of course, be subject to ‘bias’ of different kinds, and this is where, 
for Lonergan, judgment, whether about fact or value, becomes a crucial activity.245 This 
‘pure desire’, according to Lonergan, invites the subject ‘to become intelligent and 
reasonable’, not only in his knowing but also in his living. It encourages him ‘to guide 
his actions by referring them as an intelligent being to the intelligible context of some 
universal order that is or is still to be’.246
In the context of his lectures on education and philosophy of education, Lonergan 
justifiably devotes greater attention to the intellectual pattern of experience.247 All 
patterns of experience potentially undergo development, but it is in reference to the 
intellectual pattern of experience that Lonergan specifically addresses the question of 
human development in Topics. Lonergan sources his account of the intellectual pattern
248of experience from the general framework already provided in Insight. The 
intellectual pattern of experience, Lonergan believes, echoes the wonder that Aristotle
240 Ibid., pp. 185-186.
241 The problem is addressed by Lonergan in M ethod , where he puts considerable stress on feelings and 
em otions and clearly identifies this dimension as part o f  empirical consciousness. See, M ethod , pp. 9, 30. 
He also discusses feelings and emotional states as a component o f  the human good, with particular 
reference to their relationship to intentionality, values and sym bols. See, M ethod , pp. 31, 37-38.
242 Insight, p. 458.
243 Ibid., p. 458.
244 Ibid., p. 493.
245 Lonergan provides an extensive treatment o f  the meaning and effects o f  ‘b ias’. See Insight, pp. 191- 
2 03 ,2 1 8 -2 2 2 , 222-225 ,225-242 .
246 Ibid., p. 473.
247 Topics, pp. 86-88.
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spoke o f as the beginning of all science and philosophy.249 In this pattern of experience, 
‘consciousness is dominated by wonder, by the pure desire to know, by intellectual 
detachment and impartiality’.250 The intellectual pattern of experience is concerned with 
knowledge, understanding, and truth. Lonergan, importantly however, qualifies the 
‘purely intellectual pattern’ as ‘intermittent’ even in the most intellectual persons. It is 
‘not the whole of life’, but it is ‘an important, because guiding and directing, part’.251 
Moreover, he adds, not only is it ‘intermittent’, if one attains it at all, but ‘attainment of 
it and acceptance of that are not universal’.
Self-knowledge makes a person’s living become ‘authentic’ and through authentic 
living subjects develop, Lonergan submits. Personal development involves constant 
fidelity to the transcendental precepts of sustained attentiveness, a constant effort to be 
intelligent, a striving after reasonableness, and perseverance in making responsible 
decisions. Development of this kind makes possible an on-going self-transcendence, 
which, in turn, calls for intellectual, moral and religious conversion.
Intellectual conversion, which enables one to distinguish between the real and the 
imaginary, depends on the subject’s ability to answer three basic questions: ‘What am I 
doing when I am knowing?’ (cognitional theory question), ‘Why is doing that 
knowing?’ (epistemological question), ‘What do I know when I do it?’ (metaphysical 
question).253 Moral conversion, demanding a constant scrutiny of one’s response to the 
good of value, serves to orientate the subject to what is good and to the valuable. 
Religious conversion, arising out of religious experience, is intensely intersubjective in 
character, and demands a response from the subject on the level of, not just 
understanding and deliberation, but of deed and action. As Lonergan expresses it, the 
New Testament is not just ‘a religious document that calls for religious living’, but also 
‘a personal invitation that demands an appropriate response of a personal commitment’ 
to the person of Jesus Christ as God Incarnate.254
2 4 9 Aristotle, M etaphysics , I, 2, 982b 12-18 — 983a 12-18.
250 Topics, p. 87.
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253 Bernard Lonergan, “The Origins of Christian Realism”, A Second Collection, pp. 239-261 (241).
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IV
In Topics in Education Lonergan provides us with a concrete exemplification of what is 
involved in the transposition of Catholic philosophy of education, that is, in the effort 
‘to shift and lift’ the tradition of Catholic educational thought into a more adequate 
theoretical and contemporary context by developing the potentiality of the tradition 
while remaining true to its essence. The notion of ‘transposition’ employed here is one 
suggested by an early attempt by Lonergan to delineate what might be involved in the 
modernisation of Catholic social thought, and its use can be satisfactorily justified in the 
light of the evidence contained in Topics. Brown has analysed Lonergan’s approach to 
the transposition of Catholic social thought and his account, mutatis mutandis, proves to 
be a remarkably good template for the kind of transposition Lonergan envisages for 
Catholic philosophy of education.255
It is entirely legitimate, I would argue, to adopt a range of thematic concepts and a 
process of argument identified by Lonergan as being required for transposition of 
Catholic social thought, and to use these themes and that process as instruments for an 
analysis of what might be implicated in the transposition of Catholic educational 
thought as indicated in Topics. There is no internal contradiction involved here because 
of the basic underlying similarity and relatedness of Catholic social and educational 
thought and, indeed, the historical evolution of both bodies of Catholic thought display 
significant parallels and a degree of overlap. By adapting and using for the present 
purpose the categories identified by Brown in his study of Lonergan’s efforts to 
transpose Catholic social thought, much light may be shone on the phenomenon of 
transposition in Topics.
On three fronts Lonergan, in the course of these lectures on education, highlights the 
fundamental transitions in thinking and approach that he considers absolutely necessary 
for the successful transposition of Catholic educational thought. Such a transposition 
requires effectively that Catholic educational thought be restated in a wider and deeper 
philosophical, technical, and historical context. In each instance, Lonergan insists that
Topics in Education: An Exemplar of Lonerganian ‘Transposition’.
255 Patrick D. Brown, Aiming Excessively High and F ar , pp. 620-644 (627-628, 633, 641).
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the way forward lies in the employment of his intentionality analysis that holds equally 
for reflection on education and philosophy of education, as for all dimensions of human 
knowing.256
Transposition in Philosophical Context
Firstly, from a philosophical point of view, Lonergan explains that educators must 
become aware of how the very idea of learning and understanding has changed from 
that which flourished in a classical age. The shift in emphasis to the human subject has 
been accompanied by the opening up of new vistas of intellectual inquiry and the 
development of new methodologies of study. The ‘new learning’ - in mathematics, 
science, philosophy, art and history - which he depicts in successive lectures, embodies 
an introduction to a vastly expanded panorama of human knowledge and a new mode of 
understanding that calls for deep reflection.
In his lecture on ‘the theory of philosophic differences’, Lonergan notes that in his 
experience educators by and large tend to be ‘sceptical’ about the philosophy of
Q * A
education, because ‘there are so many and they all differ’. Yet, he claims, one of the 
great ‘utilities’ of a philosophy of education is that it will provide ‘ultimate criteria for 
judging the truth and estimating the value’ of the enormous volume of material that is 
written for educators.259 Lonergan does not relate his position to any of the well-known 
approaches to philosophy of education of the day, whether it be a pragmatic, idealist, or 
realist perspective, but is rather more concerned to trace the causes of the differences 
between competing philosophies which, for him, basically concern different views of 
self-understanding, of the nature of reality, and of the nature of knowledge. Lonergan 
infers that it is only in terms of his cognitional theory and epistemology that ‘an 
effective means of understanding and evaluating different approaches to basic questions 
of human life and existence’ is forth-coming.260
Lonergan’s primary philosophical concern, ‘to transpose the statements of philosophers 
and metaphysicians to their origins in cognitional activity’, is as evident in Topics as it
256 Topics^ p. 131.
257 Ibid., pp. 127-131.
258 Ibid., pp. 158-192.
259 Topics, pp. 158-159.
260 Ibid., pp. 176-192.
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is in his whole body of philosophical thought.261 A notion that demands transposition as 
a matter of priority, Lonergan maintains, is the metaphysics of development and of the 
human person, for there is, he notes, a radically new method of answering the old 
question, What is man? 262 Today many new and diverse kinds of knowledge and 
understanding of human nature are available from the natural and human sciences, and 
from different philosophies, to provide an answer to that question. What is urgently 
required, however, is a synthesis and higher integration of the whole process and 
finality of human development. Lonergan cautions, though, that not every philosophy is 
capable of adopting a ‘position’ on the nature of human existence that is in harmony 
with that which arises out of his analysis in terms of the basic levels of cognitive 
operations (experiential, intellectual, rational and reflective). Indeed, some rather end 
up in a ‘counter-position’ that involves ‘a blind spot or limited horizon’, where the 
limitation occurs at either the intellectual or experiential level.
A genuine function of philosophy of education, Lonergan concludes, is to bring the 
‘horizon of the educationalist’ out of and beyond the kind of ‘private world’ he 
considers, with or without justification, many educators to be living in, and to 
accompany them into the ‘universe of being’.264 Lonergan believes that, with regard to 
the philosophy of education, a ‘fundamental problem’ is the horizon of the 
educationalist and the teacher, since these horizons are ‘insufficiently enlarged’.265 
Educators need to become aware that, consequent upon the ‘new learning’ in 
mathematics and science, a remarkable shift in understanding the nature of knowledge 
has occurred and this has fundamental implications for the philosophy of education. The 
shift to the human subject has opened up new vistas of intellectual inquiry, A shift in 
focus from the objects of knowledge to the operations of the knowing subject is 
noteworthy, and with this, the idea of learning has been completely transformed from 
that assumed in Scholastic theory.266
261 Insight, p. xii.
262 Ibid., pp. 469-479.
263 Topics, p. 179. See, Insight, pp. 387-390 ,484-489 , 495-500, 557-558, for Lonergan’s notions o f  
'position’ and ‘counter-position’.
264 Topics, p. 106.
265 Topics, p. 106.
266 See Topics, “Mathematics and the N ew  Learning”, pp. 108-132; “Science and the N ew  Learning”, pp. 
132-157.
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Secondly, contemporary Catholic educators must attend to the apparent ‘dearth of 
technical information and knowledge’ that frequently characterises Catholic educational 
discourse. It was Lonergan’s view, Brown notes, that in common with other areas of 
Catholic dialogue with the contemporary world, Catholic education’s deficit of a 
technical dimension must be considered its ‘greatest weakness’.267 Lonergan illustrates 
the point and attempts to make good the deficiency by his frequent reference to the 
work of Jean Piaget.268 Lonergan is adamant that there needs to be ‘a vast enlargement 
of the theoretical horizon’ of Catholic educational philosophy. This enlargement will 
need to be accompanied by a similar effort to fully integrate the natural and human 
sciences into a transformed educational theory. Both an empirical and theoretical 
framework is essential for the reconstruction of Catholic philosophy of education.270
Lonergan on more than one occasion draws attention to the relative weakness of the 
theoretical component in Catholic educational thought. By his estimate, Catholic 
educational thought is not yet up to the level of the times to the extent that it lacks 
adequate technical knowledge of educational theory, and of social and political 
theory.271 It is also not yet up to the level of the times to the extent that it lacks some 
way of ‘collaborating in the on-going generation, refinement, evaluation, and diffusion’ 
of such theories throughout the field of education.272 Here, however, there may be a real 
problem for philosophy of education since, as it attempts to integrate the human 
sciences, it can hardly be expected to be reduced to playing the classic ‘handmaiden’ 
role that philosophy once played to theology. For Lonergan, philosophy will best assist 
Catholic educational thought if it ‘takes the form of an empirical and critical 
philosophy’ in continuity with the tradition, yet also on the level of the times.273
Furthermore, developments in the natural and human sciences, as well as in historical 
studies, have produced a ‘new and distinct problem of integration’, Lonergan reckons, 
as witness the range of contemporary studies available for an understanding of human
Transposition and the Technical Context
267 Patrick D. Brown, Aiming Excessively High and F ar , p. 628.
268 See, for instance, Topics, pp. 37-38, 99-100, 119-121, 168-170, 193-207.
269 Aim ing E xcessively High and Far , pp. 631 -632.
270 Ibid., pp. 638, 640.
271 Aiming Excessively High and Far , p. 628.
272 Ibid., p. 628.
273 Aiming Excessively High and Far , p. 641.
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beings for instance.274 It is no longer the human being as the ‘pure nature5 of Scholastic 
definition, but the concrete human being as ‘concretely developing and declining in 
historical process5 that is investigated by the scholars today.275 Lonergan, nevertheless, 
reminds us that in principle the problem of integration, despite the scale and sheer 
difficulty of the contemporary task, is ‘not wholly without precedent5, as Aquinas's use
276of Aristotelian philosophy as ‘an integrating instrument5 should remind one.
Lonergan appears to be exemplifying one way in which the relative weakness of the 
theoretical component in Catholic philosophy might be addressed by his widespread 
reference to the work of Jean Piaget. In his lecture on “Piaget and the Idea of General 
Education55 Lonergan devotes the bulk of his time to a discussion of cognitive 
development in the child according to Piagetian theory and seeks to spell out the 
relevance of this theoretical component for Catholic philosophy of education. 277 
Piaget's work is in the first place, for Lonergan, further evidence of the subjective turn 
in understanding in the human learning process. Lonergan also considered aspects of 
Piaget's notion of development useful in explaining what he called ‘active method5 in 
education, in understanding the origin and development of moral ideas in children, and 
in an analysis of how reality is perceived as the infant comes to encounter the world of 
objects and makes the transition from the world of immediacy to the world mediated by
278meaning.
Transposition and Historical Context
Thirdly, ‘thinking on the level of history5 is a key feature of what Lonergan understands 
by ‘transposition' and it is what he is attempting to introduce into his development of a 
Catholic philosophy of education. That single phrase, ‘to mount to the level of one's 
time’, writes Frederick Crowe, is one that perhaps better than any other sums up the 
driving force of Lonergan5 s whole career.279 As an innovative theorist, Lonergan 
regarded as the ‘sin of backwardness5 the actions of those cultures, authorities, and
274 Ibid., p. 641.
275 Ibid., p. 641.
276 Ib id , p. 641.
277 Topics, pp. 193- 207 (193-203).
278 Ibid., pp. 104-105, 99-100, 168-170. For the significance o f  the transition to a ‘world mediated by 
m eaning’, see M ethod in Theology, pp. 28, 30-31, 35, 76-77, 89, 92-93, 95-96, 112, 221, 238-39, 262-64, 
303.
279 Frederick E. Crowe, Lonergan , p. 58.
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individuals that ‘fail to live on the level of their times’.280 Throughout Topics Lonergan 
describes in many different ways how Catholic education and its philosophy must 
attempt to climb into modernity. To the extent that Catholic philosophy of education 
lacked sophistication and influence in contemporary times, its predicament most likely 
derived from a failure to ‘operate on the level of our day’.281
Reflection on history is ‘one of the richest, profoundest, most significant things there 
is’, not only in the sphere of education, but throughout human life, Lonergan 
believes.282 Lonergan develops a complex dialectical theory of history in Insight, but 
one that is too detailed to enter upon here. In historical process, Lonergan contends,
283man becomes for man ‘the executor of the emergent probability of human affairs’. 
Lonergan alleges that how history is conceived is ‘a problem’, and he argues that the 
solution to the problem is to realise that the three basic operations of consciousness lead 
to three different modes of organizing history and three different types of under-pinning 
philosophy, notably, the empiricist, the idealist, and the realist. These different 
philosophical positions give rise to different kinds of history.
Lonergan argues that a scientific approach to history will incorporate the two-fold 
‘scissors-like action’ that characterises all science. One movement occurs ‘from below 
upward’ (the Tower blade’), that is, from the historical data upward through the 
possibility of understanding to judgment and knowledge, while the other occurs, in the 
reverse direction ‘from above downward’ (the ‘upper blade’), that is, from judgment or 
knowledge to an understanding of the data of experience.285 For Lonergan, data alone 
Tack significance’; while principles and key ideas alone Tack reality’.286 It is by the 
coming together of these two movements that all science, including the science of 
history, is developed. The structure of human consciousness is such that the search for 
understanding and insight in history (as elsewhere) operates by an interplay of data and 
theory, of experience and ideas and allows intelligibility to be grasped and given 
articulation. History is ultimately a matter of insight, that is, insight as it unfolds on the 
level of understanding and of judgment.
280 Bernard Lonergan, “Dialectic o f  Authority”, A Third C ollection , pp. 5-12 (8).
281 M ethod , p. 367.
282 Topics, p. 233.
283 Insight, p. 227.
284 Topics, p. 238. See also, Insight, pp. 312-13, 522-23, 577-87.
285 Ibid., pp. 251 ,255-256 .
286 Topics, p. 251.
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If Lonergan’s remark, that all his work has been ‘introducing history into Catholic 
theology5, is true, it is unlikely that he could have desisted from a similar activity in the 
case of Catholic philosophy of education.287 We must expect to see in the philosophy of 
education that Lonergan aspires to, as in every phase of authentic human development, 
and every moment of human history, an emphasis on the operations of human 
consciousness striving toward insight, constructing understanding and achieving 
knowledge, as a result of two contrasting vector forces, acting from below and from 
above.288 Frederick Crowe has offered a theoretical foundation for education based upon 
these two complementary vectors of learning that reflect Lonergan5 s interiority analysis
9  Q Q
and provide a theoretical foundation for education.
V 
Summary: Lonergan’s ‘New Bases’ for a Catholic Philosophy of Education
Lonergan5 s declared aim in Topics was that of articulating and establishing new ‘bases 
for a philosophy of education5.290 I conclude this chapter by attempting to evaluate his 
achievement in this regard insofar as it concerns the overall task of giving new 
expression to Catholic philosophy of education. Two general conclusions in relation to 
Lonergan’s philosophy of education have become clear. Firstly, while the scope of 
Lonergan’s educational vision becomes evident in Topics, many of its details remain to 
be filled out from elsewhere, particularly perhaps from his major works Insight and 
Method in Theology. Lonergan, even at the conclusion of his lecture series, does not 
claim to have provided here a fully adumbrated Catholic philosophy of education. 
Secondly, it becomes possible to envision, at least in general terms, how, in the field of 
the philosophy of education, Lonergan’s overall design of ‘transposing’ Catholic 
thought into ‘a more contemporary and adequately theoretic context’ might be achieved 
for Catholic education, through some ‘new effort of analysis and synthesis while
287 Frederick E. Crowe, “A ll M y Work Has Been Introducing History Into Catholic Thought”,pp. 78-110. 
In: D eveloping the Lonergan Legacy: H istorical, Theoretical, an d  Existential Themes, Michael Vertin 
(ed), Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 2004.
288 See Bernard Lonergan, “Healing and Creating in History”, A Third Collection”, pp. 100-112.
289 Frederick E. Crowe, O ld  Things and New: A S trategy fo r  Education , Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 
1985.
290 Topics, p. xii.
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What Lonergan intended ultimately was that the Catholic philosopher of education, the 
‘educationalist’, and the teacher, should ‘broaden their horizons’ and find a new 
foundation for their discipline in ‘interiority’ and in the turn to the subject.292 The 
‘genuine function’ of a philosophy of education, we noted Lonergan remarking above, 
is ‘to bring the horizon of educators to the point where they are not living in some 
private world’ of teachers, but ‘in the universe of being’.293 His enterprise in articulating 
a Catholic philosophy of education on this basis would be a clear-cut example of 
thatmost urgent dynamic to which he devoted his life’s work, namely, the ‘transition 
from a classicist world-view to historical mindedness’.294
Lonergan’s articulation of the ‘new bases’ for a Catholic philosophy of education would 
not appeal to deductions from logically derived first principles, notes Frank P. Braio.295 
Rather, he would invite us to rely on ‘a constructive kind of intelligence’, capable of 
following the gradual assembly of all the elements into an enriched and deepened view 
of concrete educational activity [on all levels]’.296 Lonergan wished to show how the 
new philosophical foundations he proposed for philosophy of education, ‘ranging over 
and dynamically relating to the moving viewpoints’ of several widespread fields of 
study, are ‘methodologically accessible through reflection’.297
The question to ask now is whether, in Topics, Lonergan has indeed bequeathed us a 
substantial account of Catholic philosophy of education. An answer to that question 
must first of all acknowledge that, because of the necessarily limited scope of the 
present thesis, selections of Lonergan’s lectures have had to be made and the focus of 
this study has not been in any case on a comprehensive assessment of this early 
educational work of Lonergan. It is hoped that the material selected is both fair and 
representative of the author’s views and permits an accurate estimation to be made of 
his contribution to the re-articulation of Catholic philosophy of education.
291 Patrick D. Brown, Aiming Excessively High and F ar , p. 622
292 Topics, p. 106. Lonergan describes the ‘educationalist’, somewhat disparagingly, I think, as ‘the person 
or group that has the power and the money, that runs the bureaucracy, that makes the decisions’.
293 Ibid., p. 106.
294 Bernard Lonergan, “The Transition from a Classicist W orld-View to Historical-M indedness”, A 
Second Collection , pp. 1-10.
295 Frank P. Braio, “Towards the Re-Horizoning o f  Subjects: Re-Structuring Classical-M odern  
Educational Perspectives”, METHOD: Journal o f  Lonergan Studies , Vol. 13, 1995, pp. 99-109 (101).
296 Topics in Education , p. xii.
297 Ibid., p. 101.
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Lonergan has astutely and trenchantly identified several respects in which Catholic 
philosophy of education is in need of re-articulation and, in particular, has argued how, 
in the context of contemporary educational need, its philosophical foundations need 
strengthening. Thus, he correctly insists that, a medieval foundational viewpoint, insofar 
as it still exercises any influence at all in the field of Catholic educational practice, is an 
inadequate basis for a vibrant contemporary educational philosophy. As traditionally 
interpreted, a Thomist- Aristotelian philosophy of education which is unprepared to 
introduce changes to its foundational emphases, cannot incorporate or complete the 
‘turn to the subject’. This, in Lonergan’s view, is critically important for modernity. 
Neither can such an un-reformulated philosophy successfully integrate contemporary 
understanding of learning across a range of disciplines or enthusiastically embrace a 
methodology that reflects real movement from ‘classicism to method’.
Lonergan faced the philosophical problem of how the relationship between theory and 
practice is to be redrawn. For Lonergan, the aim of philosophy is self-knowledge and 
self-appropriation. As William Shea interprets Lonergan, if the relation between theory 
and practice is to be comprehended, ‘one must understand what one does when one 
theorizes and when one acts’, and that sort of knowledge, in Lonergan’s view, can only 
be attained through ‘a critical mediation and appropriation of one’s own cognitional, 
evaluative, and decisional processes or operations’.298 If we accept a premise of 
Lonergan’s ‘generalized empirical method’, then, as one analyses the data of sense, so 
one can analyse the data of consciousness.299 To uncover what one does when one 
knows, values, and acts and to take responsibility for it is the effective reconciliation of 
theory and practice. To reconcile theory and practice in reality, Lonergan would claim 
that intellectual, moral and religious conversion is required.300
For Lonergan, education itself is an instance of ‘praxis’, the norms of which are the 
transcendental imperatives of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and 
responsibility.301 Philosophy of education has as a primary task the educating of 
educators in transcendental method and the use of intentionality analysis. Its aim must 
be to work out the educational implications of transcendental method. Lonergan intends 
philosophy of education to be a ‘critical’ praxis in two senses. It is critical insofar as it
298 W illiam M. Shea, “From Classicism to Method: John D ew ey and Bernard Lonergan”, pp. 302-303.
299 Insight, pp. 72, 243-44.
300 Bernard J.F. Lonergan, “Theology and Praxis”, A Third C ollection , pp. 184-201.
301 Ibid., pp. 11-12, 20, 53.
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heightens the possibility of self-criticism as it aims at self-understanding and self­
appropriation, and at the intellectual and moral development of authentic subjects. 
Education is also ‘critical’, in the original sense of judgment, of culture and tradition. 
Lonergan understands education as a reflective review of tradition. Education is not a
302passive acceptance of tradition but a critical appropriation of it.
Lonergan, as Shea interprets him, engaged in a contest with ‘a Catholic educational ' 
system with philosophy and theology at its apex5, that was ‘devoted to neo-scholastic 
formalism and conceptualism5, to Aristotelian and Thomist ‘logical analysis as its 
methodological ideal5, and to an understanding of ‘truth as supra-empirical, static, and 
unchanging5.303 In this context, Lonergan is to be credited with attempting to promote 
the move from ‘classicism5 to ‘method5 in Catholic philosophy of education by 
providing an interpretation of what this transition involves in terms of basic 
philosophical perceptions and highlighting its significance for our understanding of the 
practice of education.
302 W illiam M. Shea, “From Classicism to Method”, pp. 314-315.
303 Ibid., pp. 314-315.
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Chapter Four: Toward a Re-Articulation of the Catholic Tradition of 
Educational Thought from the Perspective of Terence H. McLaughlin 
(1949-2006)
145
Terence H. McLaughlin is the third of the scholars to whom this dissertation turns for 
guidance in the matter of the re-articulation of Catholic philosophy of education for our 
times. Unlike Maritain, a selection of whose work has been examined in chapter two 
above, McLaughlin does not offer for our consideration any substantive body of 
metaphysical doctrine in the Thomist-Aristotelian tradition of Catholic educational 
thought. To the extent that this tradition is represented in McLaughlin’s work, it is left 
largely unarticulated and in the background. Neither does McLaughlin adopt as key 
elements in his philosophical analysis of Catholic education the cognitional theory and 
transcendental method of Lonergan, discussed in chapter three of this dissertation. 
McLaughlin has been chosen as a significant scholar to be studied in the present 
context, because it is judged that his analytical approach provides a powerful means of 
appraising and clarifying key concepts and claims of the inherited perennial discourse 
that would be subject to assessment in any re-articulation of Catholic philosophy of 
education. Likewise, in relation to Lonergan’s subject-centred, cognitional discourse, 
McLaughlin’s espousal and subtle use ofphronesis bears a close relationship to 
elements of Lonergan’s conception of the nature and structure of insight. McLaughlin, 
finally, is considered in relation to the discourse of the Congregation for Catholic 
Education (CCE) on the Catholic school and Catholic education, as a discerning and 
reliable guide in the conversation, or dialogue, between discourses that this dissertation 
wishes might be commenced, or encouraged, as one strand in the overall task of the re­
articulation of Catholic philosophy of education.
In this chapter, therefore, an attempt is made to summarise and evaluate selected aspects 
of McLaughlin’s work that might be considered directly relevant to the task of the re­
articulation of a Catholic philosophy of education. In particular, it is intended to focus 
on McLaughlin’s analytical methodology and on what shall be termed his ‘phronetic 
paradigm’, two aspects of his work that can rightly be regarded as distinctive features of 
his philosophy of education. Several facets of both the content and methodology of 
McLaughlin’s work are of interest in relation to the re-articulation of Catholic 
philosophy of education, but reflection here is in the main limited to his analytical study 
of terms and concepts regarded as central to an understanding of the theory of Catholic 
education, and to his promotion of phronesis, or ‘practical wisdom’, in the exercise of 
judgment and deliberation in the context of its practice.
Many specific areas of the content of McLaughlin’s work, perhaps especially the bulk
of his reflections in relation to the ‘common school’, are of a generally important nature 
and deserving of detailed study in their own right but are not centrally relevant to the 
more limited objectives of this dissertation. Gerald Grace has identified three major 
themes in McLaughlin’s study of ‘faith schooling’, among them his ‘analysis of the 
distinctiveness of Catholic education’ as a particular form of faith schooling.1 This 
theme of the distinctiveness of Catholic education is the one considered most relevant in 
the present context, although the other themes identified by Grace, namely, a discourse 
on parental rights and the religious upbringing of children, and a defence of faith 
schools as a legitimate feature of liberal, pluralistic and democratic societies, remain as 
important to Catholic educators today as ever.2
What is of more direct interest in the present context is McLaughlin’s understanding of 
the nature of the philosophy of education as such, and his employment of analytical 
methodology and phronetic thinking in relation to a selected range of issues, including 
aspects of Catholic education and schooling that constitute its ‘distinctiveness’. His 
attempts to clarify the meanings of the terms used to describe the nature and specificity 
of Catholic education and to map out the logic of the concepts which these terms 
embrace is noteworthy. Undoubtedly also of special relevance in the context of this 
thesis is his ‘phronetic paradigm’, an understanding of which might in some way 
provide an enhanced theoretical foundation for the more visionary, narrative account of 
Catholic philosophy of education recently provided by the CCE.
A study of McLaughlin’s work, however limited, may help to reveal his capacity to 
marry his critical reflection with his thoughtful pedagogical tact in his study of 
education. This is of particular importance in working out what might have been his 
more developed response to the re-articulation of Catholic philosophy of education, had 
he lived long enough to undertake such a task. Together, his critical analysis and 
practical reflection provide a very measured response to the CCE body of literature 
which he considered to be ‘a rich source of Catholic educational principles’ needing, 
however, ‘interpretation and elaboration’, i f ‘an adequate account’ is to be provided.3
1 Gerald Grace, “Terence McLaughlin: Contributions to the study and practice o f  faith schooling and o f  
Catholic education”. In Graham Haydon (ed), Faith in Education: A Tribute to Terence M cLaughlin , pp. 
1-8 (1), London: Institute o f  Education, University o f  London, 2009.
2 Ib id , p. 1.
3 Terence H. McLaughlin, “The Distinctiveness o f  Catholic Education”, in: Terence McLaughlin, Joseph 
O ’Keefe, & Bernadette O ’Keeffe (ed.s), The Contem porary C atholic School: Context, Identity and
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The present chapter, therefore, will be concerned mainly with outlining McLaughlin’s 
version of analytical philosophy of education and offering a faithful account of the 
‘phronetic disposition’ which is so distinctive of his insightful study of educational 
theory and practice.
In the first section, McLaughlin’s analytical approach to the philosophy of education is 
summarised and an indication is given of how he so practised the art that he was able to 
avoid, or over-come, much of the criticism of analytical philosophy that had come to be 
directed at it. McLaughlin’s analytical philosophy of education, it will be argued, holds 
out significant promise for the re-articulation of Catholic philosophy of education in 
relation to the clarification and justification of central elements, concepts and claims, of 
the tradition.
In section two, McLaughlin’s understanding and employment of the Aristotelian notion 
of phronesis, and specifically, the notion of pedagogic phronesis, a term he made his 
own, and which is a key element for understanding what he envisages as the nature of 
philosophy of education in relation to practice, is introduced. Necessarily limited for 
the most part to a recent collection of his essays, his exposition of the concept and 
methodology he describes regularly in quite different contexts as ‘pedagogic phronesis\ 
is explored.4 From a study of selected instances of his usage of the term throughout this 
collection o f essays it is hoped to gain some sort of basic appreciation of McLaughlin’s 
‘phronetic thinking’ and ‘phronetic paradigm’, or ‘approach’, to the role of philosophy 
of education in relation to theory, practice, and policy in education.
In section three, an attempt is made to collate from a number of sources what can be 
established of McLaughlin’s substantive Catholic philosophy of education. An effort to 
identify what McLaughlin appears to have considered as some of the central elements of 
a Catholic philosophy of education is required, as is a response to his call for the 
development of ‘a distinctively Catholic version’ of the notion of ‘pedagogic 
phronesis’.5 It is suggested that McLaughlin’s Catholic ‘phronetic paradigm’, or
D iversity , London and N ew  York: RoutledgeFalmer, 1996, pp. 136-154 (137-138). Hereafter cited as:
The Contem porary Catholic School.
4 David Carr, Mark Halstead, & Richard Pring (eds.), Liberalism , Education and Schooling: Essays by  
T.H M cLaughlin , Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2008. Hereafter cited as: Liberalism, Education an d  
Schooling.
5 Terence H. McLaughlin, “Distinctiveness and the Catholic School: Balanced Judgement and the 
Temptations o f  Commonality”, pp. 65-87 (86). In: James C. Conroy (ed.), Catholic Education: Inside 
Out, O utside In, Dublin: Veritas, 1999.
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‘practical wisdom’ approach, may be important for two reasons, namely, for the re­
articulation of Catholic philosophy of education in a postmodern and pluralist context 
and, more specifically, in terms of bridging the gap between much contemporary 
philosophizing in education and the visionary, narrative account of Catholic education 
latterly provided by the CCE, where principles of Catholic philosophy may be 
embedded in non-philosophical texts designed for purposes other than philosophical 
reflection.
I
T. H. M cLaughlin, Analytical Philosopher o f Education
David Carr and his co-editors declared that T.H. McLaughlin was ‘one of the most 
widely regarded and influential philosophers of education of his generation’, a judgment 
from which even those minimally acquainted with his writing would surely not demur.6 
A scholar of the ‘highest intellectual integrity’, whose ‘awareness and commitment to 
clarity and truth’ motivated him to seek clarification of ‘some of the deepest and most 
vexed conceptual issues of contemporary professional educational practice’, is the 
fitting tribute they pay to McLaughlin.7 His work contains evidence o f ‘a lifelong 
professional commitment to the ideal of common schooling’, as well as an insightful 
treatment of faith based schooling, these writers conclude, and reflects his struggle to 
reconcile what he, as a devout religious believer, regarded as ‘educationally valuable in 
both forms of schooling’.8
McLaughlin, Gerald Grace tells us, was ‘shaped and formed academically’ by the 
culture of philosophy of education established at the University of London’s Institute of 
Education by Richard Peters, Paul Hirst, John and Patricia White, and others.9 
McLaughlin shared with these scholars and others known to him through his avid 
reading ‘a commitment to a view of education in which democratic values, personal 
autonomy and critical openness held centre stage’.10 The philosophical approach in
6 Liberalism, Education and Schooling, p. 1.
7 Ibid., p. 2.
8 Ib id , p. 2.
9 hrtp:V/w w w .st-andrew s.ac-uk/ceppa/obituaries/m claughlin .htm l. A ccessed, 28/08/2013.
10 Mark Halstead, “Obituary, Professor Terence H. McLaughlin”, Journal o f  M oral Education , V ol. 35, 
No. 3, Sept., 2006, pp. 433-435.
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question is characterised by Grace as being concerned with a conception of education, 
which focused on matters such as the ‘autonomy of the individual5, the ‘development of 
democratic citizens’ and the ‘significance of critical reason in education’.11 Broadly 
speaking, this was the analytic approach to philosophy of education that would have a 
decisive influence on McLaughlin’s thinking and writing.
Another influence on McLaughlin’s life and work, apparently fitting in comfortable 
tension with his liberal, democratic principles, was his Catholicism. Mark Halstead 
judges that, in a sense, McLaughlin’s ‘life’s mission was to search for a way of bringing 
these two into harmony’.12 Grace thinks that McLaughlin, as a result of the Catholic 
culture in which he lived, had ‘a personal project of making connections between faith 
and reason’.13 His personal faith was undoubtedly a matter of importance to 
McLaughlin and Catholic social and moral principles shaped his personality and world­
view from childhood. As already mentioned, McLaughlin had an interest in Catholic 
schooling, an interest that was primarily philosophical but not entirely so. He was 
therefore concerned to explore a range of issues arising in the context of British society 
(and elsewhere), such as the charge that Catholics schools are divisive or indoctrinatory. 
McLaughlin participated actively in the debate about whether parents have the right to 
bring up their children in their own faith, and whether children’s growth towards 
eventual autonomy is helped or hindered by a religious up-bringing.14 He rejected the 
view that ‘a secular form of liberal education is the only defensible educational 
experience in modern society’.15
McLaughlin’s Account of Analytical Philosophy of Education (APE)
One might more accurately refer to McLaughlin’s accounts (plural) of APE since it is a 
topic the principal features and evolving nature of which he was frequently at pains to 
bring his audiences and readers correctly to understand and appreciate. Four such 
accounts are available in his published papers between 2000 and 2004. These are: (1) 
“Diversity, Identity and Education: Some Principles and Dilemmas”;16 (2) “Philosophy
1 ’ http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/ceppa/obituaries/mclaughlin.html
12 Mark Halstead, “Obituary, Professor Terence H. McLaughlin”, p. 434.
13 http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/ceppa/obituaries/mclaughlin.html
14 ibid.
15 http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/ceppa/obituaries/mclaughlin.html
16 Terence H. Me Laughlin, “Diversidade e identitade”, in: Adalberto Dias de Carvallo et al. (ed.s), Actas 
de la Conferencia Internacional de Filosofía da Educacao, pp. 123-140, Porto, 2000. See footnote 20  
below for the English Version.
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and Educational Policy: Possibilities, Tensions and Tasks”;17 (3) “Education,
Philosophy and the Comparative Perspective”;18 (4) “John Wilson on Moral 
Education”.19 Emphasis varies slightly from paper to paper as one would expect 
depending on the audience being addressed and the precise nature of the topic under 
discussion. Together, however, these essays give a comprehensive account of 
McLaughlin’s understanding of analytical philosophy of education, as well as providing 
us with exemplary specimens of the method in action. It is not my intention to convey 
the contents of these accounts in full, but rather to make a judicious selection of the 
main features of APE as McLaughlin articulated it and to record the powerful manner in 
which he employed APE to address matters of educational substance and importance.
Three features of APE
In a paper delivered to an international conference on the philosophy of education in 
Lisbon, in 2000, Me Laughlin, faced with a range of different philosophical traditions, 
the existence of which he was already well aware, thoroughly understood and welcomed 
as partners in dialogue, while witnessing the different styles of argument and methods 
of approach to the major conference theme, availed of the opportunity carefully and 
succinctly to outline his own style of argument and method of approach, typical of a 
philosopher of education working from the perspective of analytical philosophy. 
According to McLaughlin, three general features characterise analytical philosophy’s 
approach. These are: (1) APE’s concern with questions of meaning and justification; (2) 
its insistence on beginning to philosophise from the particularity of the situation or 
question, and (3), a distinctive style and/or methodology.
Concern with Questions of ‘Meaning’ and ‘Justification’
Firstly, philosophers of education working within the analytic tradition are inclined, 
McLaughlin avers, to react to ‘high-level’ statements and claims by ‘asking what the 
statement means’ and then, by engaging in argumentation, to ‘determine the extent to
17 Terence H. McLaughlin, “Philosophy and Educational Policy: Possibilities, Tensions and Tasks”, 
Liberalism, Education and Schoolings pp. 14-34.
18 Terence H. McLaughlin, “Education, Philosophy and the Comparative Perspective”, Liberalism, 
Education and Schooling , pp. 35-47.
19 Terence H. McLaughlin and J. Mark Halstead, “John W ilson on Moral Education”, in: Journal o f  
M oral Education , Vol. 29, No. 3, 2000, pp. 247-268.
20 Terence H. McLaughlin, “Diversity, Identity and Education: Some Principles and Dilem m as”, 
Conference Paper, pp. 123-140, Porto, 2000. Hereafter cited as: “Diversity, Identity and Education” .
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which the statement is justified\ 21 A concern with ‘questions of meaning and 
justification5 are, therefore, central to the analytic approach to philosophy. McLaughlin 
characterises the analytical approach to philosophy of education as being ‘suspicious of 
unduly general statements and claims5 and in search of ‘more fine-grained and detailed 
argument and debate5.22 The analytic approach to philosophy of education, in 
McLaughlin's opinion, tends to begin its work, not from ‘general statements or 
theories5, but from ‘specific questions and problems5. It constantly seeks ‘fine-grained 
and detailed argument and debate5 so that attention to questions of meaning and 
justification might ‘act as an antidote to undue generality5.
What McLaughlin claims here regarding APE's argumentation and debate not being 
generally ‘couched at very high levels of generality5, and being ‘suspicious of unduly 
general statements and claims5, is highly reminiscent of the view of his erstwhile 
master, R.S. Peters, who declared that ‘it was not the function of professional 
philosophers to provide high-level directives for education or for life5.24 Whether or not 
McLaughlin also shared fully the view that contemporary philosophers of education 
should more properly ‘cast themselves in the role of under-labourers in the garden of 
knowledge5,1 suspect that he was always aware of the ‘modest role5 philosophical
* 25reflection is able to play in the complexity of educational practice and policy making.
To ‘lay bare those high-level, aristocratic pronouncements5, long taken for granted as 
the ‘proper role5 of philosophy of education, by subjecting them to the ‘analytic 
guillotine5, is how Peters expressed the task of APE.26 McLaughlin would certainly 
accept Peters5 assertion that ‘the disciplined demarcation of concepts, the patient 
explication of the grounds of knowledge and of the presuppositions of different forms of
27discourse5 had rightly become the ‘stock-in-trade5 of the analytic philosopher.
Israel Scheffler, another analytical philosopher who had a marked influence on 
McLaughlin's thinking, offered an analysis of three different kinds of what he termed 
‘educational locutions5, namely, educational ‘slogans5 (such as, ‘teaching children, not
21 Terence H. McLaughlin, “Diversity, Identity and Education”, p. 124.
22 Ibid., p. 124.
23 Ibid., p. 124.
24 Richard S. Peters, Ethics and Education, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1966, p. 15.
25 “Philosophy and Educational Policy”, Liberalism, Education an d  Schooling, p. 18. Here McLaughlin 
gives two reasons why he considers that the contribution philosophy can make is ‘m odest’.
26 Ethics an d  Education , p. 15.
27 Ibid., p. 15.
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subjects’), educational ‘metaphors’ (such as, ‘education as growth and development’), 
and educational ‘definitions’ (such as, descriptions of key educational terms, like
‘curriculum’, ‘ethos’, and so forth), the aim of which was to produce the kind of clarity
28that would allow a serious logical appraisal of these types of educational speech.
Thus, distinguishing between literal slogans that are common in educational discourse 
and their significance in actual practice is important if  the meaning intended by the 
slogan is to be properly appraised. A similar situation would prevail for educational 
metaphors and definitions, to all of which Scheffler brought insights from the 
philosophy of language then current in his attempt to analyse educational concepts and 
practice.
McLaughlin’s identification of a range of issues, concepts and claims, and his 
elaboration and clarification of the meaning of these concepts and the justification of 
these claims, follows a broadly similar pattern to that of Scheffler’s work. The results 
can be seen throughout McLaughlin’s work, though one might wish to single out such 
classic essays as, “Education of the Whole Child?”29, “Beyond the Reflective 
Teacher”30, and “The Educative Importance of Ethos”31, because of their relevance in 
the present context. These three essays show the care with which McLaughlin 
approached his work in the precise and clear interpretation of the key terms 
‘wholeness’, ‘reflection’, and ‘ethos’, respectively. Two other essays, of particular 
importance with respect to Catholic education, may also be mentioned in this 
connection, although detailed discussion of their contents and significance is best left 
until section three of this chapter. The essays in question are: “Distinctiveness and the 
Catholic School: Balanced Judgment and Temptations of Commonality”32, and “The 
Distinctiveness of Catholic Education”. 33
This latter essay, on the distinctiveness of the Catholic school, is an excellent example
28 See Israel Scheffler, The Language o f  Education, Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1960.
29 Terence H. McLaughlin, “Education o f  the W hole Child?”, Liberalism, Education and Schooling, pp. 
48-59.
30 Terence H. McLaughlin, “Beyond the Reflective Teacher”, Liberalism, Education and Schooling, pp. 
60-78.
31 Terence H, McLaughlin, “The Educative Importance o f  Ethos”, British Journal o f  Educational Studies, 
Vol. 53, No. 3 (Sept., 2005), pp. 306-325.
32 Terence H. McLaughlin, “Distinctiveness and the Catholic School: Balance Judgment and the 
Temptations o f  Commonality”,pp. 65-87. In: James C. Conroy (ed.), Catholic Education: Inside-Out, 
Outside-In, Dublin: Veritas, 1999; and, Liberalism, Education and Schooling, pp. 199-218.
33 Terence H. McLaughlin, “The Distinctiveness o f  Catholic Education”, pp. 136-154. In: The 
Contem porary Catholic School: Context, Identity and D iversity , Terence McLaughlin, Joseph O ’K eefe SJ 
& Bernadette O ’K eeffe, Abington, Oxon: RoutledgeFalmer, 1996.
of this first feature of the analytical approach to philosophy of education, that is, the 
focus on clarification, as outlined above. Here McLaughlin argues that the sort of 
‘clarity’ which is needed in relation to the distinctiveness of Catholic education needs to 
‘go beyond the edu-babble\ that ‘imprecise and platitudinous rhetoric, offering 
educators a spurious clarity in the form of slogans’.34 More especially, McLaughlin 
asserts, ‘sustained attention to questions of the meaning and justification’ of central 
concepts and claims are needed, together with an attempt to ‘delineate an overall 
substantial framework of Catholic educational thought’.35 McLaughlin identifies several 
issues that he considers worth studying from the perspective of a Catholic philosophy of 
education committed to this forensic-like analysis of key concepts and terms, among 
them ‘the aims of education, the personal autonomy of the individual, moral education 
and education in religion’.36
A cursory comparison of the contemporary analytic philosopher’s approach with that of 
Maritain, for instance, might lead us to suspect that Maritain would be a likely figure to 
be included by R. S. Peters among those who ‘took it for granted that the philosophy of 
education consisted in the formulation of high-level directives which would guide 
educational practice’.37 As has been pointed out, however, in discussing Maritain’s 
critique of the aims and processes of education, Maritain’s approach of ‘distinguishing 
in order to unite’ (distinguer pour unir) also involved an exercise of ‘analysis’, not of 
common language usage as such, but an examination of concepts and themes for the 
purpose of eventually integrating them in ‘synthesis’.38 Maritain believed that he was 
following in the footsteps of Aquinas for whom the making of distinctions was an 
integral part of his methodology and analytical style of argumentation. Maritain’s 
commitment, too, was rooted in his desire, directed toward truth and wisdom for its own 
sake, to clarify the meaning and to justify the truth of his statements about both God and 
man. Maritain could no doubt direct us to the logic of analogy so widely used by 
Aquinas to instance the centrality of clarification and justification in his thinking.
Lonergan, too, as has been noted, called for an all-out effort of analysis and synthesis in 
order to transpose Catholic philosophy of education into a new and more adequately
34 T.H. McLaughlin, “The Distinctiveness o f Catholic Education”, p, 138.
35 Ibid., p. 139.
36 Ibid., p. 139.
37 R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education, London: George A llen & Unwin Ltd., 1996, p. 15.
38 See, Jacques Maritain, The Degrees o f  Knowledge, London: Geoffrey B les / The Centenary Press,
1937.
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theoretic context.39 Activities of clarifying and justifying in Lonergan’s case arise out 
of, and belong within his understanding of cognitional structure, that dynamic on-going 
process of questioning and answering, focusing on understanding, developing reflective 
judgment, and responsible decision-making, that constitutes human knowing. This triad 
of questions, for intelligence, for reflection, and for responsibility, as has already been 
noted, is an integral part of the structure of intentional activity. Human knowing for 
Lonergan is not a threefold compound of unrelated operations but a single, simple act in 
the field of consciousness, where three events come together and are constitutive of our 
knowing. These events are, firstly, the given-ness of the data, the objective of our 
research; secondly, a cumulative series of insights into the data, which respond to 
questions for intelligence and yield a hypothesis; thirdly, a probable judgment on the 
adequacy of the insights.40 Synthesis for Lonergan is profoundly a matter of reflective 
judgment, just as analysis is the acquisition of intelligent insight and understanding into 
the data of consciousness. There is a sense in which these operations comprise one 
unified whole integral to the process of all human knowing.
While there are distinct echoes in McLaughlin’s work of Maritain’s strategy of 
‘distinguishing in order to unite’, and of Lonergan’s ‘analysis and synthesis for the 
purpose of transposition’, McLaughlin’s analytical discourse allied with his phronetic 
approach (discussed below), provides the Catholic philosopher of education with a 
uniquely powerful instrument for the clarification and justification of the concepts and 
principles of Catholic education in contemporary society.
On Not ‘Beginning from the General’
A second feature of analytical philosophy of education that McLaughlin underlines 
arises out of his observation of how frequently there is a marked tendency for 
arguments and debates in the field of education to begin from discussions of the work of 
classical, authoritative philosophers (Aristotle, Plato, Aquinas, Kant, Hegel, etc.) and 
traditions of thought. Only subsequently does much philosophy of education begin to 
address ‘more directly educational questions’, and this is achieved often through ‘a kind 
of application of the insights of such thinkers to these questions’.41 For McLaughlin, the 
analytical tradition of philosophy of education ‘tends to approach things the other way
39 Bernard Lonergan, “The Future o f  Thomism”, A Second C ollection , pp. 49-52.
40 Bernard Lonergan, “A Post-Hegelian Philosophy o f  Religion”, A Third Collection , pp. 204-211.
41 “Diversity, Identity and Education”, p. 124.
around’, that is to say, one begins with ‘the directly educational questions’ and ‘seeks 
their appropriate illumination from the resources of broader philosophical argument’.42
McLaughlin reports how APE has ‘an aversion to grand-scale accounts of the nature of 
reality’, which perhaps underlies its reluctance to begin to philosophise from classic 
theories of education that claim to have a generalized validity.43 McLaughlin agrees 
with Peters in acknowledging the reasons why it should be ‘thought incumbent upon the 
philosopher to produce high-level directives’, since the questions addressed frequently 
have ‘a high-level or second-order character’.44 APE, nevertheless, expresses its dislike 
for, or at least its disinclination, to conceive philosophy of education in terms of a 
theory, or a tradition, which understands philosophy as offering ‘an account on the 
grand scale’ of the nature of reality, the place of human beings within it, and the 
implications of all this for ‘how people should comport themselves in the world and 
towards one another’.45
McLaughlin records Peters’ dissent from a conception of philosophy, and philosophy of 
education, as an activity ‘offering high level directives’. He might equally well have 
referred us to Scheffler, whose philosophy of education has been compared to that of 
Peters, and who exercised a profound influence on McLaughlin’s own thinking, 
especially in regard to the role of reason in education. In what was one of the first 
accounts of analytical philosophy of education, Scheffler offered a conception of 
philosophy of education as ‘the rigorous, logical analysis of key concepts related to the 
practice of education’.46 For Scheffler, as for Peters, philosophy of education consists, 
not in ‘narrative recounting of grand theory’, but in ‘logical analysis’, understood as 
‘careful attention to and sophistication concerning the language, and the inter­
penetration of language and inquiry’, which attempts ‘to follow the modem example of 
the sciences in empirical spirit, in rigour, in attention to detail, in respect for 
alternatives, and in objectivity of method’.47
42 Ibid., p. 124.
43 T. H. McLaughlin, “Education, Philosophy and the Comparative Perspective”, Liberalism, Education  
and Schoolings pp. 35-47 (36).
44 Ibid., p. 36.
45 “Education, Philosophy and the Comparative Perspective, p. 36. McLaughlin here cites D.E. Cooper, 
W orld Philosophies. An Historical introductions Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003a, p. 2.
46 Israel Scheffler, “Towards an Analytical Philosophy o f  Education”, H arvard Educational R eview , Vol. 
24, 1954, pp. 223-230.
4 7 Ibid., p. 223.
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Two problems would seem to ensue for the Catholic educator from this analytic 
perspective on and understanding of philosophy of education. Firstly, it raises the 
question of how valid Maritain’s approach of ‘applying Thomistic general principles to 
concrete situations’ might be considered to be, and how such application makes his 
approach ‘philosophical’. More fundamentally, it causes one to wonder how in the 
analytical perspective it is possible to have a Catholic philosophy of education at all, if 
it cannot draw upon its tradition of educational thought, which is in essence a tradition 
of ‘high level directives or principles’, to articulate the relationship between theory and 
practice. The first of these questions can be commented upon briefly at this point; the 
second problem, now, of course, aggravated by postmodernism’s ‘incredulity towards 
meta- narrative’, its opposition to any kind of foundationalism, essentialism, or realism, 
and its rejection of all transcendental arguments, standpoints and principles, must of
48necessity await discussion until later in this chapter as well as in chapter five below.
The contrasting strategy o f ‘analysis’ and ‘application’ adverted to by McLaughlin is 
perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in the case of the traditional method of approach 
and style of argument represented in Maritain’s work that was discussed in chapter two 
above. It will be recalled how Maritain begins from an elevated understanding and 
theory of the nature of the human person that is derived from the Thomist-Aristotelian 
tradition, and seeks to employ this conceptual tool to distinguish between true and false 
understandings of the aims of education. Maritain’s Thomistic anthropology is first 
appealed to, including Aquinas’s account of the powers of the human soul, of intellect, 
will, and free will, and statements about aims and processes of education are measured 
against this yardstick.
Maritain’s essay, “Thomist Views on Education”, in addition to EC (1943), commented 
upon at length above, illustrates very clearly his methodology of identifying and 
invoking philosophical principles and addressing practical situations to which these pre­
existent, and pre-formulated Thomist principles can be ‘applied’.49 Maritain describes it 
as ‘advisable’ to draw a clear ‘distinction’ between ‘basic philosophical issues on which 
theories of education depend’, and the questions of a more practical nature which bear
48 See, Jean-Fran^ois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A R eport on K now ledge , Minneapolis: 
University o f  Minnesota Press, 1984.
49 Jacques Maritain, “Thomist Views on Education”, pp. 57-62, In: M odern Philosophies and Education, 
The Fifty-fourth Yearbook o f  the NSSE, 1955, Nelson B. Henry (ed). Hereafter cited as: “Thomist V iew s 
on Education”.
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on ‘concrete application and the technique of education’.50 His view of philosophy of 
education seems to envisage the two disciplines, philosophy and education, as separate 
activities, where it is the prerogative of the former to inform the latter. Maritain 
perceives three sets of principles, metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological 
principles, which underlie all questions concerning ‘the basic orientation of 
education’.51 His view of philosophy of education would seem to be diametrically 
opposed to that of Dewey, for whom the discipline is ‘not an external application of 
ready-made ideas to a system of practice having a radically different origin or 
purpose’.
Maritain’s double movement, o f ‘analysis’ and ‘application’, is operated on the basis of 
being able to call upon an established body of principles and concepts that he considers 
to be valid for all times and places. He refers to the ‘basic philosophical issues on which 
theories of education depend’, which in his case is the Thomist system of educational 
thought and what he considers to be its educational implications.53 Situations and 
problems may be in need of clarification, but there is no need for justification at the 
level of principle, for principle, in his opinion, being derived from more ultimate 
considerations, is unchanging and universally valid and can be applied directly to each 
situation. A method of approach that first seeks clarification of the meaning of terms 
and principles through linguistic analysis, and justification of the relevance or truth 
claims of a statement or principle, before being applied to a certain state of affairs, is not 
the approach that appealed to Maritain and Catholic philosophy of education generally 
before the 1960s. Maritain was insistent on what he regarded as the logical connections 
or implications for educational theory and practice of Thomist metaphysical, 
epistemological and axiological principles and did not question the validity of their 
application to concrete situations.
From our perspective today, Maritain might be considered to have failed to explain 
what it might mean for a philosophical position to have logical implications, or 
necessary consequences, for the theory and practice of education. In this matter his 
philosophy of education was perhaps no different from that of other major schools or 
systems of philosophy such as realism, idealism, pragmatism, and so on, in that he
50 Ibid., p. 57.
51 Ibid., pp. 57-67.
52 John D ew ey, D em ocracy and Education , p. 386.
53 Bernard Lonergan, “Thomist Views on Education”, p. 57.
158
assumed that one’s philosophic position should make a fundamental difference in 
considering educational matters. J.J. Chamblis points out that, in taking a philosophical 
position as foundational to his philosophy of education, Maritain, in common with other 
philosophers who contributed to the Fifty-Fourth Yearbook o f  the National Society fo r  
the Study o f  Education (1955), appears to ignore Dewey’s admonition that philosophy 
of education is not an application of philosophical theory to educational practice.54
Randall Curren argues that developing and applying a set of beliefs about human 
existence and education might be a ‘sufficient condition’ for regarding work in 
education as ‘philosophical’, but it would not be a ‘necessary condition’ today, given 
developments in educational research and analysis that do not appear to rely on some 
general philosophical position but have, nevertheless, opened the way to different ways 
of conceiving the philosophy of education.55 The discussion, raised by Curren, o f what 
it means for philosophy of education to be the kind of study of education that should be 
regarded as ‘philosophical’, although it cannot be pursued here, is interesting and 
relevant in the context of categorising the CCE discourse on Catholic schooling and 
education. Here it is necessary to have some clarity about the degree to which this 
discourse may, or may not, be termed philosophical before arriving at a conclusion 
about the extent to which the philosophical basis of that discourse is in need of 
enhancement.
Likewise, the theory-practice relationship in education, and specifically the rejection of 
the traditional bifurcation of theory and practice and the construal of practice as mere 
application of theory, which arises out of a consideration of Maritain’s philosophy of 
education from an analytic perspective is a matter in need of further discussion and 
attention is given to this matter in section three of this chapter. McLaughlin’s essay, 
“Beyond the Reflective Teacher”, is useful in providing a better conceptualisation of the 
relationship between rational action and theoretical knowledge as a result of more 
developed and sophisticated reflective thinking.56
54 J. L. Chambliss, “Philosophy o f  Education Today”, Educational Theory, Vol. 59, No. 2, 2009, pp. 2 33 -  
251 (249).
55 Randall Curren (ed), Philosophy o f  Education: An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007 , pp. 
1-4 .
56 See, Terence H. McLaughlin, “Beyond the Reflective Teacher”, Liberalism , Education and Schooling, 
pp. 60-78.
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An Issue of ‘Style’ and/or ‘Method’
A third feature of the analytic approach to philosophy of education, according to 
McLaughlin, is that the preoccupation of this approach with questions of meaning and 
justification already mentioned leads to an emphasis upon ‘a form of argumentation5 
which emphasises inter alia
(i) the clarification and analysis o f  concepts, premises and assumptions, (ii) the consideration o f  
counter examples, (iii) the detection and elimination o f  defects o f  reasoning o f  various kinds,
(iv) the drawing o f  important distinctions, (v) a concern to identify and address directly 
philosophical considerations rather than those o f  other kinds, (vi) a particular spirit o f  criticism  
and (vii) the structured development o f  an argument leading to the establishment o f  clear 
conclusions which aim to be (in some sense) true, interesting and important.
It scarcely needs remarking that this kind of analysis is completely absent from the 
recent, officially endorsed CCE documentation in its entirety. This should neither 
surprise us, given the special nature, origins and purposes of this body of literature 
(about which much more will be said in chapter five below), and nor does it 
automatically devalue them. The CCE discourse is not an academic, scholarly 
undertaking in a narrow sense but a largely pastoral theological exhortation, a calling to 
mind of statements of general principle and intended purposes, very much akin to the 
literature that embodies Catholic social teaching. Here, there is presentation of central 
concepts and leading philosophico-theological principles, and statements of Catholic 
position, but positions are not generally arrived at by argument, nor is there a prolonged 
critique of contrary positions. There is little or no acknowledgment of specialist writers 
or sources upon which the editors of the documents have most likely drawn, other than 
perhaps citation from traditional authoritative Church sources and previous 
ecclesiastical authorities and publications on aspects of Catholic education and 
schooling.
Given the nature and purpose of the CCE discourse, however, it does not follow that its 
non-analytical character deprives it of all value since it is clearly the case that human 
communication is by no means limited to an analytical mode, nor is it to be totally 
identified with that particular phase or operation of knowing. Lonergan, in his analysis 
of the emergence of ‘stages of meaning5, has criticised the kind of linguistic analysis 
that reduces the function of philosophy to ‘working out a hermeneutics for the
57 “Diversity, Identity and Education”, p. 125.
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clarification of the local variety of everyday language’, or regards it as ‘a somewhat 
technical form of common sense5, insisting that philosophy finds its proper data in 
‘intentional consciousness5 and its primary function in ‘promoting the self-appropriation
58 r p  •that cuts to the root of philosophic differences and incomprehensions5. There is no 
question of McLaughlin’s analytical thinking coming under Lonergan’s stricture, 
however, for he clearly accepts Lonergan’s differentiation of consciousness into 
different realms of meaning, including, for example, the realms of common sense with 
its meanings expressed in everyday or ordinary language, and the realm of theory where 
language is technical and refers to the subject and his operations in a purely objective 
way 59
The Evolution of APE and a Response to its Critics
McLaughlin has always been perfectly open and honest about possible or real 
shortcomings and limitations of the analytic tradition of philosophy of education and is 
fully aware of the critiques that have been made of this approach. He is particularly 
sensitive to the difficulties that might be occasioned by this approach in situations 
where it is important to engage in dialogue with philosophers of education from other 
traditions and where it is necessary to converse with educators and teachers non-versed 
in the arts and skills of pure philosophical reflection. In two further accounts of the 
salient features of analytical philosophy of education McLaughlin is keen to point out to 
the evolutionary path the method has traversed over the years, and how it has sought to 
meet its critics and continue to claim an essential role in philosophy of education.
McLaughlin has carefully traced the trajectory of APE in a way that makes abundantly 
clear the high value he places upon this methodology and the reasons for his preferring 
it to other conceptions of philosophizing. In “Philosophy and Educational Policy: 
Possibilities, Tensions and Tasks55, McLaughlin describes how it is possible to 
distinguish ‘an earlier and a later phase5 in the analytic tradition, the earlier phase being 
characterized by ‘certain preoccupations and methodological commitments5 which later 
became ‘less prominent5 within the perspective of the broader focus of the subsequent 
phase.60 In the early period, the analytic approach was applied to the ‘clarification of
58 Bernard Lonergan, M ethod in Theology, pp. 94-95.
59 Bernard Lonergan, M ethod , pp. 254-257.
60 Terence H. McLaughlin, “Philosophy and Educational Policy: Possibilities, Tensions and Tasks”, 
Liberalism, Education and Schooling, pp. 21-22.
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concepts distinctive to education’ and the ‘delineation of philosophically interesting 
connections between them’.61 It included ‘a critique of currently influential educational 
theories in terms of the ‘philosophically problematic concepts and claims’ they 
contained.62 It considered the application of philosophical analyses to ‘educationally 
relevant concepts’ and, more generally, it specified the conditions for ‘the application of 
the resources of epistemology, philosophical psychology, ethics and social philosophy’
63to educational concerns.
McLaughlin indicates how, in retrospect, this earlier period of the analytic tradition in 
philosophy of education came to be seen as ‘rather narrow in the character and focus of 
its concerns and methodology’.64 By restricting itself to ‘the clarification of concepts’, 
the ‘exploration of the grounds of knowledge’, the ‘elucidation of presuppositions’ and 
the ‘development of criteria for justification’, its critics emphasized the ‘second-order’ 
character of much of its philosophical activity and the lack of the development of 
‘substantive argument’ as they understood it.65 The extensive range of criticism of this 
earlier phase of APE included charges that it was ‘inattentive to the history of ideas’, 
seeing ideas and values as apparently ‘independent of social and cultural context’, and 
that it aspired to ‘a spurious value-neutrality’ and was ‘uncritical about its own 
assumptions and values’.66 APE in the first phase also came to be regarded as wrong in 
‘reading too much into a mere analysis of concepts’ and in its implication that ordinary 
language use provides ‘an unassailable court of appeal in determining meaning’.67
McLaughlin does not consider in any detail whether these lines of criticism were 
justified, either in whole or in part. As always in the course o f the development of ideas, 
there were instances of overstatement and even misunderstanding and McLaughlin 
draws attention to the charge that the approach claimed to be value-neutral as one such 
misunderstanding.68 Nevertheless, dissatisfaction and frustration among both its 
practitioners and critics about the role of APE, and in particular its ‘inability to make 
any real impact upon the determination and improvement of educational practice and
61 “Philosophy and Educational Policy, p. 22.
62 Ibid., p. 22.
63 Ibid., p. 22.
64 Ibid., p. 22.
65 Ibid., p. 22.
66 Ibid., p. 22.
67 Ibid., p. 22.
68 Ibid., p. 23.
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policy’, necessitated a development of both key elements and the methodology of 
analytical philosophy of education and this in time gave rise to a second, or later phase, 
of the enterprise.69 Even the founding fathers of the movement (like R.S. Peters) 
McLaughlin reports, came to recognise the ‘limitations’ of the earlier period and to 
draw attention to its ‘shortcomings’, such as, for example, ‘the failure of much analysis 
to attend to the social and historical background’ and to be explicit about ‘the view of 
human nature which analysis presupposes’.70
McLaughlin carefully outlines the key features and enhanced nature of the ‘later phase’ 
of the analytical approach to the philosophy of education, seeking to show that, while 
‘retaining a commitment to a broadly analytic approach’, APE in its later phase is 
characterized by ‘a broadening of approaches, concerns and sensitivities’, and ‘a 
movement towards the more normative and practical concerns of applied philosophy’.71 
The particular elements that McLaughlin chooses to identify as part of this development 
include a willingness ‘to move beyond second-order clarificatory concerns’ and to 
‘develop substantive arguments in favour of particular positions’; a willingness ‘to 
engage with directly practical matters’; a concern with ‘thicker and more substantive 
concepts’ such as those relating to well-being and virtue; a ‘concern to articulate the 
nature of the person, of human flourishing, and of the place of reason in human life’; 
and a greater ‘attention to the cultural and political frameworks within which concepts 
and practices are located’.72
Amenability of APE to Catholic Educational Practice
McLaughlin makes clear the respects in which the later phase of the analytical tradition 
is ‘more amenable’ to application to educational concerns than its earlier counter-part. 
He notes especially how it ‘frees the philosopher to make a less technical and a more 
flexible’, as well as a ‘more substantive and tangibly constructive’, contribution to 
educational debate and practice.73 This is a matter of crucial importance in 
philosophizing about education in the Catholic tradition. This tradition, despite the 
disinclination of the analytic tradition generally to understand philosophy as offering 
any grand scale narrative of any kind, would appear to be obliged to, as D.E. Cooper
69 “Philosophy and Educational Policy”, p. 24.
70 Ibid., p. 24.
71 Ibid., p. 24.
72 Ibid., p. 24.
73 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
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puts it, give an account of the nature of reality, and of the place of human beings within 
it, as they seek meaning and fulfilment in life, and of the implications in this of how 
people should comport themselves in the world and towards one another.74 McLaughlin 
emphasises that the analytical approach is in fact concerned with educational questions 
which have 4a clear philosophical dimension or resonance’, questions, of course, that 
‘may not be wholly or exclusively philosophical’ but do, however, have ‘clear
75philosophical dimensions and implications’.
In his own case, McLaughlin regularly analysed deep and extensive questions of great 
complexity, of both theoretical and practical concern, such as, for example, the kind of 
schools a liberal democratic society should favour, and whether this might include 
schools that based their educative influence on the religious faith of the family. While 
established, classical philosophers may well have a contribution to make to ‘an 
illumination of these dimensions and implications’, the analytical approach to 
philosophy of education, McLaughlin explains, tends to seek this illumination from ‘a 
prior direct consideration of the questions themselves’ before resorting to the 
knowledge and wisdom of the tradition.76
McLaughlin is keen to rebut the charge that philosophers of education in the analytic 
tradition are ‘interested only in language’. He stresses that what is at stake in reality is 
‘our understandings, beliefs and values’ and the clear ‘significance they have for human 
life generally’.77 McLaughlin never subscribed to the view that analytical philosophy of 
education works towards some kind of ‘neutrality’ understood in this sense, where 
personal beliefs and values are expected to be left out of consideration by the 
philosopher. McLaughlin is quick to meet the criticism sometimes levelled at APE to 
the effect that the ‘directly educational questions’ selected for study by this approach
78are ‘likely to be unduly low-level or practical in nature’.
McLaughlin most likely would have agreed with Paddy Walsh that the ultimate purpose 
of linguistic analysis is ‘to discover embedded patterns in our thought and enquiry
74 D. E. Cooper, W orld Philosophies: An H istorical Introduction , Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003a,
p. 2.
“Diversity, Identity and Education”, p. 124.
76 Ibid., p. 124.
77 Ibid., p. 125.
78 Ibid., p. 124.
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regarding matters like education’.79 The analytic tradition does not attempt to ‘reduce 
philosophy of education to smaller questions’, McLaughlin affirms, holding that this 
impression arises from a failure to appreciate that what is at issue is ‘a question of an 
appropriate starting point’.80 A starting-point, however, is by definition a place from 
which one leaves and both the ultimate destination and the means of getting there have 
also to be considered.
McLaughlin would also, no doubt, have been aware of the accusation that analytical 
philosophy made claims upon ‘exclusivity’, noting with David Carr, ‘something of an 
educational philosophical tendency of late’, to associate traditional analytical
Q l
epistemology with ‘outright suppression of alternative voices’. Carr disputes the 
justice of this particular accusation, as McLaughlin almost certainly would also, but 
both might agree that in another sense, at least in its early days, ‘analytical philosophy 
has been methodologically exclusive of, if not exactly hostile to other traditions of 
philosophy’.82 While convinced that analytical philosophy should not be lightly 
dismissed, and provided its goals and strategies are clearly understood, McLaughlin 
would probably have had little trouble in laying aside any suspicion of exclusivity, and 
admitting that different strategies of analysis from that which he himself practised are 
available and can, with different emphasis and sense of priority, be legitimately 
employed in the study of education.
The Tasks of APE and their Relevance for Catholic Philosophy of Education
McLaughlin’s final description of analytical philosophy of education, which is 
substantially the same as the earlier accounts given above, helpfully selects for our 
attention ‘four inter-related and over-lapping tasks’ to which the discipline commits 
itself.83 These tasks offer a convenient framework for the use of analytical philosophy in 
the field of Catholic philosophy of education. They are first listed here with brief 
comment, and are then illustrated in relation to aspects of McLaughlin’s work 
considered to be important for the re-articulation of Catholic philosophy of education. It 
will become apparent that the conduct or deployment of these tasks after the manner
79 Paddy Walsh, Education and Meaning: Philosophy in P ractice , London: Cassell, 1993, p. 11.
80 David Carr, “Contribution to Symposium on Philosophy o f  Education”, D iversity, Identity and  
Education, pp. 181-190. ler.letras.up.pt/uploads/ficheiros/6201.
81 Ibid., p. 183.
82 Ibid., p. 183.
83 T. H. McLaughlin, “Education, Philosophy and the Comparative Perspective”, Liberalism, Education  
and Schooling, pp. 37-38.
envisaged by McLaughlin can supply a much-needed analytical dimension to Catholic 
educational thinking.
Firstly, then, philosophy of education in the analytic tradition, according to 
McLaughlin, typically engages in ‘analysing an educationally significant term or
84concept, showing its multiple uses and meanings, for the purpose of clarification’. 
Clarity of meaning, he admits, may not be a sufficient virtue in educational discourse, 
but it is a necessary one. McLaughlin emphasizes that analysis is not to be seen as 
merely the ‘uncovering of an essential or correct meaning’ of a term or concept in some 
‘putatively value-free way’.85 Furthermore, it is the ‘connective nature’ of this kind of 
analysis, which involves an investigation of how any one concept is often associated 
with a web of other concepts to which it is logically related, that is of first importance 
here.86 Terms and concepts in Catholic education apt for clarification in this way 
abound in the CCE literature and include the notions o f ‘integral formation’, ‘holistic 
influence’, ‘synthesis of faith and culture’, ‘permeation of Gospel values’, ‘distinctive 
ethos’, ‘educative community’, to select but a few of the more dominant terms of that 
discourse.
Secondly, analytical philosophy of education, McLaughlin explains, deploys the clarity 
achieved in this first phase of its activity to ‘critically evaluate’ educationally significant 
terms or concepts, so as to ‘identify hidden assumptions, internal contradictions or 
ambiguities in the usage of the terms’, and to ‘disclose potential or actual partisan or 
controversial effects’ which a term may have acquired in professional and/or popular 
discourse.87 McLaughlin emphasizes that the notion o f ‘critical evaluation’ here 
indicates that the analytical philosopher is interested not only in clarity but also in 
‘justification’. It is not enough to clarify the meaning of an educational term or concept; 
there still remains the task of showing how this term or concept has educational 
significance, the relevance and value of which can be assessed on the basis of rational 
argument. The Catholic philosopher of education committed to an analytic perspective 
must be able, for instance, to explain the reasons why the Catholic school, or Catholic 
education, claims to be ‘distinctive’ and to justify this claim in reasoned discussion, say, 
in regard to the aims of Catholic education.
84 Ibid, p. 37.
85 Ib id , p. 37.
86 Ib id , p. 37.
87 Ib id , p. 37.
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Thirdly, McLaughlin sees this philosophical, critical evaluation, not simply, or at all, as 
an academic exercise, but as ‘a true analytic evaluation’ of education, or educationally 
significant practices, policies, aims, purposes, functions, theories, doctrines, and 
‘visions’.88 Such philosophical reflection in education is notoriously broad in range and 
depth and will ideally be conducted in a close relationship with other disciplines of 
enquiry and be open to the experience and insights of those engaged in the practice of 
education. According to McLaughlin, much educational thinking, policy and practice is 
not only ‘apt for philosophical attention’ in the sense just outlined above but actually
OQ
‘requires it’.
Fourthly, analytical philosophy of education develops ‘positive arguments and 
proposals’ concerning the matters in regard to which it seeks clarification and 
justification, including the philosophical articulation and justification of fundamental 
educational aims, values and processes.90 McLaughlin maintains that it is here that the 
move away from a preoccupation with ‘second-order’ concerns to more substantive 
issues in recent times can be most clearly seen.91 It might also be noted that this 
emphasis on ‘positive arguments and proposals’ as an outcome of analysis is intended to 
counter the criticism sometimes raised in relation to APE, namely, that its effects are 
overly destructive and forestall progress in the development of argument and the 
implementation of practice.
In summary, then, McLaughlin believes that the analytical tradition in philosophy of 
education is ‘unified not by shared doctrines’ but by a ‘range of characteristic methods’, 
or rather by a ‘common methodology’, the salient features of which can be identified 
and which have already been outlined above. Whilst philosophy needs to ‘adopt a 
properly modest approach to the contribution it can make’ to educational practice, he 
tells us, educational policy makers must acknowledge the extent to which the content of 
their work, and the context in which it is undertaken, is ‘saturated with assumptions, 
concepts, beliefs, values and commitments’ which, if not of themselves of a
92philosophical kind, are ‘apt for philosophical attention’.
88 “Education, Philosophy and the Comparative Perspective”, p. 38.
89 Ibid., p. 39.
90 Ibid., p. 38.
91 Ibid., p. 38.
92 Ibid., p. 37.
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Although McLaughlin’s use of an analytical approach in the study of selected aspects of 
Catholic education and schooling needs to be examined in much greater detail, it is 
possible to indicate here in summary form how an analytical perspective such as his 
might provide a much-needed extra dimension to the re-articulation of Catholic 
philosophy of education. Before concluding this section, therefore, I want to identify 
very briefly how and where I think McLaughlin’s critical analysis might be pertinent for 
the clarification and justification of educationally significant terms and concepts in the 
context of a re-articulation of Catholic philosophy of education.
Apart from the potential value of his analytical methodology in general as outlined 
above, McLaughlin has in the course of his work on Catholic education and schooling 
identified the ‘need for the distinctiveness of Catholic education to be clarified’, since 
without such clarity Catholic education will ‘lack direction and focus’.93 McLaughlin 
argues that a ‘shared clarity of educational vision’ in Catholic schools is ‘particularly 
needed’ and that such clarity should be ‘a central element in the complex exercise of 
judgment and discernment’ which must underpin their educational mission in the 
contemporary world, and not simply a matter of educational effectiveness.94 Of prime 
importance in this context is how McLaughlin understands the ‘sort of clarity’ needed to 
treat the theme of the ‘distinctiveness of the Catholic school’, and the distinctive nature 
of Catholic education that underpins it.95 He has been at pains to analyse the notion of 
‘distinctiveness’, to scrutinise the validity of the claims made for and on behalf of 
Catholic schools, and to specify the kind of clarity and justification required.
Negatively, McLaughlin contends that ‘imprecise and platitudinous rhetoric’, which 
offers educators a kind of ‘spurious clarity’, often in the form of ‘slogans’ mined in a 
totally ‘eclectic way’ from educational documents of the Church, and amounting to no 
more than ‘edu-babble’, is ‘no substitute for sustained thought’.96 Positively, what is 
required for the analysis of matters relating to the distinctiveness of Catholic education 
is ‘sustained attention to questions of the meaning and justification of central concepts 
and claims’, together with ‘an attempt to delineate an overall substantial framework of
93 “The Distinctiveness o f  Catholic Education”, pp. 136-154 (137).
94 Ibid., p. 137.
95 Ibid., p. 138.
96 Ibid., p. 138.
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Catholic educational thought’.97 In effect what is necessary, and what a sympathetic 
analysis might contribute to, is no less than ‘a distinctively Catholic systematic account 
of the nature and role of education’, which would logically lead to a ‘Catholic
QO
philosophy of education’.
McLaughlin stresses something that is central to the analytic tradition, that is, ‘an 
exploration of the conceptual schemes embedded in our everyday language’ by means 
of ‘a form of analysis which is connective’, in the sense that ‘it examines the 
philosophically interesting connections and relationships between concepts’.99 
McLaughlin understands very clearly the importance of this ‘connectivity’ between 
concepts in the study of Catholic education, as well also as the embedded-ness of 
Catholic educational concepts in the wider belief, tradition and practice of the Church. 
Two features of the analysis McLaughlin offers are this focus on the interrelatedness of 
concepts and terms in Catholic philosophy of education, and the attention to be given to 
the imperative of interpreting Catholic educational principles in appropriate context so 
that assumptions do not remain hidden and possible ambiguity may be prevented.
McLaughlin selects three specific features that emerge as distinctive for Catholic 
education from a survey of recent and official Church documents on education and the 
Catholic school and subjects them to a characteristically rigorous analysis. These 
features he lists as: Catholic education’s ‘embodiment of a view about the meaning of 
human persons and of human life,’ its ‘aspiration to holistic influence,’ and a 
commitment to ‘religious and moral formation’.100 McLaughlin indicates that a Catholic 
philosophical perspective on education should be expected to offer a coherent 
understanding of these three elements; it must be capable of explaining the significance 
of each and appreciating their mutual interrelationship, and it is imperative that it be 
able to justify their inclusion in its educational programme.101
There are several other related features in the educational corpus of the CCE, in addition 
to the three McLaughlin has mentioned here, that should similarly seek to satisfy the 
same demand for clarification, coherence and justification. An assessment of whether 
the CCE discourse as a whole possesses the necessary philosophical foundations for this
97 Ibid., p. 139.
98 Ibid., p. 139.
99 “Diversity, Identity and Education”, p. 125.
100 D istinctiveness o f  Catholic Education”, pp. 139-145.
101 Ibid., pp. 148-151.
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goal to be achieved must be deferred until an analysis of the principal constituent 
elements of that discourse is undertaken in chapter five below.
The task of articulating a Catholic perspective on education has a number of 
complexities and difficulties inherent in it that arise directly out of the context of its 
origins and nature, McLaughlin believes.102 Central features relating to the Catholic 
tradition of faith and life which are of ‘particular educational significance’ are critically 
important.103 These include Catholicism’s ‘emphasis upon sustained critical reason’, its 
influence by, and attempts to ‘respond to modernity’, the role which conscience plays 
within the tradition, and contemporary struggles to extend the ‘notion of a Catholic 
identity’ to include groups, practices and beliefs previously seen as marginalised’.104 
McLaughlin correctly observes that while a distinctive Catholic perspective on 
education ‘cannot be read directly and straightforwardly off from the central features of 
the Catholic tradition of faith and life,’ nevertheless, neither can Catholic education be 
properly understood in the abstract, ‘independent of its actualisation in a particular 
societal context’.105
McLaughlin more than once acknowledges that the ‘relatively undeveloped state’ of a 
contemporary ‘systematic Catholic philosophy of education’ is one factor which 
‘inhibits the fuller articulation’ of the characteristic elements that might be considered to 
comprise its perspective on education.106 His own sterling attempts to bring an 
analytical philosophical perspective to bear upon an assessment of the distinctiveness 
and aims of Catholic education should be judged to make good some of this deficit. In 
the following section it is hoped to indicate how McLaughlin’s ‘phronetic disposition’, 
as exhibited in what he terms ‘pedagogic phronesis\ has the potential to provide a 
further resource in developing a coherent contemporary Catholic philosophy of 
education that might be an important resource for the illumination not only of Catholic 
education, but of education as such.
102 Terence H. McLaughlin, “A Catholic Perspective on Education”, Journal o f  Education and Christian  
B e lie f  V ol. 6, N o. 2, 2002, pp. 121 -134.
103 Ibid, p. 127.
104 “A Catholic Perspective on Education”, p. 128.
105 Ibid, p. 128.
l06“The Distinctiveness o f  Catholic Education”, p. 139.
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II
It is necessary at this point to reflect on the regular and heart-felt invitations and pleas, 
recommendations and even injunctions, that McLaughlin makes to his audiences and 
readers, to embrace a ‘phronetic disposition5, and become engaged in insightful 
reflection, in respect of important educational issues, problems and dilemmas, for the 
resolution of which there does not appear to be available ready to hand scientific or 
technical knowledge. Certainly, it is a feature of much educational practice that was of 
interest to McLaughlin where, as Joseph Dunne notes, we are presented with ‘a 
problematic situation5, to which there is ‘no discrete problem with clear-cut criteria for 
its solution5, but rather ‘a difficulty or predicament5 that calls for discernment and 
judgment.107 Faced with such problematic situations, described by Dunne as ‘points of 
intersection for several lines of consideration and priority5, where attempts to unravel 
any one of the strands in the tightly interwoven and complex web, may only introduce 
greater tangles in the others, McLaughlin, the dedicated analyst, might have been 
expected to deliberate most carefully, before arriving at a decision that has to be made, 
in a given set of circumstances.108 This is the familiar context in which McLaughlin 
invited educators and others to embrace the Aristotelian virtue of phronesis and, more 
specifically, to become engaged in an exercise of ‘pedagogic phronesis\
The characteristic approach to educational thinking and philosophy that can be 
considered to arise from the practice of the virtue of phronesis, which generates 
‘phronetic insight5, discernment, and discrimination, and is conducive to wise and 
balanced judgment, decision-making and action in educational situations, may be 
conveniently designated as a ‘phronetic paradigm5. It is imperative that some of the key 
or distinguishing features of McLaughlin's ‘phronetic paradigm5 be examined if one 
would do justice to his contribution to Catholic philosophy of education. McLaughlin 
was obviously familiar with the renewed interest in Aristotle's conception of ‘practical 
wisdom5, or ‘practical rationality,5 that came to be seriously entertained in philosophy
107 Joseph Dunne, “An Intricate Fabric: Understanding the rationality o f  practice”, in P edagogy , Culture 
and Society, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2005, pp. 367-389 (381-382).
108 Ibid., p. 381.
T.H. McLaughlin’s ‘Phronetic Paradigm’ and Catholic Philosophy of
Education
171
of education in the decades following the 1980s.109 Indeed, both in respect of its origins, 
and attempts at its definition for our times, he would have been acutely aware also of 
contemporary attempts to recover various features of the notion of phronesis that 
appeared to hold out promise for the renewal of philosophy of education. More than 
this, McLaughlin seems to have cultivated a deep appreciation for Aristotelian 
phronesis, as he understood it, and to have set a high store upon ‘pedagogic phronesis’ 
as a way of philosophizing in the most complex situations of education and schooling, 
and about the most intricate and delicate of educational issues.
To arrive at some understanding of what the notion, phronesis, entailed for McLaughlin, 
an attempt is made in this section, firstly, to identify the key elements of the Aristotelian 
notion that he succeeded in appropriating and putting to use in the most creative of ways 
in his ‘phronetic paradigm’, or ‘phronetic approach’, to philosophy of education and, 
secondly, to examine briefly some of the many situations and contexts in which he had 
recourse to the paradigm, usually by way of what he referred to as ‘pedagogic 
phronesis\
Although he nowhere uses the term, it seems to have been McLaughlin’s declared 
intention throughout his focus on educational praxis to establish, or construct, a 
‘paradigm of phronetic thinking, or judgment’, the deployment of which he considered 
an essential feature of the philosophy and practice of education. It is as well, therefore, 
to begin with a brief discussion of what the term ‘phronetic paradigm’ might have 
connoted for McLaughlin.
McLaughlin’s ‘Phronetic Paradigm’
One should perhaps make clear first of all, the sense in which ‘paradigm’ is being used 
in reference to the ‘phronetic paradigm’ or framework for the study of challenging 
issues in educational praxis that I attribute to McLaughlin. As it is ordinarily 
understood, the term ‘paradigm’ is a typical example, pattern, or model of reality that 
involves a shared set of assumptions relating to how we perceive the world. A paradigm 
is a set of ideas, a philosophical or theoretical framework or model of how we 
understand society or nature works. It is a theory or group of ideas about how, in 
consequence, something should be done, made, or thought about. A paradigm is a
109 See, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, London: Sheed & Ward, 1979; Richard J. Bernstein, 
B eyon d O bjectivism  and Relativism , Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvannia Press, 1983.
framework of concepts, results, and procedures within which work in a given field 
continues to be done until such time as the whole framework is questioned and the 
phenomenon o f ‘paradigm shift5 occurs.110
Although the term ‘paradigm5 is possibly over-used, it is useful for my purposes in the 
present context. In attributing to McLaughlin a ‘phronetic paradigm5 for educational 
praxis, characterised by a distinctive ‘phronetic disposition5, the intention is to 
emphasise the ‘constellation of beliefs, values, and techniques5 that he has recovered 
from the Aristotelian ethical tradition and which is constitutive of his deliberative 
approach.111 Use of the term ‘paradigm5 is designed also to focus on the ‘concrete 
puzzl e-solution5 approach that he uses so creatively in the absence of ‘explicit rules5, or 
a body of scientific and/or technical knowledge, to bring resolution to the inevitable 
dilemmas of educational practice. In general, use of the term ‘phronetic paradigm5 
draws attention to the priority to be attached to the particular, to definite situations 
where practical decision making is called for, rather than to the production or creation 
of supposed, universally valid, generalised knowledge.
McLaughlin and Aristotle’s 0pôvtjaiç, phronësis
McLaughlin’s model for the study of educational dilemmas and predicaments suggests a 
characteristic Aristotelian inspiration, and indeed bears all the hallmarks of Aristotelian 
phronësis. A proper appreciation of McLaughlin’s ‘phronetic paradigm5 demands a 
degree of familiarity with the Aristotelian notion oîphronësis. Aristotle describes 
phronësis in the Nicomachean Ethics as ‘a true state, reasoned and capable of action 
with regard to things that are good or bad for man5.112 Alternatively, phronësis is, ‘a 
true and reasoned state or capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad 
for man5.113 A third and more recent translator renders this passage as, ‘a state grasping 
the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about things that are good or bad for a
110 See, Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1970. For the ‘multiple definitions o f  paradigm’ offered by Kuhn, see Margaret Masterman, “The Nature 
o f  Paradigm”, pp. 59-90. In: Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism  and the G rowth o f  
K now ledge , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
111 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions, p. 175.
112 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J.A.K. Thomson, London: Penguin Books, 1953, NE  VI, 5,
1140b5. This translation is the one primarily used in this section, though reference may be made to other 
versions.
113 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1984,
1140b5.
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human being’.114 These descriptions are basic and sparse and various attempts have 
been made to pin-point the meaning of the multi-faceted term.phronesis. Different 
translations have offered the following potted meanings of the term, among others: 
‘practical reasoning’, ‘practical wisdom’, moral discernment’, ‘moral insight’, and 
‘prudence’.
Each of these renditions points to different and important facets of the term phronesis. 
Jana Noel notes a degree of confusion in the translations and commentaries on 
Aristotle’s notion of phronesis, and uncertainty as to whether it should be regarded 
primarily as a form or knowledge, a form of reasoning or understanding, a form of 
disposition, or a personal quality.115 The focus varies, from attention to ‘rationality’, to 
the nature of ‘perception and insight’, and, indeed, to the ‘moral and ethical character’ 
of the person who possesses phronesis, that is, the phronimos. Whatever the concept 
offered in translation, it follows that a different set of assumptions, both contextual and 
ethical, will be implied and from these assumptions different approaches to the 
application of phronesis in educational practice will arise.116
Despite the lack of clarity and consistency in the translation of phronesis, several 
scholars, including McLaughlin, have seen some promise in the notion, as an 
interpretive key, and as a useful concept, to undergird practical judgment in educational 
practice and planning. Different conceptions of phronesis, as noted, give rise to 
different approaches to the deployment of the notion in the study of education and 
schooling. McLaughlin’s praxis approach is recognisably ‘phronetic’ in several 
respects. His interests match the classic subject matter of phronesis: he reflects on 
‘variable’ matters (‘what may be done in different ways or not done at all’, NE VI,
1140a24-bl2), matters that cannot be encapsulated in universal rules or procedures; his 
knowledge in each particular circumstance cannot be equated with or reduced to 
knowledge that is merely general or technical; and his purpose is directly related to 
values pertinent to the good that is the well-being of the community.
Bent Flyvbjerg has pointed out that, whereas episteme (scientific knowledge) is to be 
found in the contemporary vocabulary o f ‘epistemology’ and ‘epistemic’, and techne
114 Aristotle, TheNicom achean Ethics, trans. T. Irwin, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999, 1140b5.
115 Jana N oel, “On the Varieties o f  Phronesis”, Educational Philosophy and Theory, V ol. 31, N o. 3,
1999, pp. 273-289 (273). See also, Carrie Birmingham, “Phronesis: A M odel for Pedagogical R eflection”, 
Journal o f  Teacher Education , Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 313-324.
116 “On the Varieties o f  Phronesis”, p. 273.
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(craft or art related knowledge) in ‘technology5 and ‘technical5, there is no modem word 
that similarly incorporates the Aristotelian intellectual virtue of phronesis (practical 
wisdom).117 This is regarded by some as ‘indicative of the degree to which scientific 
and instrumental rationality dominate modem thinking and language5.118 For lack of 
such a satisfactory modem word, Flyvbjerg has suggested that the term ‘phronetic5 
might be used to denote an activity that emphasizes phronesis.U9 Episteme focuses on 
theoretical knowledge and techne denotes technical know-how, but ‘phronesis5, 
emphasizing practical knowledge and ethical value in action, is the intellectual activity 
that is fundamental to and crucially important for ‘praxis5.
McLaughlin's ‘phronetic disposition5 clearly arises out of an acute awareness that 
‘scientific knowledge5 {episteme) alone and / or ‘technical knowledge5 {techne) alone 
are either non-existent in many concrete situations, or are insufficiently sensitive to the 
issues involved in specific cases. For McLaughlin as for Aristotle, phronesis and techne 
are distinct categories, and although both involve skill and judgment, one type of 
intellectual virtue cannot be reduced to the other. Phronesis is not just a higher form of 
‘technical rationality5 and is not primarily concerned with producing anything.
Phronesis is primarily about value judgment in specific contexts. Similarly, phronesis 
cannot be conflated with episteme, or the commitment to create a systematic corpus of 
generalised knowledge. The aim or goal of theory or ‘theoretical science5 is simply the 
knowledge to be gained. In the context of education, as in many other contexts, where 
phronesis is the more appropriate kind of knowing, the end is not knowledge per se, but 
what we can do with it, that is, pursue the knowledge for the sake of action (‘praxis5).
Flyvbjerg maintains that insofar as phronesis operates via a practical rationality based 
on judgment and experience, it can become scientific in an epistemic sense only through 
the development of a theory of judgment and experience.120 A ‘phronetic5- based 
approach to ‘praxis5 arises out of the lived experience of developing, from the available 
resources of the individual and his/her community, a practical wisdom to address 
specific situations and does not have as its aim a search for universal rules, or an all- 
encompassing doctrine, or some meta-theory, to handle the issues. W. Bowman argues
117 Bent Flyvbjerg, “Phronetic Planning Research:Theoretical and Methodical R eflections”, Planning  
Theory and P ractice , Vol. 5, No. 3, Sept., 2004, pp. 283-306 (285).
118 Ibid., pp.285-286:
119 Ibid., p. 285.
120 Ibid., p. 288.
175
that ‘praxis’ is rightly understood as ‘practical human engagement embedded within a 
tradition of communally shared understandings and values’, and as ‘a mode of action 
through which participants constitute themselves both as a community and as individual 
members of that community’.121 Phronesis, as the ethical discernment by which agents 
gauge what course of action is right, is the form of knowledge that is fundamental to, 
and most appropriate for praxis, where the particular and the situationally dependent are 
emphasized over the universal and over rules, and the concrete and the practical are 
emphasized over the theoretical.122
It is not Aristotle’s position, nor was McLaughlin much interested in developing ‘grand 
theory’ in education, neither one of his own making, nor of any inherited from his 
tradition and culture. Daniel T. Devereux notes that Aristotle’s concept o f ‘practical 
wisdom’ regards ‘action’ as both the goal and subject matter o f phronesis', and since 
action is concerned with particulars, phronesis must be primarily about particulars 
rather than universals.123 McLaughlin’s employment of a phronetic paradigm always 
relates to the particularity of situations. Phronesis is of capital importance for those who 
take inspiration from Aristotle’s vision because it is the intellectual virtue that regulates 
the ethical employment of both episteme and techne in all our undertakings. This is a 
point of view McLaughlin seems to have fully shared and importantly, by way o f his 
phronetic disposition and paradigm, put to good use in the ethical checks and balances 
he was diligent in observing in all his educational deliberation.
McLaughlin’s ‘phronetic paradigm’ might best be seen as, not a replacement for, but as 
complementing, a number of alternative paradigms. The ‘interpretative paradigm’, 
which focuses on describing how things come to be, and how actors interpret the world, 
is one such paradigm that is perhaps most widespread in the humanities and social 
sciences today and bears certain resemblances to the phronetic approach. A second is 
the ‘positivist paradigm’, with its focus on episteme, or the formulation of scientific 
knowledge. The phronetic paradigm, which I seek to link closely to McLaughlin’s 
work, in order to emphasize his reflective thinking and practical wisdom, could provide 
an alternative model of engaging critically with the praxis of teaching and learning.
121 W. Bowman, “Discernment, respons/ability, and the goods o f  philosophical practice”, A ction , 
Criticism, and Theory fo r  Music Education , Vol. 1, No. 1, April 2002, pp. 1-36 (7).
122 Bent Flyvbjerg, “Phronetic Planning Research”, p. 289.
123 Daniel T. Devereux, “Particular and Universal in Aristotle’s Conception o f  Practical K now ledge”, The 
Review  o f  M etaphysics, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Mar., 1986), pp. 483-504 (483).
McLaughlin’s Conception of ‘Pedagogic Phronesis': The Significance of 
Pedagogical Judgment.
McLaughlin’s deployment o f ‘pedagogicphronesis', in several different situations and 
contexts, is described in the posthumous collection of essays referred to above, 
Liberalism, Education and Schooling, ranging over the years 1992-2005.124 In this 
collection alone, McLaughlin has employed the concept of ‘pedagogic phronesis5 on 
more than twenty occasions125. There would be little to be gained, I think, by 
undertaking an exegesis of each and every one of these texts. It is likely to be more 
beneficial to focus on a smaller number of texts, both for their particular relevance, and 
because clustered together they illustrate substantially the same or related meanings of 
pedagogic phronesis. What I want principally to illustrate is how, over a range of 
distinctive educational issues, each characterised by its own ‘burdens and dilemmas’, to 
use another favourite phrase of his, McLaughlin, always conscious of the need for 
‘balanced judgment’ in often contested or controversial matters and contexts, 
exemplifies a characteristic and distinctive ‘phronetic approach, or paradigm’, which 
illustrates ‘phronetic’ thinking at the heart of educational discourse and practice.
Although it is by no means exhaustive, the background to McLaughlin’s ‘phronetic 
paradigm’ outlined above, out of which is bom his ‘pedagogic phronesis', must suffice 
as a framework for a study of a few samples of his work. It is hoped that a deeper 
appreciation of this centrally important McLaughlin commitment to ‘practical wisdom 
or judgment’ will arise out of a consideration of some of the essays in which he 
employs the notion and which serve to delineate something of the nature and scope of 
‘pedagogic phronesis’. Two essays in the collection, Liberalism, Education and 
Schooling, which represent the bulk of the references there to ‘pedagogic phronesis', 
may be briefly considered.
(1) “Beyond the Reflective Teacher”.126
In this essay, dating from 1999, McLaughlin, in the context of a critical analysis of the 
nature of the activity of ‘reflection’, draws attention to the requirement for the teacher to 
be able to ‘make rational practical judgments about what to do in particular
124 David Carr, Mark Halstead, & Richard Pring (eds.), Liberalism, Education and Schooling , E ssays by  
T.H. M cLaughlin , 2008
125 See Liberalism, Education and Schooling, pp. 34, 43, 76-77, 100, 109-119, 207-209, 223, 252.
126 “Beyond the Reflective Teacher”, Liberalism, Education and Schooling, pp. 60-78.
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circumstances’, to have the skills to ‘carry out what is decided’, and the ‘dispositions to 
actually do what is judged appropriate’.127 He points out that practical judgments 
requiring reflection, ‘in some sense, and to some extent’, are inescapable in teaching. In 
order to appreciate the sense in which ‘reflection’ is correctly understood in the 
complex activity of teaching, McLaughlin suggests it might be useful ‘to distinguish 
two continua along which conceptions of reflection are located’.128 McLaughlin’s first 
continuum refers to the nature of reflection; the second continuum, dealing with various 
matters on which teachers are invited to, or expected to, reflect on, refers to the scope 
and objects of reflection. For present purposes, it is McLaughlin’s first continuum that 
is most immediately relevant.
At one end of the continuum representing the nature of reflection, McLaughlin places 
‘views o f reflection which stress the explicit and the systematic’ and, at the other end, 
‘views which lay emphasis upon the implicit and the intuitive’.129 The ‘explicit / 
systematic’ and the ‘implicit/intuitive’ distinctions are taken to refer to the nature of the 
reasoning involved in each case and the degree of reason’s closeness to, or distance 
from, the action envisaged or undertaken. McLaughlin argues that at the ‘explicit and 
systematic end’ of this particular continuum there is a view of reflection which involves 
‘technical reason’.130 Here, ‘technical reason’ refers directly to Aristotle’s notion of 
xexvfi, techne, an activity o f ‘making’ or ‘production’ (7roiijcn(;, poiesis), ‘aimed at a pre- 
specifiable and durable outcome’, that is, at a product, or state of affairs, which 
constitutes the purpose or ‘telos’ of the activity.131
‘Technical rationality’, with its clear understanding of the ‘why, how, and with what’, 
something is to be made, or produced, or brought about, although it may be able to 
provide a rational account of a process, and give one complete mastery over an activity, 
as a form of reflection to govern the practice o f teaching, it has, in McLaughlin’s 
opinion, severe limitations.132 McLaughlin cites Dunne to the effect that the application 
of scientific theory and technique in an instrumental way to solve the problems of
Ibid., p. 63.
128 Ibid., p. 64.
129 ibid., p. 64.
130 Ibid., p. 64.
131 Ibid., pp. 64-65.
132 Ibid., p. 65.
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practice is ‘widely acknowledged to have its deficiencies’. 133 At the heart of the 
problem, as McLaughlin and Dunne see it, is ‘the inappropriateness of conceiving 
teaching as a techne \ 134 Educational ends, McLaughlin rightly notes, ‘are neither clear, 
fixed, unitary, nor evaluatively straight-forward’and are ‘not achieved primarily through 
technical means/end processes which can be mastered through scientific or technical 
knowledge and skill’.135 Even if the notion of ‘technical reason’ is not called upon 
explicitly, McLaughlin concludes that other attempts to reflect on the application of 
theory to the demands and realities of practice risk being inadequate, because they rely 
on ‘an account of reflection that arises from a faulty conceptualization of the 
relationship between rational action and theoretical knowledge’.136
At the implicit and intuitive end of the spectrum representing the nature of reflection in 
education, McLaughlin, alluding to the work of Donald Schön, identifies as the most 
appropriate form of reflection the latter’s notion of the ‘analysis of the core of artistry’ 
inherent in professional practice.137 Schön, like McLaughlin, rejects the adequacy of 
‘technical rationality’ as an account of professional knowledge, since professional 
decision making involves not merely the solving of given, and fully specified, problems,
138but often involves ‘a process of wrestling with messy, indeterminate solutions’. 
McLaughlin understands Schön’s notion of ‘analysis of the core of artistry’ as ‘an 
exercise of intelligence’, and ‘a kind of knowing’, revealed in arts such as ‘problem 
framing, implementation and improvisation’, that, along with our everyday 
‘competences of recognition, judgment and skill’, is largely ‘tacit’ in character.139 What 
is involved, McLaughlin concludes, is ‘knowledge-in-action’, knowledge ‘contained in, 
and revealed by, intelligent action itse lf.140 McLaughlin notes Schön’s distinction 
between ‘reflection-on-action’ (which is retrospective in character) and ‘reflection-in- 
action’ (where reflection can make a difference to what we are doing at this moment). 
He further notes how ‘reflection-in-action’, or ‘reflection in practice’, as Schön 
describes it in his account of professional competence, has ‘a crucial function of
133 Ibid., p. 9. McLaughlin cites Joseph Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground , Notre Dame, IND: University 
o f  Notre Dame Press, 1993, p. 9.
134 Ib id , p. 65.
135 Ib id , p. 65.
136 Ib id , p. 65.
137 “Beyond the Reflective Teacher”, p. 66. McLaughlin cites Donald Schön, Educating the Reflective 
Practitioner, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1967, p. 22.
138 Ib id , p. 66. McLaughlin cites Schön, ib id , p. 4.
139 Ibid, p. 67.
140 Ib id , p. 67.
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McLaughlin sees in Schon’s notion of ‘knowledge-in-action’ a certain similarity to 
another Aristotelian kind of knowledge, namely, ^ p a ^ ,  praxis, which is to be 
contrasted with techne. McLaughlin describes ‘praxis’ as
a form o f  knowing that involves the engagement o f  persons in activity with others, in a non­
instrumental way, and that is not intended to realise goods external to the persons involved but
142
rather excellences characteristic o f  a worth-while form o f  life.
McLaughlin uses his reading of Dunne ‘to bring into focus’ further important elements 
of our understanding of praxis that previous authors may not have commented upon to a 
sufficient degree. Thus, McLaughlin invites readers to understand praxis as (i) an 
activity that ‘both involves one with other people and is at the same time a realisation of 
one’s self; (ii) a ‘more intimate kind of engagement than poiesis that brings one’s 
emotions more into play and forms and reveals one’s character’ to a greater degree; (iii) 
an experience that ‘brings one into situations that are more heterogeneous and 
contingent than any over which we might be able to exercise unfettered control’; and, 
(iv) most importantly, praxis ‘requires a kind of knowledge that is more personal and 
experiential, more supple and less formulable’, than, for instance, the knowledge 
conferred by techne , 1 4 3  In short, McLaughlin identifies this very special kind of 
knowledge required by ‘praxis’ with Aristotle’s (ppovqcnq, phronesis, or ‘practical 
wisdom’.144
McLaughlin, while acknowledgingphronesis as playing a major ‘ordering agency’ role 
in our lives generally, sees ‘the sort of reflective thinking that is appropriate for 
teachers’ as a reality that is ‘harmonious with, and arising out of phronesis.145 In 
particular, McLaughlin is attracted to this notion because, unlike other views of 
reflection he has examined, the sort of knowledge characteristic of phronesis draws 
attention to ‘the qualities of character and personhood that arise in the Aristotelian 
perspective’.146 Furthermore, the Aristotelian phronetic account of reflection is, in 
McLaughlin’s view ‘associated with a complex and well-articulated account of the 
nature of the theory/practice relationship’ that is in many respects preferable to the
141 Ibid., p. 67.
142 Ibid., p. 67.
143 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
144 Ibid., p. 68.
145 Ibid., p. 68.
146 Ibid., p. 68.
questioning the assumptional structure of our knowing.141
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‘technical rationality’ and rationalist approaches that support rather crude accounts of 
how theory is to be translated into, or applied to practice.147
(2) “Distinctiveness of the Catholic School: Balanced Judgement and the 
Temptations of Commonality”.148
This essay, also dating from 1999, clearly has important ramifications for the task of 
giving new and systematic expression to Catholic philosophy of education and as such it 
belongs more appropriately to the following section of this chapter. It is nonetheless 
worth commenting upon here where the object is to instantiate McLaughlin’s 
deployment of ‘pedagogic phronesis ’ as a valuable methodology of reflecting and 
deliberating on issues of complexity and sensitiveness in education. The immediate 
context of this essay is the matter of the responsiveness of Catholic schools to calls that 
they be ‘open to the educational demands of a liberal democratic society’, in terms both 
of the common good in general and the needs of members of other religious faiths in 
particular, while at the same time maintaining a sense of their own ‘distinctiveness’.149
McLaughlin considers that one of the critical questions that is posed to Catholic schools 
today, and perhaps ‘the most fundamental and the most difficult’ one, concerns the 
vision o f ‘distinctiveness’ contained in the CCE discourse. Thus, CSTTM (1997), states 
that the Catholic school has ‘an ecclesial identity and role’, which is not ‘a mere 
adjunct, but is a proper and specific attribute’, a ‘distinctive characteristic which 
penetrates and informs its educational activity’, but a ‘fundamental part of its very 
identity and the focus of its mission’. 150 Me Laughlin highlights a number of 
complexities that arise out of claims by the Catholic school to a distinctive educational 
responsibility and character rooted in the very distinctiveness of Catholic education 
itself.
The ‘complexities’ arise, according to McLaughlin, in relation to two claims, namely:
(a) the claim that ‘the Catholic school exists in order to transmit the Catholic tradition of 
faith and life and to educate within it’, and (b) the claim that Catholic schools on the 
one hand and common schools on the other are, and should be, ‘based on a somewhat
147 Ibid., p. 68.
148 Terence H. McLaughlin, “Distinctiveness o f  the Catholic School: Balanced Judgement and the 
Temptations o f  Commonality”, Liberalism, Education and Schooling, pp. 199-218.
149 “Distinctiveness and the Catholic School”, pp. 199-200.
150 CSTTM (1997), N o.s  10-11.
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different conception of education and have a somewhat different educational 
responsibility and character’.151 It is in relation to the many practical questions for 
teachers and school leaders that arise out of these claims to distinctiveness that 
McLaughlin has recourse to ‘pedagogic phronesis ’ in this instance. He reminds his 
readers that every school is ‘engaged in a practical enterprise of great complexity’, 
which calls for many forms of ‘practical knowledge and understanding, judgment and 
wisdom, skill, disposition and commitment’ on the part of those who teach and those 
who lead the school.152
The ‘professional qualities and capacities’ demanded of teachers and educational 
leaders in Catholic schools, precisely because of the claims to distinctiveness, are ‘wide- 
ranging’, and include not only an understanding of issues at the level of general 
principle, but also ‘an ability to judge what is demanded in practical terms as an 
expression of the demands of distinctiveness in particular contexts’.153 Furthermore, 
there is required the ‘skill to put such judgments into practice’, the ‘disposition to be 
concerned about matters of distinctiveness and the commitment to pursue these 
matters’.154 The complexity of some of the practical judgments involved in these 
matters, McLaughlin notes, ‘scarcely requires emphasis’.155
McLaughlin concludes his argument for the need for ‘pedagogicphronesis’ by noting 
that ‘a crude application of theory to practice’ by teachers and educational leaders is not 
the answer to the difficulties encountered here. It has long been realised, he writes, that 
‘the proper role of theory in relation to educational practice sees theory as initially 
developed in practice’, as part of the ‘professional common sense’ of teachers and 
educational leaders, much of which is ‘unreflective and tacit in character’.156 
McLaughlin does not deny that there is a role for theory that ‘gradually sophisticates 
this understanding in an appropriate way’ and he regrets (as already noted) how the lack 
of an articulated contemporary Catholic philosophy of education has deprived the 
Catholic community of an important resource in this regard.157
McLaughlin considers briefly the suggestion that the concept of, and discourse centred
151 “Distinctiveness and the Catholic School1’, p. 201.
152 Ibid., p. 204.
153 Ibid., p. 205.
154 Ibid., p. 205.
155 Ibid., p. 205.
156 Ibid., p. 206.
157 Ibid., pp. 206-207.
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on ‘the reflective teacher’, might be the way to cope with the challenges involved in
158practice for those who seek to uphold the distinctiveness of the Catholic school.
Despite the insights that are embodied in the concept of ‘the reflective teacher’, 
McLaughlin feels, as already noted, that the concept ‘lacks clarity and is apt for use as a 
vague slogan’ and, without ‘sustained attention to the meaning and implications of the 
concept of reflection’, must be rejected.159 McLaughlin proposes that the professional 
qualities and capacities that are required to meet the challenge of upholding a 
distinctiveness claim for the Catholic school are ‘better conceptualised in terms of a 
form of pedagogic practical wisdom, or phronesis, in the Aristotelian sense’.160 In 
particular, he singles out the description of phronesis offered by Wilfrid Carr as a 
promising way forward.161
One might conclude this section by noting that McLaughlin judges that phronesis is ‘an 
attractive concept’, not merely with respect to a number of the difficulties that occur 
concerning the ‘nature of reflection’, but, in the form of ‘pedagogic phronesis \  it 
provides a more potent means of understanding and providing ‘balanced judgment’ in 
relation to the various implications arising out of claims to ‘distinctiveness’ on the part 
of the Catholic school.162 Although it is certain that McLaughlin saw benefits in this 
notion of phronesis and in a phronetic approach generally in a much wider context than 
just in his study of ‘reflection’, the ‘reflective teacher’, and the ‘distinctiveness of the 
Catholic school’, the scope of this dissertation does not permit a fuller investigation of 
the several other areas of educational thought and practice to which McLaughlin 
brought this novel approach.
As a brief summary of the ‘attractive’ benefits McLaughlin saw in phronesis in respect 
of these specific topics, it is worth recording the following. Firstly, with respect to the 
question of the ‘reflective teacher’, phronesis ‘offers the prospect of a unified concept 
of reflection’, with practical judgement ‘playing a role in deciding the nature and extent
158 Ibid., p. 207.
159 Ibid., p. 207.
160 Ibid., p. 207.
161 McLaughlin cites this particular description o f  phronesis , attributed to Wilfrid Carr, at two points in 
Liberalism , Education and Schooling. [Phronesis] is ‘a comprehensive moral capacity which com bines 
practical knowledge o f  the good with sound judgment about what, in a particular situation, would 
constitute an appropriate expression o fth is ’. See p. 77, and p. 207.
162 The theme is asserted in both the essays, “Beyond the Reflective Teacher”, and “Distinctiveness o f  the 
Catholic School”, respectively.
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of the forms of reflection necessary for particular purposes’163. Secondly, it offers a 
context for the resolution of the questions of the adequacy of reflective judgment. 
Practical judgment is seen at the heart of the matter, rather than the justification of 
principles of whatever kind.164 Finally, phronesis underlines a concern to embrace a 
range of wider human qualities than reflection considered equally desirable in the 
teacher.
With regard to the ‘distinctiveness of the Catholic school’, ‘pedagogic phronesis’ 
understands the need for the exercise of ‘balanced discernment and judgment’ in 
relation to issues of great complexity, as well as the need to be ‘alert to distorted 
perception and reaction’ that might arise out of an insufficiently nuanced understanding 
and appreciation of the Catholic tradition of faith and life.165 McLaughlin considers that 
several of the demands of distinctiveness seem apt for satisfaction by phronesis. These 
include the need for the exercise of ‘complex contextualised judgment’ and the demand 
for reflection on the appropriate kind and manner of influence upon their pupils of 
teachers and others in the life and work of the Catholic school.166
The complex model of judgment that McLaughlin appropriated from Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics might readily be the subject of a more comprehensive treatment 
than is possible here. What McLaughlin’s wisdom and judgment, together with his often 
innovative and percipient analysis, situated within a particular understanding and 
interpretation of Aristotelian phronesis and practical rationality, has to offer the re­
articulation of Catholic philosophy of education is investigated in the following section.
I ll
M cLaughlin’s Phronetic Paradigm and Catholic Philosophy o f Education.
McLaughlin appears to have approached the study of Catholic education, not in the 
traditional fashion of establishing a foundational stance based on metaphysical, 
epistemological and axiological principles, such as, for example, Maritain’s 
understanding of Thomism had dictated to him. Neither does his Catholic philosophy of
163 “Beyond the Reflective Teacher”, p. 77.
164 Ibid., p. 77.
165 “Distinctiveness and the Catholic School”, p. 211.
166 Ibid., p. 208.
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education begin from cognitional theory and a study of human understanding after the 
manner of Lonergan. There are indeed similarities between McLaughlin’s exposition of 
Aristotelian phronesis and aspects of Lonergan’s study of human understanding, 
perhaps especially his conception o f ‘common sense’ insight.167 McLaughlin’s 
philosophy of education develops primarily from his appropriation of the Aristotelian 
notion ofphronesis, and in conjunction with a commitment to analysis, proceeds in 
phronetic terms to subject theoretical and technical knowledge to a role of being one 
element in a ‘criticalpraxis\Xb%
One should not assume that it is McLaughlin’s commitment to analytical philosophy of 
education that disillusions or prevents him from starting from some substantial Thomist 
position. He saw Aquinas as a resource for the elaboration of a Catholic philosophy of 
education, as indeed he similarly recognised the philosophical writings of Newman, 
Maritain and Lonergan as sources that could be called upon for illumination.169 If 
McLaughlin had shared any ‘aversion’ to, or wished to ‘discount philosophy of 
education as a grand scale narrative of the nature of reality and of human beings’, a 
position he might have endorsed as an analytical philosopher, though this is not 
necessarily the case, this would surely handicap his efforts to contribute to the Catholic 
tradition of educational thought. Here, a set of foundational principles has traditionally 
been regarded as a requirement for the discipline and centrally significant for its 
articulation. In the previous chapter, we have seen how thoroughly Lonergan critiqued 
this ‘classicist’ position. Fortunately, although it is by no means to the forefront of his 
thought, McLaughlin does not appear to have found it necessary to reject outright the 
over-arching Thomist-Aristotelian philosophical foundations of Catholic education. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of his admittedly limited published comment on Catholic 
education, McLaughlin’s position vis-à-vis Thomism is at best ambiguous.
McLaughlin’s attitude to Catholic philosophy of education does not, in fact, hinge on 
his relation to Thomism, however that should be assessed. He was always fully prepared 
to participate in philosophical study of the nature and distinctiveness of the Catholic 
school and Catholic education. Indeed, he was one of a number of high-profile 
philosophers of education, who, as Catholics, saw the urgent need for the the
167 See Bernard Lonergan, Insight, pp. 173-206, 207-244. The relationship between ‘common sense 
insight’ and phronesis  is beyond the remit and scope o f  this dissertation.
168 “Beyond the Reflective Teacher”, pp 67-68.
169 “The Distinctiveness o f  Catholic Education”, p. 139.
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‘elucidation of a distinctively Catholic systematic account of the nature and role of 
education5.170 Like many of the other professional philosophers with whom he 
contributed to the promotion of a Catholic perspective on education, his point of 
departure, if not the full-blown Thomism of Maritain or even the transposed Thomism 
of Lonergan, would seem to have been a genuine sense of commitment to Catholic 
beliefs, values, and way of life, especially as interpreted in the light o f the great renewal 
movement of Vatican II. It was not, apparently, the defence of traditional foundational 
principles but the need to promote the virtue of phronesis that McLaughlin considered 
to be such a crucially important matter in the context of reflection on Catholic 
education, so much so that he accorded it a primacy and, indeed, called for serious 
consideration to be given to the formulation of a specifically ‘Catholic pedagogic 
phronesis\ 171
Here, in an endeavour to offer a fair assessment of McLaughlin's contribution to the 
elucidation of a Catholic philosophy of education, one can perhaps place to one side the 
possible difficulty just raised, namely, about the relationship of his philosophy of 
education to the substantive Catholic tradition. That the relationship is much less clear- 
cut or emphatic than that of Maritain, for example, is not per se a major problem and 
may merely indicate a difference of emphasis and focus in McLaughlin's vision of the 
renewal of Catholic philosophy of education. McLaughlin's phronetic disposition and 
espousal of a phronetic paradigm for the analysis of educational practice and policy­
making would seem, not only to prove his eligibility to comment upon Catholic 
education, but serve to single him out as an extremely important figure in the context of 
the re-articulation of Catholic philosophy of education and that for reasons of a general 
nature that are detailed below.
Extending McLaughlin’s Notion of Pedagogic Phronesis
McLaughlin sadly never had the opportunity to set out a systematic and detailed 
articulation o f ‘pedagogic phronesis\ or to characterise its various components, in a 
manner similar to what he achieved for his version of analytical philosophy of 
education. Although such an extension and elaboration of his phronetic paradigm must 
amount to a fairly major project, it is possibly acceptable to attempt at least to sketch
170 tbid., pp. 139, 151.
171 “Distinctiveness and the Catholic School”, p. 217.
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briefly what one thinks might be involved in such an undertaking, both to understand 
why McLaughlin accorded such a primacy to phronesis and to appreciate why his 
phronetic paradigm has a crucial importance for the re-articulation of Catholic 
philosophy of education.
One might begin the task of extending and articulating McLaughlin’s notion of 
‘pedagogic phronesis\ starting from an analysis of a definition of the concept and 
thence proceeding to comment upon the various elements of the definition until a more 
comprehensive picture of the reality becomes apparent. The completion of these steps, 
however, would still leave the need for the development of ‘a pattern of discourse5 that 
had phronesis as its central and characteristic feature. Such discourse would have to be 
built up from the relatively few but nevertheless highly fecund, allusions to phronesis 
and ‘pedagogic phronesis5, which occur regularly in McLaughlin’s later writings.
McLaughlin appears to have had a certain preference for Wilfrid Carr’s definition of 
phronesis, which he cites in a number of his essays.172 Carr describes phronesis as,
a comprehensive moral capacity which combines practical knowledge o f  the good with sound
judgment about what, in a particular situation, would constitute an appropriate expression o f  this
j  173 good.
McLaughlin highlights the fact that this description of phronesis makes clear how 
‘practical knowledge of the good’ is related to ‘intelligent and personally engaged 
sensitivity5 to situations, individuals and a tradition of belief and life, and that it 
achieves this by ‘making inherently supple and non-formulable practical judgments 
about what constitutes an appropriate expression of the good in a given 
circumstance’.174 McLaughlin indicates that a fuller articulation of phronesis on the 
basis of this description is in order, but I choose rather to make use of an alternative 
description of the notion (but with the same intention in mind) that I believe to be 
equally helpful in such a task.
Charles W. Allen has offered a description of phronesis, which may serve to highlight 
some of the characteristics McLaughlin ascribed to pedagogic phronesis, and might 
help to identify key moments in this uniquely powerful approach to the study of
172 See, Liberalism, Education and Schooling , pages 77 and 207.
173 Wilfrid Carr, For Education . Towards Critical Educational Inquiry, Buckingham, UK: Open 
University Press, 1995, p. 71.
174 “The Distinctiveness o f  the Catholic School”, pp. 207-208.
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education.175 McLaughlin was convinced of the need to concede a certain primacy to 
phronesis in his commentary on Catholic education and, perhaps, very much for the 
same reasons as those proposed by Allen, whose reflection was prompted by what he 
terms the ‘frustrating tendencies’ of our times regarding ‘two conceptions of 
rationality’, namely, ‘objectivism’ and ‘relativism’, that have tended to dominate 
contemporary thought.176 For Allen, phronesis is not simply ‘one legitimate way of 
making sense’ -  it is the ‘most fundamental and inclusive way’, from which ‘all other 
ways of making sense derive whatever merits they may legitimately claim’.177 This 
view of the critical importance of phronesis was also shared by McLaughlin and it was 
the reason for his seeming preference for a ‘phronetic approach’ to Catholic education.
Allen’s definition of phronesis is helpful for an understanding of the meaning of the 
term itself and useful as a basis for expanding McLaughlin’s notion of pedagogic 
phronesis. Allen describes phronesis as
the historically implicated, communally nurtured ability to make good sense o f  relatively
178
singular contexts in ways appropriate to their relative singularity.
Allen’s definition reflects closely Aristotle’s description of i^p6\r\mq, phronesis, as ‘a 
state of grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about things that are 
good or bad for a human being’, even allowing for the several different perspectives 
among scholars as to Aristotle’s precise meaning.179 Allen’s definition is rather helpful 
in seeking to respond to McLaughlin’s suggestion already mentioned, that ‘sustained 
attention’ be given to ‘the exploration of a distinctively Catholic form of pedagogic 
phronesis’.
Firstly, it will be noticed that phronesis, according to Allen’s definition, is employed in 
‘making good sense’.180 Phronesis is engaged primarily in understanding and making 
judgments. ‘Sense’ here is probably best understood in terms of both meaning and truth. 
Phronesis is certainly about making knowledge available, leading to understanding, but
175 See, Charles W. Allen, “The Primacy o f  Phronesis: A Proposal for A voiding Frustrating Tendencies in 
Our Conceptions o f  Rationality”, The Journal o f  Religion , Vol. 69 N o. 3 (Jul., 1989), pp. 359-374. 
Hereafter: “The Primacy o f  Phronesis”.
176 “The Primacy o f  Phronesis”, p. 359.
177 Ibid., p. 369.
178 Ibid., p. 363.
179 Aristotle, Nicom achean Ethics, London: Penguin Books, trans. J.A.K. Thomson, 2004 (revsd. Edn.), 
Book VI, chapter v, 1 140b20. Herefafter: NE Book VI Ch v 1140b20.
180 Ibid., pp. 363-364.
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not knowledge of some theoretically detached or value neutral kind, which is as it were,
‘parachuted’ into a situation. Allen’s ‘phronetic sense-making’ is an approach to
practical situations where we encounter meanings that are not easily understood but
require considerable effort to interpret. The process o f ‘making good sense’ is always on
the basis of ‘practical engagement’, and recognises that ‘our own participation and
— * 1 8 1value judgments play an essential role in the kind of knowledge phronesis yields’.
McLaughlin’s phronetic paradigm, in the context of Catholic education, begins from 
reflection on the very practical matter of Catholic schools, their claims to be distinctive 
and how they justify their claims to ‘distinctiveness’.182 His in-depth exploration of a 
number of authoritative statements relating to the claims to distinctiveness of the 
Catholic school is anchored in the practice of schooling as he experiences it and it is out 
of that practice that he is able to alert us to ‘complexities’ of the kind which must be
183deliberated upon before judgment is made.
McLaughlin is clearly in possession of the knowledge base (including the traditional 
Aristotelian-Thomist principles and the discourse of the CCE) upon which these claims 
to distinctiveness are made, but his characteristic approach to ‘sense-making’ begins, 
not with the invocation of a body principles and their accompanying world-view, but 
with an analysis of the ‘complexities’ of the concrete situation before him. His 
judgment about the ‘good’ is not arrived at by the importation of a body of knowledge 
extrinsic to the situation, but on the basis of the meaning and truth he divines within this 
context of the practice with which he engages.
A second element of Allen’s description of phronesis is the claim that ‘phronesis is 
communally nurtured’.184 The value judgments which are an essential feature of 
phronesis arise from particular communities and represent for these communities 
important features about their overall vision and understanding of human existence. The 
community of its origin is thus an important resource for phronetic judgment and 
provides, as well as a fount of traditional wisdom, a means of being accountable and 
exercising a role of self-criticism in relation to deliberation upon practice. Aristotle 
draws attention to the fact that our values inescapably arise from the communities that
181 Charles W. Allen, “The Primacy o f  Phronesis”, p. 363.
182 “Distinctiveness and the Catholic School”, Liberalism, Education and Schooling, pp. 199-218.
183 Ibid., p. 201.
184 Charles W. Allen, “The Primacy o f  Phronesis”, p. 364.
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M cLaughlin’s phronetic analysis o f  aspects o f  Catholic education is conducted against 
the background o f  a Catholic ‘tradition o f  thought’, understood in the sense o f  A lasdair 
M acIntyre’s notion o f  a ‘tradition o f  thought’.186 W hen M cLaughlin arrives at the 
judgm ent that Catholic education is ‘distinctive’, in virtue o f  its ‘em bodim ent o f  a 
particular view  about the meaning o f  human persons and o f  human life, its aspiration to 
engage in a certain kind o f  holistic influence, and its concern with the form ation o f  its 
students in its ow n religious and moral tradition’, it is on the basis o f  three features that 
he has found to be a consistent aspiration o f  the Catholic educational com munity and a 
constant feature in the Catholic tradition o f  thought.187 However, M cLaughlin’s concern
is not ju st to record this fact, but to assert that each o f  the elements o f  Catholic
* * * 188education w hich have been identified ‘require interpretation and judgm ent’. These
‘m atters o f  judgm ent’, he concludes, ‘require the determ ination o f  the proper balance to
189be struck betw een different emphases or aspects o f  the Catholic tradition’.
A third elem ent in A llen’s definition o f phronesis is the idea that ‘phronesis is 
historically im plicated’, by which he means, firstly, that ‘it is bounded by 
unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences’, and, secondly, that ‘it can 
be distorted by various forms o f  self-deception’.190 The exercise o f  m aking sense and 
arriving at balanced judgm ent is never accompanied by a guaranteed outcom e in the 
sense o f  being entirely free from the risk o f  error and distortion. The ethical-m oral 
character o f  the phronimos and the continuous cultivation o f  phronesis w ithin the 
com munity, are essential requirements if  the risk o f  distortion in identifying the good 
and the risk o f  self-deception in acting to secure it is to be lessened.
M cLaughlin realises that the ‘historical im plicatedness’ o f  phronesis calls for due 
attention to be given to various situations within the Catholic tradition where the 
dim ensions o f  practical wisdom and judgm ent need to be emphasized. M cLaughlin w as 
critically aware o f  how ‘ambiguities and questions’ might arise in relation to questions 
concerning the distinctiveness o f  Catholic education and the Catholic school sim ply
185 See, Aristotle, A£,I, 2; I, 4; X, 9.
186 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, Notre Dame, IND: University o f Notre Dame Press, 3rd edn., 2007, 
pp. 146, 221-223.
187 “The Distinctiveness of Catholic Education”, p. 145.
188 Ibid., p. 149.
189 Ibid., p. 149.
190 Charles W. Allen, “The Primacy of Phronesis”, pp. 364-365.
have formed us.185
because 'the Catholic tradition o f faith and life’ (a feature contributing to 
distinctiveness) might itself be susceptible to 'different interpretation’ from  one 
historical period to another.191 The beliefs that articulate Catholic education in practice, 
while necessarily displaying a continuity o f  some kind, may give rise to different 
emphases in different epochs reflecting the 'phenom enon o f  dispute and disagreem ent 
w ithin the C hurch’.192 The interpretative task which is required in relation to several 
substantive m atters o f  theory and practice in historically situated Catholic educational 
com m unities requires balanced judgm ent o f  a high order.
A  fourth elem ent o f  A llen’s description o f  phronesis em phasizes how  this specific type 
o f'sen se -m ak in g ’ is 'alw ays provoked by relatively singular contexts’.193 A llen defines 
‘singular contexts’ as contexts 'whose intelligibility depends on noting not only how 
they are to be related to other contexts but also how they are to be distinguished from 
every other context and, finally, how these two aspects are to be inter-related’.194 A llen 
believes that Aristotle has this inter-relationship in mind when he speaks o f  'universals 
and particulars’ in Nicomachean E th ics}95 'Scientific know ledge’, episteme, it will be 
recalled, is said to consist in ‘forming judgm ents about things that are universal and 
necessary, dem onstrable truths that depend on first principles’.196 One should note that 
phronesis is not concerned with ‘universals’ and 'particu lars’ as they are understood in 
formal logic, w here ‘universals’ are com pletely invariant and ‘particulars’ function only 
as instances o f  ‘universals’. 197
M cLaughlin’s analytical approach to philosophy o f  education, w ith its ‘aversion’ to the 
kind o f  philosophy that would offer an account on a grand scale o f  the nature o f  reality 
and the place o f  human beings within it, as already m entioned above, m ay have pre­
disposed him  to seeking knowledge and understanding in ‘relatively singular contexts’. 
As an analytical philosopher, his field o f  operation was pre-em inently the ‘relatively 
singular context’, where his focus dwelt on analysing significant term s and concepts 
arising in a given situation, critically evaluating educationally significant practices,
191 “Distinctiveness and the Catholic School”, p. 201.
192 Terence McLaughlin et al., The Contemporary Catholic School, p. 149.
193 “The Primacy of Phronesis”, p. 365.
194 Ibid., p. 366.
195 Aristotle, NE VI, 7, 1141bl5-16: ‘Phronesis is not concerned with universals only; it must also take 
cognizance of particulars’. See also, NE VI, 8, 11
196 Ibid., 1140b31-1141a2.
197 Charles W. Allen, “The Primacy of Phronesis”, p. 366.
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policies, aims, purposes, functions, theories, and so forth.198
M cLaughlin is, o f  course, a prime example o f  an analytical philosopher who moved 
away from a pre-occupation with ‘second order’ issues to more substantive concerns. 
Still, his analytical bent o f  mind makes him  suspicious o f unduly general statements and 
claims, and causes him to prefer working from, not general statements or theories, but 
from specific questions and problems, arising in particular situations and dem anding a 
practical response, corresponding closely with a w illingness to seek m eaning in the 
concrete particular that is bom  o f his phronetic commitment. M cLaughlin, w ith his 
sophisticated understanding o f the nature o f  the relationship between theory and 
practice, rarely if  ever resorts to, or expects the simple application o f  universal 
principles to result in ‘balanced discernm ent and judgm ent’ in any concrete situation.
‘Phronetic sense-making in relatively singular contexts’, one might say, is a hallm ark o f  
M cLaughlin’s study o f  Catholic education and schooling. Thus, for instance, he has 
chosen to write about a very specific topic, the ‘distinctiveness’ o f  the Catholic school, 
and offered an analysis o f the complexities involved in the claim to distinctiveness, as 
w ell as highlighting the underlying different conception o f education involved in this 
claim .199 M cLaughlin does not explore this question o f  distinctiveness in the kind o f 
abstract and theoretical way that would involve reference to philosophical first 
principles, as M aritain might have done. In his focus on particularity, M cLaughlin 
rem inds us that ‘a school is not a sem inary’, concerned with the explanation o f  ‘abstract 
or theoretical ideas in a detached and disinterested w ay’.200 Au contraire, a school is 
engaged in ‘a practical exercise o f great com plexity’ which calls for m any ‘forms o f
practical know ledge and understanding, for judgm ent and wisdom, skill, disposition and
201com m itm ent’ on the part o f teachers and educational leaders.
A final elem ent o f  A llen’s definition o fphronesis stresses that ‘the w ays in which 
phronesis makes sense are appropriate to its subject m atter’.202 Contextuality is as ever 
directly relevant to the interpretation we give to, or find within a given text or situation. 
Aristotle, early on in Nicomachean Ethics, states that one m ark o f  a well-educated 
person is ‘to look for precision in each class o f  things ju st so far as the nature o f  the
198 “Education, Philosophy and the Comparative Perspective”, pp. 36-37.
199 “Distinctiveness and the Catholic School”, pp. 199-217.
200 Ibid., p. 204.
201 Ibid, p. 204.
202 Ibid, p. 366.
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subject adm its’.203 The same degree of precision is not to be expected in all discussions, 
A ristotle adds. In hum an action, much difference and variety exists. In discussing topics 
and arguing from evidence, we must often be satisfied with a broad outline o f  the 
truth.204 W here practical engagement, or ‘p rax is’, is concerned, there is too much 
‘variety and fluctuation’ for it to be judged by the standards o f  precision used in 
scientific or mathematical proof. Because o f  its practical engagem ent w ith ‘relatively 
singular contexts’, phronetic thinking has to be in im portant respects ‘flexible rather 
than rigid’, A llen concludes.205
A llen’s suggestion o f  the term ‘elastic’ is a good descriptor o f  what phronetic sense- 
making is able to achieve, where in many practical situations we may have to be content 
‘to indicate the truth roughly and in outline’.206 Any sort o f ‘elastic’ sense-making 
resists attem pts to classify everything into one rigid, hierarchically ordered system. A t 
the same time, however, one has to be careful, if  one would avoid the charge o f 
‘relativism ’, to preserve some kind of continuity o f  m eaning across situations and avoid 
the creation o f  isolated, unrelated realms o f  meaning. ‘E lastic’ sense-m aking needs to be 
construed in phronetic terms, insofar as any sense-m aking involves an interplay o f
207m eanings and norms, and must be open to com m unal accountability.
M cLaughlin appreciated the need for a sense o f  discernm ent in practical situations 
where particularity seemed to be in conflict w ith the dem ands o f  universality. His 
concern is reflected in his comments about the proper relationship between ‘theory’ and 
‘practice’. This relationship rules out any kind o f  crude application o f  ‘theory’ to 
p ractice .208 M cLaughlin believes that a m ore adequate view  o f this relationship sees 
‘theory’ as initially developed in practice. M uch practice is ‘unreflective and tacit in 
character’ and m ore ‘explicit and systematic theory’ has a role in gradually 
‘sophisticating this understanding in an appropriate w ay’, thereby contributing to the 
developm ent o f  a body o f educational practices ‘inform ed and justified by defensible 
practical theory’.209 On this view, abstract or theoretical analyses w ould still have an 
indispensable value and role and ‘theory’, as the guardian o f  the universal, w ould be
203 Aristotle, NE I, 3, 1094b25.
204 Ibid.
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able to make known its demands in the context of the particular.
IV 
Constructing a ‘Phronetic Discourse’ for the Re-Articulation of Catholic 
Philosophy of Education
The availability o f  a full-blown ‘phronetic discourse’ would be an undoubted boon to 
the Catholic educator and to the Catholic philosopher o f  education seeking its re ­
articulation. The term ‘discourse’ often means no more than the activity and form s o f  
com m unication that contribute to particular institutionalised ways o f  thinking. It is more 
appropriate to understand ‘discourse’, in the first instance, as a distinctive kind o f  
inquiry that allows us to engage in and to articulate and support our w orld-view , our 
theories about reality, or enable us to discover the nature and structure o f  a discipline or 
theory. W alsh defines ‘discourse’ as ‘a sustained and disciplined form o f  inquiry, 
discussion and exposition that is logically unique in some significant w ay’.210 A s 
individuals and communities, we need discourse-based frameworks, not ju s t to conduct 
inquiry, but for the purpose o f  facilitating com m unication and sustaining rational living.
A  discourse community that accorded a priority to phronesis w ould not only have a 
custom ary set o f  defining characteristics, including com m on goals, m echanism s o f  
inter-com m unication, bodies o f  texts or practices, and so on. A phronetic discourse 
com m unity would be characterised by ways o f  thought, habits o f  m ind, and methods o f 
com m unication significantly distinct to enable the achievem ent o f  its principal and 
defining goal or rationale. A discourse-based theory o f  phronesis would have 
im plications not only for classroom pedagogy but for the articulation o f  one’s 
understanding o f  education as such.
This is the kind o f  backdrop against which the Catholic philosopher o f  education who 
would seek to construct a ‘phronetic d is c o u r s e as distinct from  the adoption o f  a 
‘phronetic approach’ for Catholic education, would have to develop his or her thoughts. 
He or she w ould be faced with difficult questions: Can such a discourse pattern be 
constructed? W hat would be some of its characteristic features? O f what benefit to the 
re-articulation o f  Catholic philosophy o f education might such discourse be? W hether
210 Paddy Walsh, Education and Meaning, pp. 52-53.
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M cLaughlin ever envisaged the formal construction o f  a ‘phronetic discourse’ is not 
known. Certainly, to date, there does not appear to be any scholar currently engaged 
upon such a project, either because o f its im possibility, irrelevance to the practice o f 
Catholic education, or the difficulty of reconciling the concept to the thinking and 
mores o f  postmodemity.
M cLaughlin’s conclusion that Aristotelian phronesis is a m atter ‘worthy o f  sustained 
attention’ does not cause him to close his eyes to  some o f  the difficulties that the notion 
o f  a phronetic approach and its widespread em ploym ent as a way o f  thinking in 
Catholic educational practice must o f necessity expect to m eet in practice. A  central 
difficulty noted by M cLaughlin seems to be that phronesis ‘demands established and 
relatively stable communities o f  practice’, w here there is ‘a stable and rooted sense o f  
the sort o f  person a teacher should be and the sort o f  practice education is ’.211 Susan 
Pendlebury argues that the notion o f ‘pedagogic phronesis’ demands flourishing and 
relatively stable ‘communities o f practice’.212 W hether the Catholic tradition o f  faith 
and life in m any Catholic schools is sufficiently ‘established’ in the required sense is 
obviously a m atter for debate.
A nother difficulty noted by M cLaughlin is that, given the ‘differences o f  view  about 
education w hich are characteristic o f m odernity and post-m odernity’, there has to be a 
question as to whether phronesis possesses ‘a sufficiently robust and sceptical form  o f  
reflection to do justice to the genuine demands o f  fundamental query and criticism ’, or 
‘the resources to defend itself against sceptical and relativist accusations that it is itse lf 
only one conception competing against others’.213 M cLaughlin acknowledges the 
inevitability o f  tension between the demands o f  ‘rooted-ness’ and openness to 
‘criticism ’, w hich is perhaps more accentuated in the context o f  a distinctive 
‘com m unity o f  com m itm ent’ than in a ‘com m on school’.214
N otw ithstanding these and other difficulties associated w ith a phronetic approach to 
educational thinking, M cLaughlin accorded a certain prim acy to phronesis throughout 
his philosophy o f  education, and this disposition is clearly discernible not least in his 
study o f  the Catholic school and Catholic education. M cLaughlin would have been very
211 “Beyond the Reflective Teacher”, p. 77
212 Susan Pendlebury, “Practical reasoning and situational appreciation in teaching”, Educational Theory, 
Vol. 40, 1990, pp. 171-179.
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m uch aware o f  the lim itations and difficulties associated w ith the practice o f  ‘pedagogic 
phronesis', in Catholic education and elsewhere. The very suggestion that a Catholic 
form o f ‘pedagogic phronesis’ might be explored, M cLaughlin h im self advises us, ‘may 
encounter a num ber o f  objections and difficulties’.215 A  clear challenge for a re­
articulated Catholic philosophy o f  education w ould be the resolution o f  these problem s 
and the installation at its core o f  phronesis as a model, not only for pedagogical 
reflection, but for philosophical discernment and the exercise o f  practical reason 
throughout the field o f  Catholic education.
It w ould seem, fortunately, that although objections to phronesis and difficulties w ith 
reconciling the notion to the thinking and mores o f  postm odem ity are inevitable, they 
are not insuperable. A  robust notion of phronesis is perhaps not so m uch a hostage to 
fashion as one m ight at first be persuaded to believe. This ancient A ristotelian notion, as 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, for one, attempts to show, is capable o f  addressing and raising 
vital issues in our own tim es.216 Much depends upon the definition o f  phronesis and the 
prim acy one wishes to accord it in understanding rationality.
V
Summary
The context o f  tim e and place, and the tim bre o f  theological and philosophical reasoning 
characteristic o f  the age, m atter greatly to the philosophy o f education elucidated by 
scholars, as the cases o f  M aritain, Lonergan, and M cLaughlin amply illustrate. Their 
very different contexts alter radically their perspectives on so many facets o f  their 
philosophizing about education. The extent to which philosophy o f education engages 
in mutual and reciprocal dialogue with other disciplines has also varied. But the 
Catholic understanding o f  the relationship betw een faith and reason persists, always 
growing and developing, and being, ultimately, a truly significant factor for what one 
thinks about the nature and purpose of Catholic philosophy o f  education.217
In Chapter Two, above, we saw how M aritain was driven by what seemed to him  an 
alm ost heaven-sent injunction: ‘Woe to me i f  I do not Thom isticize!5 H e understood the
215 Liberalism, Education and Schooling, pp. 77, 208.
216 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, London: Continuum, 1975 (3rd rvsd edn).
217 See, John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, 1998, for the continuing importance of the faith-reason dialogue in 
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prim ary task o f  Catholic philosophy of education (as, indeed, he envisaged the task 
im perative upon him in the many other areas -  aesthetic, political, religious, social -  o f 
his life’s work) to lie in the analysis of education’s ends and processes in  the light o f  his 
reading o f  the work o f  Aquinas, and the application o f  fundamental Thom istic 
principles to the problems and challenges o f  Catholic education in the face o f  positivism  
and de-Christianization, the twin threats to the religious condition o f  his 
contemporaries, as it seemed to him. Aristotelian-Thom istic principles, the fruit o f  
hum an reason illuminated by the light o f  Christian faith, not the tenets o f  these 
philosophies, constituted for M aritain the true and appropriate rationality for the 
Christian philosopher. In essence, this is M aritain’s gift to the re-articulation o f a 
Catholic philosophy o f  education.
In chapter three, the imperative that drove Lonergan was noted, namely, the need for 
Catholic thought to be transposed into a more contem porary and adequately theoretic 
context in a new  effort o f  analysis and synthesis while preserving its basic elements. 
Lonergan, also indebted to Aquinas, brought his cognitional theory and transcendental 
m ethod, both arising out o f  his massive study o f  hum an understanding, to the task o f  
‘lifting and shifting’ Catholic thought on to ‘the level o f  the tim es’. There is in 
Lonergan, Langdon Gilkey has noted perceptively, more o f  the ‘intent’ than the 
‘content’ o f  Aquinas, more o f  the ‘eros’ o f  Thom as than the conceptual principles and 
structures that Scholasticism handed on to later generations.218 Lonergan, then, w ould 
offer the project o f re-articulating a Catholic philosophy o f  education, not the structural 
elements (Aristotelianism  and a version o f  Augustinian theology in the m ain) o f  the 
m edieval Thom ist system, but the eros, or ‘in tent’ o f  St. Thomas, that is to say, ‘the 
desire to interpret the Christian tradition through the use o f  a coherent and system atic 
unity o f  thought’, based on the fruits o f  hum an knowing, in philosophy, and in the 
natural and human sciences.219
M cLaughlin’s imperative, finally, might well have been A ristotle’s ‘deliberating w ell 
about the good in concrete and contingent circum stances’, the phronesis  at the centre o f 
the Nicomachean Ethics. Equally as significant as the analytical disposition and body o f  
skills that he employed unceasingly in the clarification and justification o f  concepts and
218 Langdon Gilkey, “Response to Lonergan”, The Journal o f  Religion, 1978, Vol. 51, Supplement, pp. 
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219 Ibid., p. S18.
197
principles in the context o f  philosophy o f education, M cLaughlin’s appropriation o f 
A ristotelian phronesis rates highly as a significant gift to the re-articulation o f  Catholic 
philosophy o f education. M cLaughlin was keenly aware o f  the search for a non- 
foundationalist rationality across many disciplines. Comm itted sincerely to the 
foundational principles o f  Catholic Christianity, M cLaughlin’s was a quite sophisticated 
and nuanced ‘foundationalism ’, which in tandem  w ith the ‘phronetic trajectory’ he 
attem pted to map out for philosophy o f education, enabled him to negotiate confidently 
the challenges for Catholic philosophy o f education in the face o f  moderate 
postm odernism  and life in a liberal democratic society.
It is opportune, now, to consider what kind o f  response the recently published 
authoritative, ecclesiastically sanctioned, discourse on the Catholic school and Catholic 
education, prom ulgated by the Congregation for Catholic Education, m ight be prepared 
to make to the w ork o f the three contemporary philosophers we have been considering. 
This is the essence o f  the task to be attempted in chapter five following. In assessing the 
possibilities available to Catholic philosophy o f  education from these sources, this 
dissertation argues that any kind of dialogue between the philosophically explicit 
discourses above and the theological-pastoral discourse o f  the CCE, is likely to bear 
fruit only if  it is prom oted within an interrogatory framework, w hich truly reflects both 
the philosophical wisdom represented in the chapters above and focuses on features o f  
the ecclesial discourse where there is significant potential for response and action.
198
Chapter Five: A Philosophic Basis for the Literature on Education and 
Schooling of the Congregation for Catholic Education
199
A m ajor aim o f this thesis has been to investigate aspects o f  the educational thought o f  
three contem porary philosophers - M aritain, Lonergan, and M cLaughlin - w ithin the 
context o f  a project o f  re-articulating a Catholic philosophy o f  education. Earlier 
chapters sought to identify elements and recover dim ensions o f the educational theory 
o f  these philosophers that might be considered pertinent to the task o f  giving new  
expression to Catholic philosophy o f education for today. At the same time, recognising 
the fact that there is now also in existence in the Catholic com m unity a num ber o f  other 
less philosophically accented studies o f Catholic education, including an initiative 
officially endorsed by the Holy See’s Congregation for Catholic Education (CCE), this 
thesis envisaged a subsidiary aim o f seeking to bring into dialogue, for the purpose o f  
their mutual interrogation, the more patently philosophical discourse o f  the nam ed 
philosophers and the more or less theological and pastoral perspective o f  the CCE 
discourse. It is to this aim that this concluding chapter is largely devoted.
The chapter is structured in two parts along the following lines. In Part one, there is, 
firstly, a b rief resumé o f the peculiar origin and purpose, character and genre, o f  the 
CCE discourse on the Catholic school, w hich is well enough know n not to require 
detailed textual presentation in this context. Secondly, an outline is furnished o f  the 
particular fram ework o f  discourse analysis to be em ployed in attem pting to correlate the 
quite different scholarly and Congregational reflections on the aim s and practice o f  
Catholic education. And to conclude this first part o f  the chapter, the nature o f  the 
challenge involved in facilitating the conversation between these discourses concerning 
three major aims o f Catholic education is noted, and the hoped-for outcom e o f  the 
dialogue is indicated.
In Part two o f the chapter, there are set down three com ponent strands o f  the CCE 
discourse on the Catholic school and Catholic education w here it is considered that the 
m ore characteristically philosophical discourses o f  M aritain, Lonergan, and M cLaughlin 
m ight be particularly pertinent to the task o f  buttressing the CCE discourse. It is 
suggested that the explicitly philosophical perspectives m ight provide the largely non- 
theoretical CCE discourse w ith a philosophic basis and fram ework for analysis, thereby 
com plem enting and strengthening it. Thus, M aritain’s personalism  and related Christian 
hum anist perspective is proposed as an appropriate basis for a theoretical foundation for
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the key CCE aim o f the ‘integral formation o f  the hum an person’.1 Next, Lonergan’s 
cognitional structure and interiority analysis, from w hich he derives his conviction that 
the hum an spirit driven by the desire to know is capable o f  ‘sublating’ all knowledge 
into a  synthesis illumined by Christian faith, is put forw ard as being worth investigating 
in the context o f  another characteristic aim o f the CCE discourse, namely, the 
‘integration o f  faith and culture’.2 Finally, M cLaughlin’s ‘phronetic discourse’, that is, 
discourse arising out of, and contoured specifically by ‘pedagogic ph ro n esis\ is 
considered pertinent to the development o f  a more pronounced philosophical 
perspective regarding a third major aim o f the CCE discourse, the construction o f  an 
‘educational / educative / educating com m unity’.3
The chapter concludes that the kind o f  cross-fertilization that m ight result from bringing 
together these very different types o f  discourse, that is, the overtly philosophical and the 
more pastoral-theological discourse o f  the CCE, and the m utual interrogation arising out 
o f  their encounter, are matters that are worthwhile investigating in the context o f  the re- 
articulation o f  Catholic philosophy o f education and, indeed, invite further research in 
the area. A n interrogatory framework that w ould facilitate the dialogue o f  discourses 
m ight be constructed following further investigation o f  the theoretical and practical 
issues involved here. It should be possible to form ulate a set o f  im peratives which 
would provide a basis for a reading o f  the m ajor them es o f  the CCE discourse in 
conjunction w ith the related philosophical principles that ground these themes. A series 
o f  questions w ith robust philosophical intent m ight be devised both to  draw out w hat is 
problem atical in the foundations o f  the m ajor strands in the CCE discourse and to 
suggest w ays o f  informing would-be students o f  th is discourse as to how  their 
philosophical reflection might be enhanced.
1 GE (1965), No. 8; CS (1977), No. 8.
2 GE (1965), No. 8; CS (1977), No. 37.
3 GE (1965), No. 8; CS (1977), No. 32.
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IOver the past forty years, the Holy See’s Congregation for Catholic Education (CCE) 
has addressed a number o f key documents on the Catholic school to Conferences o f  
Catholic Bishops worldwide inviting them, and through them  all who w ork in the field 
o f  education at primary and secondary levels, to reflect on the m eaning and goals o f  
Christian education in the context o f a rapidly growing secular and pluralist 
environment. Integral to this discourse is a largely tacit or un-spoken philosophy o f  
education, characteristically personalist in nature, m elded tightly w ith theological and 
pastoral perspectives familiar to those who work in the field. From  the point o f  v iew  o f  
a re-articulation o f Catholic philosophy o f  education, this body o f  discourse while 
welcom e is not w ithout its problematic, as I shall note below. It is m y contention, 
however, that at least selected aspects o f  this discourse can be entertained with profit to 
both the largely theological focus o f the ecclesiastical discourse and to the philosophical 
perspective on education that is the subject o f  this thesis. Such mutual benefit can be 
derived from  a creative dialogue, and a m utually interrogative stance, between selected 
them es o f  the CCE discourse and some o f the m ajor philosophical orientations in the 
work o f  the scholars studied here.
The vision and ‘philosophy’ o f the Catholic school represented in the CCE discourse 
and its substantive theory o f Catholic education are in reality drawn from 
interdisciplinary sources that include inform al and general ‘philosophical’ stances, and a 
more explicit Christian, denominational theology. For that reason John Elias has 
suggested that the term ‘philosophy o f  education’ may need to be replaced by a term  
such as ‘Catholic educational theory’, to reflect the inter-disciplinary nature o f  the 
enterprise.4 W hether the inter-disciplinary model is sufficient to  reveal the structure and 
coherence one might demand from  Catholic philosophy o f  education is, o f  course, 
another matter. H ow to describe the reality o f  Catholic education from  the perspective 
o f  its foundational framework is not a m atter o f  sem antics, in truth. A  thorough analysis 
o f  such an um brella term as ‘Catholic educational theory’ is called for, and what
Features of the CCE Corpus and its Availability for Philosophical Analysis
4 John L. Elias, “Whatever Happened to Catholic Philosophy of Education?” Religious Education, Vol. 
94, No. 1 (Winter, 1999), p. 105.
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‘philosophising about education5 means in this context may need to be investigated 
more thoroughly than is possible in the present thesis.
The lim ited purpose in this concluding chapter is sim ply to ascertain to what extent 
selected them es o f  the CCE discourse are am enable to philosophical analysis 
understood in the broadest o f  terms, and to suggest various ways in w hich the 
philosophical perspectives o f the scholars studied in earlier chapters m ay enhance that 
analysis. D ue to its very specific nature and purpose, the CCE discourse appears to be 
deficient in term s o f explicit philosophical basis and theoretical fram ework that m ight 
provide a com prehensive interpretive key for an understanding o f  Catholic philosophy 
o f education. It does not seem to furnish us w ith m uch explicit philosophical criteria for 
an evaluation o f  the dominant themes and concepts o f  the discourse. G iven the peculiar 
features o f  this discourse and the circumstances o f  its origin, a variety o f  herm eneutical 
foci m ight need to be considered appropriate for a com prehensive reading o f  the CCE 
discourse. A  philosophy o f  education focus is but one o f  the approaches that may be 
em ployed in the study o f this discourse and, w ithin the lim its that it is possible to do so, 
at least in the context o f  this study, is a valid approach.
A Variety of Hermeneutical Foci for the Analysis of CCE Discourse
It is vitally im portant to note the distinctive character and m ethod o f  presentation 
em ployed in the CCE discourse on the Catholic school and Catholic education. The 
docum entation, as often is the case in Catholic thought, seeks for a continuity in  the 
tradition and is w ritten in the style o f frequent reference to earlier authoritative 
statements relating to education and schooling. There is, by contrast, little by w ay o f  
reference to contemporary educational discourse since the docum entation is not 
designed prim arily as a work o f scholarship but rather as a source o f  vision and 
inspiration for the benefit o f Catholic educators w orld-w ide. The discourse is 
intentionally designed to permit a reading, and to encourage an appropriation o f  its 
m essage and content, in a pre-theoretical manner. A uthentic belief relating to, and cast 
in a language with which the Catholic educational com m unity is fam iliar, precedes 
com plex philosophical or theological articulation o f  positions based on that faith. 
Because the content is not presented as a fully articulated theology or philosophy o f  
education, a m ore direct access by diverse social and cultural audiences to the core 
message is hoped for. The need for CCE discourse continuously to justify  its statem ents,
203
and to critique other philosophical positions, discourse, or vocabulary, w hich m ight 
distract from, or interfere with, or undermine engagem ent w ith its dom inant faith stance, 
is thus eliminated.
This distinctive character o f the CCE discourse on Catholic schooling and education 
means that it can be engaged with via a num ber o f  distinctive herm eneutical foci. Three 
different interpretative paradigms can be envisaged as appropriate herm eneutical 
instruments for the investigation o f  this corpus. These m ight be conveniently designated 
as: (1) A Catholic Social Teaching approach and m ethodology; (2) a Philosophy o f  
Education fram ework or perspective, and (3) a Pastoral Theological paradigm  or m odel. 
For a com prehensive reading of the CCE literature that is beyond the scope o f  the 
present thesis, it would probably be unnecessary to decide betw een these various 
perspectives and a harmonious combination o f  approaches m ight be the ideal way to 
engage with this discourse. It seems to me, however, that the m ost obvious 
hermeneutical focus that one might select in the present context, nam ely, the philosophy 
o f education perspective, is the least well developed in  the CCE literature and, at least 
as far as explicit content, as distinct from general principles, is concerned, leaves m uch 
to be desired.
Characterisation of Dominant Features of the CCE Educational Corpus
It is im portant to bear in mind, I think, that the CCE corpus, relating to various aspects 
o f  the ‘Catholic school5 and offering an account o f  Christian education very largely 
from  the perspective o f  a Catholic understanding and practice o f  schooling, addresses 
first o f  all, and quite intentionally, the Catholic school in term s o f  its identity and 
distinctiveness, and not the nature o f Catholic education sim pliciter. The distinction is 
neither vacuous nor is the argument that follows from  it specious, ju s t as the distinction 
between ‘schooling5 and ‘education5 in general is not illogical or pointless. W e know  
the thinking o f  the CCE about Catholic education only through an interpretative 
exercise carried out on the basis o f  and in relation to its view s about the nature and 
purpose o f  Catholic schools. In the context o f  seeking a re-articulation o f  Catholic 
philosophy o f  education to which the CCE discourse m ight contribute it is entirely 
legitimate to draw attention to this fact. To com m ent upon the selected educational 
principles judged to be present in the CCE discourse in  term s o f  the w ider perspectives 
available am ong contemporary scholars who have w ritten about Catholic philosophy o f
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education demands that the discourse be properly contextualised.
Theoretical Articulation in the CCE Documents
An im portant point that needs to be noted here relates to the distinctive method o f 
teaching em bodied in many o f the C hurch’s social docum ents, as well as in the 
Catechism o f  The Catholic Church 5, and in the education docum ents o f  the 
Congregation for Catholic Education. Here, elements o f  Catholic truth are presented, 
not as an overt and fully articulated theology, or moral philosophy, or indeed, 
educational philosophy, but simply as ‘T ruth’, to be accepted and lived in the real life 
situations o f  believers. From an analysis o f  the content o f  the docum ents scholars can, 
o f  course, attem pt to work back through to the com plex and varied philosophies and 
theologies that have inevitably been used to articulate, explain and defend the faith. But 
the key to the documents is that the teaching itself can be appropriated in a pre- 
theoretical way. The documents seem designed intentionally to perm it a reading and an 
appropriation o f  the teaching in such a pre-theoretical way. Obviously, one doesn’t have 
to be a theologian or a philosopher to believe; in any case, authentic belief for Catholics 
always in some way precedes the more com plex philosophical and theological 
articulations o f  that belief.6
This kind o f  procedure has its attractions because it reasserts the prim acy o f  the lived 
experience o f  ordinary religious and moral life over the forms o f  clever rationalization 
that are provided on a regular basis by contem porary scholars o f  w hatever variety. But 
ordinary religious and moral experience cannot always w ithstand the solvent o f 
criticism, not because it lacks a grounding in truth, but rather because o f  the way 
religious and moral practices are complex wholes that involve a shared perception o f  a 
life lived in common, which cannot be appreciated by adopting some external 
philosophical or theological critical standpoint.7 This com m ent is not designed to 
devalue the significance o f CCE docum ents or the method o f teaching and handing on 
the faith w hich they illustrate. One can readily acknowledge the value o f  a pre- 
theoretical articulation o f  Catholic beliefs and m oral, social and educational principles
5 Catechism o f the Catholic Church, 1994, London: Geoffrey Chapman.
6 I am indebted to Dr. Paul J. Kelly, formerly of Department o f Political Theory and Government, 
University of Wales, Swansea, for this insight into an understanding o f Catholic social teaching. His 
unpublished paper titled, The Family as an Institution and a Metaphor in Catholic Social Teaching, 
delivered to the Newman Society in Swansea, circa 1994, has been most helpful in regard to the 
discussion here.
7 Paul J. Kelly, ibid., page 2.
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in this specific context. Because the content is not presented as an articulated theology 
or philosophy, a m ore direct access to the central truth, to the key m essage, is rendered 
possible, and a greater engagement with the wider world o f  social, political, moral and 
educational theorising is enabled. The need continuously to reject differences o f 
philosophical method, discourse or vocabulary, which m ight underm ine engagem ent 
with the faith stance is thus eliminated.
This is not to suggest, either, that the Church, in her educational or other teaching 
documents, sees no need for philosophy and other disciplines in the articulation o f 
Christian truth. For long periods o f  its history, Catholic tradition regarded philosophy as 
an ancilla  ( ‘handm aiden’) o f theology. Though no longer a m atter o f  subservience o f  
the one discipline to the other, the kind o f  special relationship betw een faith and reason 
which is a characteristic o f the Catholic theological tradition, has been acknowledged 
by, among others, Langdon Gilkey8. Gilkey records how, throughout Catholic history, 
there has been ‘a drive toward rationality’, that is to  say, an insistence that the divine 
mystery be insofar as possible ‘penetrated, defended, and explicated by the most acute 
rational reflection’.9
Having said all this, it has to be admitted that a Catholic philosophy o f  education that 
wishes to engage in dialogue in a contemporary, secularist environm ent, that wants to 
meet the challenges o f  historical consciousness in Lonergan’s phrase, m ust be prepared 
to utilise and coordinate the best resources o f  Catholic faith, o f  reason and philosophy, 
o f  the findings o f  the human sciences that relate to teaching and learning, as well as the 
wisdom  o f its ow n tradition, in the effort to understand, explain and transform  hum an 
persons and hum an life in community.
8 Langdon Gilkey, Catholicism Confronts Modernity: A Protestant View, New York: Seabury Press, 
1975.
9 Ibid., pp. 20-22.
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I I
To decide to w hat extent the CCE corpus m ight be subjected to proper philosophical 
analysis w ith a view  to its enhancement, and especially to facilitate its dialogue with 
contem porary society, I intend, firstly, to reflect briefly on the sense in w hich it is 
possible to characterise the CCE output as ‘discourse’ and the im plications this has for 
our understanding o f  it. In this connection, I draw on the w ork o f  Paddy W alsh in 
relation to discourse analysis and the reflective teacher.10
W alsh has argued for a view o f educational theory as a reality ‘em ergent in practice and 
forming a single complex with practice’.11 Education, he claim s, is a typical area in 
which the theory is to be ‘sought in the practice and the ideals o f  the practice, to a 
significant extent’.12 A good deal o f ‘theoretical reflection’ on education, W alsh 
believes, needs to be ‘located within the practice o f  education i t s e l f .13 One can make a 
reasonable case for the claim that a Catholic philosophy, or theory, o f  education is better 
sought in the practice o f  Catholic education and in the ideals o f  that practice, rather than 
in the invocation o f abstract principles ab extra after the m anner of, say, M aritain. This 
is the position adopted in this dissertation and the perspective w ithin w hich the re­
articulation o f  Catholic philosophy o f education is envisioned.
The question then arises as to the extent to which the theoretical reflection contained in 
the CCE corpus does in fact provide an adequate source, in conjunction w ith the 
practice o f  Catholic education, from w hich a vibrant Catholic philosophy o f  education 
might emerge. A theory that is ‘adequate to educational p ractice’, W alsh argues, is 
required to be ‘seriously philosophicaV , that is to say, ‘notably broad and notably 
coherent’, as well as ‘practical’.14 W alsh articulates such a theory, that is, his ‘em ergent 
theory’ paradigm , by means o f  the notion o f  ‘discourse’.15 A  ‘discourse’, he proposes, is
10 Paddy Walsh, “Discourses of the reflective educator”, Journal o f  the Philosophy o f  Education, Vol. 26, 
No. 2, 1992, pp. 139-52.
11 Paddy Walsh, Education and Meaning: Philosophy in Practice, London: Cassell, 1993, p. 52. Hereafter 
cited as: Education and Meaning.
12 Ibid., p. 47.
13 Ibid., pp. 46-47.
14 Ibid., p. 52.
15 Ibid., p. 52.
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‘a sustained and disciplined form of enquiry, discussion and exposition that is logically 
unique in some significant way5.16 Walsh uses this notion as he attempts to distinguish 
and relate the ‘different voices in the theory that is emergent in good practice’.17 He 
further proposes the thesis that educational theory is ‘a cluster of four discourses 
relating to educational practice, namely, ‘utopian’, ‘deliberative’, ‘evaluative’ and 
‘scientific’ discourses.18 Each of these discourses, he suggests, ‘stands in a unique 
relationship to practice’, but the stance of each ‘presupposes and supports that of the 
other three’.19 These four discourses, in many ways inter-dependent and each integral to 
the theory of education, are able, he asserts, to offer ‘profoundly complementary 
perspectives on educational practice’.20
It is possible, I think, to use Walsh’s fourfold discourse in an attempt to articulate and 
evaluate the kind of theory that might emerge from the practice of Catholic education 
that is guided and supported by the C C E  discourse. It w ill be my contention that 
Walsh’s ‘utopian discourse’ largely predominates in the practice of Catholic education 
insofar as the C C E  corpus influences it, and that the relative neglect of the other forms 
of discourse in Walsh’s cluster inevitably means that the theory of Catholic education 
which emerges is weakened in important respects.21 If  this is really the case, one needs 
to appeal to the scholars studied in the earlier chapters of this thesis to remediate the 
situation and to contribute to the emergence of a more robust Catholic philosophy of 
education for our times. Walsh refers repeatedly to the inter-relationships that he 
perceives among the various forms of discourse and he notes how discussion and 
writing about the philosophy that arises from practice is able ‘to switch easily and 
coherently from one discourse to another’ .22 It is part o f my concern for the adequacy of 
a theoretical base and framework of analysis in Catholic philosophy of education based 
on the C C E  literature that these documents as a whole do not make explicit the 
existence of different discourses much less develop the relationship between them.
16 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
17 Ibid., p. 52.
18 Ibid., p. 53.
19 Ibid., p. 53.
20 Education and Meaning, p. 53.
21 It is important to note that the phrase ‘utopian discourse’ as used by Walsh does not imply any of the 
usual pejorative connotations associated with this adjective.
22 Ibid., p. 58.
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‘Utopian D iscourse’ in the CCE Corpus
‘Utopian discourse5 is described by Walsh as that ‘form of discourse in which ideal 
visions and abstract principles are formulated and argued over5.23 It has two defining 
characteristics. Firstly, it is ‘directly committed to the flourishing of education as an 
aspect of a wider human flourishing5.24 Secondly, its focus is not just any good, but ‘the 
ideal5 good.25 Although other areas of human activity also have their ‘ideal scenarios5, 
in Walsh's view, education's ‘integral aspiration to a view of life as a whole5 implies 
that its utopian discourse is particularly ‘broad and complete in its scope5.26 Education's 
utopian discourse, Walsh explains, embraces discussions o f ‘educational values in 
relation to general life values, analyses of cultural capital, and theories of many aspects 
of human development5.27 It is committed to seeking some sort of coherence across 
these various discussions and theories, as it looks to a set of visions of human 
development that w ill resonate with each other and relate to the educational values 
under discussion.
It is clearly the case that discourse relating to ‘the pursuit o f an ideal5, and ultimately to 
the ideal of human flourishing as understood in the Catholic tradition of educational
thought, is a central feature of the C C E  documentation on the Catholic school, as indeed
28it is of earlier sources from which that discourse draws its inspiration. Catholic 
education has a number of defining characteristics that, to the outside observer at any 
rate, must in some measure be seen to, ‘eschew the question of attainability5, and to 
entertain no more than ‘ideal scenarios5.29 Thus, Catholic education ideally is ‘ inspired 
by a supernatural vision5 that focuses on the transcendent dimension of human destiny; 
it is committed to the ‘integral formation of the human person5; it is ‘imbued with a 
worldview5 that is desirous of permeating the whole curriculum; it is ‘animated by a 
sense of Christian communion and community5, and is ‘sustained by an authentic 
witness to Gospel values5 in an educational community that is committed to the
23 Ibid., p. 45.
24 Ibid., p. 53.
25 Ibid, p. 53
26 Ibid, p. 53.
27 Ibid, p. 53.
28 See Pius XI, DIM (1929), No.s 6-8 on the notion of Christian ‘perfection’ and how Catholic education 
seeks to empower children and young people in the pursuit of perfection. John Passmore has written an 
excellent account o f Christian perfection, in John Passmore, The Perfectibility o f  Man, Indianapolis 
Liberty Fund, 2000 (3rd edn.)
29 Education and Meaning, p. 53.
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evangelising mission of the Church.30 The nature of the ideal that Catholic education 
proposes for its schools seems to oblige it to embark on a quest for the kind of 
completeness and coherence of which Walsh speaks in connection with utopian 
discourse.31
It would be wrong, Walsh reminds us, to suppose that ‘utopian discourse is always full­
blown and visionary5, or, ‘dogmatic and a-temporaT, even when it tends to conjure up 
‘committed, completed and forever powerful portraits o f education5.32 To engage in 
utopian discourse at all is, for some, a totally impractical project. This is not a view that 
could be entertained in Catholic philosophy of education. It is important, however, that 
one remembers that utopian discourse is just one of a cluster of discourses constituting 
educational theory. While utopian discourse plays a critical role in identifying aims and 
values in education, it is only in conjunction with other modes of discourse, such as for 
example, ‘deliberative discourse5, that these aims can in practice be achieved.
The ‘Vision-Guided Nature’ of the CCE Discourse
Closely related to Walsh's idea of ‘utopian discourse5 is a conception of education that 
has been described by the notion of ‘vision5. Vision is commonly understood as a 
distinctive apprehension of reality of a special kind. Here, the concern is with ‘vision5 
embodied within a community of practice and focused on the self-understanding of, and 
conception of the aims and purposes of that practice. ‘Vision-guided5 institutions are 
portrayed by Daniel Pekarsky as institutions ‘organised around conceptions of what 
they are most fundamentally about, conceptions that give meaning and direction to the 
activities of the participants and to the enterprise as a whole5.33 This concept of ‘vision5 
has often been used to prescribe a strategy for an organization or a business. In this 
usage vision might be described as a ‘mission statement5 that gives expression to aims 
and objectives to be pursued, and is designed to provide motivation and focus for the 
achievement of the institution's goals and values. This kind of perspective on vision is 
often associated with external outcomes, with the movement from theory to practice, 
and from practice to measurable outcomes.
30 Most Rev. J. Michael Miller, CSB, “Five Essential Marks of Catholic Schools” , pp. 17-63. In: The Holy 
S ee’s Teaching on Catholic Schools, Atlanta: Sophia Institute Press, 2006.
31 Education and Meaning, p. 53.
32 Ibid., p. 54.
33 Daniel Pekarsky, “Vision and Education: Arguments, Counter-Arguments, Rejoinders”, American 
Journal o f  Education, Vol. 113, May 2007, pp. 423-450 (426). Hereafter cited as: “Vision and 
Education”
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In the present context, however, the emphasis is rather on a process internal to the 
practice. Used in the context of understanding Catholic education one would expect a 
vision to express some conception of what education should be fundamentally about 
and to prescribe, implicitly at least, a coherent set of principles that would give shape 
and direction to the process.34 Schools and educators, in addition to being judged on 
external effectiveness, have sometimes been charged by, for example, authors like Neil 
Postman amongst others, with having an insufficiently clear and compelling sense of 
purpose, of having guiding ideals that are vague, give little direction and are thus unable 
to generate much commitment.35 ‘Vision-guided’ education aims in part to address this 
issue. It seeks to explain clearly the conception of what a school is most fundamentally 
about, and attempts to identify the processes internal to the school community that 
enable it to achieve its aims. This dimension is very much to the fore in the C C E  
discourse on the Catholic school and Catholic education.36
‘V ision’, in this sense, is best described as ‘existential vision’, as Pekarsky terms it, and 
as it is intended to be understood here.37 An ‘existential vision’, Pekarsky suggests, is ‘a 
conception of the kind of person and community that one hopes to cultivate through the 
educational process’.38 An ‘existential vision’ is an answer to the question about the 
raison d ’être of the educational process and what the school is fundamentally about. It 
expresses the need for some kind of ‘guiding conception of the person and of the 
community’ that education is designed to cultivate. The cultivation of the individual 
along various, organically interrelated dimensions - intellectual, affective, moral, 
cognitive, and others -  is seen to be intimately connected with the process o f realizing 
community, and both aims are fostered equally by the school. A  conception of the kind 
of person we hope will emerge from the educational process, Pekarsky writes, ‘is 
intimately connected with a conception of the kind of community that he or she w ill 
share in’ .39 Sim ilarly, the attempt to foster a thriving community of a certain kind 
‘necessitates the cultivation of individuals whose qualities of hearts and minds are
34 Daniel Pekarsky, “The place of vision in Jewish education”, Journal o f  Jewish Education, Vol. 63, 
Winter/Spring, 1997, pp. 31-40 (31). See also, Seymour Fox, Israel Scheffler & Daniel Marom (Eds.), 
Visions o f  Jewish Education, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
35 See, Neil Postman, The End o f Education: Redefining the Value o f  the School, New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1995; A.G. Powell, E. Farrar, & D.K. Cohen, The Shopping Mall High School, Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1985.
36 See, for example, CS(1977), No.s 25-27, 33-37, 53-56, 73.
37 “Vision and Education”, p. 426.
38 Ibid., p. 426.
39 Ibid., p. 426
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An ‘existential vision’ should be at the centre of our conception of education and its 
purposes, Pekarsky claims, and this is a view that the C C E  educational discourse would 
certainly share. An ‘existential vision’ seeks to identify what a particular existence (in 
Pekarsky’s case, a Jewish existence, in ours, a Catholic one), in its social and / or 
individual dimension, would look like if  fully realized.41 Such existential visions, 
Pekarsky claims, are to be found not only im plicitly in the social life of communities 
but more explicitly in the inherited writings and traditions of the community. An 
existential vision, Pekarsky importantly adds, can be ‘more or less fílled-in’, that is, it 
might consist of ‘a thick, ordered constellation of attitudes, skills, understandings, and 
dispositions’; or it might be limited to ‘a particular attitude or way of approaching the 
world and the skills and understandings that make this possible’.42 It is not to be 
assumed, however, Pekarsky notes, that an existential vision is always necessarily 
coextensive with an entire way of life of a community.43
It is precisely at this point, perhaps, that the educational vision of the C C E  discourse 
seeks to differ from that of others. The C C E  vision, in keeping with the tradition of 
Catholic educational thinking regarding the aims of the Catholic school, seeks a very 
close relationship between the school and the Catholic community, its beliefs, values, 
and way of life. Indeed, the Catholic school, as the most important locus for human and 
Christian formation, is also envisioned in terms of its ‘ecclesial identity’ and regarded 
as ‘a genuine instrument’ of the Church’s mission.44 The C C E ’s ‘vision’ is not just 
about a set of ‘ inspiring ideas’ as such, but is a ‘vision-for-education’, that is, a 
programme of ideals that are, as Pekarsky puts it, ‘embodied in a credible conception o f 
how they might be interpreted and meaningfully implemented’ in a given set of 
circumstances, in this case, in the life and work of the Catholic school.45
M cLaughlin, analysing the distinctiveness of the Catholic school in contra-distinction to 
the common school, appreciates the closeness of fit between vision and way of life
congenial to its requirements’.40
40 Ibid, p. 426.
41 “The Place of Vision in Jewish Education”, p. 32.
42 “The Place o f Vision in Jewish Education”, p. 32.
43 Ibid, p. 32.
44 CSTTM (19 9 7 )1  No.s 11-12.
45 Daniel Pekarsky, “Catching the Wave: Next Steps in Advancing the Vision-in-Practice Agenda”, 
Journal o f Jewish Education, Vol. 74, 2008, pp. 16-28 (19).
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intended by the Church’s educational discourse. In this connection he raises the 
question of the ‘temptations of commonality’ that face the Catholic school, tempted as it 
may be to compromise on its substantial or comprehensive vision, perhaps by putting 
aside its ‘thick or substantial views of the human good’.46 Elsewhere, M cLaughlin 
underscores the same priority of desired close fit between ideal and practice, of co­
extensiveness of vision and way of life of the Catholic community, when he speaks of 
the wider mandate for the exercise of educational influence based on an overall 
philosophy of life that faith schools enjoy.47 The co-extensiveness of vision and 
Catholic way of life implies that the Catholic school is not to ignore, much less to
48 ■ ■ iforget, the fact of its religiously tethered education and spirituality. The ‘vision-m- 
action’ of the Catholic school makes it alert to ‘the demands of substantiality’, which 
means that its work must ‘satisfy conditions which go beyond the procedural or the 
m inim alistic’. No combination of under-interpreted principles can meet the demands of 
substantiality without an overall vision of life as a whole.49
There can be little doubt that central features of Catholic education and schooling as 
represented in the C C E  literature, mainly those concerned with the aims and goals of 
education, the holistic influence of a religious perspective, and the quality of the ethos 
of the Catholic school, all appear to qualify it as aspirational discourse and pre­
eminently ‘vision-guided education’. To claim that the Catholic school sets out ‘to be a 
school for the human person and of the human person’, to forefront the ‘promotion of 
the human person’ as the goal of the Catholic school in this way, is to adopt an 
‘existential vision’ p a r  excellence . 5 0  For this purpose the Catholic school must be 
characterised by a ‘vision-in-action’ so as to be ‘a place of integral formation of the 
human person through a clear educational endeavour of which Christ is the 
foundation’ .51 The manner and extent to which this ‘vision-guided’ approach should, 
and can, contribute to the articulation of a Catholic philosophy of education needs to be
46 T. H. McLaughlin, “Distinctiveness of the Catholic School”, Liberalism, Education and Schooling, pp. 
214-217. For the notion o f ‘thick ‘substantial views o f the human good, see McLaughlin, “Education of 
the Whole Child?”, Liberalism, Education and Schooling, pp. 52, 54-55.
47 T. H. McLaughlin, “Philosophy, Values and Schooling”, Liberalism, Education and Schooling, pp. 
234-238.
48 T. H. McLaughlin, “Education, Spirituality and the Common School”, Liberalism, Education and 
Schooling, pp. 239-245.
49 T. H. McLaughlin, “Sex Education, Moral Controversy and the Common School”, Liberalism, 
Education and Schooling, pp. 267, 269, 279.
50 CSTTM (1997)^ No. 9.
51 Ibid., No.s 9-10.
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assessed. Such an assessment is all the more important in view of some of the criticisms 
that can and have been made in regard to this way of visualizing the meaning, aims and 
basic purposes of education.
Ill
CCE ‘Vision-Guided5 Educational Discourse: A Challenge for Catholic 
Philosophy of Education
To the extent that the C C E  discourse is adequately categorised as ‘vision-guided’ and 
‘aspirational’, it is subject to the range of criticism  usually directed at this genre of 
discourse. The C C E  discourse, however, is well-constructed and has probably been 
composed with a view to communicating its positive reflection on the nature, purpose, 
and distinctiveness of Catholic education in the full knowledge that, in a postmodern 
world, many of its central claims would be subject to challenge on philosophical or 
other grounds. C C E  discourse is not, therefore, entirely without some element of 
defence and justification of its position, at least in relation to the major strands 
comprising the discourse. The question which is addressed throughout this dissertation 
relates to the sufficiency of this defence. Once it is accepted that Catholic philosophy of 
education is in need of re-articulation and that the C C E  discourse has a part to play in 
this enterprise, the philosophical basis of the latter discourse becomes a relevant matter.
The point at issue here is not primarily the extent to which it becomes possible to realise 
in practice the aims and aspirations that utopian vision gives rise to. It is obviously 
difficult to say in relation to the C C E  vision for Catholic education, for example, 
whether apparent failure to engage with the vision and to achieve its desired outcomes is 
due to the reluctance of the critical stakeholders ‘to really embrace the vision in a 
serious way’, or whether the practices identified by the educational community as ‘the 
appropriate vehicles for actualising the vision’ are in fact appropriate and can be 
‘meaningfully adopted’.52 What is of prior concern is the nature of the C C E  discourse 
itself, the quality of the theoretical articulation in its constituent documents, and its 
seeming over-reliance on utopian and aspirational vision, not only to motivate, but to 
convince readers of the value of its major positions in relation to Catholic education.
52 Daniel Pekarsky, “Vision and Education”, p. 430.
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A  range of criticism of vision-guided education, as indicated below, needs to be 
discussed together with the inferred defence of the C C E  that may be regarded as being 
im plicit in, and recoverable from, a study of the texts. The implications of a deficit o f 
supporting discourse of types other than the utopian kind, and the consequences of other 
problematic features of the C C E  discourse, should also be considered. When this two­
fold task has been completed, it should be possible to assess the nature of the challenge 
for a re-articulated Catholic philosophy of education to incorporate the C C E  discourse 
in its project. Whatever the nature of this challenge, it would seem reasonable that 
Catholic philosophy of education should be able to turn to the work of scholars such as 
Maritain, Lonergan and McLaughlin, both to understand the nature of the task and to 
gamer support from that rich variety of philosophical discourse.
Criticism of Vision-Guided Education with Reference to the CCE Discourse
The whole idea of vision-guided education is subject to criticism  on a number of 
grounds. For some there are concerns that vision-guided education goes hand in hand 
with what they regard as religious fundamentalism, involving allegiance to a particular 
conception of the good, or based on ‘thick’ or substantial views of the human good, to 
borrow M cLaughlin’s phrase.53 The C C E  discourse is obviously primarily intended for 
those who share a view on the meaning of life and subscribe to a common set of 
architectonic principles. In itself, this should not rule out vision-guided education, since 
as M cLaughlin points out the appropriate response in the face of difference is tolerance 
and ‘principled forbearance of influence’ .54 Earlier in this dissertation, too, Maritain’s 
endorsement of a basic principle for living in a pluralist society was noted.55 In effect, 
vision-guided education does not per se seek to impose upon people, or demand from 
them, as a condition for their ‘belonging to the city’, any philosophic or any religious 
creed.56 RDECS (1988), in the context of the religious freedom and personal conscience 
of individual students and families, establishes the principle that ‘to proclaim or to offer 
is not to impose’.57
For critics of vision-guided education of the kind offered by the C C E  discourse the 
charge that this type of education, and the institutions that provide it, are indoctrinatory,
53 See, for example, Liberalism, Education and Schooling, pp. 52, 54-55, 127-130.
54 T. H. McLaughlin, Liberalism, Education and Schooling, pp. 54-56, 59, 86, 229.
55 Jacques Maritain, “Thomist Views on Education”, pp. 72, 84-85, 87.
56 Ibid., p. 72.
57 RDECS (1988), No. 6.
215
is never far away. The whole idea of formation, or transformation, of persons into a 
certain kind of human being, dictated by a religious or philosophical conviction, sits 
uncomfortably with many in a liberal democratic society. The issues involved here are 
clearly beyond the remit of this dissertation. Nevertheless, since indoctrination depends 
largely on the intentions of educators, on the content of what they offer, and on the 
appropriateness of the means chosen to achieve the aims or goals of education, it is 
possible to mount a robust defence of the C C E  vision-guided project that would rule out 
the legitimacy o f many accusations of indoctrination. Thus, it is not the intention of the 
C C E  discourse to diminish human persons, or deny their freedom, but rather to promote 
their integral human development. While C C E  discourse refrains largely from dictating 
the curriculum of Catholic schools, it insists on respect for all bodies of true knowledge, 
including religious knowledge, and directs that ‘individual school subjects must be 
taught according to their own particular methods’, and not be ‘regarded as mere
58adjuncts to faith or as useful means of teaching apologetics’ .
A  key element of the C C E  vision-guided education is the integration of culture, faith 
and life, and although it provides little detail on how that aim might be achieved, there 
is every reason to believe that educational means that are antithetical in spirit to the ends 
being sought w ill be ruled out. Vision-guided education does not rule out the active role 
of learners, for example, in their own education. Guiding visions that emphasise the 
ideal of autonomy would perforce give rise to educational practices that incorporate 
autonomy-respecting practices.59 It has already been suggested above that the 
cognitional theory of Bernard Lonergan might be capable of assisting the C C E  
discourse with this integrative aim, and more attention will be devoted to this 
suggestion below.
Hostility to vision-guided approaches to education often grow out of a rejection of 
educational aims per se. The identification and prioritisation of aims is regarded by 
some critical scholars as an abuse of power and as a concealed method of disguising 
sources of power and influence. Though he does not identify with it, such a view has 
been described by Nicholas Burbules, who writes that the postmodern distrust of meta­
narratives has questioned the foundationalism of attempting to provide an over-arching
s*CS(1977), No.s 38-39.
59 “Vision and Education”, pp. 435-435.
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or universal account of what education should be seeking to achieve.60 Any general 
account of the aims of education is regarded by these critics as ‘totalizing and 
normalizing5, ‘imposing on teachers and learners constraints upon their freedom to 
define, negotiate, and establish their own educational purposes5.61 This stance, of 
course, challenges the entire notion of universal truth and intrinsic value, in relation to 
which the C C E  discourse justifies the aims and purposes of Catholic education.
It is not the purpose of the C C E  discourse to claim exclusive authority for its 
perspectives on education, or to marginalise other perspectives that might have valuable 
insights into the educational aims that are regarded as important. In any case it is 
difficult to understand how one can seriously deny the needs experienced by all peoples 
and cultures to share and transmit their beliefs and values and to guide the development 
of the young. There may well be a case to answer too by those who espouse this 
postmodernist outlook that they are deceiving themselves if  they think that they are 
championing a particular set of objectives that avoids assumptions about beliefs and 
values. The C C E  discourse is adamant, and correctly so, that ‘either im plicit or explicit 
reference to a Weltanschaaung is unavoidable in education5.62 There is ‘a tendency to 
forget that education always presupposes and involves a definite concept of man and 
life ’ . 63 In particular, ‘each type of education is influenced by a particular concept of 
what it means to be a human person5.64
The question of ‘ownership5 of the vision is yet another problem for some educators. 
There are several difficulties apropos ‘owning5 the vision in vision-guided education. 
For some, the vision proposed is assumed to be the vision of individuals or communities 
who wish to impose their beliefs and values on those served by the institution 
subscribing to the vision. In any case, there is likely to be a spectrum of response to the 
vision from the very enthusiastic to the lukewarm and the apathetic, or maybe even 
hostility. It may well be the case that the vision does not respond to the needs of 
individuals and families that patronise the school. The institution's priorities may be 
perceived to be different or elitist. What parents often want for their children may
60 Nicholas Burbules, “Ways of Thinking about Educational Quality”, Educational Researcher, Vol. 33, 
No. 6,2004, pp. 4-10.
61 Ibid., pp. 4-10.
62 CS (1977), No. 29.
63 CSTTM(1997), No. 10.
64 LC S(J982), No. 18.
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represent a mis-match in terms of what the Catholic school has to offer. Some may feel 
that the Catholic school’s priorities subordinate present needs to some future destiny. 
Educators, following Dewey, may argue that education, in the interests of children’s 
happiness and fulfilment, should not identify some far-off human good at which to aim 
but should design education that will engage learners today. The emphasis must be on 
making the most of the present but without total neglect for ‘ends-in-view’.
These are but some of the criticisms that are regularly made of all vision-guided 
education and clearly a Catholic education that relied mainly on utopian discourse 
would neither be immune from, nor best placed, to cope with this kind of critique. 
Nonetheless, on the assumption that it is possible to give a rational account for one’s 
espousal of a particular guiding existential vision, and possible to anchor that account in 
a more comprehensive view of reality, one has to query whether there exists in the C C E  
discourse a sufficiently robust philosophical argument pertinent to the rational 
justification and concrete realisation of the vision. It is the argument of this thesis that a 
deficit of explicit theory in the C C E  discourse constitutes a major challenge to the re­
articulation of Catholic philosophy of education.
Theory Deficit in CCE Discourse
A  symptom of the over-reliance of C C E  literature on utopian discourse and a vision- 
guided approach to education is the absence of an explicit theoretical perspective. The 
problem for theoretical discourse relating to the practice of Catholic education, to the 
limited extent that it is espoused at all in the C C E  documentation, is that much of the 
theory base may be present in an implicit or tacit mode only, and its availability is 
restricted in important respects to educators familiar with the Catholic tradition. Indeed, 
a cursory reading might easily lead one to conclude that the C C E  discourse has 
eschewed altogether the inclusion and use of theoretical perspectives that are common 
elsewhere in education-related documents.
One might illustrate the problem involved here by reference to a dominant theme in the 
C C E  discourse, namely, the integral formation of the human person’, one of the over­
arching aims of Catholic education.65 While there is an over-thematization of the
65 Reference to the theme o f ‘the integral formation of the human person’ as the aim of Catholic education 
is widespread in the CCE discourse and in earlier documentation from which it draws its inspiration. See: 
D IM (1929), No.s 7, 8; GE (1965), No.s 1, 3, 8; CS (1977), No.s 8, 12, 14, 15, 29, 35, 45; LCS (1982),
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formative theme in C C E  writing, there is, either as a direct consequence of this, or 
indirectly because of the absence of a strongly academic discourse throughout the 
corpus, an under-theorization of fundamental aspects of the formative education 
tradition that one might reasonably expect Catholic philosophy of education to theorise 
about. No comprehensive and critical philosophical examination of the meaning and 
significance of the key terms in this often cited educational aim, the ‘integral formation 
of the human person’, is apparently available in the C C E  literature, nor generally in the 
extensively published official comments on Catholic education that have followed in its 
wake.66 What seems to occur in the Catholic educational community in the absence of 
theoretical discourse is that the meaning of the terms in statements like ‘the integral 
formation of the human person’ is taken as self-evident, or as being generally so explicit 
as not to warrant detailed and in-depth analysis. Where such analysis has been 
undertaken, a substantial and coherent account of ‘formation’ in a distinctively 
philosophical register has not always been provided. In consequence, the intelligent 
practice of Catholic education and its promising fruits is conceivably put at grave risk.
Catholic educational discourse expresses ideals regarding what it believes are realizable 
goods (integral human formation, synthesis of faith and culture, the construction of an 
educative community). These broad goals determine a general orientation for Catholic 
education and allow the Catholic educational community to deliberate on how in 
general the Catholic educator may progress from an actual situation to the ideal desired. 
But there appears to be singularly lacking from the C C E  discourse any discussion of the 
theory that, according to Walsh, must necessarily ‘under-pin the sustained 
methodological actions and processes’ that comprise the educational initiatives to be 
undertaken in pursuit of these goals.67
A Challenge for Catholic Philosophy of Education
It would hardly be disputed that educators are entitled to examine and reflect on the 
under-lying theoretical basis of programmes or enterprises they are invited, or expected, 
to make use of and participate in. In fact, one would anticipate that the authors, or 
originators, o f any such programme or enterprise would make very explicit the
No.s 3, 15, 16, 18, 28; RDECS (1988), No.s 1,4, 56, 63,98,99; CSTTM(I997), No.s 4, 9, 10; CPMS 
(2002), No.s 18 ,31 ,33 ,34 ,35 ,38 ; ETCS (2007), No.s 1,2, 13, 14.
66 That no such philosophical scrutiny should be expected in this context, given the nature and intended 
purposes o f the CCE literature, is a valid point of view. 1 do not share the view.
67 Edvcation and Meaning, p. 59
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underlying rationale for what was being proposed and spell out the theoretical 
considerations upon which the proposal is founded. The CCE literature, however, does 
not make sufficiently explicit its under-lying theoretical basis for the integral hum an 
formation o f  persons, or for the synthesis o f  faith, life and culture, both proposed as 
goals for and intended to be realized (in part, at least) in, and through, the educational / 
educative / educating experience of the Catholic school as com munity.
W hat appears to be the case in reality is that the grounding o f  its proposals for integral 
human developm ent and the integration o f  faith and culture rests upon an im plicit 
theory and a philosophical line o f argumentation presum ably im ported, perhaps 
somewhat uncritically, from an earlier phase o f  the Catholic tradition o f  educational 
thought. This criticism does not arise from a purely negative attitude tow ard a whole 
body o f  im portant educational literature originating ‘from the heart o f  the C hurch’, and 
intended by Church leaders to contribute to an on-going dialogue about the m eaning and 
purpose o f  education in a pluralistic w orld .68 The real reason for expressing a concern 
here is that any perceived or real weakness in this central m atter o f  integral hum an 
development, or the synthesis o f faith and culture, is a crucially im portant consideration 
that Catholic philosophy o f education cannot ignore but ought to address 
sympathetically, but also critically and with some urgency.
W ithout being able to engage fully in an analysis o f the internal evidence o f  the CCE 
docum entation itself, it is appropriate, and perhaps necessary, to reflect how ever briefly, 
on the question o f  theory and one’s approach to theory in the context o f  an education 
intended to promote the integral development (formation) o f  the hum an person and the 
synthesis o f  faith, life and culture. It probably goes w ithout saying that theory is vitally 
necessary if  Catholic education is to understand and articulate its philosophy, to be in  a 
position to justify  its commonly accepted im plicit assum ptions, and be w illing to show  
how  fundam ental features o f  its vision are congruent w ith that philosophy and able 
legitim ately to support practice. One should worry about the identity and credibility o f  
Catholic education, and its defence against attacks from  outside sources, if  Catholic 
philosophy o f education fails to engage in intentional and explicit theorizing in m atters 
so central to its educational programme as integral hum an developm ent (form ation) and 
the synthesis o f  faith and culture.
68 This phrase is from the title of the Apostolic Constitution o f John Paul II, Ex Corde Ecclesiae, 1990.
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The Problem s o f  Over-Thematisation
The problem s w ith over-thematisation need to be underlined, at least in passing. 
Focusing attention on a topic such as ‘integral hum an form ation’, or the ‘synthesis o f 
faith and culture’, or the ‘construction o f  an educative com m unity’, by selecting the 
particular topic as a key theme in discourse, by discussing it extensively, by associating 
it w ith other related themes and topics, by building it into a larger fram ew ork o f 
discourse, is a ‘philosophical’ approach in a sense, that seeks understanding and 
appreciation o f  the central themes in a programme. It may not, however, be sufficient if  
one’s intention is to propose a theory that can serve to articulate and critique a practice, 
such as for example, the educational distinctiveness and efficacy o f  the Catholic school. 
‘Theory’ (Greek, Gecopia, theorid) implies the kind o f  self-critical, speculative thought, 
that can construct an hypothesis, or form a conjecture, and rigorously submit that 
hypothesis to scrutiny and testing in the process o f  seeking to explicate or elaborate 
upon the m eaning o f a phenomenon or an event or series o f  events. The mere narration 
o f  a them e may prove inadequate to the elaboration o f  a com plex and m ulti-faceted 
reality such as integral human growth and development.
O ther problem s that might be connected with the over-them atisation o f  ‘form ation’, 
‘integration’, or ‘synthesis’, or ‘educative com m unity’, and so on, in the CCE literature 
include the following. Firstly, discourse w ith others outside one’s tradition is not 
necessarily m ade any easier simply by highlighting one’s own position relating to a 
topic or theme, though clearly frank and honest exchange is a necessary starting-point. 
But to achieve a level o f  agreement about meaning, or to agree a com m on strategy in 
relation to a com m on challenge, in the presence o f  a dominant conceptual model or 
framework, is no simple matter. Secondly, over-em phasis on a central them e can 
som etim es lead to a deformation or caricature o f  one’s own position and im proper 
em phasis can lead to misunderstanding. A llied to this danger, there is always the risk 
that lim ited perspective means that other viewpoints and areas o f  investigation are being 
neglected or prematurely excluded. Thirdly, focusing solely on one’s ow n chosen topic, 
or selected m ethodology for its study, m ay be symptom atic o f  a lack o f  critique o f  one’s 
ow n position, or even a reflection o f one’s own confusion and lim ited understanding o f  
an issue. Finally, genuine problems are inevitably occasioned by a dom inant them e that 
cannot be debated adequately because of, either inadequacy w ith respect to the 
developm ent o f  a theoretical framework, or a perceived threat considered to belong
integrally and ineradicably to the key notion or theme in question. Thus, for exam ple, 
one can imagine that the theme o f ‘form ation’ might be regarded by some as being 
incapable o f  adequately accounting for other basic notions such as ‘developm ent’, 
‘grow th’, ‘m aturation’, etc. And ‘form ation’ would certainly hold for others a threat to 
the freedom  and autonomy o f the person, such that his/her very hum anity m ight be 
considered at risk in the absence o f  education targeting these goals as a priority.
In addition to a surfeit o f  thematisation about, for exam ple, the ‘form ation o f the hum an 
person’, or the ‘synthesis o f  faith and culture’, the absence, o r dow n-playing o f  critical 
reflection, as suggested, must obviously be seen as a contributory cause to the ‘under­
theorising’ o f  discourse on these important matters in the CCE docum entation. By 
‘under-theorising’ I mean the absence, by and large, o f  any sustained attem pt at 
providing an adequate definition, or paradigm, or model o f  what, for exam ple, the 
‘integral developm ent o f the human person’, or the ‘synthesis o f  faith and culture’, 
m ight connote, and the consequent failure to articulate an explicit theoretical foundation 
for these key notions so that they might be better understood and be available to 
Catholic educators and others as a useful focus for their work.
CCE discourse did have available in the Thom ist-A ristotelian educational tradition a 
theory, or rather a ‘m eta-theory’, the well-known ‘hylom orphic theory’, which it m ight 
have chosen to re-articulate and promote thinking about integral hum an developm ent 
for our tim es, but wisely declined to do so. By ‘m eta-theory’ (Greek, meta, beyond, or 
transcending) is meant here theory that defines the context in w hich theoretical concepts 
are constructed, somewhat akin to the way the architect’s plans define how  a building is 
to be constructed. The function o f ‘m eta-theory’ is to provide a source o f  concepts out 
o f  w hich theories and methodologies can grow, and to give guidelines that may provide 
consistency and avoid conceptual confusion. W illis F. O verton has defined ‘m eta­
theory’ m ore concisely as, ‘a set o f rules, principles, or a narrative that both describes 
and prescribes what is acceptable and unacceptable as theory’, that is, it is the m eans o f 
conceptual exploration in a scientific dom ain.69 W hen a m eta-theory’s key ideas are 
tightly inter-related and form a coherent set o f  concepts, the set is often referred to as a 
‘m odel’ or ‘paradigm ’. The coherency o f  a paradigm  and its breadth o f  application in
69 See, Willis F. Overton, “Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology”, p. 21. In, 
R. M. Lemer (ed.), Theoretical Models o f  Human Development, Vol. 1, Handbook o f  Child Psychology, 
New York: Wiley, 2006 (6th edn.).
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tu rn  contribute to the elucidation o f a ‘w orldview ’ ( Weltanschaaung) w hich w ould 
additionally contain specific sets o f  ontological and epistem ological principles.
One good reason why the CCE discourse was wise not to have engaged explicitly w ith 
‘m eta-theory’, o f a Scholastic or any other kind, is because there appears to  be little 
enthusiasm  today for ‘m eta-theory’. A m ajor them e in the work o f Jean-Fran^ois 
Lyotard is the total opposition to any attempt to establish wide-ranging, coherent, 
definitive theories and interpretations w hich ideally can provide an answ er to all our 
questions.70 According to theorists such as Lyotard, we live, not in ‘m odernity’, but in 
‘post-m odernity’, and our existence is characterized by the rejection o f  ‘grand 
narratives’, including all the major systems o f religious, political, or cultural ideas 
w hich have been used to under-pin social and political institutions, practices, and 
intellectual styles. Furthermore, Lyotard’s belief in the ‘incom m ensurability o f various 
forms o f  discourse’ means that a consensus that can serve as an objective basis for 
conceptions o f  truth or justice is not even ideally attainable.71
Under-developed, or at least, not emphatic enough, about its philosophical basis, though 
clearly belonging to the Thom ist-Aristotelian tradition (legacy) and inform ed by its 
m ajor principles o f reality (metaphysics), knowledge (epistem ology) and value 
(axiology), Catholic philosophy o f  education as depicted in  the CCE discourse, needs 
the kind o f  input from, among others, the three scholars whose work was exam ined 
earlier in this thesis, if  it is to provide philosophical conviction in respect o f  the declared 
over-arching aims o f that authoritative discourse, not least in the context o f 
postm odem ity. One must not, o f course, give the im pression that no philosophical 
reflection, other than a watered-down Thom ism  perhaps, has been em ployed in the 
construction and elaboration o f the CCE discourse. Internal evidence in the form  o f  
analysis o f  the vocabulary and thematic expression o f  the docum ents com prising this 
discourse w ould suggest the strong influence o f  personalism  (broadly defined) at work 
in the com position o f  this discourse. The philosophical personalism  o f  John Paul II, 
probably acquired from his reading o f M ax Scheler, is clearly evident, not least in the 
frequent citation by the authors o f  key statements that reflect the pope’s personalist
70 See, Jean-Fran9ois Lyotard, The Post-Modern Condition, 1979.
71 See, Thomas Mautner (ed.), The Penguin Dictionary o f  Philosophy, London: Penguin Books, 2005 (2nd 
edn.)
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position.72 Granted, however, that there is some level o f philosophical foundation in the 
CCE discourse, the question would still remain about its adequacy.
CCE Discourse and an Appeal to Contemporary Philosophers
The explicit theoretical articulation and interpretation o f CCE discourse may leave 
m uch to be desired, but this is a situation w hich can be rectified to some extent by the 
em ploym ent o f  selected aspects o f  the work o f  scholars like those studied in chapters 
two, three and four o f this dissertation. This in summary is the argum ent proposed in 
this second part o f  the final chapter o f this thesis.
Having suggested that the CCE discourse suffers from  an un-acceptable level o f  under- 
theorisation, m y argument draws on, respectively, (1) M aritain’s perennial and 
prescriptive/norm ative discourse to provide a m ore deliberative basis to the largely 
utopian, visionary discourse o f  the CCE corpus relating to the ‘integral form ation o f  the 
hum an person ' (Section IV below); (2) Lonergan’s intentionality analysis and cognitive 
theory which, together with his understanding o f  ‘culture’, w ould seem to m irror a 
m odel o f  integration that could support the CCE injunction to Catholic education to 
prom ote a ‘synthesis o f  faith, life and culture’ (Section V), and (3) M cLaughlin’s 
‘phronetic discourse’, to ensure discernment, balanced judgm m ent and appropriate 
decision-m aking in matters relating to the construction o f  ‘a Catholic educational /
73educative / educating com m unity’ (Section VI).
M cLaughlin above all envisages a perspective on a Catholic philosophy o f education 
that can perhaps steer us through the difficulties that have just been narrated. His 
phronetic approach would attempt to provide ‘a distinctively Catholic systematic 
account o f  the nature and role o f education’, one that ‘draws not only upon the 
philosophical resources’ o f  notable Catholic thinkers, ancient and m odem , but which 
also ‘addresses directly matters o f  current educational concern’.74 And it would be a 
Catholic philosophy that would ‘stand alongside other philosophical approaches’ and 
seek to ‘illuminate the nature not merely o f  Catholic education, but o f  education as 
such5.75 Such a philosophy o f  education would am ount to a reflection on Catholic
72 It is beyond the remit of this dissertation to pursue this interesting line of thought but it is obviously 
something that is worth studying in greater depth.
73 GE (J965), No. 8.
74 “The Distinctiveness of Catholic Education”, p. 139
75 Ibid., p. 139.
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educational thought that also took seriously Lonergarfs injunction (first expressed by 
him  in relation to the development of Catholic social thought) that the richness and 
depth o f  Catholic thinking be ‘transposed into a m ore contem porary and adequately 
theoretical context’, by undergoing ‘a new  effort o f  analysis and synthesis’76. Any ‘new 
effort o f  analysis and synthesis’ would at the same tim e be obliged, in the interests o f 
the continuity o f  the tradition, to preserve the ‘basic elem ents’ o f  the tradition as 
represented by M aritain, for example, and would have to construct theoretical and 
m ethodical structures consonant with up-to-date scientific and technical knowledge, in 
order to become a genuine response to historical process and to dem onstrate the extent 
to w hich it was capable o f  operating ‘at the level o f  the tim es’.77
IV
Maritain and the CCE Aim of Integral Formation of the Human Person
Jacques M aritain’s work allows the Catholic philosopher o f  education to adopt a 
‘herm eneutic o f  continuity’ vis-à-vis the Catholic tradition o f  educational thinking, as 
he or she attempts to renew  the tradition for our times. M aritain’s influence is already 
clearly visible in key features o f  the CCE literature and perhaps now here m ore so than 
in the declared aim o f this corpus to seek, through the integral Christian hum anism  o f 
the com m unity that is the Catholic school, the ‘integral form ation o f  the hum an 
person’.78 M aritain provides the CCE educational discourse w ith a norm ative, or 
prescriptive, element that many, in the interest o f  continuity in the tradition, consider 
essential to the nature o f Catholic philosophy o f education. He unhesitatingly offers a 
vigorous, philosophically defended conception o f  w hat the aim s and activities o f 
education ought to be, as we have already seen in chapter two above. The setting free o f  
the individual to enable him  or her to become a hum an person, enlightened in intellect 
and strengthened in will, is a priority in M aritain’s educational philosophy.
M aritain’s prescriptions for education derive from his Thom ist ‘utopian’ vision and the 
set o f metaphysical, epistemological and axiological principles he identified there and 
rigorously applied to the field o f  education. M aritain, as E llis A. Joseph expresses it,
76 See: Patrick D. Brown, Aiming Excessively High and Far: The Early Lonergan and the Challenge of 
Theoiy in Catholic Social Thought”, in Theological Studies, Vol. 72, No. 3, 2011, pp. 620-644 (622).
77 Ibid., pp. 643-644.
78 EC (J943),p. 88.
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‘dares to philosophize about education during a tim e o f  flux, crisis, and am bivalence’; 
he dares ‘to use the imperative when recom m ending a practical course o f  action’, and he 
dares, qua philosopher, ‘to descend to the level o f  practical educational considerations 
at a tim e when such a descent is perhaps m ost discouraging’.79 W e have at our 
com mand, M aritain wrote, ‘a vast and continually augm enting treasure o f  instructions’ 
from w hich it is possible to draw ‘guidance o f  the highest value’, and a philosophy 
‘thoroughly adapted to the needs o f  m odem  civilization’.80
M aritain, as we have seen, takes it for granted that a set o f  philosophical prem ises can 
generate a com prehensive and consistent educational programm e and that, not ju st for 
the Catholic school, but for all true education as he understood it. In one o f  his m ost 
extensive articles on the subject, “Thomist Views on Education” , M aritain makes a clear 
distinction between ‘principles’ and ‘practice’ and systematically devotes as much 
attention to the ‘application o f principles’ to educational practice as he does to the 
‘stating o f  the principles’.81 In common w ith m any other contem porary ‘-ism s’, such as 
pragm atism  and its support for ‘progressive education’, sometimes in dialogue with 
these philosophies, and acknowledging their achievem ents when these are not coloured 
by ‘prejudice or ideological intemperance’, yet always firm ly based on an all-or-nothing 
com m itm ent to Thomism, M aritain offers a quite explicit account o f  how  education 
ought to proceed, what it is for, and whose interests it ought to serve.
Maritain, the CCE Discourse and ‘Formation’
The ‘integral form ation o f  the human person’ is, as mentioned, a them e o f the CCE 
discourse where aspects o f M aritain’s Thom ist philosophy appear to have been 
influential. M aritain’s conception o f the person, allied to his notion o f  Christian 
hum anism , m ight potentially have been able to strengthen the CCE discourse in respects 
called for in this dissertation, had his ideas been acknow ledged explicitly or som ehow 
reflected m ore distinctly in the CCE narrative. W ith regard to this particular CCE 
theme, w hat is arguably the most problem atic elem ent is its w idespread use, w ithout
79 Ellis A. Joseph, “The Philosophy of Catholic Education”, pp. 27-63 (45). In, Thomas C. Hunt, Ellis A. 
Joseph and Ronald J. Nuzzi (ed.s), Handbook o f  Research on Catholic Education, Westport, CONN: 
Greenwood Press, 2001.
80 Jacques Maritain, “Catholic thought and its mission”, Thought, Vol. IV, 1930 (b), p. 538.
81 Jacques Maritain, “Thomist Views on Education”, pp. 57-90. In: Nelson Henry (ed.), Modern 
Philosophies and Education: The Fifty-fourth yearbook o f the National Society fo r  the Study o f  
Education, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955.
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Firstly, it should be noted that it is ‘form ation’, and not ‘developm ent’, that is the 
preferred term  used in the CCE discourse in reference to the them e o f  the integral 
growth and developm ent o f the human person. By contrast, the word ‘developm ent’ is 
em ployed relatively little on its own, and when used it is alm ost always in a subsidiary 
role, and within the context o f the meaning o f  the more com prehensive and all- 
em bracing term, ‘form ation’. This is an im portant point to note because it means that 
‘developm ent’ in this instance has to be read within the context of, or against the 
background o f a term  with a long and unique history o f  antecedent meaning.
Secondly, although at first sight there m ight seem to be very little to be concerned about 
in the choice o f  the ideal o f ‘formation o f  the hum an person’ as a goal for education in 
the Catholic school, the matter is not in reality that straight-forward. Traditionally this is 
a vision to w hich Catholic educators have subscribed and though some, even among 
those com m itted to Catholic education, may question the feasibility o f  actually, or fully, 
achieving such a high ideal in schooling in contem porary society, they are unlikely to 
share the kind o f  deep reservations about a range o f  issues to w hich others, who object 
to faith schools in any form, are likely to entertain. Catholic educators and leaders 
would presum ably, however, have to be quite com fortable in adm itting that discourse 
about ‘form ation’ necessarily entails, to use the term inology o f  G eertz and others, such
83as M cLaughlin, a ‘thick description’ o f  the character o f  Catholic education.
Argum ents for and against faith schools involve a range o f  com plex and overlapping 
issues, including philosophical issues, that are beyond the scope o f  this thesis to discuss. 
But as far as ‘form ation’ is concerned we are as well to adm it from the beginning that 
discourse about education in terms of ‘form ation’ necessarily constitutes ‘thick 
description’, and that, as such, it is likely to be problem atical in one sense or another for 
some educators today.
Thirdly, there is no easy or facile way o f escaping the inevitable consequences o f  such a
82 See GE(196S), No.s 1, 2, 3, 5, 8; CS (1977), No.s 8, 12, 14, 15, 19, 26, 29„ 30 ,31 ,32 ,35 , 36,45; ZCS 
(1982), No.s 3, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 28; RDECS 0988), No.s 1, 4, 48, 50, 51, 56, 63, 98, 99; CSTTM 
(1997), No.s 4, 9, 10; CPMS (2002), No.s 18, 19,31,33, 34, 35, 38; ETCS (2007), No.s 1,2, 8, 12, 13,
14.
83 Clifford Geertz “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture”, The Interpretation o f  
Cultures, New York: Basic Books, 1973, pp. 3-32. Geertz acknowledges his indebtedness to Gilbert Ryle 
for the concept, ‘thick description’ (pp. 6-7). McLaughlin, in Liberalism, Education and Schooling uses 
the epithet frequently in relation to theories of the good; see, for example, pp. 52, 54, 55, 149, 263.
82explicit definition or description, of the term ‘formation’ throughout the corpus.
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position. W hat we are faced with in such discourse, is, if  I may borrow  G eertz’s words 
from  another context, ‘a multiplicity o f  conceptual structures, m any o f  them  super­
im posed upon or knotted into one another, w hich are at once strange, irregular, and
84inexplicit, and w hich one must contrive som ehow first to grasp and then to render’.
The m atter at issue here is whether Catholic philosophers o f  education like M aritain 
have brought any degree o f clarity into this area, that is, whether, in fact, they have 
effectively articulated and evaluated the underlying ‘conceptual structures’ related to a 
them e such as the integral formation o f  the hum an person. To ‘grasp and then to render 
[m eaningful]’ is by no means straight-forward in the case o f  analysis o f  the term 
‘form ation’. A  real problem with a com prehensive doctrine such as ‘form ation’, 
entailing as it does ‘a particular, overall, thick or substantive vision o f  the good life as a 
w hole’, to quote M cLaughlin in another context,85 is the set o f  assum ptions the concept 
m ust bear in its train.
Clearly, m uch depends upon what is to be understood by the term  ‘form ation’ and the 
specific context in which it is used, and for this reason the historical antecedents o f  its 
origin, m eaning and usage are also o f some significance. W hile it w ould be interesting 
to speculate on how the contemporary CCE discourse on Catholic education, in its 
attem pt to them atise the concept o f ‘form ation’ (rather casually), m ay have simply 
recapitulated and repeated earlier discourse o f  this Congregation related to a quite 
different project and a different context, namely, the form ation o f  candidates for the 
priesthood in seminaries, the matter m ust be left aside in  the present context. Suffice it 
to rem ark that there are quite clear parallels between the CCE discourse on the ‘integral 
form ation o f  the human person’ and the ‘Four P illars’ model o f  priestly  formation, 
involving ‘the human, spiritual, intellectual and pastoral form ation o f  persons’, 
proposed in the Instruction on Fundamental Norms fo r  Priestly Formation , also 
published by the CCE, in 1970.86
It m ay not be entirely a m atter o f  coincidence that a docum ent on the form ation and 
education o f  candidates for the priesthood was in fact prom ulgated by the CCE, the 
same Congregation that has authored the series o f  educational docum ents that are the
84 Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description”, p. 10.
85 Terence H. McLaughlin, “Education, Spirituality, and the Common School”, Liberalism, Education 
and Schooling, p. 241.
86 See Vatican II Decree on Priestly Formation (1965); Instruction on Fundamental Norms for Priestly 
Formation, CCE, 1970; John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation Pastores dabo vobis, 1992; USCCB, The 
Programme o f Priestly Formation, 2006.
228
subject o f  consideration in this chapter. W hether there is a com m on thread o f thought 
about ‘integral formation o f  persons’ that runs through all the publications o f this body, 
despite the substantial differences surrounding the intended audience and readership, is 
a m atter that would be worth further study. That the suitability o f  the ‘Four P illars’ 
model o f  form ation proposed for the formation o f  clergy should be assumed, if  that in 
fact w as what was envisaged, as also suitable for the task o f  the Catholic school in the 
form ation o f  children and young people, is certainly a m atter meriting further critique.
The difficulties o f  this situation are compounded by the absence from the CCE literature 
on the Catholic school o f any kind o f inquiry relating to the nature o f  the under-lying 
theory, or model, or paradigm upon which the integral form ation o f  the human person 
m ight be based. It may well be that the CCE corpus o f  educational literature adopts the 
strategy that it is often more useful to eschew  formal definition o f  a term, and instead 
adopt a w orking description that would delineate certain features o f the term and simply 
seek to account for its major constitutive elements. Because o f  its pronounced pastoral, 
exhortatory and generally ‘unscientific’ (in a narrow  sense) nature, CCE discourse 
w ould then offer us only a summary description o f  ‘integral human form ation’. W hether 
it has, in fact, done even this is, indeed, a m oot point.
In general, in what concerns ‘definition’, I agree w ith Geertz that although ‘it is 
notorious that definitions establish nothing’, in them selves they do, if  they are carefully 
enough constructed, ‘provide a useful orientation o f  thought’, such that an extended un­
packing o f  them  can be ‘an effective way o f  developing and controlling a novel line o f 
inquiry’.87 W hat is critically important about the CCE description and usage o f  the term 
‘integral hum an form ation’ is whether, to use G eertz’s words, it does in fact provide ‘a 
useful orientation o f thought’ and whether, when ‘un-packed’, it does suggest ‘an 
effective way o f developing a line o f enquiry’. I would argue that it can only do so with
the aid o f  M aritain’s discourse that explicitly focuses upon ‘an education that deals w ith
88the form ation o f  man and the inner liberation o f  the hum an person’.
Maritain’s Theoretical Support for Formative Education in the Catholic Tradition
Integral hum an formation, by means o f  the synthesis o f  faith, culture, and life is a 
norm ative dim ension and requirement o f  Catholic philosophy o f  education in the CCE
87 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation o f Cultures, p. 90.
88 EC (1943), p. 91.
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discourse.89 These are elements regarded as belonging to the nature, or essence, o f  the 
discipline, which are a sine qua non for the Catholic philosopher o f  education, today as 
in the past. M aritain’s work provides a theoretical basis that is highly consistent with the 
Thom ist-Aristotelian tradition o f educational thinking from whence these requirements 
o f  Catholic education originate. Two aspects o f  M aritain’s thinking on The education o f 
m an’ may be singled out for brief commentary, nam ely, his ‘personalistic ontology’, 
and his ‘integral Christian hum anism ’.90
(1) Maritain’s ‘Personalistic Ontology’
Just as usage o f  the term ‘form ation’ in the CCE discourse is not w ithout its problems, 
so, too, the notion o f ‘person’ assumed by this discourse can be the occasion o f  
disagreem ent and debate. The CCE discourse represents in one sense a development, at 
least in emphasis, from the traditional notion o f  the person fam iliar to Catholic 
philosophy o f education from its Thomist legacy. The CCE discourse evidences the 
influence o f  twentieth century re-focusing in Catholic theology on understanding the 
nature o f  humanity, where the constructs o f Thom istic philosophy appear to have been 
sidelined to be replaced by a more biblically based understanding o f  the human person 
and a ‘personalist’ philosophy, which understands the human person from a 
phenom enological perspective, not just in terms o f ‘rationality’, but equally importantly 
in term s o f  ‘relationality’ and the search for authentic hum an fulfilment.
One distinctive feature in M aritain’s account o f  m etaphysics, W illiam  Sweet believes, is 
the em phasis he places on ‘the act o f existing’.91 This em phasis lends an important 
‘existentialist’ dim ension to his philosophy, and that is significant in relation to his 
educational thinking. Sweet has described M aritain’s em phasis on the value o f  the 
hum an person as a form o f ‘personalism ’, which he regarded as a via media between 
individualism  and socialism.92 In The Person and the Common Good , M aritain 
describes ‘personality’ as ‘the subsistence o f  the spiritual com m unicated to the hum an 
com posite’.93 M aritain’s theory o f subsistence provides a m etaphysical account o f  the 
personhood o f  the human subject. He appears to fully concur w ith the definition o f  the 
‘person’ as ‘an individual substance o f  a rational nature’ (rationalis naturae individua
89 See, for example, LCS (1982), No.s 18, 20; CPMS (2002), No. 60.
90 EC (1943), p. 102.
91 William Sweet, “Jacques Maritain”, p. 7.
92 Ibid., p. 17.
93 Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947, p. 27.
substantia) proposed by Boethius in the early part o f  the sixth century and subsequently 
adopted by Aquinas. This definition obviously im plies that every hum an being is a 
person since every human being is (to em ploy Boethius’s philosophical language) an 
individual substance o f  a rational nature. But the definition betokens a more static 
notion o f  the person than contemporary philosophy or psychology would subscribe to.
A key notion in M aritain’s discussion o f  the person is that o f  ‘hum an freedom 5.94 For 
M aritain, the ‘end5 o f humanity is to be free, not in the sense o f  licence or pure rational 
autonomy, but in terms o f the realisation o f  the hum an person in accord w ith his or her 
nature.95 It is fair to say that M aritain considered that in a great deal o f  m odem  
philosophy m ore emphasis is laid on freedom  than on self-consciousness as the chief 
characteristic o f  the human person. As Frederick Copleston puts it, in m uch m odem  
philosophy o f  the person (as, for example, in the case o f  Em manuel M ounier), hum an 
freedom  is regarded as the efficient cause o f  personality, or at least as its necessary 
condition, for personality is looked upon as something to be created and maintained. 96
M aritain believes that by the effort o f his intelligence and will each person can enhance 
his personal worth, become more o f a person, grow in humanity, and orient h im self 
tow ard his ultim ate goal o f full hum anisation.97 This belief is clearly reflected in the 
CCE discourse on Catholic education. Yet, there would appear to be at the heart o f  this 
educational vision an inevitable tension betw een a conceptualisation o f  ‘form ation5 w ith 
Scholastic antecedents, and a more holistic and evolutionary notion o f  the hum an 
‘person5 being assisted toward the goal o f  ‘full hum anisation5. To what extent the CCE 
discourse, appreciating this tension, has used it in a creative fashion to elaborate a 
m odel o f  hum an formation, is a matter requiring m uch further debate.
(2) Maritain and ‘Integral Christian Humanism’
M aritain considered education some seventy years ago to be standing ‘at the 
crossroads5, faced with the choice between freeing itse lf from the background o f  ‘an 
instrum entalist and pragmatist philosophy5, and becom ing engaged upon ‘a profoundly
94 William Sweet, “Jacques Maritain”, p. 17.
95 Ibid., p. 17.
96 Frederick C. Copleston, “The Human Person in Contemporary Philosophy”, Philosophy, Vol. 25, No. 
92 (Jan., 1950), pp. 3-19 (4).
97 See Paul VI, Populorum Progression 1976, No. 15.
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personalist and hum anist educational venture’.98 In M aritain’s view it was im perative 
that the institution o f  the school should take on board the im portant task o f  providing ‘a 
liberal education with regard to a new hum anism ’.99 For M aritain, ‘liberal education’ as 
he understood it, was not only ‘grounded on the essential value o f  m an’, but also upon 
its value in ‘meeting some specific needs o f the im mediate fu ture’, such as satisfying 
‘the thirst for a new  hum anism ’, ‘rediscovering the integrity o f  m an’ and ‘overcoming 
the threats o f  slavery and dehum anization’ which, in his opinion, contemporary 
civilization faced.100
The ‘integral hum anism ’ which M aritain posits as the salvation o f  mankind dem ands an 
‘integral education’, he tells us: ‘To correspond to this integral humanism, there should 
be an integral education’.101 For M aritain, ‘education has its own essence and its own 
aim s’.102 This ‘essence’ and these ‘essential aim s’ deal w ith ‘the form ation o f  m an and 
the inner liberation o f  the human person’.103 True education, ‘liberal education’, m ust 
provide the com m on man with the ‘means for his personal fulfilm ent’; it must seek to 
slake the ‘thirst for knowledge’ and the ‘thirst for social liberation’ o f  all, and this is 
‘one o f  the reasons why liberal education should be extended to a ll’.104 The real aim o f 
education is ‘to make m an’, and it should essentially aim at ‘liberating the hum an 
person’.105 M aritain is well aware o f  the m any dangers that threaten, and o f  the 
deficiencies that characterize the education o f  even dem ocratic countries, and ch ief 
am ong these he lists the danger o f  an education w hich w ould aim, ‘not at making man 
truly hum an’, but making him merely into ‘an organ o f  a technocratic society’. 106
The source o f  m uch that threatens and makes contem porary education deficient, 
according to M aritain, lies ultimately in the fact that, for m any people in a progressively 
‘secularised’ W estern society, w hich has experienced the loss o f  its Judaeo-Christian 
heritage, both civilisation and education suffer from a cleavage between ideals for living 
and acting and the reasons that justify these ideals .107 It has becom e difficult, if  not
9% EC (1943), p. 118.
99 EC (1943), p. 88.
100 Ibid., p. 88.
101 Ibid., p. 88.
]02 Ibid., p. 91.
103 Ibid., p. 91.
104 Ibid, p. 90.
105 Ibid, p. 100.
106 Ibid, p. 113.
107 Ibid, p. 117.
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im possible, M aritain feels, to show the world ‘how  human action m ay be reconciled 
with and perm eated by an ideal which is m ore real than reality’.108 Very largely 
responsible for this development, in M aritain’s view, is the trium ph o f what he 
describes in several places as ‘anthropocentric hum anism ’.109
M aritain sets out in several places a full account o f  ‘hum anism ’ and, in his prom otion o f  
the idea o f  ‘theo-centric’, or ‘integral hum anism ’, and specifically, ‘Christian 
hum anism ’, develops an understanding o f  it that is diametrically opposed to 
anthropocentric hum anism .110 Being well aware that the term  ‘hum anism ’ is susceptible 
to multiple definition, and lends itself to many different interpretations, M aritain offers 
this description o f  what the term means to him. Humanism , he m aintains
tends essentially to render man more truly human and to manifest his original greatness by 
enabling him to partake of everything in nature and in history capable o f enriching him. It 
requires both that man develop the latent tendencies that he possesses, his creative powers, and 
the life of reason; and that he work to transform into instruments o f his liberty the forces o f the 
physical universe.111
M aritain’s Christian personalist and hum anist discourse is apt for interpretation in term s 
o f  its possible contribution to the re-articulation o f  Catholic philosophy o f  education 
today. There can be little doubt about the impact M aritain has had upon the CCE corpus 
w here clear echoes o f  the kind o f  personalism  he espoused are to be found, still evident 
even w here it is now  over-laid by a more contem porary personalist doctrine. His 
Thom ist ontological commitment has made it possible for the authors o f  the CCE 
discourse to ensure that Catholic education continues in the long tradition o f  formative 
education that included liberal Bildung. A  teleological view o f  hum an nature and o f  the 
purpose o f  hum an living demands, in M aritain’s thinking, the highest and m ost 
harm onious development o f  the whole and com plete person.
M aritain’s liberal education focuses on the form ation o f  hum an beings in the first place 
and seeks to ensure for the person the freedom  to becom e truly human. Educators are 
enjoined not simply to transm it unrelated pieces o f  knowledge, nor m erely train their 
students in moral living, or the acquirement o f  technical skills and com petences. Their 
priority should rather be to develop the mind and will so that people can becom e
108 Ibid, p. 117.
109 See, Jacques Maritain, The Twilight o f  Civilization, London: Sheed & Ward, 1946.
110 See, Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1951; The Range o f  
Reason, London: Geoffrey Bles, 1953; integral Humanism, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1968.
1,1 Jacques Maritain, “The Twilight of Civilization”, London: Sheed & Ward, 1946, p. 3.
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persons. They should aim to develop a person’s capacity for autonom y and m ust be 
com m itted to forms o f  education that do not underm ine true, hum an and Christian 
autonomy. Each o f  these priorities and tasks are am ply reflected in the CCE discourse, 
if  not explicitly, certainly in an implicit vision sufficient to guide the practice o f 
Catholic education.112
M aritain’s Christian humanism provides a basis for the developm ent o f  the social, 
cultural and political dimensions o f human living. It addresses the form ation o f  the 
social aspect o f  hum an existence which com plem ents the individual and personal 
dim ension o f  the human condition. Here, M aritain’s com m itm ent to a natural law  
tradition, that claims common and universal principles are rooted in hum an nature and 
can be known by all, may make his prescriptions for a new  kind o f  society less 
acceptable today when there is little or no agreem ent about the nature o f  the good for 
hum an beings. M aritain seems, though, to have anticipated the objections that w ould be 
made to his new  civilization founded on Christian hum anism , on the basis o f  cultural 
and religious pluralism, stating that humanity could agree upon certain basic tenets o f  ‘a 
practical dem ocratic faith’, such as ‘truth and intelligence, hum an dignity, freedom, 
brotherly love, and the absolute value o f the moral good’, even though people m ay have 
different or conflicting metaphysical or religious outlooks.113
Finally, while one might be tempted to conclude that M aritain’s vision o f  a new 
civilization based on Christian humanist values reflects in m any respects w hat Lonergan 
called a ‘classicist w orld-view’, because it is ultim ately a refusal to think and decide in 
‘historically-m inded’ terms, there is undoubtedly sufficient truth in M aritain’s perennial 
discourse, sympathetically interpreted, still to m erit the attention o f  Catholic philosophy 
o f  education today. M aritain desired, and argued for, ‘an integral education’ that w ould 
correspond to his ‘integral (Christian) hum anism ’. I f  we interpret ‘correspond’ along the 
lines o f  the everyday usage o f  the term, then M aritain may be understood to be 
dem anding some kind o f  constructive correlation, or interrelation, between his 
program m e o f Christian humanism and the existence and working out o f  the aims o f  the 
Catholic school.
For such a ‘correspondence’ to develop in practice, E llis A. Joseph specifies four goals
112 See, for example, CS (1977), No. 41; RDECS (1988), No. 49; ETCS (2007), No. 24;
113 Jacques Maritain, The Range o f Reason, London: Geoffrey Bles, 1953, pp. 165-71, 180-84.
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that ‘integral’ Catholic education will have to w ork towards. These are: the rem oval o f  
the rift between the ‘social claim ’ and the ‘individual claim ’ which is thought to blight 
m uch Catholic education; the development o f  a deep respect for hum an rights and 
hum an obligations; the reconciliation o f the vertical m ovem ent o f  the person tow ard 
eternal life and the horizontal movement o f  persons in the fulfilm ent o f  their proper 
temporal ends, and the ending o f  the cleavage between w ork or useful activity and ‘the 
blossom ing o f  the spiritual life and disinterested joy  in knowledge, truth and beauty’.114
These im peratives upon ‘integral Christian education’ pose a tw ofold challenge for the 
Catholic school. A n essentially humanistic education has to be offered to all while 
sim ultaneously this essentially formative experience m ust be adapted to the real life 
requirem ents o f  everyday living. For M aritain, it is the creation and m aintenance o f  an 
integral Christian humanism at the heart o f  its enterprise that enables the Catholic 
school, ‘at the risk o f  warping its truly educational w ork’, to accept ‘for the sake o f  the 
general w elfare’, the extraneous burdens superadded to the norm al task o f  education.115. 
Christian educators, M aritain tells us, have a twofold duty: They have both ‘to m aintain 
the essentials o f  humanistic education’ and ‘to adapt them  to the present requirem ents o f 
the com m on good’.116 M aritain’s vision o f  the school as a com m unity engaged upon an 
essentially educative task, namely, the integral form ation o f  the hum an person, and an 
institution com mitted to the accomplishm ent o f  the com m on good, rem ains the tem plate 
for Catholic education today.
This is M aritain’s legacy to Catholic education and the Catholic school, namely, the 
allocation o f  what he term s ‘the normal task o f  education’ together w ith the ‘im position 
o f  its superadded burdens’ arising out of, and for the sake o f  the com m on good. The 
Vatican II Declaration on Christian Education reflects very w ell this M aritainian 
com posite task o f  the Catholic school:
A true education aims at the formation of the human person in the pursuit o f his ultimate end and 
of the good of the societies o f which, as a man, he is a member, and in whose obligations, as an 
adult, he will share.117
114 Ellis A. Joseph, “The Philosophy of Catholic Education”, p. 50. In, Thomas C. Hunt, Ellis A. Joseph 
and Ronald J. Nuzzi (ed.s), Handbook o f Research on Catholic Education, 2001.The sentiment is 
attributed to Maritain.
115 EC (1943), p. 91.
116 Ibid., p. 91.
1,7 GE (1965), No. 1.
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V
Lonergan’s Cognitive Theory and the Integration / Synthesis of Faith and 
Culture
Brendan Carmody has suggested how Bernard Lonergan’s notion o f  self-transcendence 
m ight be able to contribute to the development o f  a fram ework for a new  approach to 
Catholic philosophy o f education.118 Lonergan’s cognitional theory and transcendental 
m ethod both suggest a line o f  inquiry that Catholic philosophy o f education m ight 
profitably follow  in its attempts to reflect on what m ight be involved in seeking to 
bolster and complement the CCE discourse in relation to the tw o-fold ‘integration’ it 
envisages when it speaks o f ‘a synthesis o f  culture and faith, and a synthesis o f  faith and 
life ’ as a prim ary task o f  the Catholic school.119 This task o f  integrating culture and faith 
is rated a key task o f the Catholic school, second only to that o f  the ‘hum an form ation’ 
o f  children and young people, by the Vatican II Declaration on Christian Education , 
which states that the ‘proper function’ o f  the school is ‘to order the whole o f  hum an 
culture to the news o f salvation so that the knowledge the students gradually acquire o f 
the world, life and man is illumined by faith’.120
As w e have seen in relation to other im portant tasks assigned to the Catholic school by 
the CCE discourse, none o f  its documents anywhere indicates in any extensive or 
explicit way the meaning intended by key terms in the task, nor do they suggest a 
m ethodology that might be pertinent to the accom plishm ent o f  the task, nor com m ent 
upon how  one might evaluate the success or otherwise o f  initiatives undertaken in 
furtherance o f  the task. This, even while making allowance for the peculiar genre o f  the 
CCE discourse and its aspirational intentions, must be regarded as a weakness in the 
discourse, at least as far as the purpose o f  re-articulation o f  Catholic philosophy o f 
education is concerned. Nevertheless, that deficiency is som ething that can be put right 
to some extent when the philosophers whose work was exam ined in the previous 
chapters are invited to engage in interrogation and dialogue w ith the CCE discourse. In 
the present instance, I turn to aspects o f  the w ork o f  Lonergan to exam ine how  some o f
118 Brendan Carmody SJ, “Towards a contemporary Catholic philosophy of education”, International 
Studies in Catholic Education, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Oct., 2011), pp. 106-119.
" 9 CS (1977), No. 37.
120 GE (1965), No. 8.
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his w ork might be used to reinforce the official, authoritative discourse o f  the CCE, 
notably its prescriptions relating to the synthesis o f  faith and culture, for the purpose o f  
giving new  expression to Catholic educational thought for today.
To begin with, what the CCE discourse says about this task o f  synthesis or integration is 
briefly indicated and the problematic nature o f its accom plishm ent in practice is noted. 
Then, Lonergan's cognitional theory, with its accurate analysis o f  hum an understanding 
is pu t forward as a fundamental, guiding principle for the integration o f  knowledge. It is 
suggested that, in conjunction with his understanding o f  ‘culture’, Lonergan’s 
transcendental method contains a sound philosophical basis upon w hich to develop the 
kind o f  integration o f faith and culture required by the CCE discourse. Lonergan’s 
transcendental method can provide a kind o f  fram ew ork and trajectory for the Catholic 
philosopher o f  education to enable him or her to focus on ‘w hat we are doing when we 
do philosophy o f  education’, and how that philosophizing m ight be perform ed in some 
authentic fashion.121
The Integration of Faith and Culture in CCE Discourse
The CCE corpus discusses the ‘integration’, or ‘synthesis, o f  faith and culture’ on
several occasions and it is undoubtedly a feature o f  the Catholic tradition that it is
122considered im portant to propose to Catholic educators for their attention. The 
underlying im petus and motivation for this integrative goal o f  Catholic education is 
evident in the encyclical, Fides et Ratio, and its b e lie f that ‘faith and reason are like two 
w ings on w hich the human spirit rises to the contem plation o f  tru th ’.123 God him self 
has ‘placed in the human heart a desire to know the truth, in a word, to know  h im se lf , 
so that by know ing and loving God, ‘people may come to fullness o f  truth about 
them selves’.124 CSTTM (1997) insists that ‘one o f  the m ost significant elem ents’ o f  the 
Catholic school’s educational project is ‘the synthesis between culture and faith’, a 
critically im portant aim, ‘since knowledge set in the context o f  faith becom es w isdom
121 See, Daniel Vokey, “What Are We Doing When We Are Doing Philosophy of Education?’, Paideusis, 
Vol. 15, No. 1 (2006), pp. 45-55. Vokey’s question is an adaptation o f Lonergan’s approach to 
cognitional theory and epistemology, which begins with the question, ‘What are we doing when we are 
knowing?’ (.Insight, 1958).
122 See, DIM (1929), No.s 80, 87, 95, 98; CS (1977), No.s 37-48; LCS (1982), No.s 20-21, 29-31; RDECS 
(1988), No.s 34, 49, 51-65; CSTTM (1997), Nos. 4, 14, 16-17; CPMS (2002), No.s 5, 6, 38, 39, 50, 53,
54, 60, 61, 68; ETCS (2007), No.s 3, 24.
125 John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Fides et Ratio, Faith and Reason, Introduction, 1998.
124 Ibid., Introduction.
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and life vision’.125 That docum ent explains that ‘the endeavour to interw eave reason and 
faith ’ makes for ‘unity, articulation and coordination’ and ‘brings forth w ithin what is 
learnt in school a Christian vision o f  the world, o f life, o f  culture and o f  history’.126
The problem  with this lofty vision o f integrative education in the Catholic school is not 
the vision as such, nor its foundations in traditional Catholic educational thinking, but 
rather the lack o f  clear-cut definition o f  term s in the CCE discourse and the absence o f 
even an outline methodology to be adopted in the pursuit o f  the desired goal. John 
Henry New m an, Christopher Dawson, and Jacques M aritain have all discussed the 
historical perspective and the theological and epistem ological bases on how  faith 
becomes ‘integrated’ w ith culture and how  that ‘synthesis’ o f  faith and culture is both 
justified and regarded as a definitive dim ension o f  Christian ed u ca tion .127 O f itself, o f 
course, an historical perspective on the question is hardly sufficient. A  range o f 
essentially epistemological issues needs to be exam ined both in relation to the terms 
‘integration’ and ‘synthesis’, and also in relation to the notions o f  ‘faith ’ and 
‘know ledge’. A  more extensive study o f  this m atter w ould need to ensure that 
epistemological reflection and critical theological insight are brought to  bear upon the 
relation o f ‘faith’ to ‘tru th’ and ‘knowledge’.
In keeping with the more m odest remit o f  this thesis, com m ent is confined to an 
exam ination o f  the usage and meaning o f the term s ‘integration’ and ‘synthesis’ in the 
CCE discourse on Catholic education and schooling and to a discussion o f  those aspects
o f  the w ork o f  Lonergan that may be helpful in  dealing with the very real difficulties
* ' 1 2 8  w hich arise here in pursuit o f  the vision o f  a ‘synthesis o f  faith, culture, and life’. To
begin with, it should not be too readily assumed, as it som etim es appears to be, that the
notion o f  ‘integration’ or ‘synthesis’ o f  faith and culture, deem ed to be entirely
characteristic o f  the goals o f  Catholic education, is self-evident and incurs no risk o f
m is-understanding or m is-statem ent.129 On the contrary, the concept is in  every respect
^  CSTTM (1997), No. 14.
126 Ibid , No. 14.
127 John Henry Newman, The Idea o f a University, ([1858], 1959; Christopher Dawson, Religion and 
Culture (1948), Religion and the Rise o f  Western Culture (1958), The Historic Reality o f  Christian 
Culture (1965); Jacques Maritain, Religion and Culture (1931), True Humanism (1938), The Twilight o f  
Civilization (1943), Degrees o f  Knowledge (1959).
128 CS (1977), No.s 37-43.
129 It should be noted that there is a tendency throughout the CCE discourse to use the terms ‘integration’ 
and ‘synthesis’ indiscriminately and inter-changeably.
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in need o f  interpretation and explanation if  am biguity and uncertainty are to be avoided. 
Yet, to clarify the meaning o f  either integration or culture is by no means straight­
forward. Similarly, several questions suggest them selves about the methodology 
envisaged in the CCE discourse for ‘developing a relationship between human culture 
and the message o f  salvation5, from which it is hoped students will gradually acquire 
‘knowledge o f  the world, o f life, and o f the human person illum inated by faith5.130
To the kind o f  questions that suggest themselves, however, no clear or fully articulated 
answ er appears evident in the CCE discourse. Thus, for exam ple, one wonders w hether 
what is intended is some form o f ‘curriculum integration5, or interdisciplinary, or 
m ultidisciplinary, or trans-disciplinary enquiry. There are occasional references in the 
Congregational documents to ‘interdisciplinary w ork5, one, for instance, to the effect 
that ‘interdisciplinary work has been introduced into Catholic schools w ith positive 
results5 because, it is said, there are ‘questions and topics that are not easily treated 
w ithin the limitations o f  a single subject area5.131 Thus, it is advised that ‘religious 
them es should be included5 [in interdisciplinary enquiry] when ‘they arise naturally in
132 *dealing with topics such as the human person, the family, society or history5. Even in 
this instance, the role o f religious education as an integrating discipline is not discussed 
at length, the docum ent in question m aintaining that ‘the prim ary m ission5 o f [religion 
teachers] m ust be ‘the systematic presentation o f  religion5.133 N evertheless, the 
docum ent adds, they can also be ‘invited, w ithin the limits o f  what is concretely 
possible, to assist in clarifying religious questions that come up in other classes5.134 The 
same CCE document, RDECS (1988), cites an address o f  John Paul II in which he 
speaks o f  the ‘need for religious instruction to be integrated into the objectives and 
criteria that characterize a modem  school5.135 Religious instruction, the pope said, 
should ‘seek appropriate interdisciplinary links w ith other course m aterial so that there 
is a co-ordination between human learning and religious aw areness5 such that, like other 
subjects, it too promotes culture.136
130 GE (1965), No. 8; RDECS (1988), No. 51.
131 RDECS (1988), No.s 64-65.
132 Ibid., No. 64
133 Ibid., No. 65
134 Ibid., No. 65
135 Address o f Pope John Paul II to the Priest o f the Diocese o f Rome, 1981. In, Insegnamenti, IV / 1, p. 
629.
136 Ibid.
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It m ust rem ain a m oot point as to whether this limited indication o f  what m ight be 
intended by ‘integration, or ‘synthesis’, o f  faith and culture throughout the CCE 
discourse is sufficient for the construction o f  an appropriate methodology. Such limited 
com m entary concerning what is a notoriously difficult issue, theoretically and 
pedagogically, in  the field o f  curriculum studies, does not rem ove the need for m ore 
extensive reflection on the nature, purpose and m ethodology o f  the ‘integration’ or 
‘synthesis’ o f  faith and culture as envisaged in the CCE discourse. It is likely, indeed 
necessary, that the CCE discourse needs to be com plem ented and provided w ith a 
greater degree o f  theorisation. This is a challenging task not ju st because o f the 
countless ways in which the concept of ‘integration’ is used in educational discourse 
and, indeed, in other areas o f human life.
Meaning of ‘Integration’ in an Educational Context
In a  sense, it is not at all surprising that the concept o f  ‘integration’ should occasion a 
challenge to those who wish to write about it in the context o f  Catholic education. The 
word has been used extensively in a variety o f  situations both w ithin and beyond the 
sphere o f  education. Thus, ‘integration’ is frequently encountered in contexts where 
there is question o f  merging, or fusing, or unifying, or otherw ise bringing together into a 
new relationship various elements and systems with the intention o f  achieving a greater 
degree o f  coherence. In social or cultural situations or environm ents ‘integration’ is 
encountered as the term o f choice for the policy o f  seeking greater inclusion or 
recognition for different ethnic, racial, cultural, or religious com munities, to form a 
reality that is somehow, as a result, more whole or com plete. In the educational realm 
that prim arily concerns us here, ‘integration’ is often em ployed to describe a process o f  
correlating or encom passing in a unified w hole a variety o f  realities o f  both a curricular 
or whole school nature, in pursuit o f  goals such as equality o f  opportunity, fairness, 
quality o f  learning through interdisciplinary or m ultidisciplinary studies.
The com plexity o f  the situation is obvious. This m ulti-contextual usage m ight indicate 
to some people that the term is too diffuse to prove o f  m uch value in m any situations.
On the other hand, such wide applicability m ight prove a strength since the versatility o f 
the concept m ust owe something to its potential for providing a description and 
explanation o f  the reality o f  such diverse situations. It is in this m ore positive vein that 
further elucidation o f  the meaning and usage o f  the term  ‘integration’ m ight be
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considered worthwhile in the present context. Nevertheless, the essential point is that 
w hen we analyse the use o f the concept ‘integration’ in the CCE discourse, we cannot 
be sure o f  which o f the many meanings o f  the term  - fusion or merging, inclusion or 
incorporation, correlation, harmonization, or simply association or joining - is intended.
It is scarcely the case that all these terms can be taken to share a com m on m eaning and 
so can be used indiscriminately. It is more likely true that each term  postulates a 
different kind o f  relationship resulting from  the activity in question, and that the m anner 
o f  correlating, the identity and status o f  the elem ents that are brought together, differ 
subtly in each case. It is not at all clear w hether any o f  these modes o f  integration is best 
suited to the particular form o f ‘integration’ o f  faith and culture envisaged in the CCE 
discourse. N either is it clear under what conditions any o f  these forms o f  ‘integration’ 
m ight be apt for the tasks o f ‘illuminating culture by faith’, or ‘bringing faith and 
culture into harm ony’, or ‘initiating appropriate dialogue between culture and faith’, or 
‘bringing forth within what is learnt in school subjects a Christian v ision’, or 
‘interpreting and giving order to human culture in the light o f  faith’, as required by this
117
discourse.
A Paradigm of Integrative Factors between Faith and Culture
A num ber o f  key questions need to be asked in  relation to ‘integration’ in general, and 
specifically in relation to the kind o f ‘integration’ that m ight most adequately represent 
the integration o f  faith and culture envisaged in the CCE discourse. Firstly, one m ight 
ask w hether a set o f ‘integrative factors’ can be identified w hich facilitates the 
phenom enon o f ‘integration’ in question and by w hat means. One w ould like to know  
what factors m ight contribute to the integration o f  faith and culture, if  these could be 
identified. Secondly, it would be useful to investigate the nature o f  the interaction or 
correlation that occurs when integration takes place successfully. A form  o f integration 
o f  particular relevance in the present context m ight be what has som etim es been 
referred to as ‘dialogical’ integration. Here, an im portant consideration is how  the 
correlating elements interact and interrogate each other. Finally, and specifically in 
relation to the integration o f knowledge originating from  different domains, one would 
like to be able to specify under what conditions such integration can take place.
137 GE (1965), No. 8; CS (1977), No 37; LCS (1982), No. 29; RDECS (1988), No.s 51-52; CSTTM (1997), 
No. 14 ; CPMS (2002), No.s 38, 54.
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The task o f  re-articulation o f  Catholic philosophy o f  education would do w ell to attem pt 
to construct a suitable paradigm that would have as its primary aim the provision o f  a 
fram ework that would enable one to understand the epistemological basis o f  the 
integration o f  faith and culture and, in addition, make available for Catholic educators a 
pathway and a m ethodical structure designed to prom ote integration in practice. W hat is 
required, in effect, is an understanding o f  hum an knowing that can, it m ight be argued, 
accommodate the major difficulties associated w ith the definition o f  both o f  these terms, 
‘integration’ and ‘culture’, and allow, also a m ethodology to be at least outlined for the 
accom plishm ent o f  this critical goal o f Catholic education. It is suggested that 
Lonergan’s cognitional theory might well be helpful in this regard and his thought can 
be briefly explored for the purpose of elucidating an integrative theory o f  Catholic 
education.
Lonergan and an Integrative Theory of Catholic Education
Richard Liddy m aintains that the ‘explanatory understanding o f  the dynam ics o f  hum an 
understanding’ in Lonergan’s Insight can provide ‘a way o f  knowing how the various 
areas o f  know ledge are related’.138 The hum an spirit’s basic ‘m ethod’ o f  knowing is the 
basis for the integration o f  all areas of know ing, Liddy believes.139 Lonergan traces the 
dynam ic m ethod o f  human knowing unfolding through the basic levels o f  experiencing, 
understanding, judging, and deciding. In scientific learning these basic levels unfold 
through the processes o f experimentation, hypothesis formation, and verification; in 
historical scholarship they are manifested through processes o f  research, interpretation, 
and historical judgm ent.140 Lonergan’s educational project is fundam entally grounded 
in, and m ethodologically sustained by, a philosophy o f  hum an consciousness w hich, 
arguably, is what constitutes the roots o f  all learning.141
In the introduction to Insight Lonergan w elcom es his readers to accom pany him  on a 
journey o f  exam ination o f  human consciousness and an analysis o f  the various 
intentional operations within consciousness (what philosophers today call ‘intentionality 
analysis’) so as to discover first-hand how  their m inds come to understand and how  one
138 Richard M. Liddy, “Bernard Lonergan on a Catholic Liberal Arts Education”, Catholic Education: A 
Journal o f  Inquiry and Practice, Vol. 3, No. 4 (June, 2000), pp. 521-532 (523).
139 Ibid., p. 523.
140 Ibid., p. 523.
141 Jeffrey M. Centeno, “Education as Leaming-to-Be: Reflections on Bernard Lonergan’s Transcendental
Philosophy of Education”. Downloaded from http://panl.multiplv.eom/iournal/item/3.
19.12.2011
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Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines
of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern,
142opening upon all further developments of understanding.
Lonergan insistently invites his readers to verify w ithin their own consciousness that 
this analysis, the basic method o f the human spirit’s activity o f  knowing, consisting o f 
experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, is correct.143 This is the structure o f  
our hum an consciousness and it is involved in every aspect o f  our know ing and doing.
If  it is correct, then, according to Liddy, this is ‘the basis for the integration o f  all areas 
o f  know ing’.144 A n accurate account o f  human interiority as it m anifests itse lf in the 
various methods employed by the human spirit, he believes, is the basis for ‘a 
philosophical vision strong enough to integrate the various scientific and scholarly 
m ethods’.145
The accurate analysis o f  human understanding as it takes place in the practice o f  the 
sciences and scholarly disciplines, as well as in ordinary living, is, in this interpretation, 
‘the principle for the integration o f the various disciplines’.146 Such know ledge o f  the 
basic structure o f  human consciousness allows a person o f  faith, Liddy proposes, ‘to 
sublate all the other areas o f  human knowing into a faith v ision’.147 Such a ‘sublation’, 
concludes L iddy’s reading o f Lonergan, ‘acknowledges the proper autonomy o f all
* • * 148 ,these other areas, but it also sets them w ithin the higher view point o f  faith’. Thus, 
Lonergan’s notion o f ‘sublation’ is critical for his understanding o f  how  the integration 
o f  faith and culture might be conceived .149 Lonergan sees Christian faith as itse lf a 
principle o f  sublation in its effects upon the whole o f  hum an living. Intellectual, moral, 
and religious conversion (or transformation) brings about a developm ent o f  the 
assim ilative pow er o f heightened consciousness. The hum an subject is thereby enabled 
to orientate and relate all understanding and learning to new  reference frames, the 
frames o f  intelligibility, truth, value, goodness, and eventually, G od .150
might obtain awareness into the meaning and experience of insight.
142 Insight, pp. xxviii and 748.
143 See, Bernard Lonergan, “The Self-Affirmation of the Knower”, Insight, ch. XI, pp. 319-417.
144 “Bernard Lonergan on a Catholic Liberal Arts Education”, p. 523.
145 Ibid., p. 523.
146 Ibid., p. 525.
147 Ibid., p. 525.
148 Ibid., p. 525.
149 Method in Theology, p. 240.
150 “Bernard Lonergan on a Catholic Liberal Arts education”, p. 530.
Denis K lein has approached Lonergan’s understanding o f  the ‘integration o f  faith and 
culture’ from the point o f  view o f his understanding o f  ‘culture’.151 Lonergan, according 
to Klein, sees culture as originating within the dynam ic intentional structure o f human 
consciousness. The dynamic operational structure o f  conscious human intentionality
152 *functions as ‘the source and wellspring o f  hum an meaning and value’. Such meanings 
and values supply the very ‘s tu ff  that constitutes culture. The function o f  culture is to 
‘discover, express, validate, criticize, correct, develop, and improve m eaning and
153value’. . Lonergan’s explanatory approach to culture in term s o f  its origin w ithin the 
hum an subject would seem to mirror a model o f  integration in human intentionality 
analysis. The elements o f  a theory o f integration correlate with, are defined in term s of, 
and can be isomorphically traced back to some elem ent within the dynam ic and 
invariant structure o f conscious human intentionality.154
Lonergan and ‘Active Method’: ‘Constructing one’s world’.
Closely related to his understanding o f ‘integration’, indeed, a more com prehensive 
perspective within which integration might be situated, is Lonergan’s conception o f 
how  the hum an subject ‘constructs his own w orld’.155 Lonergan believes that education 
is fundam entally a matter o f  helping subjects to construct their own world, even their 
ow n reality, by attaining to personal developm ent through expanding their horizons.156 
This is the ‘element o f  fundamental tru th’ that, he says, is to be found in ‘active 
m ethods’ in education, namely, the conviction that ‘learning helps subjects to construct 
their own w orld \ 157 Lonergan’s remarks about subjects ‘constructing their own w orld’ 
have to be read in the context o f  his over-arching position relating to cognition and 
hum an development. It will be recalled how Lonergan understood that what makes 
hum ans human is the breakthrough to intellectual consciousness and the possibility o f  
the em ergence o f  insight. ‘Fundamental potentialities in the subject’ lie at the root o f  
hum an developm ent and this process Lonergan interprets in  term s o f  the invariant three­
fold self-assembling cognitional structure, w ith its levels o f  cognitional activity
151 Denis Klein, “Concepts of Culture: Lonergan and the Anthropologists”, METHOD: Journal o f  
Lonergan Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, March, 1991, pp. 23-43.
152 Ibid., p. 38.
153 Method in Theology, p. 32.
154 Denis Klein, “Concepts of Culture”, p. 39.
155 Topics, pp. 104 -105.
156 Ibid., p. 104.
157 Ibid., p. 104-105.
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(experience, understanding, judging or reflecting, deciding) and its own sets o f
158operations.
‘Active m ethod’, as understood by Lonergan, takes account o f  the fact that knowing is 
not a single activity, but a dynamic, cumulative process consisting o f  these distinct but 
functionally related components. Insight, that ‘supervening act o f  understanding’ is not, 
for Lonergan, a mere mental activity, but a real constituent factor in hum an knowledge. 
Insight’s function in cognitional activity is so central that ‘to grasp it in its conditions, 
its workings, and its results’, is to confer a basic yet startling ‘unity’ on the whole field 
o f  hum an inquiry and hum an opinion.159
Lest Lonergan be considered to entertain an extreme ‘constructivist’ view  o f learning in 
his claim  that ‘education helps the subject construct his own w orld’, perhaps one should 
attempt to clarify what it is likely his true position m ight be. ‘Contructivism ’ has been 
considered by Catherine Twomey Fosnot to be based on an epistem ology that regards 
knowledge as ‘temporary, developmental, non-objective, internally constructed, and 
socially and culturally m ediated’.160 It is a psychological theory that construes learning 
as an interpretive, recursive, non-linear building process by active learners interacting 
with their physical and social world. As a psychological theory o f  learning it describes 
how  structures, language, activity, and m eaning-m aking come about, rather than one 
that simply characterises the structures and stages o f  thought.161
It is undoubtedly true that some aspects o f  constructivism  as it is so described 
accurately reflect features o f  the theory o f  learning envisaged by Lonergan in his term 
‘active m ethod’. N evertheless, even allowing for the fact that he m ight be in agreement, 
for exam ple, about the nature o f knowledge and m eaning as ‘developm ental’, ‘internally 
constructed’, and ‘socially and culturally m ediated’, for Lonergan, constructivism  as a 
theory will stand or fall by the degree o f  its fit to the principles and processes o f  his 
cognitional theory. In any case, it is unlikely that Lonergan would support any 
widespread and uncritical acceptance o f  constructivism  as it is com m only understood 
today.
158 It should be noted that the later Lonergan, writing in Method in Theology, for instance, speaks in terms 
of four levels o f cognitional activity. The additional level, deliberation and decision, though it is 
mentioned, is not yet given prominence in Topics in Education.
159 Insight, p. ix.
160 Catherine Twomey Fosnot (ed), Constructivism: Theory, Perspectives, and Practice, New York: 
Teachers College Press, 1996, pp. ix, 3.
161 Ibid., see especially chapter 2, “Constructivism: A Psychological Theory o f Learning”.
245
Keith Roscoe suggests that Lonergan’s theory o f cognition can inform the current 
debate by suggesting ways in which the views o f  constructivists and realists can be 
appreciated and the gap between them bridged.162 Roscoe argues that Lonergan’s theory 
o f  cognition, w hich sees human knowing not as a single operation but as a dynamic 
integral whole o f  the operations o f  experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding, 
overcom es the ‘false dichotom y5 between, on the one hand, the teacher’s presentation o f 
an already established body o f knowledge and, on the other, the personal meaning-
163making or developing o f  insights and construction o f  concepts. Lonergan’s
cognitional theory would imply, Roscoe maintains, that these are simply different parts 
o f the same process o f  know ing.164
Lonergan’s focus on integration is a plea to prom ote a sense o f  the underlying unity o f 
knowledge, something that in his opinion is an urgent requirem ent for the genuine 
advancem ent o f  knowledge, for the authentic developm ent o f  hum an life and for world 
harm ony.165 The intellectual pattern o f consciousness, it w ill be recalled, was critically 
im portant for Lonergan in his understanding o f  hum an development. It is interesting to 
note the special importance that the CCE discourse also affords to the ‘intellectual work 
done by students’.166 The light o f  Christian faith, a CCE docum ent affirms, ‘enkindles a 
love for the truth that will not be satisfied with superficiality in knowledge and 
judgm ent’.167 Faith ‘awakens a critical sense5, ‘impels the mind to learn w ith careful 
order’, and to ‘work with a sense o f  responsibility5.168 The CCE discourse may not offer 
a theory for the integration o f  faith and culture, but it is explicit about what the task 
involves for the Catholic school, that is, helping young people ‘to becom e aware o f  the 
relationship between faith and culture’ and com m itting itse lf to ‘interpreting and giving 
order to hum an culture in the light o f Christian faith5.169
162 Keith Roscoe, “Lonergan’s Theory of Cognition, Constructivism and Science Education”, Science & 
Education, Vol. 13, 2004, pp. 541-551.
163 Ibid., p. 550.
164 Ibid., p. 550.
165 Something like this vision of a ‘higher integration’ appears to be behind Lonergan’s notion of 
‘CosmopolisL See Insight, pp. 238-242, 633, 690.
155 RDECS (1988), No. 49. See, also, CS (1977), No.s 38-41.
167 RDECS (1988), No. 49.
168 Ibid., No. 49.
169 Ibid., No.s 51-52.
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V I
M any o f the tasks assigned to the Catholic school by the CCE discourse, concerning the 
nature, aims and procedures o f  what it variously describes as ‘an educations/ / educative 
/ educating com m unity’, can occasion the kind o f  debate that arises in relation to some 
o f  the m ost contested issues o f  philosophy o f  education and o f  educational practice in 
the context o f  contemporary liberal democratic societies. N ot a few o f the issues, 
problem s and dilemmas that arise out o f  the attempts to construct, m aintain and promote 
the functioning o f  the Catholic school as a distinctive ‘educational / educative / 
educating com m unity’, demand ‘deep and un-parochial reflection’ and the exercise o f 
practical w isdom  and judgm ent, to ensure that a reasoned and authentic educational 
experience becom es a defining characteristic o f  Catholic education.170
Several features o f  the tasks assigned to schools by the CCE discourse make imperative 
in the theory and practice o f Catholic education the availability of, the w ide-spread 
recourse to, and the skilful employment o f  the kind o f  ‘phronetic discourse’ that arises 
out o f  M cLaughlin’s pedagogic phronesis, w hich was exam ined in chapter four above. 
CSTTM (1997) alludes also to the ‘capacity for prudent innovation’ w hich should be a 
feature o f  the Catholic school, especially in the context o f the new challenges faced by 
education such as ‘a crisis o f values’, ‘extrem e pluralism ’, ‘m ulti-culturalism ’, and a 
grow ing ‘m arginalisation o f the Christian faith as a reference point and a source o f  light 
for an interpretation o f existence’.171
K evin W illiam s considers that in this concept o f  ‘pedagogic phronesis’ M cLaughlin has 
provided ‘a very fertile conceptual tool’ for the philosophical analysis and satisfactory 
resolution o f  m any problems and dilemmas that occur in the practice o f  Catholic 
education.172 W illiams has further suggested, as M cLaughlin him self recognised, that, 
in the Catholic school context, ‘there is m ore w ork to be done on the character o f  the
McLaughlin’s ‘Phronetic Discourse’ at the Service of the Catholic School as
‘Educational / Educative / Educating Community’
170 Paddy Walsh, Education and Meaning, p. 49.
m  CSTTMf}997) t No s 3> i
172 Kevin Williams, “The common school and the Catholic school: a response to the work of T.H. 
McLaughlin”, International Studies in Catholic Education, Vol. 2, No. 1, March 2010, pp. 19-36 (32).
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kind o f  pedagogic phronesis appropriate to the C hurch’s educational institutions’. It 
is highly desirable that there be available to Catholic philosophy o f  education a m ethod 
o f educational thinking that is directly oriented to practice and attuned to its attendant 
problem s and difficulties.
In assessing M cLaughlin’s possible contribution to a re-articulation o f  Catholic 
philosophy o f education, the manner in w hich his concept and practice o f  ‘pedagogic 
phronesis ’ m ight com plement and be incorporated into a reading o f  the CCE discourse 
on the Catholic school as ‘educational com m unity’ is worth exam ining. M cLaughlin’s 
uniquely pow erful paradigm o f ‘pedagogic ph ron esis\ together w ith his accom plished 
analytical skills, offer m uch to a Catholic philosophy o f education that w ould seek to 
engage in dialogue with, and interrogate the officially prom ulgated educational 
discourse o f  the CCE, with a view to utilising the potential o f  the latter for enhancing 
insight and vision in the practice o f  education in the Catholic school.
A priority in this section, therefore, is to identify selected elem ents or features o f  the 
CCE discourse on the Catholic school as ‘educational / educative/ educating 
com m unity’ that would seem to demand, and very profitably benefit from, the use o f 
M cLaughlin’s analytical skills and the exercise o f ‘pedagogic phronesis’. Such features 
include substantive tasks allocated to the Catholic school relating to its aims and 
procedures, w here appropriate reflection and discernm ent by practitioners would appear 
to be a necessary pre-condition for a genuine educational /  educative / educating 
environm ent to be created. Furthermore, it would be useful if  one could identify and 
collate a repertoire o f  approaches and procedures frequently used by M cLaughlin in the 
course o f  his exercise o f  ‘pedagogic ph ron esis\ w ith a view  to constructing some form 
o f ‘phronetic discourse’ that might be used to engage in dialogue with various other 
discourses in the context o f  Catholic philosophy o f education.
‘Community’ in CCE Discourse
It should be noted immediately that any attem pt to study extensively how community is 
conceptualised in Catholic educational discourse, or to judge the relevance o f  its 
educational, social, and moral dimensions for Catholic education w ithin the context o f  a 
pluralistic society, m ust pose an initial and significant problem , not ju s t o f  scale, but o f
173
having to decide upon the optimal approach to be adopted for the accom plishm ent o f  
the task. A study that began from a comprehensive analysis o f  the notion o f 
'com m unity’ and progressed to identify specific educational dim ensions and functions 
o f  com m unity would seem to be neither necessary nor feasible in the present context. 
The lim ited objectives o f this thesis preclude extensive treatm ent o f  ‘com m unity’ as 
such, and suggest rather that attention m ight more profitably be directed to, not the 
sociological or multiple other features o f  the study o f  com munity, but to the 
m etaphorical description o f the Catholic school as ‘com m unity’, symbolising an 
educational reality possessing in different degrees a specific Catholic identity and sense 
o f  purpose.174
The CCE discourse is insistent, firstly, that ‘everything the Catholic educator does in a 
school takes place within the structure o f  an educational com m unity’.175 It is its 
com m unity dim ension that makes the school ‘an instrum ent o f  integral form ation o f  the 
hum an person’, and provides opportunities ‘to initiate appropriate dialogue between 
culture and faith’.176 Although it is not ‘an exhaustive description’ o f  the Catholic 
school, ‘the concept o f the scholarly institution as an educational com m unity is one o f 
the m ost enriching developments for the contem porary school’.177 Secondly, the 
com m unitarian dimension o f  the Catholic school constitutes its educational potential 
and influence, but this conception o f  school as ‘com m unity’ is derived ultimately from, 
and elucidated in CCE discourse, principally in term s o f  a Christian theological 
anthropology, rather than as a sociological construct o f  any k ind .178 Docum ents o f  the 
CCE corpus, such as CPCS (2002), stress the theological notion o f  communio and invite 
Catholic schools to promote a ‘spirituality o f  com m union’, w hich w ould be capable o f 
being developed into ‘an educational principle in the various environm ents in w hich the 
hum an person is form ed’.179
A priority in the present context is to reflect on what the CCE discourse understands as
174 The many works of George A. Hillery, Jr and, more recently, Kenneth A. Strike and Frank G. 
Fitzpatrick, listed in the bibliography, are a valuable resource for understanding the Catholic school as 
‘community’. For a discussion of the sense in which the Catholic school community might be seen as a 
reality to be realized or constructed, see, Anthony P. Cohen, The Symbolic Construction o f Community, 
London: Tavistock Publications, 1985.
175 LCS (1982), No. 22.
176 Ibid., No.s 22, 29
177 Ibid., No. 22.
178 LCS (1982), No. 22; RDECS (1988), No, 31.
179 CPMS (1982), No. 15.
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an educational community, to appreciate the conditions under w hich it may be said to be 
educative, and to consider why, according to the educational docum entation under study 
here, an educating community is deemed an appropriate m etaphor for the Catholic
i in *  *
school. On the basis o f  this partial study it is hoped to arrive at an appreciation o f 
how  M cLaughlin’s ‘phronetic approach’ m ight provide an appropriate methodology for 
educators to becom e aware o f  what is involved in, and to work towards the realization 
of, the ideal o f the Catholic school as an educational /  educative /educating community, 
w hich claims to provide a unique and alternative Christian educational experience.
Substantive CCE Tasks of the Catholic School and the Need for ‘Pedagogic 
Phronesis’
M ore frequently perhaps than any other term  throughout its corpus, the CCE literature
employs, very often equivalently, the three term s, educational community, educative
181community and educating community, to denote the Catholic school. A  summary 
analysis o f  these multiple references serves to identify some o f  the m ore substantive 
tasks that the CCE discourse commits to the Catholic school in its capacity as an 
educational / educative / educating community. A  simple listing o f  these tasks will 
clearly reveal the inevitability o f  the demand for Catholic educators to be able to make 
‘balanced judgm ents’ and arrive at decisions o f  a very fundam ental nature relating to 
the challenging ‘burdens and dilemmas’ arising out o f  expectations to be m et and 
initiatives to be undertaken regarding the perform ance o f  these tasks, within specific 
schools, often differing widely in social, cultural and religious background, upon which 
the potential o f  the school as an education / educative / educating com m unity may 
rightly be thought to depend.182 Among the ‘burdens and dilem m as’ arising in the 
Catholic school com munity and requiring acutely tactful judgm ent and response are, the 
following.
Firstly, let us consider the statement o f the CCE that the Catholic school is tasked with,
180 The CCE discourse appears to use the epithets ‘educational’, ‘educative’, and ‘educating’ 
indiscriminately in relation to the Catholic school as community. This may reflect no more than the 
customary variants to be expected in translating material from the original source.
181 See: CS (1977), No.s 54, 70, 73, 85; LCS (1982), No.s 22, 24, 34, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 56; RDECS 
(1988), No.s 6, 24, 25, 31, 32,38, 39,42, 67, 108; CSTTM(1997), No.s 4, 6, 9, 10, 14,16, 18; CPMS 
(2002), No.s 18, 20, 21, 25, 42, 43, 46, 47, 49, 50, 54, 60, 65, 67, 72, 73; ETCS (2007), No.s 5, 12, 13, 15, 
16, 20, 34, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 53.
1821 borrow the phrase ‘burdens and dilemmas’ from T.H. McLaughlin, “The Burdens and Dilemmas of 
Common Schooling”, David Carr et al., ed.s, Liberalism and Schooling, 2008, pp. 137-174 (137).
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and expected to aspire to become, ‘a place o f integral education o f  the hum an person 
through a clear educational project o f w hich Christ is the foundation5. W ith its 
educational project ‘inspired by the G ospel5, the Catholic school ‘focuses on the hum an 
person in his or her integral, transcendent, historical identity5.184 Christian belief that 
‘all hum an values fmd their fulfilment and unity in C hrist5, dictates that the ‘prom otion 
o f  the hum an person5, and the ‘development o f  the w hole m an5, becom e the ‘goal o f  the 
Catholic school5, and explains the ‘centrality o f  the hum an person in its educational
pro ject5.185 This awareness, too, ‘strengthens the school’s educational endeavour and
•  •  *  186renders it fit to form strong personalities5.
This statem ent o f  intent must be related to the real-w orld environm ent o f  m any Catholic 
schools, w hich are confronted with children and young people who in an increasing 
num ber o f  instances are ‘not only indifferent and non-practising, but also totally lacking 
in religious or moral form ation5, who display ‘a profound apathy w here ethical and 
religious form ation is concerned5, and require no m ore o f  their Catholic school than ‘a 
certificate o f  studies or, at most, quality instruction and training for em ploym ent5.187 
W hile the CCE discourse is to be commended for this aw areness, the stark contrast o f 
educational intent and educational reality clearly indicates the necessity for Catholic 
educators, in all aspects o f school life, to engage in reflective practice and to develop 
the art o f  sensitive understanding and tactful judgm ent in furtherance o f  the integral 
education o f  children and young people.
A second exam ple o f  where discernment and good judgm ent becom es im perative in  the
Catholic school that strives to be a genuine educational / educative / educating
com munity, relates to its commitment and actions to generate a sense o f  inclusiveness
throughout the community. Again, based upon its Christian conviction that ‘the Spirit is
at w ork in every person5, the CCE discourse insists that ‘the C atholic school offers itse lf
188to all, non-Christians included, with all its distinctive aim s and m eans’. The Catholic 
school, inspired by the Vatican II Declaration on the Relationship o f  the Church to 
Non-Christian Religions, wishes thereby to become able ‘to acknow ledge, preserve, and 
prom ote the spiritual and moral qualities, the social and cultural values, which
183 CSTTM (1997), No. 4; CS (1977), No.s 8,15, 34.
184 CSTTM (1997), No. 10.
185 CSTTM (1887), No. 9; CS (1977), No. 35.
186 CSTTM (1997), No. 9.
187 CSTTM (1997), No. 6.
188 CS (1977), No. 85; CSTTM (1997), No. 16.
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characterize different civilizations’.189 The CCE publication, L C S  (1982), acknowledges 
that ‘at times there are students in Catholic schools who do not profess the Catholic 
faith, or perhaps are without any religious faith at all’.190
The sensitive Catholic educator, conscious o f  the incompatibility o f  free commitment to 
Christian faith and any kind o f indoctrination, is reminded of, and does well to note, the 
imperative that ‘faith does not admit o f violence; it is a free response o f  the human 
person to God as he reveals h im se lf.191 A later CCE document reiterates the point: 
‘Schools, even Catholic schools, do not demand adherence to the faith. An encounter 
with God is always a personal event’.192 Here is another typical example o f  where the 
kind o f phronetic thinking that characterizes the work o f  McLaughlin is vitally 
necessary. Catholic educators, seeking to construct an educational / educative / 
educating community, must be able to decide wisely how they are ‘to teach doctrine in 
conformity with their own religious convictions and in accord with the religious identity 
o f the school’, while at the same time ‘having the greatest respect for those students 
who are not Catholics’, being ‘open at all times to authentic dialogue’, and able to show  
‘a warm and sincere appreciation for anyone who is honestly seeking God according to 
his or her own conscience’.193
A  final instance o f  how a task demanded o f the Catholic school by the CCE discourse 
calls for the exercise o f  ‘pedagogic phronesis\ especially when the authoritative 
discourse remains silent about how the goal is to be achieved in practice, may be 
illustrated by the declared goals o f  the Catholic educational / educative / educating 
community to ‘help young people to grasp their own identity’, ‘to reveal to them the 
authentic needs and desires that inhabit everyone’s hearts’, ‘to foster authentic 
relationships among young people’.194 Advocating what it calls a ‘spirituality o f  
communion’, the CCE document, CPM S (2002), calls for renewed emphasis on ‘the 
priority o f  the person and o f  relationships’ in all educational communities.195 Such a 
‘spirituality o f  communion’ should become ‘the educational principle’ o f  every
189 CS (1977), No. 85; Nostra Aetate, 1965, No. 2.
190 LCS (1982), No. 42; RDECS (1988), No. 6.
191 LCS (1982), Wo. 42.
192 CPMS (2002), No. 51.
193 LCS (1982), No.s 42, 55; Vatican II Declaration on Religious Freedom, 1965, No. 3.
194 CPMS (2002), No. 18
195 CRMS (2002), No.s 6, 15
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environment in which the human person is formed.196 Educating young people ‘in 
communion and for communion’ in the Catholic school is, declares another CCE 
document, E T C S  (2007), ‘a serious commitment that must not be taken lightly’.197
Effectively, this task is interpreted to mean that Catholic educators must ‘make the 
entire educational sphere a place o f  communion open to external reality and not closed 
in on itse lf , such that students are enabled to ‘grow authentically as persons’ with a 
degree o f  openness to the whole o f reality.198 In terms o f  providing an anthropological 
foundation for the formative education o f schools, these documents define the human 
person, not just in terms o f  his or her ‘rationality’ (that is, one’s intelligent and free 
nature), but equally importantly by his or her ‘relational nature’ (that is, one’s 
relationship with other persons).199 The commitment to promote the relational 
dimension o f the person and the care taken in establishing authentic educational 
relationships with young people are aspects o f  education that should be facilitated in the
Catholic educational community.200 Learning is facilitated when educational interaction
201takes place at a level that fully recognizes the equality and dignity o f  every person. 
Freedom is recognised as an essential dimension o f  growth to personhood and 
‘education to freedom’ is regarded as ‘humanising action’ because it aims at the full 
development o f  personality.202
With regard to this third task o f  the Catholic school noted here, namely, helping young 
people to achieve their own sense o f  identity and encouraging them to engage in 
meaningful relationships, it is clearly possible for a whole range o f  matters to arise 
where sophisticated judgment and decision are called for i f  the educational virtue o f the 
school is to be realised. It is possible that young people or their parents may feel that 
they are being indoctrinated, that their freedom o f choice is being unduly curtailed, and 
they may dissent from what is being proposed for them, and may challenge the authority 
structure o f  the school. The absence of ‘pedagogic phronesis’ in this case can be very 
damaging to both individual pupils and the ethos o f  the school. The Catholic school’s 
whole project o f  formative education, no matter how idealistic and merit-worthy, may
196 CPMS (2002), No. 15.
197 ETCS (2007), No. 20.
198 ETCS (2007), No. 43.
199 CPMS (2002), No. 35.
200 CPMS (2002), No. 43.
201 CPMS (2002), No. 45.
202 CPMS (2002), No. 52.
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be challenged on the grounds that it involves unnecessary interference in the future 
flourishing o f  children and young people.
McLaughlin notably engaged in debate on the right o f  parents to bring their children up 
within a specific religious tradition, which might or might not involve them in being 
educated in a Catholic school.203 The question at issue in this debate is whether such 
religious upbringing violates the child’s right to an open future. A  similar type o f  
question also surfaces in the context of the effects o f  being educated in a Catholic 
school, and whether such education violates a central liberal value o f  personal 
autonomy. McLaughlin’s grappling with this situation by proposing two stages to 
religious upbringing, a first stage where children are given an ‘initial faith’, then a later 
stage o f  enhancement and critical reflection on the original set o f  beliefs and values, an 
approach he termed ‘autonomy via faith’, might well be found useful in the context o f  
the sharing o f  religious faith and values with which CCE discourse tasks the Catholic 
school.204 It is yet another example o f his phronetic discourse from which Catholic 
schools might derive the benefit o f  enlightenment.
Complementing the CCE discourse: McLaughlin and the Construction of a 
Phronetic Paradigm
That opportunity exists for the deployment o f  ‘pedagogic phronesis’ in relation to the 
realisation o f  the aims o f the CCE discourse concerning the Catholic school as 
educational community has been clearly sign-posted. It should be possible to identify a 
repertoire o f  dispositions, judgments, and skills employed by McLaughlin in his 
analysis o f  the problems and dilemmas encountered in the context o f  both the common 
school and the Catholic school, which would provide us with an enlightening and rich 
vocabulary and range o f skills, for the construction o f  a phronetic paradigm as a 
characteristic feature within a re-articulated Catholic philosophy o f education. One way 
in which this task might be approached would be through an analysis o f  McLaughlin’s 
pedagogic phronesis as reported in several o f  his better known essays. The hope would  
be that ultimately McLaughlin’s understanding and practice o f  ‘pedagogicphronesis’ 
might enable a more substantive and coherent account o f  what is termed his ‘phronetic
203 T.H. McLaughlin, “Parental rights and the religious upbringing o f children”, Journal o f  Philosophy o f  
Education, Vol. 18, 1994, pp. 75-83.
204 T.H. McLaughlin, “Peter Gardner on religious upbringing and the liberal ideal o f religious autonomy”, 
Journal o f  Philosophy o f Education, Vol. 14, 1990, pp. 107-25.
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approach’ to be constructed, which would redound to the benefit o f  Catholic philosophy 
o f  education by way o f  complementing the CCE discourse.
In chapter four above, McLaughlin’s use o f  his phronetic paradigm to analyse the 
claimed ‘distinctiveness’ o f  Catholic education was examined, and features o f  his 
‘pedagogical phronesis’ as exemplified there were noted. An essay o f  McLaughlin’s, 
“The Educative Importance o f  Ethos”, published in 2005, and directly related to an 
important dimension o f  the Catholic school as ‘community’, might similarly be briefly 
referred to here for the same purposes. McLaughlin’s engagement o f  ‘pedagogic 
phronesis’ is very evident throughout this essay, and in many ways this work can offer a 
template for the construction o f a ‘phronetic paradigm’.
McLaughlin, in the essay in question, explores what he terms the ‘educational 
importance’ o f  ethos and argues that, despite a wide acknowledgment o f  its importance 
in the context o f  education and schooling, the notion needs to be ‘brought into clearer 
focus’ and its role as ‘a form o f educative influence’ merits further exploration.205 What 
has often been lacking in the study o f ethos and its related notions, such as ‘culture’, 
‘climate’, etc., McLaughlin feels, is ‘the need for a more detailed and precise focus 
upon the notion o f  ethos itself and its educative importance’.206 He offers ‘a broadly 
philosophical exploration’ o f  the notion o f  ethos in the context o f  teaching and 
schooling and admits that it is ‘a notoriously difficult concept to analyse’ for a number 
o f  reasons.207
McLaughlin’s account, as one would expect, is a fine display o f  his analytical skills as
he attempts with great effect ‘to tie down a notion o f  ethos’ that, he notes, ‘contains no
208suggestion that the term has a single correct meaning to which appeal can be made’.
His concern is to attempt ‘to embrace, in a full a way as possible, a range o f  meanings 
o f  the term which can yield a persuasive definition’ with practical uses and benefits in 
its application to educational influence.209 McLaughlin next turns to consider how, in
the context o f  classrooms and schools, ethos comes up for assessment ‘in terms o f  the
210extent to which it embodies and facilitates educative influence’. It is here, I think, that
205 T.H. McLaughlin, “The Educative Importance o f Ethos”, pp. 306-325 (306)
206 Ibid., p. 307.
207 Ibid., p. 308.
208 Ibid., p. 308.
209 Ibid., p. 311.
210 Ibid., p. 312.
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one might focus more closely on McLaughlin’s exercise o f  ‘pedagogic phronesis\ as 
distinct from his analytical skill.
McLaughlin observes that the kinds o f educational influence that teachers and schools 
seek to exert upon students relate to many ‘kinds o f  achievements’, and the ‘forms o f  
educational influence’ through which this range o f  achievements are promoted by 
teachers and schools are similarly varied.211 According to McLaughlin, philosophy o f  
education has ‘two major concerns’ with respect to these kinds o f  achievements and 
forms o f  influence. Firstly, it underlines the ‘value laden nature’ o f  these achievements 
and forms o f  influence, and ‘the need for justification o f  their pursuit’. Secondly, it calls 
for ‘a proper understanding o f the character o f the achievements and modes o f  
influence’, and is interested in the logical and other kinds o f  relationship between 
them.212
McLaughlin notes that both the kinds o f  educational achievements that are related to 
ethos and the modes o f  influence which an ethos exerts ‘are consistent with broadly 
Aristotelian accounts o f  these matters’.213 In these accounts, the forms o f educational 
achievement that are seen as ‘particularly apt for development via an ethos’ are 
‘qualities o f  character and virtue, dispositions, sensitivities o f  perception and qualities 
o f  judgment, most notably practical wisdom, or phronesis\2U The particular kind o f  
educative influence exerted by an ethos, McLaughlin argues, can best be seen in terms 
o f  ‘the provision o f  a context in which a range o f  forms o f  educative influence and 
learning can flourish’.215 Examples of such educative influence and learning would 
include, McLaughlin judges, ‘imitation, habituation, training in feeling, attention and 
perception, induction into patterns o f action and habit, forms o f  guidance and 
experience, and exemplification’.216 With Aristotle, McLaughlin asserts, human 
development requires ‘initiation into a culture in which qualities o f  personhood and
917character are recognised and practised’.
The primary purpose o f  examining McLaughlin’s essay on the educative importance o f  
ethos, it must be stressed, is not to become acquainted with his substantive view on this
211 “The Educative Importance of Ethos”, p. 316.
2,2 Ibid., p. 316.
213 Ibid., p. 318.
214 Ibid., p. 318.
215 Ibid., p. 319.
216 Ibid., p. 319.
217 Ibid., p. 319.
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matter, important though that is. Despite the fact, also, that the essay contains valuable 
insights as to how one might interpret the term ‘educative’ in relation to the Catholic 
school as a whole, this, too, is not the reason for its study here. The real objective in the 
study o f  this essay is to identify within it McLaughlin’s powerful display o f phronetic 
reasoning. McLaughlin judges that ‘much greater reflection is needed’ on the kinds o f  
educational achievement with which ethos is concerned, and the specific aspects o f  the 
educational aims and values o f  the classroom and school with which it is particularly 
related and the modes via which its influence is exerted.218
Clearly, McLaughlin’s conclusion that, such reflection should lead to the realisation o f  
the educational importance o f  ethos and its scope, is incontestable.219 In general, what is 
needed, therefore, is an appropriate form o f reflection that would facilitate discourse, 
not just related to the educative influence o f  ethos, but in relation to several other 
aspects o f  Catholic educational practice and theory, but which must not merely be ‘a 
form o f theorising, but part o f a process o f  the improvement o f  practice via forms o f  
pedagogic wisdom ’.220 That such a form o f reflection and guidance relating to practice 
is not well articulated in the CCE discourse relating to the Catholic school as an 
educational / educative / educating community must be a matter o f  regret for Catholic 
educators.
McLaughlin’s ‘appropriate and sustained engagement’ with pedagogical matters is 
amply illustrated as a central feature o f  ‘pedagogic phronesis\ He emphasises that the 
nature o f  the judgment involved in phronesis ‘requires practical knowledge o f  the good, 
together with intelligent and personally engaged sensitivity to situations and 
individuals’, in making judgments about what constitutes an appropriate expression o f  
the good in a given circumstance’.221 Practical judgment o f  this kind is, in 
McLaughlin’s judgment, ‘inherently supple, non-formulable and non-codiflable’. His 
illustration o f the meaning o f  the concept and practice o f  phronesis, as evidenced in this 
essay, could become the basis for the construction o f  a form o f discourse that would 
complement the largely aspirational discourse o f  the CCE .
2.8 Ibid., p. 319.
2.9 Ibid., p. 319.
220 Ibid., p. 322.
221 Ibid., p. 318.
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Conclusion
There can be little doubt that Maritain, Lonergan, and McLaughlin each have distinctive 
and positive contributions to make toward enhancing the nature and quality o f  the 
educational discourse offered in the CCE literature. Their work is to be called upon, not 
because o f  some un-argued assumption that ‘philosophy is better’, but in recognition o f  
specific ways in which each has the potential to construct with the CCE discourse an 
interrogative framework, within which the different perspectives o f  the diverse 
discourses might be brought into creative relationship, for the benefit ultimately o f  the 
re-articulation o f  a Catholic philosophy o f  education. In mutual dialogue with the CCE 
discourse these philosophers can provide a philosophical reinforcement o f the 
foundations o f  Catholic philosophy o f education that the CCE discourse alone is not 
equipped to carry into effect.
Catholic philosophy o f  education in the future will need to be able to provide a 
theoretical articulation o f its own nature and relevance to the practice o f  Catholic 
education. It is highly unlikely that a mere vision-guided approach to Catholic 
education, on its own, will be adequate or sufficient to cope with the challenges o f  life 
in a postmodern and increasingly secular world. Both robust philosophical perspective 
and aspirational vision need to become dialogue partners in providing Catholic 
philosophy o f  education with an understanding o f its nature and function in the context 
o f the practice o f  Catholic education.
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This dissertation is based on a conviction that Catholic philosophy o f  education today 
should be seeking greater clarity in terms o f  its own self-understanding and ought to be 
pursuing the restoration o f a more explicit philosophical foundation, as it attempts to 
identify an opportunity and a means o f articulating its traditional aims and purposes 
within new and contemporary contexts. An opportunity has presented itself in recent 
decades, from a source that is perhaps being neglected, for the Catholic educational 
community to contribute toward these goals. This opportunity comes from what is, at 
first sight, a decidedly un-philosophical source, in the form o f the publication by the 
Holy See’s Congregation for Catholic Education (CCE) o f  a fairly extensive body o f  
literature on the Catholic school and Catholic education. The opportunity which this 
event presents is not, indeed, clear cut and straight-forward but requires philosophical 
discernment and a willingness to reconsider the nature and tradition o f  Catholic 
educational thought from a number o f different perspectives.
The notion o f  ‘transposition’, as conceived by Lonergan, is an appropriate means o f  
giving new and systematic expression to the tradition o f  Catholic educational thought. It 
will be recalled that Lonergan conceived the task o f  ‘transposition’ essentially as that o f  
positioning the received tradition within a more contemporary and adequately theoretic 
context by means o f  a renewed effort o f  analysis and synthesis. The implications and 
requirements o f  such a ‘transposition’ o f  the tradition might be analysed, it is argued, by 
means o f  a process o f  bringing the recent CCE discourse into dialogue with the varied 
and different educational discourse of three important Catholic philosophers, namely, 
Maritain, Lonergan, and McLaughlin, whose central insights have been summarised in 
chapters two, three, and four above. To enable the discourses o f  the philosophers and 
that o f  the CCE to mutually interrogate one another, characteristic themes and principles 
within the educational works o f  the former, that invite a more philosophically oriented 
response from the latter, have been identified.
The value and relevance o f  the CCE discourse for contemporary thinking about Catholic 
philosophy o f  education, already appreciated by philosophers such as McLaughlin, 
Williams, and others, and acknowledged in various ways in the text above, has recently 
been confirmed by the two most recent publications o f  the CCE. Thus, Educating to 
Inter cultural Dialogue in Catholic Schools published in 2013, and Educating Today and 
Tomorrow: A Renewing Passion published in 2014, not only reflect many themes that 
are integral to the tradition o f  Catholic educational thought, but introduce a note o f
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contemporary salience for Catholic philosophy o f  education not only in regard to the 
specific matters they address but also in the more or less novel manner o f  how these 
matters are addressed.1 These documents bear a note o f  realism about them that strongly 
contrasts with some o f the earlier CCE publications o f  this century that were rightly 
considered to be theologically elitist and generally overly idealist in failing to come to 
terms with what is the reality for the majority o f  Catholic schools in most contemporary 
environments.
Thus, the invitation in E ID  (2013) to Catholic schools to foster ‘intercultural dialogue5 
by being educating communities that, while having their own 'specific nature and 
purposes5, are committed to ‘following the pathways that lead to encountering others5, 
and are ‘open to the universality o f  knowledge5, constitutes not only a challenge to the 
practice o f  Catholic education but suggests that our understanding o f  its fundamental 
reality should accentuate a focus on openness and inclusivity.2 Likewise, the advice in 
E T T  (2014) that Catholic educators be aware that it is not just the ‘acquisition o f  
information or knowledge5, but ‘personal transformation5, that is the desired goal o f  
education seems timely. The accompanying invitation, in the words o f  Pope Francis, to 
regard educating as not just ‘a profession5, but as ‘an attitude to others and a way o f  
being5, seem to imply that Catholic education should be seeking with renewed effort to 
recover, even in the face o f  the multiple challenges o f  contemporary societies, an 
emphasis on education and its philosophy as ‘a way o f  life5.3
Notwithstanding the justly positive appreciation o f  the visionary and pastoral strengths 
o f  the CCE discourse, however, it has been seen as appropriate and necessary, in the 
context o f  this dissertation, to draw attention to perceived weaknesses in the discourse 
as a whole, most notably in respect of its lack o f  explicit philosophical basis and the 
kind o f  framework it can offer to Catholic schools and others to analyse aims, 
pedagogical processes, ethos, and curriculum in a contemporary context. The CCE 
documents undoubtedly presume a certain universal Catholic philosophical-theological
1 Congregation for Catholic Education, Educating to Intercultural Dialogue in Catholic Schools: Living 
in Harmony fo r  a Civilization o f  Love, Vatican City, 2013; Educating Today and Tomorrow: A Renewing 
Passion, Vatican City, 2014. Hereafter, these documents are referred to respectively as: EID (2013) and 
ETT (2014).
2 EID (2013), No. 86.
3 ETT (2014), Section III (e); Conclusion.
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position that, with Williams and others, one could broadly characterise as ‘Thomist’.4 
But questions and concerns remain, both about the degree to which such a unifying 
Catholic philosophy is in practice shared by Catholic schools on any kind o f widespread 
basis, and about the extent o f the influence an overtly and traditionalist Thomist 
Catholic philosophy o f education is able to exert in the so-called ‘public square’. These 
questions have been explored in this dissertation, but not exhaustively so, since the 
focus has been rather on the non-explicit nature o f  the reference to any kind o f  
philosophy, even its own personalist stance, as a feature o f  the CCE discourse.
The question as to whether there is, or is not, substantial agreement about a 
paradigmatic philosophy o f Catholic education that is fully implemented in practice in 
any given context is conceivably one that can be resolved by empirical investigation. 
The further concern about the capacity o f  Catholic philosophy o f education to invoke a 
set o f principles that would exercise influence in public debate is a matter upon which 
considerably more discussion should ensue. Despite the heartfelt conviction o f Maritain 
and his efforts to re-tailor Thomism to contemporary needs, grave doubt remains about 
the degree and kind o f ‘illumination’ o f  the nature and practice o f  education his work 
can offer today to society at large.5 That is not to say, however, that Maritain’s 
philosophy o f  education is irrelevant, for if  his thought can survive the range o f  
criticism to which it has been subjected, there are elements within it that might serve as 
a useful corrective to some claims o f contemporary philosophy o f  education.
An attempt was made to assess Maritain’s contribution to Catholic philosophy o f  
education in chapter two above, and while it is evident that several themes and 
principles from his philosophical reflection are echoed in the CCE discourse, they are 
present therein without pronounced or distinctive philosophical expression. Themes 
considered as intrinsic to the aims and purposes o f  Catholic education, such as the 
integral formation o f the human person, the unity o f  knowledge, the liberation o f  the 
mind and the strengthening o f  the will, and the social nature o f  human existence, are an 
intrinsic part o f  the Catholic tradition o f  educational thinking, though by no means 
limited to that tradition which does not, in fact, lay exclusive claim to such liberal 
humanistic education. We would look to the CCE discourse in vain, however, as indeed
4 See, Kevin Williams, “Aquinas and Thomism”, pp. 50-54. In Phillips, D. C. (Ed.), Encyclopedia o f  
Educational Theory and Philosophy, Los Angeles, London: SAGE Publications, 2014.
5 See, Jacques Maritain, Integral Humanism: Temporal and Spiritual Problems o f  a New Christendom, 
Notre Dame, IN: University o f Motre Dame Press, 1973.
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to Maritain, to discover how we might bring such educational themes and principles 
into conversation with more instrumental views o f  the purpose o f  education that 
arguably predominate today. In the chapter on Maritain it was noted how his ideal o f  
‘applying Thomist principles’ to problems is problematic for much philosophy o f  
education today.
It has been a contention in this dissertation that the lack o f an explicit philosophical 
dimension in the CCE discourse has handicapped and diminished the potential o f  
Catholic philosophy o f education in a number o f ways. Mario O. D ’ Souza has 
accurately summarised what the absence o f  a much needed philosophical lens, through 
which the CCE discourse can be read and discerned, means in terms o f  Catholic 
educational practice.6 While Thomism once provided a unifying philosophical system o f  
analysis in Catholic philosophy o f  education, since Vatican II (1962-1965), this system 
has been questioned by many scholars and silently but decisively rejected by the 
majority o f  practitioners. There are many reasons why Thomism’s unifying 
philosophical system has been openly questioned and largely rejected, not just in 
relation to Catholic philosophy o f education, but in the context o f  the wider arena o f  
Catholic intellectual life, though discussion o f these is not the object o f  this thesis. The 
acceptance o f  pluralism and the diversity o f  philosophic viewpoint today have no doubt 
compounded the problem so that postmodernism, deconstructionism and cultural theory 
make it difficult, in the opinion o f  some scholars at least, to pursue any kind o f  unifying 
theme or over-arching viewpoint.7
D ’Souza raises several concerns that arise out o f  this situation and these precisely have 
been among the factors that prompted this investigation o f  whether, and by what means, 
a more robust philosophical foundation might be provided for the under-stated Catholic 
philosophy o f  education that is implicit in the CCE discourse. Firstly, the CCE 
publishes documents on Catholic schooling and education that appear at base to 
presuppose that a largely Thomistic methodology and framework is still widely 
subscribed to, and able to provide a scaffolding for all Catholic intellectual discourse.
6 Mario O. D’Souza, “Some Reflections on Contemporary Canadian Catholic Education”, Interchange, 
Vol. 34, No. 4, 2003, pp. 363-381.
7 Ibid., pp. 374-377.
8 See GE (1965), No. 10. The Declaration on Education is one of the few Vatican II documents that cites 
Aquinas by name. Aquinas is recommended as a model of openness and an exemplar of a scholar that 
promoted ‘a deeper realization of the harmony that exists between faith and learning’. The CCE literature
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If this presupposition cannot be justified, however, it is likely that those who reject that 
body o f  principles will be neither interested nor prepared to consider Catholic 
philosophy o f education, insofar as it is embodied in the CCE discourse, in their search 
for principles that guide and bring unity to their practice. On the other hand, those who 
continue still to believe in its relevance will perhaps regret the fact that traditional 
Thomist educational thinking does not appear more prominently in the CCE discourse.
It is not, incidentally, an aim o f this thesis either to justify or to reject the application o f  
Thomist principles in Catholic educational discourse. These principles, couched in 
explicit Thomist conception and language, appear today to matter less to some Catholic 
educators than to others. One readily acknowledges, o f  course, that Thomism in 
Catholic education has its defenders, among them Williams, and that their case is a 
strong one.9 My concern is with the extent to which all philosophical principles appear 
to be played down in the CCE literature. A more pronounced philosophical nuancing o f  
basic principles in the CCE discourse might have been o f  benefit to those who wish to 
retrieve a positive core from the Catholic tradition o f  educational thought, but who 
would be prepared to do so only by a more critical reading o f  the tradition, and one that 
is no longer so dependent on the now largely dismantled Thomist grand theory.
The precise reason why a philosophical perspective seems not to be emphasised in the 
CCE discourse may be to some extent capable o f  a straight-forward explanation. The 
authors o f  these documents will be aware o f  the fact that, in the words o f  Pope John 
Paul II, ‘the Church has no philosophy o f her own’, nor does she ‘canonise one 
particular philosophy in preference to others’.10 Given that the CCE documents are 
destined for the Church’s schools and educators world-wide, existing as they do in very 
different cultures, with markedly different propensities for philosophical reflection, 
there may have been an explicit wish to remove undue emphasis upon a particular 
philosophical theory o f  education. This concern, I suggest, has translated itself into a 
situation where all explicit philosophising is more or less absent from the CCE 
discourse. But if  that discourse has instead opted for, say, a theological approach to 
education, if  this was an option that was deliberately availed of, while it might appear to 
solve one problem, it actually creates another, for theology, too, as M. J. Priester
is essentially concerned with promulgating the principles laid down in GE (1965) and may be assumed to 
share this positive appreciation of Aquinas and his approach to a synthesis o f faith and culture .
9 See Kevin Williams, “Aquinas and Thomism”, pp. 50-54.
10 John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, On the Relationship between Faith and Reason, 1998, No. 49.
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explains, ‘makes use o f  the thought and methods o f  philosophical inquiry’, both to 
perform its own tasks, and to assist in the ‘meaningful communication’ o f  its findings.11
The Catholic tradition o f  educational thought, in common with the whole intellectual 
enterprise o f  that community, arises at the most fundamental level in the belief that, as 
J. L. Garcia puts it, following St. Augustine o f  course, God has ‘placed in the human 
heart a desire to know the truth’, in a word, ‘to know h im self. To respond to that 
natural urge is to undertake ‘philosophical reflection’, Garcia believes.12 The Papal 
Exhortation, On the Relationship between Faith and Reason, stresses that without 
philosophy’s contribution, it would in fact be ‘impossible to discuss theological issues’, 
though it does not limit the value o f  philosophy to its instrumental importance in this 
kind o f  context.13 As ‘one o f the noblest o f  human tasks’, quite apart from its 
instrumental value, John Paul II appreciated the value o f  philosophy in a way 
reminiscent o f  Aristotle and Aquinas who deemed rationality as a distinguishing mark 
o f  humanity.14 For this reason it is somewhat disappointing that the CCE discourse 
appears to have omitted or at least undervalued a philosophical perspective.
It is possible, o f  course, to argue that the CCE discourse really does in fact contain 
much in the way o f philosophy and that my concern in pursuing some way o f  explicitly 
undergirding its text with explicit philosophical statement is mistaken, and arises out o f  
a failure to recognise its characteristic philosophical insights, precisely because they 
have been expressed in non-technical language, from which overtly metaphysical, 
epistemological and axiological terminology has carefully been omitted. One might thus 
instance in support o f  this argument the presence in the CCE discourse o f  such soundly 
philosophical themes as its Christian anthropology, its personalism, its emphasis on 
relationality and the inter-personal, its positive appreciation o f the value o f  human 
knowledge, and its understanding o f the task o f  Christian education as that o f the 
formation o f  the human person and the synthesis o f  faith and culture.
Much more work than it has been possible to undertake here needs to be done in this 
connection, perhaps with a view to understanding the degree to which philosophies such
11 M. J. Priester, “Philosophical Foundations for Christian Education”, in M. J. Taylor (ed), An 
Introduction to Christian Education, Nashville: Abingdon, 1966, pp. 60-70.
12 J.L.A. Garcia, “Death of the Handmaiden: Contemporary Philosophy in Faith and Reason”, Logos: A 
Journal o f  Catholic Faith and Culture, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Summer, 1999), pp: 11-19 (12).
13 See, Fides et Ratio, Introduction, No.s 61, 66.
14 Fides et Ratio, No. 3.
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as existentialism and phenomenology are deployed in the articulation o f  the CCE 
discourse. Modem philosophy, Fides et Ratio asserts, has the great merit o f  ‘focusing 
attention upon man in his concrete historical existence’.15 Such philosophy, rather than 
starting from an abstract ontology, metaphysics, epistemology, and so on, undertakes 
first to understand the human person and may call upon these other studies as it seeks to 
understand the person’s humanity, nature and destiny. I have acknowledged this point 
o f view  to the extent that at various stages throughout this dissertation I have expressed 
a preference for Lonergan’s approach to a Catholic philosophy o f  education, which 
emphasises the existential and historical dimensions o f  the educational task, rather than 
opting for the perennialist discourse of Maritain.
Whatever way we choose to categorise the philosophical character o f  the CCE
discourse, the fact remains that the educational task is ‘a decidedly philosophical one5.16
It is precisely in this context that I considered Maritain’s work, and that o f  Lonergan, as
perhaps worthy o f  being studied again to see how, and why, philosophy should be at the
heart o f  Catholic educational reflection. Maritain was convinced that education is not
‘an autonomous science’, but one that is dependent upon philosophy.17 Every theory o f
education, Maritain argues, is based on ‘a conception o f  life’ and, consequently, is
18‘associated necessarily with a system o f  philosophy’. According to Haldane, the 
Catholic educator would do well to recall G.K. Chesterton’s observation that every 
education ‘teaches a philosophy’, and it does so, ‘if  not by dogma then by suggestion, 
by implication, and by atmosphere’.19 C ST T M  (1997) explicitly acknowledges the 
CCE’s own appreciation o f the centrality o f  the philosophical perspective in education 
when it notes that ‘there is a tendency to forget that education always presupposes and 
involves a definite concept o f man and life’.20
A key problem, therefore, is whether the philosophical position in the CCE discourse is 
sufficiently explicit to enable Catholic educators to foreground the moral and 
philosophical remit o f education. This claim needs serious defence. Many who hold
15 Fides et Ratio, No. 5.
16 Mario O. D ’Souza, “The Christian Philosophy o f Education and Christian Religious Education, Journal 
o f Educational Thought, Vol.34, No. 1, pp. 11-28 (12).
17 Jacques Maritain, The Education o f Man, Donald and Isabella Gallagher (ed.s), 1962, pp. 39-40.
18 Ibid., p. 39.
19 John Haldane, “Chesterton’s Philosophy of Education”, Philosophy, Vol. 65, No. 251 (Jan., 1980), pp. 
65-80 (65).
20 CSTTM (1997), No, 10.
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secular principles consider education to be a philosophical and moral enterprise and to 
argue that case is itself a deeply philosophical and moral task. We have to ask, with 
Maritain in mind, in what way the CCE discourse is capable o f  assisting with the 
traditional task o f  'enlightening the intellect’ and through this, leading to a 
corresponding and equally important 'strengthening o f  the w ill’, to ask, indeed, whether 
that discourse can demonstrate that this still remains a valid goal for education.21 And 
again, with Maritain in mind, we can perhaps hope that elements o f  his thought, such as 
his personalistic ontology, might be capable o f  providing philosophical grounding for 
CCE’s aim o f promoting the integral formation o f  the human person.
Throughout this dissertation I have subscribed to a view that is essentially Maritain’s, 
that a coherent and unified Catholic philosophy o f  education is needed in order to 
justify the traditional aims and priorities o f  Catholic education. What has been o f  
concern is whether the CCE discourse makes sufficiently explicit the foundational 
philosophical basis o f such a philosophy, thereby, on the one hand, communicating the 
distinctiveness o f  Catholic education and, on the other, enabling it to engage vigorously 
in educational dialogue in postmodernist, and increasingly secular societies. A further 
illustration o f this concern can be seen in relation to another professed aim o f the CCE 
discourse, namely, that Catholic education should bring about a synthesis o f  faith and 
culture, and o f  faith and life. The synthesis, or integration, o f  faith and culture requires, 
or has traditionally been thought in Catholic philosophy o f  education to so require, an 
epistemology by means o f  which knowledge can be filtered, analysed, inter-connected, 
rated hierarchically, and built up around some centre o f  unity.
D ’Souza has suggested that the absence o f  a unifying Catholic philosophy o f education
leads to difficulties both with regard to the task o f  synthesising faith and culture and
22  *indeed o f  determining the very purposes o f  the curriculum in the Catholic school. His 
analysis is consistent with the argument o f  this dissertation. In connection with the 
matter o f  integration, it has been suggested that the cognitional theory and intentionality 
analysis o f  Lonergan may be capable o f  enabling the CCE discourse to specify how this 
traditionally important goal o f  the integration o f  faith and culture is to be approached. 
Traditionally, philosophy has been seen as the unifying discipline for knowledge and 
learning and Newman, followed diligently by Maritain, proposed theology as cohesive
21 Mario O. D ’Souza, “Reflections on Canadian Catholic Education”, p. 375.
22 Ibid., pp. 376-377.
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force for the unification o f  all knowledge. A Catholic philosophy o f  education that 
would neglect the element o f philosophical analysis in relation to the integration o f  faith 
and culture must necessarily lead, not to integration, but to a certain imbalance in the 
dialogue between faith and learning.
Furthermore, if  it is true as Robert A. Davis suggests, that the traditional ‘theocentric’ 
curriculum o f  the Catholic school was designed to ‘dialogue with both the wisdom o f  
the past and the present’, so that it could ‘maintain the truths o f  the Christian gospel 
without becoming isolationist or introspective’, then Catholic philosophy o f  education 
needs to ask again today about the purpose o f  the curriculum and the knowledge 
components that comprise it. Such reflection on the nature and unity o f  the curriculum 
o f  the Catholic school has to be promoted at a time when it is difficult if  not impossible 
(or, to some, desirable) to ensure a ‘theocentric’ curriculum and to guarantee the 
inclusion within it o f subjects considered to be somehow intrinsically capable o f  
enlightening the mind and strengthening the w ill.23 The purpose o f  the curriculum 
today, just as much in Catholic schools as in others, is considered by some to be 
dominated by issues o f  instrumentality, and the social preconceptions o f society’s and 
o f  the nation’s needs and wants, and may scarcely touch upon criteria for inclusion by 
reason o f the very nature o f mind and intellect.24
In the past, Davis argues, Catholic theology nurtured a curriculum that was ‘Catholic in 
the fullest sense’, that is, ‘committed to the Thomistic axiom that all knowledge is one’, 
and ‘wedded to the belief that the human subject is formed by God’s grace in 
sacramental encounter and faithful response to the Christian gospel’. The evident 
fragmentation o f  this vision o f  the Catholic curriculum, which Davis traces in exquisite 
detail, was interpreted by Maritain as the abandonment o f  what he called ‘integral 
Christian humanism’. We have seen in this dissertation how the goal o f  recovering and 
restoring an integral Christian humanism dominated much o f  Maritain’s writing and 
was central to his reflection on the aims and processes o f  Catholic education. One 
problem with Maritain’s integral humanism in a world dominated by diversity and 
pluralism is to safeguard the basic concept and to elucidate its real meaning, while 
making it clear that Maritain did not in fact wish to impose a Christian culture upon
23 Robert A. Davis, “Can there be a Catholic Curriculum?”, pp. 207-229 (211). In, James C. Conroy (ed), 
Catholic Education: Inside Out, Outside In.
24 Marion O. D ’Souza, “Reflections on Canadian Catholic Education”, p. 377.
25 Robert A. Davis, “Can there be a Catholic Curriculum?”, p. 211.
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The remit o f  this dissertation has not allowed one to discuss fully the Catholic school’s 
scope for what Davis refers to as ‘enculturation’, that is, the cultivation o f  a positive 
disposition toward cultural forms o f specific cultural and ethnic groups.26 This may well 
be a topic that is worthy o f  future study, especially in the light o f  the CCE’s declared 
commitment that Catholic schools help synthesize faith and culture and faith and life, 
and the prominence given in its most recent publications to the goals o f  ‘intercultural 
dialogue’, ‘respect for diversity’, and ‘inclusiveness’.27 Fides et Ratio, too, affirmed the
value o f  humanity’s various cultures as different and valuable efforts to plumb the
28mystery o f  our existence and to guide people to more human lives. Promoting the 
dignity and well-being o f  the human person is undoubtedly central to the Catholic 
educational project and this o f  course means respecting ‘difference’. But Davis is 
correct in suggesting that enculturation and the synthesis o f  faith and culture implies a 
much deeper process o f  reflection on the content o f  what is taught and the framework o f  
knowledge and understanding in which that content inheres. The complex way in 
which issues o f  value penetrate all systems o f  knowledge in whatever way they are 
enculturated has not been studied at any depth in this thesis.
Chapter five o f  this dissertation drew attention to the potential o f  Lonergan’s 
cognitional theory and transcendental method in connection with the Catholic school’s 
declared aim to effect a double synthesis / integration o f  faith and culture, and faith and 
life. The matter deserves fuller investigation. From a Lonerganian perspective the whole 
o f  education might be seen as a process o f  promoting the movement o f  the human spirit 
from the realm o f  ‘common sense’ to that o f  ‘theory’, from the realm o f theory to that o f  
‘interiority’, and from the realm o f interiority to the realm o f ‘self-transcendence’. This 
trajectory o f  ascent to meaning and self-appropriation begins with the sense o f  wonder 
in conscious experience, which in turn leads to intelligent inquiry and the start o f  a 
process o f  self-discovery during which all our knowing is taken up and integrated in the 
context o f  a dynamic process o f  authentic development comprising intellectual, moral 
and religious dimensions.
everyone, nor to return to some remote and putatively idyllic Christian past.
26 “Can there be a Catholic Curriculum?”, p. 224.
27 See, for instance, ETT (2014), Sect. II, No.s 5, 6.
28 Fides et Ratio, No.s 70ff, 96.
29 “Can there be a Catholic Curriculum?” p. 224.
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Lonergan was sure that the process whereby we discover how our mind works, the 
understanding it produces, the verification process by which we test the accuracy o f  our 
judgments, and the validity o f our decisions, constituted knowledge o f  much practical 
worth. Insight, he writes, is the source not only o f  theoretical knowledge but also o f  all 
its practical applications and, indeed, o f  all intelligent activity.30 It has not been possible 
in this dissertation to explore exhaustively the practical value o f  Lonergan’s 
intentionality analysis in the re-articulation o f  a Catholic philosophy o f  education. I 
hope I have been able at least to indicate, on the basis o f  a limited analysis o f  his Topics 
in Education, the usefulness for Catholic philosophy o f education o f  Lonergan’s 
conception o f  human development in the intellectual pattern o f  experience. It is here 
that insight vital for education and learning is formulated, resulting from a movement 
out o f a familiar world o f immediacy into a new world mediated by meaning by means 
o f  a four stage set o f functional and interrelated operations (sensible, intellectual, 
rational, responsible operations).
This dissertation, in addition to Maritain’s perennialist discourse and Lonergan’s 
intentionality discourse, also drew on the work o f  T.H. McLaughlin, who would not 
have claimed to be a theologian, nor would he have intended to offer Catholic 
philosophy a body o f novel concepts and principles. McLaughlin’s philosophy o f  
education is characterised by two features, analysis and phronesis, that make him an 
ideal carrier or ‘transposer’ (in the Lonergan sense) o f  the perennialist discourse o f  
Maritain, and a sympathetic advocate o f  Lonergan’s cognitional discourse and its under­
lying intentionality analysis.
The purpose o f  re-articulating a Catholic philosophy o f  education in a more 
contemporary and adequately theoretic context might be achievable, in part at least, 
through the provision o f an interrogatory framework whereby the discourses o f  Maritain 
and Lonergan, on the one hand, and that o f  the CCE discourse on the other, would be 
enabled to address questions to one another concerning issues such as a person-centred 
education, the synthesis o f faith and culture, and the nature and characterising features 
o f an authentically functioning Catholic educative community . The establishment and 
proper functioning o f such a framework would demand advanced skills o f philosophical 
analysis and discernment in those who sought to guide the conversation, and the
30 Insight, p. xiii.
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giftedness o f  McLaughlin in both these areas strongly suggests an important role for his 
work in the re-articulation o f  Catholic philosophy o f  education.
Notwithstanding McLaughlin’s appreciation o f  the importance o f  technical and 
prudential factors in philosophy o f education in the context o f  a democratic liberal 
society, he would not have appeared to wish to reduce Catholic educational thought to 
practical experience and the common sense bom o f  it, or to mere expertise in the field 
o f  philosophy o f  education. He appreciated thoroughly the need for theological and 
philosophical reflection in order to make sound analyses and arguments in this field. 
Several aspects o f  McLaughlin’s analytical philosophy were instanced in this 
dissertation in relation to specific or closely related subjects, o f  interest to Catholic 
educators and philosophers o f education. Most notably, his contribution to analysing the 
nature o f  the ‘distinctiveness o f  the Catholic school’ was assessed, as also were matters 
very pertinent to Catholic philosophy o f education, such as the ‘educative importance o f  
ethos’, and the questions o f what is intended by the term ‘reflective teacher’, and in 
what senses Catholic educators can speak meaningfully and coherently o f  the ‘education 
o f  the whole child’.
An all too brief exploration o f McLaughlin’s phronetic approach or paradigm has been 
sketched out in this dissertation. It should be possible, on the basis o f  a more extensive 
study o f  McLaughlin’s work than has been achieved here, to identify within his thought 
a range o f  insights and a series o f  practically oriented principles which, taken together, 
might constitute a uniquely powerful pattern o f discourse for the Catholic philosopher 
o f  education. In discussing McLaughlin’s practice o f  phronesis in chapter five above, 
Walsh’s definition o f  ‘discourse’, as ‘a sustained and disciplined form o f inquiry, 
discussion, and exposition that is logically unique in some significant w ay’, was found 
useful.31 McLaughlin’s process o f  inquiry having as its goal, not only the understanding 
o f  a given situation, action, or problem, but the achievement through a process o f  deep 
reflection and discussion o f a state o f discernment and a preparedness to decide and to 
act in that situation in an appropriate fashion, is a typically sustained and disciplined 
inquiry. McLaughlin has developed the capacity to define appropriately the problem to 
be solved and has the wisdom to recognise within its contours the elements o f its 
resolution.
31 Paddy Walsh, Education and Meaning, pp. 52-53.
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An aspect o f  McLaughlin’s work that could be further developed would be to compare 
and contrast his ‘pedagogicphronesis’ with Lonergan’s ‘common sense\ and to 
investigate what elements o f  the combined insights o f  these scholars might be harvested 
for the renewal o f  Catholic philosophy o f  education. Lonergan’s ‘common sense 
insight’, when its various limitations, drawbacks, and biases have been accounted for, 
would appear to be what the phronimos is seeking to do in the process o f  acquiring 
ethical insight.32 Lonergan’s ‘common sense’ is not to be confused with any kind o f  
naive realism, or even considered as equivalent to the doctrine o f  ‘intuition’ as proposed 
by Thomists such as Maritain, whereby it is possible to have an immediate grasp o f  self- 
evident principles. ‘Common sense’ is, rather, a kind o f  intelligence directed at concrete 
living rather the mere abstraction o f sense data, or the product o f  theoretical 
explanation, and it is a kind o f intelligence to be found across human history and culture 
in all times and places. It is a ‘realm o f meaning’ within differentiated consciousness, 
and it is ‘the mode o f  all concrete understanding and judgment’.33 What this means for 
Lonergan is that ‘common sense’ provides, not generalized knowledge, but a usefulness 
o f  a general kind. ‘Common sense’ does not provide us with wisdom in the sense o f  a 
general principle that applies to every situation, but offers specific pieces o f  relevant 
and useful advice almost after the manner o f  the proverb. It would be worthwhile to 
pursue within the context o f  McLaughlin’s pedagogic phronesis how Catholic education 
might seek to cultivate the ‘self-correcting process o f  learning’ that Lonergan considers 
is bom o f ‘common sense’.34
The analysis and discussion throughout this dissertation assumes that Catholic educators 
have a right to draw on the CCE discourse for assistance with reflection upon the many 
complex matters relating to the nature o f  Catholic education and the practice o f  
Catholic schooling in a postmodern world. Catholic education’s aims and purposes, its 
ethos, and its curriculum, all require proper analysis and discernment in what has to do 
with decision-making and the whole conduct o f the Catholic school in a contemporary 
milieu. It remains open to question whether the CCE discourse as it stands is capable o f  
furnishing even the dedicated Catholic teacher with the practical assistance needed in 
the contemporary Catholic school. It is for this reason that I have identified key roles for 
Lonergan’s cognitive theory and McLaughlin’s analytic and phronetic approaches in
32 Insight, pp. 173-206, 207-244.
33 Topics in Education, p. 73.
34 Insight, pp. 174-175.
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this context, both to clarify the nature and the aims o f Catholic philosophy o f  education, 
and to create a kind o f  intermediate discourse that might guide the Catholic educator in 
the way o f right judgment and effective decision-making.
To its credit, the CCE discourse focuses centrally on the aims o f  Catholic education that 
have traditionally characterised it, namely, the integral formation o f  the human person, 
the synthesis o f  faith and culture, and the provision o f  an experience in communal living 
and learning. The CCE discourse accords a definite priority to the nurture o f  the 
person’s God-given faculties o f  intellect and will, but it also recognises the important 
social, political, ethical, and moral dimensions o f  education. More is required o f  the 
CCE discourse, however, than a vision-guided presentation o f Catholic principles o f  
education, helpful as that may be in inspiring and motivating those who work in 
Catholic schools.
All this gives rise to a valid question as to how foundational principles in Catholic 
educational thought should be articulated and made available to the Catholic 
community. Catholic educational thinking, like, for instance, Catholic social thought 
and the rest o f  what one might describe as ‘applied Catholic thought’, has its roots both 
in revelation and reason. Anyone interested in making Catholic philosophy o f education 
better known and understood must be committed to becoming thoroughly familiar with 
both the theological and philosophical aspects o f  this body o f  thought.35 Throughout this 
dissertation, I have chosen, without wishing to press too far the distinction between 
philosophy o f  education and theology o f  education, to place an emphasis on broadly 
philosophical principles, or what might more precisely be described as philosophical- 
theological principles, in my discussion o f the perceived deficiencies in the CCE 
discourse on Catholic education and schooling. With a view  to suggesting how an 
amelioration in the situation might be achieved, an appeal was made to two quite 
different Thomist thinkers, Maritain and Lonergan, with the intention o f  selecting from 
their educationally oriented work a set o f  fundamental philosophico-theological 
principles deemed to be o f  use in buttressing the philosophical foundations o f  the CCE 
discourse.
It should be remarked that the problem o f distinguishing between philosophical
35 See, Joseph W. Koterski, SJ, “The Use of Philosophical Principles in Catholic Social Thought: The 
Case o f Gaudium et Spes”, Journal o f  Catholic Legal Studies, Vol. 45, 2006, pp. 277-292. Koterski 
argues this case for Catholic social teaching.
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principle and theological perspective does not disappear when reflecting upon the work 
o f these scholars, both o f whom can lay claim to the appellation o f  philosopher and 
theologian. In some respects at least, it is somewhat artificial to attempt to make any 
kind o f strict distinction between the philosophical and theological dimensions o f  the 
educational principles o f  these scholars. No attempt has been made in the course o f  this 
dissertation to argue the case for the priority o f  either theological perspective or 
philosophical understanding in relation to Catholic philosophy o f  education. For the 
Catholic educational community, there is a sense o f  false opposition here, if  the case o f  
either philosophy or theology is pushed to the extreme. A  false opposition o f  faith and 
reason is always something to be guarded against, as John Paul II states in his remark 
that ‘faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the 
contemplation o f  truth5.36 As Langdon Gilkey observes, a drive toward rationality 
characterises Roman Catholic understanding o f the Christian mystery whence it is 
incumbent upon a theory o f Catholic education to seek to integrate both philosophical 
principle and theological conviction into its deliberations.37 Nevertheless, it is probably 
the case that this too is an area that merits further investigation.
This dissertation has been completed in the light o f  McLaughlin's view (supported by 
Carr, D 5 Souza, Haldane, Pring, Williams and many others) that Catholic philosophy o f  
education is not to be identified with ‘philosophy o f  Catholic education5, which it is
* 38understood amounts to a more total and all-embracing ‘theory o f  Catholic education5. 
Catholic philosophy o f  education, ‘derived from the philosophical resources o f notable 
Catholic thinkers5, but ‘addressing directly matters o f  current educational concern5, is a 
distinctively Catholic study that can ‘sit alongside5 accounts derived from other sources 
(for example, idealism, realism, Marxism, and so on), as it seeks to ‘illuminate the 
nature and role o f  education as such5, thereby providing both the Catholic educational 
community and philosophy o f education at large with an important resource.39 Study o f  
the ‘theory o f  Catholic education5 would amount to a far more comprehensive and 
integrated type o f  discussion than it has been possible to present here. It would be 
crucial to identify the precise role Catholic philosophy o f education might play in such 
an over-arching theory, and to indicate what particular benefit might be expected to be
36 Fides et Ratio, Introduction.
37 Langdon Gilkey, Catholicism Confronts Modernity: A Protestant View, New York: Seabury Press, 
1975, pp. 17-18, 20-22.
38 “The Distinctiveness of Catholic Education”, p. 139.
39 Ibid., p. 139.
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gained from its inclusion, as well also as considering how philosophy and the many 
other contributing studies to the elaboration o f such a theory might be integrated.
In this dissertation I have been attempting to do here no more than Frederick Crowe 
tells us was Lonergan's own recommended formula for doctoral students writing a 
dissertation, namely, that they should address ‘a quite manageably small question to a 
thinker o f  stature5. 40 The ‘thinker o f  stature5 will ‘stretch5 the student's mind; a 
question that is ‘manageably small5 can introduce the candidate to the scholar's work. 
Thus, insight may be gained into the question without it being necessary to rehearse the 
whole o f  the massive and often complex corpus o f  thought o f the scholar in question. I 
have turned to three Catholic scholars o f  stature to ask them how they might conceive 
the task o f  the re-articulation o f Catholic philosophy o f  education for our times, and by 
what means might they consider this goal is best approached. At best I have hoped for a 
set o f  philosophical principles to emerge from their work that might be capable o f  
engaging in dialogue with the Catholic tradition o f  educational thought.
McLaughlin's wish for a well-articulated Catholic philosophy o f  education awaits 
fulfilment. A study such as my own would be greatly honoured if  it were judged to be 
making some minor contribution to an understanding o f  what is involved in the 
achievement o f  a re-articulation o f Catholic philosophy o f education. In its focus on 
philosophical concerns, it is an acknowledgment o f  the need to be able to clarify and 
justify the kind o f  educational policies that might be derived from the visionary CCE 
discourse, such as the integral formation o f  the human person and the positive 
appreciation o f  pluralism and diversity o f  culture, but based on principles that do not 
necessarily require a specific religious faith. The challenge that faces Catholic 
philosophers o f  education is similar to that described by Joseph Koterski in relation to 
the use o f  philosophical principles in Catholic social thought.41 They must seek to 
transpose traditional Catholic educational thought into a body o f principle, which might 
be recognised as true by all people o f good will on the basis o f  our common humanity, 
even if  our deepest reason for holding these principles is religious in character. It is 
surely a worthwhile undertaking, but one which is far from complete.
40 Lonergan, p. 47.
41 Joseph W. Koterski, “The Use of Philosophical Principles in Catholic Social Thought”, p. 280.
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